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Zusammenfassung
Die Verbreitung von Service-orientierten Architekturen in den letzten Jahren hat ei-
ne wichtige Klasse von anspruchsvollen und verteilten Anwendungen hervorgebracht
welche auf der Idee beruhen, mehrere und einfache Dienste in ein komplexes, zusam-
menhängendes Ganzes zu kombinieren. Solche Anwendungen, die sich über mehrere
Service-Aufrufe erstrecken, können am effektivsten mit der Hilfe von Workflows um-
gesetzt werden. Wenn es um die Hochleistungsausführung von Workflows geht, ist die
Verteilung (Hochskalierung) von Diensten ein Schlüsselkonzept und auch eine gegebe-
ner Vorteil des Workflow-Paradigmas. Konkret bedeutet das, dass sowohl die beinhal-
teten Dienste des Workflows als auch die Dienste des Systems, welches ihre Aufrufe
verwaltet, auf eine Menge von Rechenknoten verteilt werden müssen. In einem breiten
Spektrum von Anwendungen die Heterogenität der umfassten Rechenknoten nach sich
ziehen, z.B. im modernen Notfallmanagement, sind Aufrufe von optimalen Dienstin-
stanzen sowie deren Zuverlässigkeit Grundvoraussetzungen des verteilten Workflow-
Managements.
Das Hauptaugenmerk der Arbeit ist ein formales Modell, welches die verteilte (d.h.
skalierbare) Ausführung von Workflows definiert. Um dieses Modell auf neuartige Wei-
se um Zuverlässigkeit zu erweitern, ohne die Skalierbarkeit der Ausführung negativ zu
beeinflussen, wird der Systemdienst “Safety-Ring” vorgestellt. Die Idee hinter Safety-
Ring ist die Wiederherstellung einer Vielzahl von Knotenausfällen, welche aktive Diens-
te von laufenden Workflows beherbergen. Zu diesem Zweck bietet Safety-Ring einen
skalierbaren, zuverlässigen und konsistenten Datenspeicher, der für die Speicherung
von Workflow-Ausführungszuständen verwendet wird. Der neuartige Wiederherstel-
lungsmechanismus von Knotenausfällen bietet hohe Zuverlässigkeit, so dass er auch für
die Knoten, welche den Safety-Ring-Dienst selbst anbieten, angewendet werden kann.
Deshalb nennen wir den Safety-Ring “selbstheilend”.
Um das zuverlässige (und verteilte) Ausführungsmodell (durch Safety-Ring erwei-
tert) auf heterogene Knotenumgebungen, die überwiegend aus mobilen Geräten zu-
sammengesetzt sind, anzuwenden, führt diese Arbeit das Compass Datenzugriffsproto-
koll ein. Bei der Bereitstellung der skalierbaren Datensuche für seine verwalteten Daten
setzt Safety-Ring stabile Laufzeitcharakteristiken des Netzes voraus. Somit optimiert
Safety-Ring implizit die Anzahl der abgefragten Knoten. Insbesondere bei mobilen An-
wendungen, bei denen sich die Netzwerkverbindungen der Knoten dynamisch verän-
dern, sollte das Datenzugriffsprotokoll bei der Datensuche auf eine Verringerung der
Latenz anstatt der Anzahl der abgefragten Knoten zielen. Kompass führt latenzoptima-
le Pfade zu jedem Knoten ein, die sich dynamisch an die verändernden Netzwerkei-
genschaften in der Umgebung anpassen. Die Skalierbarkeit der Datensuche von Safety-
Ring wird dabei nicht negativ beeinträchtigt.
Im Falle der Ausweitung des verteilten Ausführungsmodells auf Diensttypen, die
kontinuierlich und zustandsbehaftet sind, wird Zuverlässigkeit von Safety-Ring nicht
gewährleistet. Da solche Diensttypen überwiegend von Geräten mit begrenzten Res-
sourcen angeboten werden, sollten neue Ansätze zur ressourcenschonenden Wieder-
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herstellung von Fehlern der kontinuierlichen Dienste vorgesehen werden. Diese Arbeit
basiert auf bewährten Wiederherstellungstechniken wie dem passiven Standby, um sie
für die Redundanz der kontinuierlichen Zustände zu erweitern und somit die Gesamt-
zuverlässigkeit des Systems zu verbessern. Dabei wird die Redundanz der Zustände
durch ein leichtgewichtiges (bezüglich des Netzwerk-Overheads) Konsistenz-Protokoll
durchgesetzt so dass die Anwendung in Umgebungen mit ressourcenbegrenzten Kno-
ten ermöglicht ist.
Um den Durchsatz der verteilten Workflows zu verbessern, stellt diese Arbeit ein
neuartiges Konzept zur Verteilung der Dienste vor. Das Herzstück unseres Ansatzes
beruht auf dezentralen Controllern, die selbstständig die dynamische Rekonfiguration
der Ausführungsumgebung im Hinblick auf die verfügbaren Dienste vornehmen. Dies
betrifft vor allem den Safety-Ring Dienst sowie alle Anwendungsdienste. Dabei sind
die Ziele der Controller die Vermeidung von Engpässen bei der Workflow-Ausführung
sowie unnötige Dienstverteilungen die Ressourcen verschwenden. Da die Controller
an jedem beliebigen Knoten im System aufgesetzt sind und jeden anderen Knoten im
System beeinflussen können sagen wir, dass das verteilte Ausführungsmodell “selbst-
optimierend” ist.
Schlussendlich bietet diese Arbeit eine Implementierung aller vorgestellten Konzep-
te im Rahmen der verteilten Workflow-Engine OSIRIS sowie ein quantitative Evaluie-
rungen mittels einer Reihe von Experimenten. Die Ergebnisse der Experimente bestäti-
gen den Mehrwert der Konzepte für das verteilte Ausführungsmodell der Workflows.
Abstract
The proliferation of service-oriented architectures in the last decade has brought for-
ward an important class of sophisticated distributed applications that are founded on
the idea of composing multiple simple services into a complex, coherent whole. Such
applications spanning multiple service invocations can be most effectively realized by
means of workflows. When it comes to high performance workflow execution, distribu-
tion (outscaling) of services is a key concept and also a very straightforward advantage
of the workflow paradigm. Concretely, both the constituent services of the workflow
and the system that manages their invocations have to be distributed across an envi-
ronment of computational devices. In a wide spectrum of applications, that entail het-
erogeneity of the encompassed computational devices, e.g., modern emergency man-
agement, invocations of optimal service instances in conjunction to their reliability are
fundamental prerequisites of distributed workflow management.
At the center of this thesis is a formal model that defines the distributed (i.e., scal-
able) execution of workflows. To extend this model for reliability in a novel way, which
does not affect the scalability of execution, the Safety-Ring system service is presented.
The idea behind Safety-Ring is to offer recovery for a wide range of node failures, which
host active services of running workflows. To this end, the Safety-Ring provides a scal-
able, reliable, and consistent data store that is used for the storage of workflow execution
state. The novel failure-recovery mechanism features effective reliability such that can
be applied on the nodes that host the Safety-Ring service themselves, thus we say the
Safety-Ring is self-healing.
To apply the reliable (and distributed) execution model, enhanced by Safety-Ring,
to heterogeneous node environments, that are predominantly composed of mobile de-
vices, this thesis presents the Compass data access protocol. In providing scalable data
lookup for its maintained data, the Safety-Ring assumes network runtime characteris-
tics which are rather stable, and thus Safety-Ring implicitly optimizes for the number of
queried nodes. Especially in mobile applications, where node network connectivity dy-
namically changes, data access protocols should aim at reducing the overall data lookup
latency, rather than the number of queried nodes. Compass introduces latency optimal
paths to each node, which dynamically adapt to changing network characteristics. The
scalable data lookup of Safety-Ring is not affected.
In case distributed execution of workflows spans services of continuous (stateful)
type, their reliability is decoupled from the Safety-Ring. Since such service types are
predominantly featured by devices of limited resources, novel approaches to resource
conservative recovery of failures for continuous services have to be provided. This the-
sis builds on proven recovery techniques, such as passive-standby, so as to enhance
them for redundancy of the continuous state and thus improve the overall reliability of
the system. In doing so the redundancy of state is enforced by means of a lightweight,
in terms of network overhead, consistency protocol which allows for its application in
resource limited node environments.
iv
In order to improve the execution performance of distributed workflows, in terms of
throughput, this thesis offers a novel concept to services distribution. At the heart of our
approach lie decentralized controllers that autonomously perform dynamic reconfigu-
ration of the execution environment in terms of available services. This primarily affects
the Safety-Ring service and all application services. Thereby, the goals of the controllers
are to prevent workflow execution bottlenecks and unnecessary service deployments
that waste resources. Since the controllers are equipped at any node in the system and
can affect any other node of the system we say that the distributed workflow execution
model is self-optimizing.
Finally, all the presented concepts are implemented within the context of the OSIRIS
distributed workflow engine and quantitatively evaluated in a series of experiments.
The results of experiments confirm the benefits of our concepts for the distributed work-
flow execution model.
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1
Introduction
The remarkable price reductions of commodity hardware in the last couple of years
have led to an unprecedented proliferation of computational devices in our every day
lives. Their gradual improvement in computational power along ever increasing adop-
tion of open software standards have made it easily possible to combine such devices
into notable clusters of powerful computational resources at a low cost. As it turns
out such loosely coupled computational environments are perfectly suited for the in-
novation of applications of rather complex functionality. By merging smaller, simpler
and already existing applications offered at a variety of available commodity devices
into a big coherent whole sophisticated applications can be created. The traditional
approaches to handling complex functionality are mainly based on centralized, single
platform and monolithic architecture programs. In general monolithic architecture so-
lutions incur powerful and dedicated supercomputers that are costly to procure and
maintain. Hence, modern innovations and newly added values are based on the idea of
available application integration and have the upper hand over traditional monolithic
architectures.
From a software architecture integration point of view, complex high-level applica-
tions can be achieved by means of Service-oriented architectures (SOA). The Service-
oriented computing [ACKM10, SH05] paradigm abstracts an atomic set of computa-
tional instructions into a self-contained activity or formally application service. The
self-contained activity (i.e., service) is enclosed with open-standard and cross-platform
interfaces that allow for an easy communication over a computer network and thus
integration with other services. In turn, computational devices of any hardware charac-
teristic (in terms of CPU and memory power) and physical location capable of conduct-
ing the underlying computational instructions can offer activities for serving at their
convenience to high-level applications. They merely have to register themselves and
their hosted services conditions to publicly accessible service repositories. Moreover,
the Service-oriented architectures paradigm allows for encapsulation of multiple self-
contained, atomic services into a superordinate complex service with a service interface
that can be invoked as well. The only prerequisite is that the interactions among the
encapsulated atomic services are well defined. Naturally, the superordinate, complex
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services can be further recursively encapsulated by another even more complex, super-
ordinate service and so on.
In order to define interactions among SOA services, in terms of high-level appli-
cation functional and temporal dependencies, workflows [AHK+02] present themselves
as a useful tool. A workflow definition describes the prerequisites, the conditions and
the plan of the necessary SOA service invocations, either atomic or complex, in order
to meet a high-level application functional goal. In turn, the workflow definition plan
is read by a workflow execution engine and is materialized into a workflow instance
that is to represent the high-level application. The workflow engine carries out the sys-
tem functionality in terms of workflow instance execution, by centrally managing all of
its application services in a request-response fashion. Precisely, the engine’s dedicated
orchestration service invokes at runtime the specified application service, receives a re-
sponse from it, and schedules the next application service for invocation provided with
the outcome data of the previous invocation in a step-by-step fashion. This process is
repeated till all integral application services of the workflow definition have been suc-
cessfully invoked.
The introduction of workflow definitions necessitates the explicit distinction be-
tween the services, in terms of their type and role in the context in workflow instance
execution. Precisely, we distinguish between application services and system services:
• Application services. Those correspond to integral functionalities of a high-level
application that are encompassed by some workflow definition. Nodes that are
hosting application services embody the SOA service providers and thus are sub-
ject to invocation by a workflow instance execution engine. Application services
are usually provided by third parties.
• System services. Those correspond to the core functionalities of a workflow execu-
tion engine that is charge of managing (i.e., executing) the invocations of applica-
tion services. An example of a system service would be the workflow instance or-
chestration service. System service enabled nodes embody the workflow instance
execution engine.
Example 1.1
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example workflow definition that is drawn from a high-level
weather forecast application scenario. As the figure shows the sample workflow is com-
posed of a set of five activities, such as the data entry activity, the weather data retrieval
activity, the map retrieval activity, the forecast computation activity and the centralized
orchestration activity. Each of those activities corresponds to a SOA service of differ-
ent type that is hosted at some computational node. Since each of those activities is
different in their semantics it is correspondingly distinguished by a different geomet-
rical shape (i.e., triangle, square, diamond and hexagon) and also maps to a different
service (i.e., illustrated by the orchestrator, cog, weather and globe icons respectively).
Moreover, the individual services differ in their roles in terms of workflow instance ex-
ecution functionality. While the data entry, weather data retrieval, map retrieval and
forecast computation activities map to application services and adhere to the weather
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forecast application functionality the orchestrator activity maps to a system service and
adheres to workflow engine functionality. The functional dependencies among the ap-
plication services are depicted with red thick arrows, representing with the direction
of the arrow the followed-by dependency. For instance, the data input service is fol-
lowed by the weather data retrieval service. Note, that the data input service is also
followed by the geographical map retrieval service at the same time and thus can be
invoked in parallel once the input data service is finished. In turn, the forecast compu-
tation service, is dependent on the results of both mentioned parallel services and thus
its invocation has to wait until both are finished. The functional dependencies among
application services and the system service, i.e., the runtime invocations that are subject
to enforcement by the centralized orchestration service are depicted with the numbered
thin black lines. Thereby, the monotonically increasing numbers on top of the black
lines correspond to the invocation order of the application services by the orchestration
service. The parallel service can be invoked at the same time, hence they posses the
same invocation order number. Finally, the shown example workflow serves only for il-
lustration purposes and shall be further discussed, in terms of runtime execution details
and associated problems in the subsequent chapters.
1.1 SOA Execution Environments
Nothing brings the trend of loosely coupled service integration on top of commodity
hardware more to fruition than the model of Cloud computing [AG10]. In Cloud com-
puting important actors in industry of computing make it their business to offer soft-
ware services and excess resources, in terms of computation and storage, to end-users
for (possibly commercial) utilization. Moreover, the Cloud promises their adopters re-
source quantities that are sheer unlimited on a pay-as-you-go model at affordable prices.
Monetary flexibility and unprecedented resource availability incites the end-users to
deploy ever increasing amounts of the most diverse applications into the Cloud which
inevitability pushes their integration even further into more complex and coherent enti-
ties. Given the resulting high degree of diversity of end-user applications of the Cloud,
integration can only be achieved by means of cross-platform, open-standard and loosely
coupled integration means such as Service-oriented architectures. In fact, the services
offered by the Cloud providers themselves are based on SOA so as to reach the biggest
possible spectrum of users.
All offered services, such as storage, messaging etc. and computation XaaS (i.e, X as
a service) are predominantly powered by commodity hardware. In order to provide the
guaranteed availability of the services at any time, even in the presence of overwhelm-
ing end-user workload, Cloud computing necessitates gradual computational cluster
expansion by adding new commodity devices to it. Thereby, the newly added devices
can span the widest possible geographical regions so as to improve responsiveness to
the end-user and do not have to be located within the same physical cluster. Moreover,
the new devices usually feature upgraded performance characteristics, in terms of hard-
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Figure 1.1: Workflow execution
ware, and can possibly be equipped with new software features that rely on SOA based
integration with legacy software and applications.
Since Cloud computing merely stands for SOA enclosed and publicly available com-
putational resources that are advertised by means of the vague Cloud term, the spectrum
of its manifestations can be very broad. The extent of it can encompass thereby every-
thing from small public computer clusters to huge privately owned data centers. For in-
stance, academic institutes may provide public clusters for research purposes whereas
commercial Cloud providers1 may offer their data centers for commercial utilization
purposes.
Form an end-user point of view, the CaaS (i.e., Computation as a Service) enclosed
resources are offered in the form of prefabricated virtualized computational devices.
Virtual computational devices emulate real ones with the benefit of being instantiable
on-demand to theoretically unlimited numbers. This means that the end-user is agnostic
to the underlying computational infrastructure and has to deal only with its own virtual
devices. This allows them to focus only on things that matter such as application devel-
opment. Moreover, by deploying the SOA backed applications onto the virtual devices
new instances of them can be instantiated on demand, increasing thereby the applica-
tion service quantities and thus availability. In practice, scalability of virtual devices, as
it is called in Cloud computing terms, is narrowed down by the fixed price tag which is
always associated to each virtual instance. Note, that Cloud computing usually implies
many more resources as a service such as storage, messaging – XaaS – etc., however we
limit ourselves in our work only to virtual devices.
1Amazon Web Services, Google App Engine, Microsoft Azure etc.
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The result of the SOA fostered application deployments to the Cloud and their con-
sequent integrations is a high degree application diversity, which might imply the most
complex interaction scenarios. For instance, complex application interaction scenarios
might even span devices which are outside of the scope of the controlled execution
environment, such as the Cloud. That is, some applications might even rely on data
or computations which are stemming from external devices, such as laptops, mobile
smartphones, wearable sensors etc. The benefit behind SOA is that external devices can
be seamlessly integrated into the Cloud based applications if they adhere to the SOA
paradigm by offering computational or data resources as services.
Hence, Service-oriented architectures play an important role in bringing applications
together, both for end-users as well as for Cloud computing providers. In the former
case SOA enables application evolution by integrating diverse applications. In the latter
case SOA enables application proliferation by providing the necessary means. By the
same token, workflow orchestration can become a service of the Cloud itself, which
subsumes all the necessary functionalities so as to manage the execution of workflow
instances. This is in particular applied in the business domain, where it is referred
to as Business Process Management as a Service (BPaaS) [SJV+15], and it enables the
companies to dynamically expand their business models on a cost efficient and pay-
per-use pricing model.
The consequence of applying SOA however is, that high-level applications usually
incur a wide spectrum of computational devices, in terms of their hardware character-
istics and hosted services, on the system that is charge of managing their execution, i.e.,
the workflow engine.
1.2 Distributed Workflow Execution
The spectrum of computational devices, a workflow engine has to face at runtime, can
range from a potentially unlimited number of Cloud virtual devices to very few com-
modity and mobile ones. Thereby, the heterogeneity of the computational devices is
usually abstracted from the workflow engine behind the services that are hosted at
them. Service level agreements (SLAs), abstract representations of the service execution
characteristics, usually reflect the host’s hardware performance characteristics. Aggre-
gated at the workflow engine, SLAs enable it to select services over others at orchestra-
tion time.
In the long run however, the centralized management of a virtually unlimited num-
ber of services at the workflow engine, hosted at a virtually unlimited number of het-
erogeneous computational devices (e.g., such as in the Cloud) for a virtually unlimited
number of high-level applications puts the workflow engine into performance and re-
liability issues. In other words, a centralized workflow engine tends to become a per-
formance bottleneck and singe-point-of-failure [Doo09]. Therefore, novel concepts to work-
flow management that addresses device heterogeneity in a salable fashion have to be
introduced in the context of SOA based Cloud applications.
Workflow execution that stands out with high performance characteristics, in terms
of the number of workflow instances it can concurrently run, inevitably entails distri-
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bution concepts. If all specified application services of a workflow definition are redun-
dantly distributed to the biggest possible extent of computational devices the system
performance should benefit as a whole. By offering application services of the same
type at more than one computational node, load balancing among them can be facili-
tated, by directing the invocations towards the best providers, in terms of workload uti-
lization, available resources, physical proximity etc. As consequence, workflow execu-
tion instances should be optimally distributed among the service providers and system
performance should increase. In the context of Cloud computing service distribution
is effortlessly facilitated as new devices with the necessary service type can easily be
added due to the unlimited resources of the Cloud platform.
Although application services are intrinsically distributed this is not always neces-
sarily the case for workflow engine system services. The example workflow shown in
Figure 1.1 highlights the problems of the centralized workflow management approach.
As Figure 1.1 depicts the orchestration system service is centrally located only on one
device and is thus always involved in all steps (i.e., numbered thin black arrows) of the
workflow execution. On the other hand, all the other nodes participate to the execution
of the workflows only when needed, that is only when their locally available application
service is actually invoked. In case the orchestration service is confronted with numer-
ous workflow instances and numerous application service providers to keep track of, its
capability to carry out application service invocations will solely depend on its underly-
ing hardware (i.e., CPU, bandwidth and memory) characteristics. Overloaded devices,
in terms of workflow instances, offering the orchestration service will have to queue ex-
cess workflow execution enactment requests. As a result the performance of the system
should degrade as a whole independent of the distribution degree of the application
services.
The distribution of system services is only possible if it is accompanied with effi-
cient management of data. In the course of a workflow definition execution among the
encompassed distributed application services, data have to be exchanged. The results
of one application service invocation are used as the input of another service instance
invocation and so on. In the traditional sense of distributed workflow definition exe-
cution (Figure 1.1) all data exchange among application services has to go through the
orchestrator node. At runtime, the orchestrator invokes an application service, collects
the resulting data and exploits it for the subsequent application service invocation. As
a consequence, all execution related data has to be stored intermediately at the orches-
trator node itself. However, the more workflow definitions there are running in the sys-
tem the more data associated to it exists that needs to be managed. Given the increase
of concurrently running workflow definition instances, efficient means of intermediate
data storage, in terms of access times, are essential. The most common way of achieving
data access efficiency is of course by means of distribution of data among environment
nodes.
Therefore, by employing the concept of a high degree distribution to services – both
application and system – and data, produced as a result of their interaction, a high
performance SOA based workflow management can be expected.
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1.3 Problem Statement
Given the three aspects of distribution to workflow engines, namely application service,
execution control, and data, distribution of it can be in a traditional sense facilitated in
two ways. Either redundant and dedicated system service nodes are introduced into the
environment or already existing application service providers are partially equipped
with workflow engine functionality. With respect to the distribution aspects we dis-
tinguish between four different classes of workflow engines as follows: traditional en-
gines, centralized engines and redundant engines. Figure 1.2 illustrates the traditional
approaches to workflow engine distribution in terms of the three distribution aspects.
• First as a reference point we introduce the traditional workflow management sys-
tems (Enterprise service bus - ESB [Cha04]). Such systems feature simple distri-
bution concepts by encompassing the invocation of distributed application ser-
vices at the price of centralized execution control and corresponding data man-
agement. Moreover, local distribution concepts, in terms of the number of orches-
trator nodes. Overload, in terms of numerous concurrent workflow definition
instances, are addressed with multiple instances of the orchestration service at
the same centralized node. The redundant instantiation of system services across
the same node is referred to as vertical distribution. As consequence, bottleneck
performance characteristics are exhibited eventually. To alleviate the bottleneck
characteristics either the control over or the data over the execution is distributed
from the traditional workflow management systems.
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• Centralized engines [LYE+11] feature next to vertical distribution of system ser-
vices also the distribution of data among nodes. Precisely, data management
functionalities are outsourced from the orchestrator nodes to scalable distributed
systems such as distributed databases or distributed file systems. Distributed
data management systems feature a redundant instantiation of system services, in
terms of data management, across a set of nodes which is referred to as horizontal
distribution. Preferably, the distributed data management systems functionalities
are featured by the application service hosts themselves. In turn, the orchestrator
continue to centrally control the execution by instructing the application services
to the data locations within the distributed data management systems. With this
approach, bottleneck performance characteristics still prevail, however with re-
spect to orchestration functionality of workflow definition instances only. Data
management does not affect the performance any more.
• On the other hand, distribution of the execution control can also help to reduce
the bottleneck characteristics of traditional systems. By horizontally distributing
( [KBG+10]) the orchestration system service across a set of dedicated nodes the
workload, in terms workflow definition instance orchestration, can be divided.
To distribute all pending workflow instances among the redundant orchestrator
nodes the most straightforward approach is to offer a global database that stores
all pending instances. This database is queried by the available orchestrator nodes
at runtime. Usually, the database has to be centrally managed so as to facilitate
concurrency control among the orchestrator nodes. As a consequence, perfor-
mance bottlenecks still prevail due to the centralized management of the database.
In the context of Cloud environments, applicability of established approaches to
workflow management are questionable. On one hand, we have the centralized bot-
tleneck characteristics. On the other hand, established approaches tend to incur addi-
tional costs on the end-user. Namely, each horizontally distributed system service node
in the Cloud is associated with a fixed price tag independent of their runtime operating
utilization. Suboptimal horizontal distribution results in higher cost eventually. For in-
stance, in case of a high workload, in terms of concurrently running workflow instances,
in system, additional nodes have to be spawned by the Cloud so as to accommodate it.
Whenever this workload drops the additionally introduced system service nodes be-
come underutilized. Hence, unnecessary costs are burdened on the end-users since
the reduced workload can be effectively managed with fewer orchestrators. To over-
come this problem, system service distribution needs to be powered by sophisticated
and utilization-based allocation strategies. Optimal system service allocation strategies
can only be applied by a centralized entity, i.e., a load-balancer. Hence, centrality of
the established approaches is further increased and thus its inapplicability to scalable
domains.
Example 1.2
Figure 1.3 illustrates such an example of the traditional orchestrator node service invo-
cation. Precisely, Figure 1.3 shows a traditional load balancing enabled node (i.e., node
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Figure 1.3: Traditional approaches to orchestration of application service invocations
id2 A), three redundantly dedicated orchestration system service enabled nodes (i.e.,
node ids B through D) and two distinct clusters (i.e., node ids E through H for the first
cluster and node ids I through L for the second cluster) of application service hosting
nodes. The interaction order among the various participants of this setting is depicted
with thin black lines and with thick green lines. Thereby, the thin black lines correspond
to the order of application service invocations whereas the thick green lines correspond
to the order of orchestrator workflow instance assignments. The exact interaction se-
quence is depicted with a lettered white circle. Moreover, the workflow definition is
depicted that consists of four activities, i.e., a heat map computation activity (the three
layer icon), a map retrieval activity (the globe icon), the weather forecast activity (the
cloud and sun icon) and the coordinates location activity (the blue dot on the map icon).
The activities themselves are organized into four invocation steps. As the picture shows
a workflow definition is inserted into the load-balancer whose instance is immediately
forwarded in a load-balanced fashion to the orchestrator C for execution. The orches-
trator enacts the execution of the workflow instance by first invoking the application
service (i.e., step 3) at node F. Once node F has finished serving the invocation request
the services at nodes I and J are invoked (i.e., step 4) in parallel. Finally, the last remain-
ing step of the workflow definition is executed by invoking (i.e., step 5) the service at
node K. In the meantime, the orchestrator nodes B and D have not been utilized at all,
thus creating unnecessary costs on the end-user.
2All nodes are distinctly represented with a node identifier letter that is enclosed within a white pen-
tagon geometrical shape.
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As Figure 1.2 suggests, the horizontal distribution of workflow definition manage-
ment systems in the traditional sense is always subject to a trade-off between centrality
of data or centrality of execution control. Given this centrality trade-off, bottlenecks
should always prevail in case the traditional engines are faced with extreme scale work-
flow definition instance numbers. An engine that is to be considered ideal has to over-
come this trade-off. That is an ideal workflow engine has to feature a high degree of
distribution both in terms of data management and execution control. As Figure 1.2
suggests with the red dot, distributed data management and execution control func-
tionalities have to be fused at the same time by the ideal engine. In other words, the
redundant and dedicated orchestrator nodes have to additionally feature distributed
data management functionalities. Thereby, the bigger the set of nodes that are equipped
with the ideal workflow engine the better the performances should be, w.r.t. workflow
definition instance numbers.
To reach the widest possible base of nodes for our ideal workflow engine the appli-
cation service providers can be exploited. If the application service providers were to be
enriched with workflow engine functionalities issues of centralized management could
be effectively avoided. For starters, by vertically distributing system functionalities to
them the resources of the service hosting nodes could be better utilized. For instance,
workflow instance orchestration or data management can be performed while not serv-
ing application service invocation requests. In the context of the Cloud, this implies
offloading of orchestration workload to underutilized existing service providers and
thus saved costs, in terms of avoided additional node instantiations. Moreover, since
the application service numbers of an environment are usually very high, the workflow
engine would posses a wide base for the distribution of workflow definition instances
even at extreme scale.
The enrichment of application service providers with fused system functionalities
(i.e., orchestration and data storage) is however accompanied with increased node site
management complexity, in terms of data management, reliability and service hetero-
geneity. Hence, novel concepts to distributed workflow management are necessary, in
terms of an ideal engine.
Distributed Data Management
In order for any application service provider to be able of perform system services
necessary metadata that powers them has to be available at all times. In the case of
the orchestration service this is data on the execution environment, in terms of service
providers, their hosted services, hardware characteristics, current load, physical prox-
imity etc. Given the constantly changing characteristics of the underlying execution
environment, in terms of existing devices, their available resources, their workload etc.,
the latest (i.e., correct) data on it has to be always accessible at runtime at all orchestra-
tors. Stale and inaccessible metadata implies false orchestration decisions (e.g., service
invocations on wrong nodes) and results in bad workflow instance execution perfor-
mance. Moreover, orchestrators have to be provided only with the most necessary data
if suboptimal resource consumption (i.e., storage) is to be avoided.
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Traditional dedicated orchestrator node approaches only partially meet these re-
quirements. By relying only on the load-balancer to interact with other participants,
dedicated orchestrator nodes are inclined to aggregate metadata on the whole execu-
tion environment. This is not always feasible, in particular in the Cloud context. Due to
unlimited resources of the Cloud vast numbers of application service providers can be
spawned. Flooding the orchestrator nodes with data on all possible service providers
of a scalable execution environment would result in early (e.g., storage) and unneces-
sary (e.g., CPU to manage all the data) resource depletion in the long run and cause a
series of resulting problems. For instance, dedicated orchestrator service devices could
not possess adequate local storage to manage all service providers, or devices could not
possess adequate computational resources to process the incoming flood of data up-
dates. As a consequence, orchestration nodes would be predominately occupied with
managing data instead of orchestrating service invocations which implies overall bad
workflow instance execution performance.
Example 1.3
Figure 1.4 illustrates an example of the traditional orchestrator node management of
data. As in the previous example the same setting is show, in terms of the participat-
ing nodes and their hosted services. The only difference lies in the exact application
services that are hosted, however this difference is not of significance to this example.
Since orchestrator nodes are only observed in the context of data management they are
not managing invocations of application services and are merely storing metadata (i.e.,
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depicted with the database icon) on the execution environment. Likewise, application
service hosts are only publishing their current state to the orchestrator nodes and are
grouped together (i.e., depicted with the different colored boxes) with other devices of
the same application service type. Moreover, the flow of metadata items, in terms of
thick arrows, can be observed that is directed from the application service clusters to-
wards the orchestrator nodes. Thereby, the amount of data (i.e., shown by number of
arrows) and the origin of the data (i.e., shown by the cluster corresponding color) can
differ. As the figure shows all orchestrator nodes are receiving metadata on node clus-
ters, at which some are receiving more than the others. That is, the orchestrator nodes
with the identifiers C and D are receiving data on both node clusters, whereas the or-
chestrator with the identifier A is only on one cluster since A is currently not aware of
the other cluster. As the consequence, C and D are overloaded (reddish color of the
database icon) with managing the incoming data whereas orchestrator with the id A is
not
Therefore, distributing the orchestration service to devices that provide application
service at the same time requires sophisticated data management concepts that guaran-
tee freshness of data which allows for an optimal workflow instance orchestration.
Execution Environment Heterogeneity
Given the high degree of device heterogeneity that SOA application inevitably entail,
deployments of services – both application and system – to them that are either random
or static can additionally affect the distributed management of workflow instances. For
instance, distribution of system services to external computational devices, such as for
example in the context of complex interaction high-level application scenarios, which
are characterized by instability and limited resources, might severely affect the exe-
cution performance of workflow instances. Orchestration performance of inappropri-
ately deployed system services are likely to exhibit bad response times. For instance,
is resource limited mobile devices are equipped with data/computationally intensive
application services they will become overloaded with the service tasks and probably
cause failures of their hosting devices due to excessive resource consumption and con-
sequent early depletion. Such devices favor are rather suitable for services which are
conservative on the local resources, and feature very limited functionality. For exam-
ple, streaming services offer resource conservative utilization of local resources (i.e., in
particular storage) and should be allowed on mobile devices only.
On the other hand, deployment of resource undemanding services to resource abun-
dant devices, such as for example in the context of Cloud device instantiations, affects
the execution of workflow instances as well. Orchestration decisions of such devices
are likely to result in excellent response times, but at the expense of poor device utiliza-
tion, which in the Cloud context results in unnecessary costs to their customers. That
is, such devices are likely to spend most of the time underutilized (e.g., in idle state),
creating additional expenses to their users as they are associated with a fixed price tag.
Suboptimal service deployments manifest themselves particularly when huge numbers
of corresponding workflow instances are run against them. Precisely, suboptimal ser-
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Figure 1.5: Traditional approaches of service deployments to heterogeneous environ-
ments
vice deployments perform like performance bottlenecks when a big number of service
invocations are issued at them by queuing the excess ones.
Traditional approaches to service deployment at devices are based on static config-
urations. This implies, that services, independent on their type, are deployed statically
only at the start-up of the device according to some high-level application strategy. At
doing so the constantly changing characteristics of the underlying execution environ-
ment, in terms of available hardware, software resources, are completely disregarded.
In the context of the Cloud, such an approach is not applicable as it reflect in unnec-
essary costs on the end-users. Static addition of on-demand services is usually based
on instantiations of new hosting computational devices, which are naturally associated
with prices.
Example 1.4
Figure 1.5 illustrates such an example of the traditional service distribution. As in the
previous example the figure shows a traditional load-balancer (i.e., node id A), three
dedicated orchestrator nodes (i.e., nodes B through D) and various application service
providers (i.e., nodes E through N). However, unlike the previous two examples the ex-
ecution environment of this one is slightly more complex, in terms of the node execution
environment heterogeneity. In this setting we have overall 14 nodes of different origin,
different device types and different hosted application services. While nodes C, E, F, I
and J are devices which are located in some third party Cloud, the nodes D, G, H, K and
L are nodes that are located inside some external grid. Nodes A, B, M and N are located
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in some external execution environment. In terms of device types nodes C, E, F, I and J
feature powerful mainframes. Nodes A, D and M feature high-end stationary desktop
devices, whereas nodes B, H and K standard mobile laptop devices. Finally, nodes G
and L feature low-end mobile devices. The application services are distributed among
the nodes manually. The interaction order among the various participants of this set-
ting is depicted with thin black lines and with thick green lines that can be also dashed.
The semantics of the lines are the same as in Figure 1.3. The dashed versions of the
thin black lines as well as the thick green lines correspond to failure recovery or load
balancing actions, respectively. However, as we can see in this figure, nodes that are
featuring low performance devices are overloaded in case they are hosting resource de-
manding services. These kind of situations may happen due to manual deployment of
services by unaware (untrained) individuals, in terms of expected execution workload
characteristics. For instance, the node B features an external laptop that has been man-
ually equipped with the orchestration system service. Since the workflow instance, that
has been assigned to it by the load-balancer, requires multiple service invocations (i.e.,
interactions 2, 3 and 4) it is quickly brought to its limits as the laptop only features low
performance characteristics. Likewise, the load-balancer (i.e., node A) is overloaded it-
self due to its featured desktop device that is not powerful enough to manage all orches-
trator nodes and all workflow instances on time. As a consequence, the inadequately
equipped nodes tend to become performance bottlenecks, hence the red color of their
corresponding computational devices. In case of the node B load balancing is performed
by sending a new workflow instance (i.e., interaction 6) to another orchestrator node.
That is why distributed workflow management has to take the dynamic heterogene-
ity of devices into account while introducing services to it. Service deployments should
be part of a constantly ongoing and dynamic process that moves highly requested ser-
vices to already existing resource abundant devices and vice-versa. This way execution
bottlenecks, unnecessary costs, potential failures can be avoided and thus the overall
system performance, in terms of running workflow instances, improved.
Reliability
The application of high degree service distribution in environments of very high com-
putational devices numbers can be affected at runtime by failures. No matter how reli-
able individually, bigger computational environments eventually exceed the mean time
between failures 3. As a result, service invocations and orchestrations are likely to fail
due to individual computational device crashes or outages. Moreover, if the computa-
tional environment is additionally extended to heterogeneous environments that con-
tain mobile, wearable and resource limited devices failures are much more likely. Such
devices may suffer from external damage or get out communication range in face of mo-
bility. Given the runtime dynamics heterogeneous environments, static deployments of
service types are likely to cause overload at some mobile devices and bring them to
failure caused by resource depletion.
3Mean time between failures (MTBF) is the predicted elapsed time between inherent failures of a
system during operation [Jon87]
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Figure 1.6: Traditional approaches to recovery of failed system and application services
nodes.
In the event of node failures, the severity of the effects may differ depending of cur-
rent context of the failed device. In case the failed device was only serving invocation
requests from the orchestrator nodes at the time of the failure the significance on the
overall workflow execution is not that high. Failed service hosts can be easily detected
by orchestrator nodes by means of simple failure detection algorithms (e.g., periodic
heartbeats) and replaced with other service providers of the same type for future refer-
ence.
On the other hand, if the failed device was enacting an orchestrator at the same time
the consequences on the execution of workflows are far more severe. In such scenarios,
the workflow instances currently managed by the failed orchestrator cease to exist as
their execution state located at the orchestrator is lost along with it. In general, the
recovery of orchestration nodes is far more challenging, as the lost workflow instances
have be restored to the exact moment of failure. This is in particular difficult, if parallel
invocations of one workflow stemming from the failed orchestrator have to be joined.
In such situations all service providers that have been invoked in parallel have to join
their results on one substitution orchestrator. The difficulty thereby lies in unanimously
determining the most appropriate one out of a potentially huge collection of them in
instant time.
The difficulties also apply to failed devices that are serving long running service in-
vocation, such as streaming services, and thus feature an internal state. Also for stateful
services, the lost state has to be restored to the exact moment of failure. This implies that
along with state, the streaming data elements that caused it have to be restored as well.
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Even if a single data element is lost, the lost state might never be recovered. The chal-
lenge behind the recovery of stateful services lies in the fact that storing a continuous
flow of data is physically not feasible. Especially the resource limited (mobile) devices
can not afford to store a continuous flow of data. The state and selected parts of the
continuous data flow could be stored at the orchestrator nodes but they are subject to
failure themselves.
Traditional approaches to application service provider and orchestrator recovery fo-
cus solely on individual service role failures (e.g., application service provider failures)
and entail significant overheads, in terms of data storage or computation (i.e., service)
redundancy. In the presence of device failures established fault-tolerance mechanisms
rely on redundancy of data that reflects workflow execution state or application service
state so as to guarantee system availability. The redundancy of data is carried out with
timely replication to stable backup sites. The backup sites are either tightly coupled to
the orchestrator or organized at devices that feature the same services as well. In any
case the assumption is made that the redundant backup sites are stable and thus imper-
vious to failure. However, this assumption cannot hold in scalable environments, due
to the mean time between failures of nodes, or in heterogeneous environments, that
are composed of resource limited devices. In the long run, the approach of excessive
data redundancy is associated with scalability problems w.r.t. the number of running
workflow instances. In case the orchestrator serve as backup sites, the computational
and storage effort of redundantly preserving huge quantities of workflow instance state
reduces their capacity to process service invocations and thus system performance. In
case the resource limited service providers serve as backup site themselves, excessive
replication overhead reduces the amount of available resources so as to conduct long
running execution. On the other hand, if inadequate data redundancy is provided, the
system might not be capable of recovering from failures by substituting the failed invo-
cations when the number of failures outweighs the number of replicas.
Example 1.5
Figure 1.6 illustrates such an example of the traditional node failure recovery mech-
anism. In this example the same execution environment setting as in Figure 1.5 is
used, i.e., the traditional load-balancer (i.e., node A), three dedicated orchestrators (i.e.,
nodes B through D) and the cluster of heterogeneous nodes E − N of application ser-
vice providers are shown. Since orchestrator nodes for this example are only observed
in the context of workflow instance execution failure-recovery they are managing in-
vocations of application services. Much like in the previous example the interaction
among the nodes, in terms of invocation orchestration and workflow instance load bal-
ancing, is displayed in the same way by means of thin black lines and thick green lines.
The dashed versions of lines correspond to failure recovery actions. In contrast to Fig-
ure 1.5, we assume here that the weather application service maintains state and thus
streams data.
As this figure shows the orchestrator at node C continuous the orchestration of the
workflow instance, once the original orchestrator at node B fails. That is, orchestrator
C resumes the invocation at step 5 by invoking the map service at node I. To this end
the orchestrator C has to share the execution state of orchestrator at B at all times. The
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subsequent failure of the service at node I can be recovered by the orchestrator (i.e.,
C) at a node of the same hosted service type – node J at dashed step 6. The workflow
execution state is located as a backup at it, thus it is capable of doing so. In case or-
chestrator C becomes overloaded due to overall extensive backup state management,
the load balancer has to redirect the workflow execution to node D (i.e., at step 7) which
orchestrates the other steps and resumes recovery responsibilities. For example, at step
10 when the streaming service at node L fails.
As we can see from this example, an orchestrator has to maintain an abundance of
data, in terms of workflow execution state and streaming services state, so as to be able
to recover all possible failure scenarios. This state has to be shared (i.e., replicated) with
the other orchestrator nodes but also with the load balancer. This tends to overload it in
face of voluminous data in the long run. In turn, the load balancer has to be additionally
outfitted with orchestrator recovery functionality which further increases its bottleneck
(hence the red color) and single-point-of-failure characteristics.
Therefore, novel concepts to fault-tolerance are needed that can cope with the ever
increasing number of running workflow instances. Thereby, is should seek to provide
a high degree of robustness but not at the price of excessive resource consumption and
performance degradation. An ideal solution should exploit the good characteristics of
the underlying execution environment such as abundance of backup nodes candidates
so as to distribute the recovery overhead.
1.4 Thesis Contributions
To address the challenges of distributed workflow management as discussed in the pre-
vious section this thesis offers the following contributions:
• A formal system model that describes the execution of workflows in a distributed
setting. The model defines workflows w.r.t. to their structure and their runtime
behavior. It captures the constitutional parts of a workflow into discrete and con-
tinuous services. Moreover, the model defines system services that manage the
distributed execution of workflows and considers the distributed environments
for which the system services are applicable.
• A novel concept to reliable distributed workflow execution that tackles the prob-
lem of node failure recovery in a scalable fashion. In particular the Safety-Ring
system service is provided that offers failure-handling for a wide range of node
failures, which host active discrete services of running workflows. The Safety-
Ring service offers self-organization and self-healing features such that it provides
reliability for itself while supporting scalable execution of workflows at the same
time. The Safety-Ring service is implemented on top of the OSIRIS distributed
workflow engine and its impact validated with empirical performance evalua-
tions.
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• An efficient data access protocol for the Safety-Ring system service – Compass.
The Compass protocol aims at optimizing for the latency among nodes while pro-
viding access to data in the Safety-Ring. Combined with Compass, the Safety-Ring
service is made applicable even for the most heterogeneous of node environments.
The Compass protocol is implemented on top of the Safety-Ring and its impact
validated with empirical performance evaluations.
• An enhanced recovery protocol for continuous service types – redundant passive-
standby. Building on top of existing recovery mechanisms, such as passive-
standby, it increases the redundancy of service state so as to improve the robust-
ness of continuous services to node failures. In doing so the redundant state is en-
forced with a data consistency protocol such that correct recovery can be provided
at all times. The data consistency protocol is lightweight, in terms of bandwidth
overhead, which allows its application to resource limited node environments.
The redundant passive-standby protocol is implemented on top of the OSIRIS dis-
tributed workflow engine and its impact validated with empirical performance
evaluations.
• A novel concept to distributed workflow execution optimization that tackles the
problem of static service distribution. At the heart of our approach lie decen-
tralized controllers that autonomously perform dynamic deployments of services
with the goal of improving the throughput of workflows in the system. Thereby,
the controllers focus on application services and the Safety-Ring system service.
The dynamic deployment of application services is implemented on top of the
OSIRIS distributed workflow engine and its impact validated with empirical per-
formance evaluations.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The composition of this thesis consists of nine chapters. The first two chapters, i.e., this
chapter and Chapter 2, focus on introducing the research field of workflows. In doing
so Chapter 1 and 2 discuss the difficulties of workflow management in distributed set-
tings and elicit the contributions of this thesis. A detailed elaboration of the difficulties
w.r.t. distributed workflow execution are presented in Chapter 2 where the workflows
are applied to a highly dynamic heterogeneous environment, in the context of modern
emergency management scenario. Chapter 3 provides detailed discussion of funda-
mental distributed data management concepts of which this thesis is based. Chapter
4 introduces the formal system model in the context of distributed workflow execu-
tion. Chapter 5 covers the conceptual contributions of this thesis. It discusses the novel
self-healing workflow execution model in terms of discrete and continuous service fail-
ures. It discusses the Safety-Ring system service, its Compass extension and redundant
passive-standby. The self-optimizing workflow execution model that features dynamic
deployment of services is discussed in this chapter as well. In Chapter 6 the implemen-
tation methods for the novel concepts are provided. The OSIRIS Peer-to-Peer work-
flow execution engine, which serves as our implementation basis is introduced in this
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chapter as well. Chapter 7 describes and discusses the quantitative evaluations of our
contributions, whereas qualitative comparisons to other relevant approaches are drawn
in Chapter 8. Finally, chapter 9 concludes this thesis and provides an outlook into the
future.

2
Motivation
In this chapter, we describe an example application scenario that illustrates the chal-
lenges on a modern workflow engine. The application scenario we have chosen stems
from the field of modern disaster management. We provide an example workflow that
is composed of SOA backed services and highlight the issues associated with the man-
agement of its instances. Finally, we summarize this chapter with a list of requirements
on a modern workflow engine.
2.1 Use Case
To motivate the application of Service-oriented architectures that is organized by means
of workflows and powered by Cloud infrastructure consider the following firefighter
rescue scenario. In this scenario we have a group of firefighters that are sent out into
the field with the task of extinguishing a fire. Usually, this group of firefighters is subdi-
vided into smaller units and strategically directed along with their firetrucks into differ-
ent geographical parts of the action area with preassigned specific tasks so as to contain
the fire from all possible sides. Given the nature of their jobs, triggered by various
environmental and human causes, critical situations can occur that put the firefight-
ers lives into risk. For instance, a sudden change of the wind direction can make the
fire spread in an unexpected way that has the potential to put the firefighters into dan-
ger by entrapping them. Due to the firemen’s individual and limited perception and
view of the overall scene, also caused by human factors such as fear, fatigue etc., they
most probably cannot anticipate such situations. In order to reduce the risk in a tradi-
tional sense, firefighters rely on mutual coordination among themselves and with the
headquarters, by means of bulky and outdated communication devices such as radios.
However, given the high dynamics of their tasks, which often includes hard physical
labor, it is not always possible for them to communicate with each others. Moreover,
radio devices might get damaged due to external causes throughout the course of an in-
tervention, and thus potentially lifesaving information is not shared. As a consequence,
the firefighters coordination possibilities in the field are rather limited, and the risks for
their lives high, if they are only based on simple radio devices. By applying the lat-
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est technological advances in the fields of mobile communication devices, surveillance
and intelligent decision support software their coordination effort could be immensely
helped.
As a vision for the future, consider a wearable intervention support system for the
firefighters. This system implies a variety of sensors that are spread out in the action
area so as to capture as much data as possible during the course of an ongoing inter-
vention. Among others, sensor data includes the physical state of the firefighters, their
actions, the environmental state of the action area etc. In conjunction with other already
existing data (e.g., weather forecasts) the data produced by the various sensors is sub-
ject to sophisticated analyses with the goal of anticipating critical situations of rather
complex semantics. The outcome the data analysis process, which should ideally hap-
pen in near real-time, are danger area heat-maps. In turn, the danger heat-maps enable
the firemen to avoid critical situations and coordinate better.
To produce the data that is needed for the heat-map creation process, the appropriate
data producing and processing devices should be strategically distributed among all
participants of the disaster management scenario. Regarding the firefighters, each of
them should be equipped with a set of portable data capturing devices such as a camera,
a GPS sensor, a accelerometer and other vital signs sensors that constantly produce
(i.e., record) data on their individual actions. Moreover, a mobile computational device,
such as a smartphone, should be carried as well by the firemen with the purpose of
integrating and recording all data sources. The locally collected data at the firefighter
smartphones should be subject to simple local processing, i.e., mainly filtering of the
data sources, before it is sent away for further processing. Thereby, the locally collected
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data should be transmitted – via wireless communication – to the nearest fire-truck. In
case no fire-truck cannot be reached, due to distance or physical obstacles, data should
be nevertheless transmitted via other firemen’s devices that are in transmission range
of any fire-truck.
The fire-trucks should be in turn equipped with more powerful computational de-
vices (e.g., laptops, desktops) and more sophisticated environmental sensor devices
(e.g., wind sensors) that are too heavy or too sensitive to be carried around by firemen.
The aggregated data stemming from firefighter mobile devices should further be en-
riched with the additional sensor sources and shared with other fire-trucks in case there
are any. By collaboratively performing simple data analysis already at this stage with all
computational devices located at the firetrucks the firemen should be coordinated bet-
ter. With the application of simple rules and databases that convey simple business logic
at the fire-trucks immediate threats can be detected and preemptive warnings issued.
At the final stage of heat-map creation process, aggregated data at the fire-truck de-
vices should be forwarded to the headquarters where it is subject to more sophisticated
analysis with the usage of intelligent software agents. In doing so, powerful computa-
tional clusters, such as the Cloud, should be exploited so as to power the computation-
ally and data intensive agents with excessive computational resources and voluminous
data, i.e., resources the cannot be easily provided to the fire-trucks. In order to improve
the quality of results, historical data and already existing data sources of third party
external providers, such as weather forecasts, geographical maps etc., should be ex-
ploited as well. Based on the outcome of the data analysis process optimal coordination
strategies should be devised – for future reference – and thus the risks for the firemen
reduced.
2.2 Dynamic Execution Environment
A global overview of the aforementioned firefighter intervention support system is de-
picted in Figure 2.1. As the figure shows, the execution environment in this scenario is
highly heterogeneous, in terms of the computational devices (i.e., their types) and ap-
plication services that are participating to it. Regarding the computational devices, we
can distinguish between four classes, namely the firefighter devices, firetruck devices,
computational cluster devices. Their specific runtime execution characteristics can be
defined as follows:
• Firefighter devices. The devices that are carried by the firefighters feature rather
limited performance capabilities of very high dynamics due to the limited re-
sources at disposal, in terms of CPU, storage capacity and bandwidth. They are
further characterized by a rather high failure probability due to their limited lifes-
pan (i.e., limited battery life) and the mobility of the firefighters. Due to the in-
herent movement of the firemen, they are more likely to disconnect unexpectedly
(e.g., reachability) from the others, to have their transmission obstructed (e.g., ob-
stacles), or to suffer externally induced damage by surrounding objects. As a con-
sequence, they are not very suitable for computationally and data intensive tasks
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or tasks that are critical to the overall intervention support system. Hence, their
applicability should be restricted to simple tasks (e.g., monitoring of other mo-
bile devices, data filtering etc.) and any conducted computation or produced data
has to be immediately secured, by means of sophisticated fault-tolerance mecha-
nisms, to more reliable sites so as to prevent losses. Since only a fixed amount of
firefighter mobile devices (i.e., initially deployed ones) is to be expected through-
out the course of intervention the most viable option that offers itself (next to other
firefighter devices) are the fire-trucks.
• Fire-truck devices. Unlike the mobile devices of the previous category, fire-truck
devices feature much higher performance characteristics. Since they do not have
to be carried by firemen they can be equipped with more powerful hardware that
corresponds to high-end desktop computers. This allows them to take on more
challenging tasks of the intervention support system, such as data aggregation
and simple analysis. By statically assigning them to fire-trucks in fixed numbers
they are less likely to fail as compared to the mobile devices. Although they are
static, they can nevertheless disconnect from the system (e.g., induced by environ-
mental obstacles) due to physical locations of the fire-trucks which are outside in
the field. That is why fire-truck devices necessitate reliable means of communi-
cation, in terms of hardware and software solutions, that guarantee lossless data
transmission. Especially, since their main role is to consolidate the mobile devices
with the remote computer clusters as junctions.
• Computational cluster devices. Devices of this category feature the best and the
most reliable performance characteristics of all. Usually, they are part of a con-
trolled and static execution environment and thus are unlikely to fail. In conjunc-
tion with a huge number of identical computational devices they can take on the
most computationally and data intensive tasks, such as the heat-maps creating
intelligent agents. However, these devices necessitate an intelligent distribution
of tasks and data among a huge number of them as a key powering concept. In
the context of the Cloud the number of computational devices can be dynamically
scaled from very small to possibly infinite by dynamically adding and/or remov-
ing them from the system. By supporting such devices, with scalable distribution
concepts so as to power the tasks at hand any kind of end-user performance re-
quirements can be met.
The observed execution environment heterogeneity can only be handled by means
of Service oriented architectures. Only if the functional roles of the devices, with re-
spect to the intervention support system, are encapsulated behind SOA application ser-
vices their mutual interaction is possible. Thereby, the data produced and the com-
putations conducted by the services can differ in the quantity and frequency it is per-
formed. Due to this, the way services can interact among each other can also vastly
differ. Precisely, we distinguish between three classes of application services w.r.t. inter-
action type, namely the discrete services and streaming services Their specific interac-
tion characteristics can be defined as follows:
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• Discrete services. This class of services corresponds to the simple request-response
interaction model. That is, services of this type are only invoked with an incoming
request by a client that triggers the execution of underlying computations. Once
the computations have been finished an outgoing response is sent to the very same
client that issued the request. Thereby, the incoming request can be accompanied
with data and likewise the outgoing response can contain data as the outcome of
the underlying computations. The exact execution time of discrete invocation is
depending on the computational intensity of the service. The invocation clients
can be other services or applications of any kind that adhere to the SOA interface
of the service. Moreover, discrete services can be stateless and/or stateful which
means that they can maintain internal state between invocations. That is, stateless
discrete services do not maintain internal state and always produce the same out-
put (data) response for the same input (data) request. Stateful services maintain
internal state based on which (i.e., its current value) the output responses are cre-
ated. Services of discrete type are predominantly to be found at cluster computing
devices as they are used for the encapsulation of long lasting complex computa-
tional tasks, such as heat-map creation.
• Streaming services. This class of services corresponds to the push/pull interac-
tion model. Once invoked, services of this type continuously produce/consume
output/input data items, based on the underlying computations of the service,
for the client that invoked them. Invocations of such services can be achieved by
means of discrete calls upon which they continue to periodically push/pull data
till they are deactivated also by a discrete call. In order to be able to pull/push
data items, invocation requests of streaming services have to specify the exact
sources/destinations of the data. A source/destination of a service is again a ser-
vice itself. By specifying the source streaming services can periodically pull data
items from them for a longer period of time and process them according the un-
derlying computations of the service. Once the pulled data items have been pro-
cessed the produced data items are periodically pushed to their destination. The
exact frequency of data pulling/pushing depends on the computational intensity
of the service and end-user requirements (e.g., in case the frequency is too high it
can be throttled down by the service). Similar to the discrete ones, streaming ser-
vices can maintain internal state that results in different subsequent (data) outputs
for same (data) inputs. Services of streaming type are predominantly to be found
at mobile computing devices of the firemen as they are used for the encapsulation
of tasks that feature long lasting data production and simple data processing.
Figure 2.2 depicts in a global overview the vast execution environment w.r.t. the het-
erogeneity of the intervention support system. As we can see the environment is mainly
defined by three dimensions, namely the device quantity, the device types and service
types that it encompasses. Thereby, the spectrum of device quantities can range from
small to possibly infinite (e.g., Cloud) and strictly static to completely dynamic (e.g.,
Cloud). Regarding the device types, the spectrum can range from homogeneous (e.g.,
third party computer cluster) one type to heterogeneous multi type devices. Regarding
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Figure 2.2: Heterogeneous execution environment of the application scenario
the service types, the spectrum can range from simple, request-response, and stateless
discrete services to continuous, stateful streaming services.
2.3 Modern Disaster Management Workflow
In order to encompass the aforementioned application services, in the context of the
intervention support system, workflows shall be used. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example
workflow definition that covers the most important aspects of the disaster management
application scenario. Precisely, the shown workflow definition represents the activities
and their mutual interactions in BPMN1 notation that are necessary so as to create the
danger area heat-maps.
In a nutshell, the workflow definition specifies that in the first stage of it data from
various sources has to be obtained in parallel, before the computations of the heat-map
can commence. Once the data has been obtained and the heat-map computed it is used
together in the second stage with other data sources to compute a coordination strategy.
In the final stage the results of the first two stages are stored at the appropriate sites for
future reference.
1Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a graphical modeling notation that is handy for
illustrations of flowchart diagrams of rather complex semantics, such as workflow definitions in our case.
BPMN stands out with intuitiveness in representation which makes it applicable for a broad spectrum of
users, and in particular for non-technical laypersons such as business users.
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Each one of the workflow definition encompassed activities directly corresponds to
a SOA service invocation. Each of the invoked services is represented with a separate
BPMN swim lane. The figure displays six services that are numbered with the white
boxes. All except for the service no.1, which is the workflow instance orchestration (i.e.,
system) service, are application services of some sort. Hence, only service no.1, i.e. the
orchestration service is capable of reading the workflow definition and managing its
execution. Thereby, the functional dependencies among the application services are de-
picted with thin black arrows, representing with the direction of the arrow the followed-
by dependency. The dashed blue bi-directed arrow represents a request-response dis-
crete invocation by the orchestration service, i.e., the functional dependency of the ap-
plication services to the workflow instance execution engine. Details on the application
services area as follows:
• Service no.2 – Data Aggregation service. Out of all application services, this ser-
vice represents to a service of streaming type and is located at some fire-truck that
is connected to the other services via a network. That is, service no.2 is in charge
of collecting the streaming data from the various data sources and providing them
to the disaster management workflow instance execution.
• Service no.3 – Strategy Service. This service is of discrete type that is computation-
ally and data intensive. It provides data management and computations services
for firemen coordination strategies. The strategy service is located on a device
inside a Cloud execution environment.
• Service no.4 – Geographical Maps Service. This service is of discrete type that is
data intensive. It provides third party data management services for geographical
maps. The Geographical Maps service is located on a different device inside the
same Cloud execution environment as the previous service.
• Service no.5 – Heat-Maps Service. This service is of discrete type that is com-
putationally and data intensive. It provides data management and computation
services for danger heat-maps. The heat-maps service is located on a different
device inside the same Cloud execution environment as the previous services.
• Service no.6 – Weather Service. This service is of discrete type that is computation-
ally and data intensive. It provides third party data management and computation
services for weather forecasts. The weather service is located on a different device
inside the same Cloud execution environment as the previous services.
Further details of the application service internal activities are omitted for simplicity
reasons except for the case of service no.2.
Due to the overwhelming majority of discrete services the example workflow def-
inition is primarily intended for an execution which is based on the Cloud execution
environment. For instance, the workflow engine can periodically triggered the execu-
tion of this workflow so as to keep the heat-maps up-to-date during the course of an
intervention.
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Figure 2.3: Example workflow definition of the application scenario
Given the modular nature of SOA the rather abstract service (i.e., service no.2) can
be further broken down into simpler services and also represented with a workflow
definition. Figure 2.4 illustrates the Data Aggregation service in BPMN notation as
well.
In a nutshell, the workflow definition of Figure 2.4 specifies that in the first stage
of it incoming data is read from data source and immediately stored to the internal
database for aggregation purposes. Afterwards the filtering of the incoming data as well
as retrieval of external data has to be performed in parallel before simple assessment of
the incoming data can be performed in the second stage. In case data assessment has
returned critical values the data source is informed by sending a message to it in the final
stage and the whole process is started from the beginning, leading this way a service of
streaming type.
Similar to the global Disaster Management workflow definition some of the activities
correspond to services which are represented with the same BPMN notation, in terms
of swimming lane and arrow meanings. However, in Figure 2.4 only four services are
depicted at which service no.1 assumes also the workflow instance orchestration system
service functionality. In the context of this workflow definition type, the system service
is a gateway to all the other services and enforces the Data aggregation application
service by orchestrating their invocations. All of services are co-located on the same
fire-truck and together they comprise the Data aggregation application service that is
accessible to other nodes via a network. The other depicted services (i.e., no. 2, 3 and 4)
correspond to simple application services, whose details are as follows:
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Figure 2.4: Data aggregation service
• Service no.2 – Sensor Data Service. This service is of discrete type that is data
intensive. It provides local data management services for incoming sensor data.
The sensor data service is located on the same device as the system service. The
managed data of this service is publicly available for queries to other users, such
as the Disaster Management workflow definition.
• Service no.3 – Strategy Service. This service is of discrete type that is data and
computationally intensive. It provides local data and computation services for for
firemen coordination strategies of smaller scale. The strategy service is located on
the same device as the system service. The managed data of this service is publicly
available for queries and updates to other users, such as the Disaster Management
workflow definition.
• Service no.4 – Filter Service. This service is of streaming type that is computation-
ally intensive. It provides local computation services for the cleaning of incoming
data. The filtering service is located on the same device as the system service.
By encompassing discrete and streaming services and supporting their types of in-
teraction within a workflow definition it appears from a higher level point of view (e.g.,
from a Disaster Management workflow definition point of view) as a streaming service
itself, provided an encapsulating high level SOA service exists.
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2.4 Workflow Engine Requirements
Given the heterogeneous execution environment of the disaster management applica-
tion scenario, and its corresponding workflow definition, we summarize the following
conceptual requirements that are put before a modern workflow execution engine, in
particular its orchestration system service:
• Service compatibility. Given the all the different types of interaction among the
services (e.g., discrete, streaming etc.), encompassed by the disaster management
application scenario, the engine should provide means of communication that
supports their combinations. Moreover, the most heterogeneous execution envi-
ronments that can find themselves hosting SOA services should be supported as
well.
• Reliability. Given the volatile conditions the firefighter mobile devices can find
themselves in or the Cloud MTBF, the engine should feature fault-tolerance mech-
anisms that prevent the loss of workflow instances and its associated data due to
the failure of devices. This fault-tolerance mechanism should be resistant to any
kind of node failure (e.g., temporary, simultaneous, permanent device failure) and
be feature good throughput performance even in the presence of many workflow
instance numbers.
• Scalability. Prominent characteristics of the underlying execution environments,
such as the Cloud scalability, should be exploited by the engine with advanced
distribution concepts, in terms of data management and system service deploy-
ment. That is, the presence of a possibly infinite number of nodes to the execution
environments and its associated management of data should not bring down the
performance of workflow instance execution. Rather by strategically distributing
data and system services across many nodes performance should be enhanced
instead.
• Resource conservation. The workflow engine should feature an easily customiz-
able and lightweight software stack, that stands out for its small hardware foot-
print, in terms of CPU, memory and bandwidth requirements. The stack should
not claim too much local resources so that application services are affected. A
small hardware footprint in conjunction to custom configurations of the engine
should allow for deployments even to resource limited (i.e., mobile) devices.
3
Distributed Data Management
The purpose of this chapter is to offer insights on most fundamental distributed system
concepts that have found a broad application in industry and research. We discuss in
this chapter fundamental data management concepts, in terms of scalable data distribu-
tion, reliable data availability and data consistency, as they will lay the foundation for
our work in the upcoming chapters.
In order to meet the requirements of an ideal workflow engine to the biggest pos-
sible extent, horizontal distribution of the engine across a number of nodes has been
identified as the primary method. Although service oriented architectures imply the
inherent distribution of application services within an environment, the execution en-
gines’ functionalities (e.g., orchestration and data management) had to be distributed in
a traditional sense by selecting a dedicated and redundant set of nodes to host them en-
tirely. By restricting the pervasive system functionalities to a few dedicated only nodes,
numerous challenges arose, in terms of reliability, data management etc.
As Figure 1.2 suggests, the horizontal distribution of workflow engines in the tra-
ditional sense is always subject to a trade-off between centrality of data or centrality
of execution control. This trade-off refrains the traditional workflow engines from ap-
plication extreme scale workflow definition instance number domains. Ideal workflow
engine however necessitate scalable horizontal distribution concepts without centrality
compromises whatsoever.
One notable and uncompromising approach to extreme scale distribution, for any
system functionality aspect, is featured by the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) [Ora01] networks. In
Peer-to-Peer architectures all participating nodes of a network feature the same func-
tionality stack that is utilized in close collaboration with other nodes without the need
of a centralized coordination entity. Peer-to-Peer nodes collaboratively share the overall
workload of a global functionality aspect (i.e., its burden) by individually and partially
contributing to it. Thereby, peers put their hardware resources at disposal to run the
functionality stack but only for a partial domain of the global functionality. The conse-
quent partitioning of the functional domain among peers results in high scalability of
peer numbers and thus a high performance of the global functionality stack.
In upcoming sections we take a deeper look into the peer-to-peer domain and elabo-
rate techniques that are intended for the storage of huge quantities of data in a scal-
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able, reliable and consistent fashion. The concepts to distributed data management
presented in upcoming section will serve as the most important building blocks of
our work as they will enable us to establish synergies among distributed data man-
agement and execution control system functionalities. From a distributed data manage-
ment point of view, P2P concepts come into play by subjecting all nodes to collaborative
data management burden sharing. The most common way of organizing P2P environ-
ments into distributed data stores in literature is by means of Distributed Hash Tables
(DHT) [SMK+01, ZHS+04, RD01, RFH+01].
3.1 Distributed Hash Tables
The distributed hash tables are structured overlay networks that aim at integrating lo-
cally residing data stores at nodes of an execution environment into one distributed and
decentralized system for the management of data. Thereby, the locally managed data
stores of the participating nodes to the DHT have to be uniformly accessible to all nodes
for lookup and updates. Usually, the local data has to be structured in such a way so
that it semantically correspond to Key-Value data stores. That is, Key-Value data stores,
such as for instance hash tables, maintain sets of Key-Value pairs that associate unique
keys to data items in memory.
In order to integrate the various Key-Value stores into one entity all nodes that host
them have to be subjected to a common, abstract address space, i.e., a common key
identifier space KI for all data items. Thereby, the key identifier space KI is usually
chosen to conform to a discrete metric space, such as for example a subset of the integer
space (e.g., KI = {0..232} ⊆ IN+) so as to address data items. Mapping of data items
and nodes into the key identifier space is achieved by double hashing. Precisely, data
items are mapped into KI by applying a consistent hashing function fh onto the data
item key value K. Those data items need to be assigned to a set of nodes N, hence all
nodes of N have to be mapped into the same key identifier space KI, as well. Node
mapping is achieved by applying another consistent hash function fn onto the node
identifiers, such as for instance node IP addresses. The following equation sums up the
mandatory key identifier space mapping functions:
∃ fh, fn : fh : K ↦→ KI ∧ fn : N ↦→ KI
By mapping nodes and data item keys into the same key identifier space KI an in-
herent association among them does not exist by default, i.e., it is not clear how the keys
are distributed among the nodes with respect to KI. Although keys and nodes share the
same space KI, their mappings by means of fh and fn will not create a direct association
among them by for instance mapping them to same values in KI, i.e., fh(k) ̸= fn(n).
It can however occasionally occur that keys and nodes feature the same KI values (i.e.,
fh(k) = fn(n)), but this is not a general rule of thumb. Rather keys will stand alone in
KI with respect to nodes. To associate keys to nodes directly, with respect to KI, even
though no node is likely to be mapped to the same KI value to which a key is mapped,
a special association function has to be introduced The function assign associates each
data item key to only one node in the environment. Thereby, the actual assignment
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logic is bound to the concrete implementation of the distributed hash table. The formal
definition of the assign function is provided as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Key node allocation function – assign). Let K be the set of data item keys
and N the set of nodes, then the allocation of keys to nodes is defined by the function assign with:
assign : K ↦→ N
□
By applying the assign function on the data item keys set K each node will be as-
signed to a subset of K. Since each key possesses a mapping into key identifier space
each node will be assigned with a subset of KI, as well. Given that assign maps keys to
one node only, KI will actually be divided among the nodes into partitions. A formal
definition of a key identifier space partition, assigned to a node, is provided as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Key identifier space partition – KIP). The key identifier space partition
KIP(n) of node n ∈ N is defined as a subset of the key identifier space KI whose mapping
data item keys are assigned to n:
KIP(n) ⊆ {KI|∀ki ∈ KIP(n) ∃k ∈ K : fh(k) = ki ∧ assign(k) = n}
□
Therefore, the union of all key identifier space partitions along all nodes will result
in the key identifier space itself and no two key identifier space partitions can have the
same key identifiers encompassed: ⋃
n∈N
KIP(n) = KI
∀n, n′ ∈ N : fn(n) ̸= fn(n′) =⇒ KIP(n) ∩ KIP(n′) = ∅
Given a key identifier value, finding the node that is responsible for it, such that it
lies within the key identifier partition of this node, is facilitated by means of the function
resp. Formally, resp is defined as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Key identifier node responsibility function – resp). The responsibility of
keys identifiers of KI among nodes of N is defined by the function resp with:
resp : KI ↦→ N where resp(ki) = n with ki ∈ KIP(n)
□
Only a node n responsible for a partition KIP(n) can offer data management opera-
tions (e.g., insert, update and delete) for data items mapping into it. Data items opera-
tions which are mapped onto key identifiers that lie outside of scope of its partition have
to be delegated to the corresponding nodes. To connect the DHT nodes for efficient data
management delegation purposes they have to be structured into a topological overlay
network. Thereby, the applied topologies of the structured overlay networks can vary
in efficiency [SMK+01, ZHS+04, RD01, RFH+01], in terms of data operation delegation,
and are dependent on the actual application scenario of the DHT.
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3.1.1 Ring Topologies
The considered structured overlay network for this thesis corresponds to a ring topol-
ogy. The reason behind this lies in the fact that ring topologies are simple to construct
and easy to maintain. For a ring topology to be constructed a DHT node n has to connect
with only two adjacent nodes, a predecessor and a successor in the ring topology.
To determine adjacency among nodes of ring topology the key identifier space can be
exploited. Namely, the successor succeeds node n if it is the first node that comes after n
in KI space when going in a clockwise direction, starting from n. By going from the node
with the highest mapped value in KI we would reach the end of KI in a liner space and
thus remain without a successor. Hence, the liner KI has to be bent into a circular metric
space by means of the mod operator (i.e., mod|KI|) such that any clockwise direction
progression is restarted to the beginning of it when the end is encountered. This way
the last node in the linear KI will be succeeded by the first node in the linear KI and
thus the ring topology can be completed. In order to determine adjacency among the
nodes inside the circular key identifier the node successor function succ is introduced.
The function succ is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.4 (Node successor function – succ). Let KI be the key identifier space. The
adjacency within KI is defined by the function succ such that for any given node n ∈ N it
returns the first succeeding node in KI, i.e., the node n′ ∈ N. Thereby, n′ is the fist node
encountered in the circular identifier space going in a clock-wise direction, i.e., starting from n:
succ : N ↦→ N and
succ(n) = n′ with n′ = arg min
x∈N
{( fn(x)− fn(n))mod|KI|}
□
Given the adjacency of nodes, in terms of KI mapping, assignment of keys to nodes
can be easily implemented in ring topologies by assigning all key identifiers that lie be-
tween two nodes to one of them. Usually all keys are assigned to the adjacent node with
the higher key identifier space value. Hence, in ring topology distributed hash tables,
the node responsibility function resp is implemented by associating keys identifiers with
nodes in KI space that are encountered first by going in a clockwise direction:
resp(ki) = n with n = arg min
x∈N
{( fn(x)− ki)mod|KI|}
The same applies for the assignment function resp. Keys can only be assigned to
a node if their mappings into KI encounter that node first when going in a clockwise
direction:
assign(k) = resp( fn(k))
A key identifier partition thus features a monotonically increasing set of key iden-
tifiers that is characterized by a lowest and a highest value that bound it. Naturally,
the lowest value corresponds to the first key identifier that comes after the predeces-
sor node, whereas the highest value corresponds to the responsible node key identifier.
Hence, a key identifier can thus be denoted by means of the two extremes as an interval,
thereby implying the key identifiers that lie between them.
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Corollary 3.5 (Key identifier space partition interval). Given a node n ∈ N, its responsible
key identifier space partition KIP(n), and a node np ∈ N for which node n is the successor.
Then KIP(n) is denoted by means of the half closed interval (x,y] such that x is the lower bound
and it corresponds to a key identifier space mapping of np, whereas y is the upper bound and
corresponds to a key identifier space mapping of n:
KIP(n) = (x, y] where fn(n) = y ∧ fn(np) = x ∧ succ(np) = n
□
The simplicity in the ring topology maintenance thus lies in the fact that each node
only has to actively maintain two links, namely the ones towards its predecessor and its
successor node. The complex maintenance of the rest of the ring remains hidden from
it behind its predecessor and successor nodes. In fact, ring topology maintenance is
also very simple when new nodes are joining or existing nodes are leaving the overlay
network. In case a node n leaves, then it just has to instruct its successor node to re-link
with its predecessor and the topology is preserved without affecting the other nodes.
On the other hand, if a node n wants to join, it merely has to interject between two
corresponding nodes of a precedence relation by updating their predecessor-successor
links towards it. The updated precedence order relations of the joining/leaving node n
are determined by the function succ∗ such that it is a transitive closure of succ.
When it comes to data management, the joining and leaving of nodes in ring topolo-
gies results in the splitting and merging of the corresponding data partitions. Naturally,
data partition merging and joining is accompanied with the transfer of the encompass-
ing data items among the nodes.
Example 3.1
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of a ring topology overlay network. As the figure
shows there are five nodes A, B, C, D and E such that node nA maps to key identifier
space value 0, nB to 2, nC to 6, nD to 9 and nE to 13. The assumed key identifier space is of
size 16, i.e., KI = {0..24}. The corresponding precedence order is thus as follows: nB =
succ(nA), nC = succ(nB), nD = succ(nC), nE = succ(nD) and nA = succ(nE). Given this
mapping of nodes into KI, the data item partitions for which the node are responsible
are resulting as follows: KIPA = (14, 0], KIPB = (1, 2], KIPC = (3, 6], KIPD = (7, 9] and
KIPE = (10, 13]. The table displayed at left hand side of the figure illustrates KI in the
first column and its assignment to nodes in partitions in the second column. In case of
a node leave, for instance of node C, than node B would precede node D instead and
the key identifier space partition KIPC would merge with KIPD, i.e., N \ C ⇒ nD =
succ(nB), kipD = (3, 9].
The simplicity of the ring topology, in terms of construction and maintenance, how-
ever does not come without a price. In case a node is accessed with an operation request
(e.g., insert, update or delete) for a data item key which lies outside of its key identifier
space partition than this request has to be delegated to another node. Since each node
is not aware of the whole ring but rather only of its adjacent nodes in the topology it
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Figure 3.1: Key identifier partitions of the ring topology
can only pass on the request to either one of them. This routine has to repeated at all
nodes along the chain of links until the corresponding key identifier space and its own-
ing node have been found. Thereby, the delegation has to be preformed in a directed
manner, i.e., if data access requests that are coming from the predecessor can only be
passed on to the successor and vice-versa. The initial direction of the delegation propa-
gation is usually based on a greedy decision. Precisely, the access request is passed on
to the adjacent node whose key is closer to the data access key inside the key identifier
space. Random selections of the direction are also possible.
Although this data access routine is fairly simple to realize it does not always offer
optimal DHT performance. For instance, the greedily selected direction can in the end
turn out to feature more nodes along the path than a randomly selected path. Moreover,
if frequently accessed data is located at distant nodes, which have to be reached over
numerous node traversals along the path, then the DHT is going to feature a bad data
access performance as well. In general, the asymptotic complexity of this data access
routine is linear with the number of nodes in the DHT environment, i.e., O(N). When
applied to huge environments that are composed of a very big number of nodes the
greedy data access algorithm yields inadequate performance to a level which makes it
useless. This is why distributed hash tables have to be enhanced with more efficient
data access algorithms that are insusceptible to big node numbers in the environment.
Precisely, we consider the well researched Chord [SMK+01] data access protocol for
distributed hash tables.
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3.1.2 Chord
In order to improve the performance of a DHT the number of traversed nodes has to be
minimized for every data access request. Thereby, the number of the traversed nodes
directly depends on the key identifier space distance of the requested key to the node at
which the request was issued. Assuming a uniform distribution of key identifier space
partitions, in terms of size, among the nodes a greater distance towards the requested
key will always result in more nodes for traversal in delegating the access request. Note,
that by applying the consistent hashing function the uniform partition assumption is
always inherent as such hashing functions guarantee even distribution of key identifiers
among the number of partitions, i.e., nodes that are responsible for them. While shorter
distances should feature lesser nodes for traversal and acceptable performance, greater
distances should generally feature more nodes and thus unpredictable performance.
To overcome this problem, assuming that continuous data redistribution to close
nodes is not feasible, shortcuts have to be introduced that can advance the data access
requests faster to the destination nodes. In view of this, DHT nodes have to addition-
ally maintain a list of shortcuts, next to the predecessor and successor nodes, which will
bring them faster to distant key identifier partitions. Maintaining the shortcuts list how-
ever for all distant key identifier space partitions is not easy for execution environments
of numerous nodes. This is why the shortcut lists have to feature only a limited number
fast paths that allow for coverage of big distances inside the key identifier space while
traversing the nodes for the destination key.
The main idea behind Chord is to maintain a list of forwarding nodes, also referred
to as the Finger Table, that will feature for any key identifier value a reduced distance to
it of at least by a half. A node belongs to the Finger Table from the perspective of node n
only if it is the first node in KI that reduces the distance by a factor of 2 for some given
key identifier. By the same logic, if we add a distance of the factor 2 to node n than the
first node that comes after this distance is a Finger Table node. A formal definition of
the Finger Table node is provided as follows:
Definition 3.6 (Finger Table node – f n). Let i ∈ IN+ ∪ {0} be the distance defined by 2i
which is added in KI to a Chord node n ∈ N. A Finger Table node of n is the first node that
comes after the added distance of 2i. The Finger Table node f n(i) of n, given the distance 2i is
defined as follows:
f n(i) = resp(( fn(n) + 2i)mod|KI|)
□
The biggest possible distance of a key identifier space is the size of the key identifier
space itself. If we select this size to be an exponential number of the base 2 (i.e., |KI| =
2m, where m ∈ IN+) then the coverage of all of KI by iteratively halving it takes at most
log(2m) iterations. This implies that only m (i.e., log(2m) = m) Finger Table nodes are
needed so as to address the whole key identifier space of size 2m. The Finger Table is
formally defined as follows:
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Definition 3.7 (Finger Table – FT). Let the key identifier space be of size 2m where m ∈ IN+
and KI = [0..2m−1]. The Finger Table FT(n) of node n ∈ N is defined as a set of m finger
nodes. Each finger node is obtained by adding m distances of 2i one at the time to node n:
FT(n) =
m−1⋃
i=0
f n(i)
The set of all node Finger Tables is defined as FT. □
The Chord protocol thus constructs the Finger Table by partitioning the key identifier
space into m intervals of exponentially increasing size. Each Finger Table interval is
defined by a start and an end. The start of an interval is obtained by adding a distance
of the factor 2 the node. The end of an interval is obtained as the start of the succeeding
interval, whereas the node that is responsible of this interval is the corresponding f n.
Table 3.1 summarizes the structure of a Finger Table entry as follows:
Table 3.1: Finger Table FT(n) entries for node n, part of a key identifier space of 2m.
Notation Definition
f n(i).start ( fn(n) + 2i) mod 2m, 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
f n(i).end f n(i + 1).start
f n(i) resp( f n(i).start)
successor f n(1)
predecessor predecessor node of the ring topology, i.e., np
Given a key identifier lookup at a node, first the Finger Table is consulted for the
interval that contains the key identifier. In case the encompassing interval is assigned
to the successor of the lookup node, the search is concluded in declaring the successor
responsible for the data item. Otherwise the same Finger Table lookup is performed at
the node responsible for the encompassing interval until the corresponding successor is
reached. Since the Finger Table intervals are constructed to be exponentially increasing
in size the encompassing interval node will feature a distance to the corresponding suc-
cessor that is reduced by at least a half. By repeating the Finger Table lookups and thus
reducing iteratively the distance to the corresponding successor by a half the search will
be concluded eventually in a number of steps that is logarithmic in the size of the key
identifier space, i.e., log(2m). Given a huge node environment, data lookup routines
of a logarithmic asymptotic complexity (i.e., log(2m)) can be considered as extremely
efficient.
Algorithm 3.1 and Algorithm 3.2 provide the corresponding pseudo-code that con-
ducts Chord based data access request forwarding. Note, that Algorithm 3.1 corre-
sponds to an implementation of the function resp.
Example 3.2
An example of a Chord ring topology overlay network is illustrated in Figure 3.2. As
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Figure 3.2: Chord data access forwarding
Algorithm 3.1 n.findSuccessor(id) returns at node n the successor for the key identifier id
1: if id ∈ (n, successor] then
2: return successor
3: else
4: n0 ← closestPrecedingNode(id)
5: return n0. f indSuccessor(id)
6: end if
we can see this figure shows the Finger Tables for each node in the ring. Moreover, it
builds upon the semantics of the ring topology, in terms of node mappings and par-
tition allocations in KI, presented in Figure 3.1. Thereby, each Finger Table features
the key identifier space intervals and their first successors. The applied key identifier
space is of size 24, hence the Finger Tables are of size 4 (i.e., m = 4). Of course, the
starting values of the intervals are computed by means of the formula of Table 3.1.
For instance, for node A, which maps to the key identifier 0, the starting intervals
of the Finger Table are computed as follows: f n(1).start = (0 + 21−1) mod16 = 1,
f n(2).start = (0 + 22−1) mod16 = 2, f n(3).start = (0 + 23−1) mod16 = 4 and
f n(4).start = (0 + 24−1) mod16 = 8. Regarding the successors, the figure shows that
the first successor for f n(1) = B (maps to key identifier 2), f n(2) = B (maps to key
identifier 2), f n(3) = C (maps to key identifier 6) and f n(4) = D (maps to key identifier
9). The remaining Finger Tables are computed in the same way, they are just offset by
their key identifier value. As the figure shows, if for instance node C is confronted with
a data access request of the key value "TestKey1" it would first have map it into the key
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identifier space by means of the hash function obtaining thus the key identifier value
1. By looking up in its Finger Table, by means of the findSuccessor() algorithm,
it would find out that the key identifier 1 is located within the interval [14, 6) which is
assigned to node A. As a next step it would forward the data access request to node
A which would also perform the same routine in executing findSuccessor(). How-
ever, at node A the Finger Table lookup would return the successor as the node whose
interval encompasses the key identifier 1 in which case the data access delegation is
concluded with the node B being the responsible one.
Algorithm 3.2 n.closestPrecedingNode(id) returns first successor of id from the Finger Ta-
ble of node n.
1: for i ← m downto 1 do
2: if id ∈ [n. f ingeri.start, n. f ingeri.end) then
3: return n. f ingeri
4: end if
5: end for
6: return n
In order to keep the Finger Table updated with optimal nodes, Chord has to contin-
uously run a set of routines that periodically validate the current Finger Table nodes for
their position in the ring topology with respect to node joins/leaves in the environment.
Naturally, each Chord node has to continuously validate its predecessor and successor
nodes so as to maintain the correct structure of the ring topology, in terms of the prece-
dence order of the key identifier space. In doing so, each DHT node has to continuously
check whether its predecessor node is alive, by means of periodical heart beat messages.
In case it is not the precedence order has to be dissolved by removing the unresponsive
predecessor from the Finger Table. Algorithm 3.3 shows the predecessor validity check
routine.
Algorithm 3.3 n.checkPredecessor() periodically updates the predecessor at node n with
respect to its liveliness.id
1: if predecessor has f ailed then
2: predecessor ← null
3: end if
Moreover, a DHT node has to continuously check its successor node for the prece-
dence order consistency among them. This means that a node checks its successor by
periodically querying it for the node that precedes it. In case there is consistency con-
flict in the precedence order among a node and its successor, the successor will show
to a different predecessor node than the node that issued the query. A node can re-
pair its successor node precedence order conflict by advertising at the new predecessor
node of the successor with itself as its predecessor. Consistency of the precedence or-
der is restored and so is the correct ring topology from a Finger Table perspective, in
case the advertising node is accepted as the predecessor at the successor’s predecessor.
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Algorithm 3.4, also referred to as stabilize(), shows the precedence order consis-
tency check routine, whereas Algorithm 3.5, also referred to as notify(), shows the
precedence order repair routine.
Algorithm 3.4 n.stabilize() periodically checks the predecessor of the successor at a node
n and in case it is not n updates the successor of n.
1: x ← successor.predecessor
2: if x ∈ (n, successor) then
3: successor ← x
4: end if
5: successor.noti f y(n)
Algorithm 3.5 n.notify(n′) checks at node n whether a node n′ could be its predecessor
and if so then it updates the predecessor to n′.
1: if predecessor = null ∨ n′ ∈ (predecessor, n) then
2: predecessor ← n′
3: end if
The subsequent changes to the ring topology, in terms in the updated predecessor
and successor node precedence orders, are propagated to the rest of the ring only reac-
tively. This means that the Finger Table updates are not directly sent to all other nodes
of interest but rather that the updates have to be retrieved by the nodes themselves.
In Chord this is achieved by means by periodical lookups for nodes that are responsi-
ble for specific key identifier values. Recap, a Chord data access lookup, by means of
iterative distance halving, terminates at a node that concludes its successor to be the
destination node. Hence, updates to the ring topology that are changed by means of the
stabilize() will be reflected with different successor nodes for the same lookup key
identifier. To keep the Finger Table updated, Chord thus has to periodically lookup for
the successor of its Finger Table interval start key identifier values. Algorithm 3.6, also
referred to as fixFingers(), shows the interval start successor lookup routine.
Algorithm 3.6 n.fixFingers() periodically searches for the successors of the Finger Table
interval start values at node n.
1: i ← i + 1
2: if i > m then
3: i ← 1
4: end if
5: f inger[i]← f indSuccessor( f inger[i].start)
In order for a node to join an existing Chord ring a bootstrapping node that is already
part of the ring structure is necessary. The bootstrapping node can refer the joining node
to its possible successor, by means of a findSuccessor() lookup, so that the joining
node can start the stabilize() routine. Algorithm 3.7 shows the Chord ring node
joining routine.
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Algorithm 3.7 n.join(nb) queries the bootstrapping node nb for an successor at node n
1: predecessor ← null
2: successor ← nb. f indSuccessor(n)
The introduced algorithms of Chord provide a simplistic yet powerful extension to
the ring topology overlay networks that guarantees scalable data access performance.
However, the Chord extension does not fully outfit ring overlay networks for all be-
havioral aspects of a distributed peer-to-peer system. For instance, at times a the ring
overlay networks might be subject to very high frequencies of concurrent node joins and
leaves. The price of a rather simplistic approach in such scenarios reflects in inconsisten-
cies at Finger Tables across a big set of nodes. This drawback of Chord is known as the
Churn problem and has been extensibility addressed in literature [KEAAH05, RGRK04].
Despite the churn drawback, theoretical analysis of Chord by the authors proves that
inconsistent Finger Tables eventually converge from even very large numbers of node
joint/leaves providing in the process mostly correct lookups and with a high probabil-
ity of O(log2m) node forwarding steps. Another notable drawback of Chord is its rigid
application of the same hash function for both data and node mapping into the key iden-
tifier space. Although such an approach is undeniably straightforward it disregards the
physical characteristics (e.g., locality) of the hashed nodes. For instance, nodes that are
physically proximate might be mapped across great distances within the key identifier
space, causing this way additional node traversals among them which would normally
not be necessary. To overcome this issue, the application of local sensitivity hashing
functions [HMA09] has been considered in the past. Hence, for all of Chord’s benefits,
in terms of simplicity and scalable lookup performance, a significant body of research
seeking to overcome all of its drawbacks has been sparked thus ensuring a secure future
for Chord both in academia as well as in industry.
3.2 DHT Data Availability
So far we have discussed data inside the peer-to-peer networks in the context of effi-
cient addressing and lookup but have disregarded actual physical location of data. To
convey the data that is subject to management by a peer-to-peer system data items are
introduced. A data item is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.8 (Data item – di). Let Φ be the common data alphabet used for the encoding of
payload information. A data items di is defined as tuple di = (k, d) where k ∈ K is the data item
key and d ∈ Φ is the payload information encoded with the common data alphabet. The set of all
data items is denoted as DI. □
Structured peer-to-peer networks imply data items be allocated only within the en-
compassing key identifier space partition and thus the responsible node. A distributed
hash table can thus be formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.9 (Distributed hash table – DHT). Given the the set of all nodes N, the set of
data items DI and the set of key identifiers KI, the distributed hash table DHT is defined by the
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relation DHT ⊆ (DI × N × KI) such that for each data item there exists one responsible node
that stores it:
∀di ∈ DI ∃n ∈ N : (di, n, ki) ∈ DHT ∧ assign(di.k) = n ∧ fh(di.k) = ki ∧ resp(ki) = n
□
However, given an execution environment of high dynamics, the assumption of stor-
ing one data item per node has to be loosened. In particular, if a node environment is
of dynamic character and features high node join/leave frequencies due to the phys-
ical failures, certain measures have to be taken to assure the physical availability of
data. Distribution of all data items across a set of nodes by means of replication is
the most common way to facilitate data availability in the presence of node failures.
Naturally, the more replicas of a data item are created and disseminated in the node
environment the more node failures the system can sustain without loosing the data
completely. However, more replicas also incur more overhead on the system by physi-
cally allocating replicas to nodes.
The data availability semantics of the system are subject to a replication factor r
that determines the number of replicas for each data item to be allocated at different
nodes. Thereby, the replication factor can range from just one replica to as many replicas
as the size of the key identifier space. Each replica is distinguished by an identifier
which reflects an enumerator of the replication factor r. The set of replication factor
enumerators is summarized as follows:
R = {1, ..., r} with 1 ≤ r ≤ |KI|
Depending of the specific DHT implementation, there are many ways to allocate
replicas to DHT nodes, all of which bear certain advantages over the others when over-
head is considered. Precisely, the most simplistic approaches to data availability in a
Chord DHT are the multiple hash functions replication and the successor-list replication
schemes.
3.2.1 Multiple Hash Functions
As the name immediately suggests multiple hash functions replication is based on ex-
ploitation of a set of distinct hash functions H so as to allocate the same data item into
the same key space. Thereby, the cardinality of the leveraged hash functions set corre-
sponds to the replication factor r the DHT wants to achieve. The hash function set is
summarized as follows:
H(r) = { fh1, fh2, ... fhr}
A data item that is supposed to be redundantly stored at different nodes is hashed
by means of all hash functions so as to obtain different key identifier space values. The
responsible nodes of the different key identifier space values can be found by means of
Chord and subsequently used for redundant data storage. To physically store a data
item di at a node n the routine n.put(di) is used. Algorithm 3.8 shows the multiple
hash function routine.
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Algorithm 3.8 n.multipleHashes(di) applies all hash functions on the given data item di
at node n and subsequently determines the replication node upon which the local data
allocation operation is used.
1: for fhi ∈ H do
2: kihi ← fhi(di.k)
3: succhi = n. f indSuccessor(kihi)
4: succhi.put(di)
5: end for
Multiple hash functions offer a low overhead, since only the normal way to data
storage has to be applied multiple times. However, they also feature a set of drawbacks.
In practice, it is very difficult to devise good hash functions that will always map keys
to different nodes. Occasionally two different hash functions can map data items to key
identifier space values that are within responsibility of the one node:
resp( fh1(k)) = resp( fh2(k))
As a consequence, the redundancy of the data items is lesser than the desired replication
factor r, thus the system is less robust to node failure. Moreover, the replication factor
of a data item cannot be maintained in the event of a node failure. If a node holding
a replica fails, then its replica is also lost and cannot be restored at the successor since
the other replicas are disseminated at random nodes with no relation to the failed node
whatsoever. Only an update to the compromised data item by the end-user can restore
the replication factor again.
3.2.2 Successor Lists
For the aforementioned reasons of the previous section, successor-list replication
schemes are generally preferred to the multiple hash functions in Chord. Still other
DHT systems such as CAN [RFH+01] and Tapestry [ZHS+04] are relying on multiple
hash functions for replication purposes. On the other hand, in the successor-list ap-
proach a node’s Finger Table is extended with a set of subsequently succeeding nodes
in the key identifier space. The nodes of the successor-list are exploited for replication.
Thereby, the size of the successor-list corresponds to the replication factor r. Hence, the
successor list is summarized as follows:
SL(r) = {n1, ...nr} with n1 = succ(n) ∧ n2 = succ(n1) ∧ ...∧ nr = succ(nr−1)
(di, n1, ki) ∈ DHT =⇒ ∀ni ∈ SL with 2 ≤ i ≤ r (di, ni, ki) ∈ DHT
Successor-lists are the standard approach to replication in Chord although they vi-
olate the assignment function assign() by allocating data items to nodes that should
not be there. This violation however is beneficial in the event of a node failure as it fea-
tures seamless key space partition responsibility hand over to the successor. Precisely,
in case a node fails, then its first successor in the list already contains its replicated data
items. The first successor can thus automatically take over responsibility of the failed
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predecessor’s key identifier space partition by repairing the ring topology precedence
order in updating the predecessor. In contrast to multiple hash tables, successor-lists
feature replication factor restoration of a data item which improves its robustness to
node failure. Precisely, a failed node that is a member of a predecessor successor-list is
replaced by extending the affected successor-list with one additional node and remov-
ing the failed node. Algorithm 3.9 shows the successor-list update routine.
Algorithm 3.9 n.updateSuccessorList(n f ail, SL, di) removes the failed node n f ail and adds
a new member to the successor-list SL such that it succeeds the last successor-list mem-
ber. Afterwards a given data item di is added to it.
1: if n f ail ∈ SL then
2: SL \ n f ail
3: nlast ← SL[r]
4: nnew ← n. f indSuccessor( fn(nlast) + 1)
5: SL ∪ nnew
6: nnew.put(di)
7: end if
Although the replication factor restoration of a data item seems fairly simple it is
however afflicted with a significant overhead. In the event of a failure, all preceding
nodes that contain the failed node have to repair their successor-lists by means of the
updateSuccessorList() routine. This implies, that r preceding nodes are directly
always affected by the failure of a node, where f is the replication factor. Moreover, not
all nodes will immediately be able to restore the successor-lists correctly. It takes some
time till successor-lists of the predecessors converge. The predecessor of the failed node
has to repair the precedence order of the ring topology and propagate this update to
its predecessor and so on. Usually, r stabilize() routines invocations are necessary
by each of the r failed node predecessors till the successor-lists converge, i.e., O(r2)
stabilization messages in total. During this time the system is susceptible for additional
failures which could bring the system into an irreparable state.
3.2.3 Symmetric Replication
To overcome replication factor restoration overhead issues, additional approaches to
data availability in Chord have been extensively studied in literature. One of them fea-
tures the symmetric replication [GAH07] of data items across the circular key identifier
space of Chord. The idea behind symmetric replication is to affect the smallest possible
amount of nodes while recovering a failure and thus keep the replication factor restora-
tion overhead low. To do so, symmetric replication bases its replication strategy along
the key space identifiers and not the nodes themselves.
The key identifier space KI is always fixed and the key identifiers will unlike nodes
never join or leave. Only the nodes that are responsible for them are subject to change.
However, as only one node is responsible for any key identifier, a change in respon-
sibility only affects one node (i.e., the newly responsible one) and not more than that.
Hence, the overhead, in terms of affected nodes, is by itself lower.
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To facilitate replication based on key identifiers, each one of them is associated with
r − 1 other replica key identifiers. The set of r associated key identifiers constitutes
an equivalence class. Hence, each equivalence class features a set of key identifiers
that are bound to each other. Distinction among the equivalence class key identifiers,
is facilitated by means of an association to a replica enumerator. Equivalence classes
thus groups key identifiers that are each associated to a distinct replica enumerator.
To group key identifiers into equivalence classes a mapping function is needed that
guarantees association among all key identifiers which is uniform, unique and disjoint.
The equivalence class is formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.10 (Symmetric replication equivalence class – ec). An equivalence class ec is
defined as tuple ec = (KIec, R, symm) where:
• KIec ⊆ KI is the set of equivalence class key identifiers,
• R is the replication factor enumerator set.
• symm is the mapping function that associates a key identifier ki ∈ KI based on a replica
enumerator i ∈ R to a congruent key identifier kiec ∈ KIec of the same equivalence class:
symm : KI × R ↦→ KI
∀kiec ∈ KIec ∃i ∈ R, kiec ∈ KIec =⇒ symm(ki, i) = kiec
The set of all unique equivalence classes is defined as EC. □
Uniqueness of equivalence classes in symmetric replication is achieved by imple-
menting the function symm as a congruence class modulo r operator as follows:
symm(ki, i) = kiec with kiec = (ki + (i− 1) |KI||R| )mod|KI|
Hence, a key identifier ki is said to be congruent with kiec for the i-th replica with respect
to the same equivalence class.
All data items of an equivalence class, in terms of the same equivalence class key
identifier kiec, have to be collocated at the same node at all times. Moreover, each equiv-
alence class has to be shared and redundantly maintained by r nodes such that each re-
dundant node corresponds to a responsible of some data item of the equivalence class.
A DHT which adheres to the symmetric replication distribution of data items is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 3.11 (Symmetric replication DHT – DHTs). Given the distributed hash table
set DHT, the equivalence class set EC and the set of all node Finger Tables FT. A symmetric
replication distributed hash table is defined as the relation DHTs ⊆ DHT × EC× FT where
∀(di, n, ki) ∈ DHT ∃ec ∈ EC : ∀i ∈ ec.R, symm( fh(di.k), i) ∈ ec.KIec
□
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Regarding data availability in face of node failures, traditional replication systems
necessitate a higher replication factor so as to guarantee a better robustness. Naturally,
the more replicas there are in the system the more failures it can sustain. The only
downside to a high replication factor is the consumed time that is needed to allocate all
replicas at all nodes. In the case of Chord, all responsible nodes have to be found first by
means of the logarithmic lookup routine findSuccessor() before they can be copied.
What makes symmetric replication really stand out from other traditional approaches is
the fact that data availability can be restored more efficiently than with the others in the
event of a failure. Symmetric replication is more robust to node failures, as replication
factor restoration on average affects only one other node.
Whenever a node leaves the DHT environment (by itself or due to failure) each of its
assigned key identifiers can be retrieved from another congruent key identifier. That is,
the successor of a departed node can compute for each of newly assigned key identifier
one congruent key identifier and query its responsible node (via Chord) for the whole
equivalence class and all of its encompassed data items. Once the equivalence class,
and all its data items, have been received the replication factor is restored.
Not only is it efficient to restore one key identifier, but also the whole key identifier
partition can be efficiently restored by affecting only one other node. Given an uniform
size distribution of key identifier partitions among nodes (as provided by the SHA-1
hash function) the key identifier space partition of the departing node should be sym-
metrically mirrored at some other node at the other end of the key identifier space as
a set of congruent key identifiers. This implies that only one symmetric node needs
to be contacted so as to obtain the whole key identifier space partition of the departed
node. In other words, the expected overhead of the symmetric replication algorithm, in
terms of exchanged messages, for the purpose of replication factor restoration is on av-
erage one, i.e., O(1). The superior efficiency, as compared to the traditional approaches,
enables the symmetric replication approach to apply a lower replication factor (e.g.,
r = 3–5) in order to guarantee availability of data.
The allocation of data items at nodes w.r.t. symmetric replication also violates the as-
signment function assign. Instead assign is replaced by symm function to as allocate
data items at nodes. In using the symm operator nodes disseminate their locally stored
data items as replicas inside the DHT environment by first determining the congruent
equivalence class key identifiers and then by finding the their responsible nodes. To
store data items at the equivalence class responsible nodes the routine puts(di, kiec, i)
is used. The symmetric replication data item insertion routine is shown by means of
Algorithm 3.10.
Algorithm 3.10 n.putData(di) applies the symm operator for all replicas of the replica-
tion factor set R on the given data item di at node n and subsequently determines the
replication node upon which the the local data allocation operation is used.
1: for i ∈ R do
2: kiec ← n.symm( fh(di.k), i)
3: succec ← n. f indSuccessor(kiec)
4: succec.puts(di, kiec, i)
5: end for
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Figure 3.3: Symmetric replication putData() execution example.
Example 3.3
Figure 3.3 shows an example of an symmetric replication data insertion by means of Al-
gorithm 3.10. This example builds on the same Chord DHT execution environment, i.e.,
the same environment configuration, as introduced in Figure 3.2. As illustrated in this
example the key identifier space is of size 16 (i.e., |KI| = 16) and the replication factor
is chosen to be 3 (i.e., R = {1, 2, 3}). As a consequence, five distinct equivalence classes
(i.e., |KI|r =
16
3 ≈ 5) are created by means of the symm operator, which are displayed in
the upper left box. Given the replication factor of three all equivalence classes contain
also three key identifiers except for one. Due to the fact that the replication factor is an
odd number and the key identifier space is an even number the key identifiers cannot
be evenly distributed. Hence, one residue key identifier space has to be assigned to
the first equivalence class. For instance, the equivalence class of the key identifier KI7
is obtained by applying the symm operator r times for each member of the replication
factor enumerator set R, i.e., symm(7, 1) = 7, symm(7, 2) = 12 and symm(7, 3) = 2. The
equivalence class congruence for KI7 is depicted with the dashed triangle at which the
triangle points correspond to the equivalence class key identifiers.
Moreover, this figure shows the locally maintained key-value store of node D with
respect to the key identifiers and the replica iterator. For instance, under the key iden-
tifier 7 and replica iterator 1 a data item of key K1 and payload Φ is stored. i.e.,
D.gets(7, 1) = ⟨K1,Φ⟩. Whereas, the key identifier 7 with replica identifier 3 does not
contain any data item associated to it, i.e., D.gets(7, 3) = ∅. Since the data item map-
ping key identifier 7 is congruent with the key identifiers 2 and 12 with respect to the
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equivalence class, the responsible nodes of them have to share this data item as well.
That is, node E, responsible for ID = 12, and node B, responsible for ID = 2, also share
the data item ⟨K1,Φ⟩ locally, albeit under different replica identifiers.
Algorithm 3.11 n.updatePredecessor(n′) applies symm on the interval with extended key
identifier space partition, determined by the new predecessor n′, and sends queries to
the replica node for the congruent interval of the same equivalence class, by means of
obtainInterval().
1: end ← fn(predecessor)
2: start ← fn(n′)
3: predecessor ← n′
4: if start < end then
5: x ← n.symm(start, 2)
6: y ← n.symm(end, 2)
7: nrsp ← n. f indSucc(x)
8: nrsp.obtainInterval(x, y, n)
9: end if
Whenever a node is to extend its key identifier space partition due to a change of
predecessor, it can compute the equivalence class congruent bounds x and y, in terms of
key identifiers, by means of the symm operator. The congruent bounds of the extended
predecessor interval can be used to determine the responsible replication node nrsp,
by finding the successor of the upper bound x or the lower bound y. Afterwards, the
responsible node nrsp for the congruent bounds can be queried for all data items lying
within the congruent bounds x and y. Algorithm 3.11 shows the update routine of the
predecessor, and the consequent replication factor restoration.
Algorithm 3.12 n.obtainInterval(x, y, n′) given the bounds x and y selects all data items
located within these bounds at node n and returns them to the specified node n′ by
means of the replicate() operator.
1: DataItems[][]← ∅
2: for i = x to y do
3: for j =∈ R do
4: dicg ← n.gets(i, j)
5: DataItems[i][j]← di
6: end for
7: end for
8: n′.replicate(DataItems)
Once a replication node receives a query for an interval it selects all locally residing
data items that are located within the specified bounds. Thereby, it selects all replicas
that are associated to the key identifiers with respect some the equivalence class. To
retrieve locally stored data items with respect to an equivalence class and a replication
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factor the routine gets(kiec, i) is introduced. All encompassed data items can be sent back
to the querying node with just one message, thus significantly reducing the replication
factor restoration overhead. Algorithm 3.12 shows equivalence class data item selection
routine.
Algorithm 3.13 n.replicate(x, y, DataItems) stores at node n, all received DataItems for
the requested interval x− y after rearranging them so as to match the equivalence class
key identifier order and replica identifiers of the local node n.
1: for i = x to y do
2: it ← n.symm(i, r)
3: for j ∈ R do
4: dicg ← DataItems[i], [j]
5: rep ← n.symm(j, r)
6: n.puts(dicg, it, rep)
7: end for
8: end for
Note, that in case the specified bounds of the interval to be obtained are not fully
encompassed by the congruent node itself, the same obtainInterval() request can
be further propagated along the successors node chain till the interval is fully matched,
i.e., y ≤ fn(n.successor). After the received data items have been rearranged so as to
match the equivalence class order of the key identifiers, they are locally stored and the
replication factor is successfully restored. Algorithm 3.13 shows the local replication
factor restoration routine.
Algorithm 3.14 n.joinReplication() applies at obtainInterval() routine at the successor
node of node n after having determined the interval bounds.
1: end ← fn(predecessor)
2: start ← fn(n)
3: successor.obtainInterval(end, start, n)
In case the predecessor of a node is updated to reduce the owning key identifier
space partition in updatePredecessor() (i.e., Algorithm 3.11, line 4) this implies that
a new node has joined the environment. In such a situation the predeccessor updating
node only has to take part a passive role in the replication factor restoration. Rather, the
responsibility over it is completely handed over to the newly joined node, which has to
determine its key identifier space partition bounds and obtain the corresponding data
items from its new successor with an obtainInterval() request. Algorithm 3.14
shows the node join routine.
Example 3.4
Figure 3.4 shows an example of a replication factor restoration process in face of a
node leave. This example builds of the symmetric replication system already shown
in Figure 3.3. Regarding runtime execution, Figure 3.4 depicts the departure of node
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B due to failure, which triggers the node C to update its predecessor. Once the prece-
dence order among nodes A and C has been repaired by means of the stabilize()
routine, node C triggers the replication factor restoration, by means of the routine
updatePredecessor() as follows:
1. First node C determines its key identifier space partition KIPcto be extended by the
key identifier partition of node B bounded by the interval [1, 2] of, i.e., N \ B ⇒
nc = succ(na), KIPc = (0, 9].
2. Afterwards, node C determines the interval [1, 2] to be congruent with the interval
[6, 7] with respect to the equivalence classes by means of the symm operator. Since
C is responsible for the congruent interval lower bound (i.e., x = 6) itself it is the
first responsible node for querying by means of the obtainInterval() routine.
However, since C does not encompass the whole congruent interval it forwards
the obtainInterval() request to its successor, i.e., node D.
3. Node D encompasses the queried interval end bound (i.e., y = 7) and returns all
data items located within the interval with one message to node C by means of
the replicate() routine. The replication involves only data items associated
with the key identifier seven (i.e., KI = 7) since only they are encompassed by the
specified interval bounds. Thereby, all replicas, associated to this key identifier
KI = 7, have to be copied so as to restore the whole equivalence class. Precisely,
only the data items di1 = ⟨K1,Φ⟩ and di2 = ⟨K5,Φ⟩ are replicated to node C.
4. Once the replication message arrives at node C the items are locally stored, al-
beit at the corresponding key identifier and replication iterator, i.e., C.gets(2, 1) =
⟨K5,Φ⟩ and C.gets(2, 3) = ⟨K1,Φ⟩. Hence, the replication factor r = 3 is restored
with just one message without affecting the other nodes in the environment.
Finally, the symmetric replication scheme also facilitates load balancing among
replicas by sending the obtainInterval() request to the least loaded replica, in
case metadata on replicas is available. Moreover, an opportunistic approach to load
balancing can be taken by sending the obtainInterval() request concurrently
to all replicas and applying the data from the fastest responding one. Concurrent
obtainInterval() request generally improve the replication factor recovery behav-
ior, which can to some extent be used for security attack prevention by applying an
consensus protocol on the received data items. In any case, the symmetric replication
scheme features the lowest overhead, in terms to replication factor maintenance, to tra-
ditional approaches.
3.3 Data Consistency
Replication of data items across a set of replication nodes facilitates the availability of
data in the event of a failure. In order to replicate the data items at the various nodes
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Figure 3.4: Execution example of replication factor restoration
they have to be sent through the transmission network of an execution environment.
It takes a small amount of time until all replicated data items physically end up at the
destination nodes. Thereby, the exact duration of the replication process depends on the
transmission characteristics of the underlying node network. In a static execution envi-
ronment, where the transmission characteristics are stable and predictable, we assume
the replication process to be instantaneous and unproblematic.
Given an execution environment of high dynamics then inherent characteristics of a
distributed system such as node overload, failures etc. might severely affect the replica-
tion process. In case the transmission network features overloads the replication process
prolongs itself due to delayed data items. This implies, that from a temporal point of
view not all replica nodes will always feature the same data items w.r.t. their actual val-
ues. Simply put, at a specific point in time some replica nodes received the latest copy
of the data item subject to replication whereas other replica nodes haven’t yet, but will
eventually.
To make matters worse, if a subsequent replication process is started before the pre-
vious has completed, i.e., has allocated all data items at all replica nodes, the two pro-
cesses might interfere with each other. In face of network overloads the order of subse-
quent replication processes might not be fully preserved. Data items might end up at
replica nodes in a random order such that some nodes might feature data item values
of a previous replication process whereas other nodes might feature data item values of
a later replication process.
The distributed data management system thus finds itself in a vulnerable situation
in the meantime. It cannot fully count on data availability until all replica nodes have
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Figure 3.5: Inconsistent data replication given two subsequent replication processes.
received their physical copies. In case it does, it might find out that either data items are
missing from some replica nodes, or that they are featuring different values as compared
to the other nodes leaving it clueless which data items to use. Such situations lead to a
reduced robustness of the system and to a corrupted (inconsistent) state of data from an
end-user application point of view.
Example 3.5
Figure 3.5 illustrates the data replication problems, in terms of data inconsistency, from
a temporal aspect. As shown the replication process started by the client at timestamp
t1 results in an inconsistent state of the data item at timestamp t5 across the replicas 1, 2
and 3. Precisely, at t5 the data item ⟨K1,Φ⟩ is has not yet been replicated to replica 2,
unlike replicas 1 and 3.
Moreover, a second replication process is started at timestamp t5 by the same client
on the same data item that forestalls the first replication process, regarding the arrival of
data items at replica 2. As indicated by the red circle the updated data item ⟨K1,Φ′⟩ of
the second replication process arrives before the data item of the first replication process
at replica 2. As a consequence, it gets overwritten with the by now outdated version of
the data item of once ⟨K1,Φ⟩ arrives at replica 2. By timestamp t12 all replicated data
items have arrived at all replica nodes, however in an unequal order. Hence, the replica
1 and replica 2 are inconsistent as they are featuring different data values, i.e., ⟨K1,Φ⟩
and ⟨K1,Φ′⟩ for that timestamp.
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For most application scenarios that are relying on distributed data management sys-
tems such behavior can severely affect the execution semantics in unforeseeable ways.
To prevent situations in which data ends up featuring different values at different nodes
the replication process needs to be designed for consistency in first place. The big idea
behind data consistency is to serialize the data replication process in a way so that all
replica nodes feature the same data item values at all times. Any end-user should per-
ceive the distributed management of the data as if there were just one copy of each data
item inside the system. This is referred to as One-Copy Serializability [BG85] of the data
replication process. When it comes to changing the data, One-Copy Serializability im-
plies that the replication process is conducted in an eager fashion to all replica nodes as
a whole or not at all. That is, distributed data items change their values from one consis-
tent version to the next by serializing the replication operations in a way which ensures
consistency of all replicas. Formally, data consistency can be described as follows:
Corollary 3.12. Let T be the set of timestamps T ⊂ IR+ and DHTs the symmetric replication
distributed hash table. The version history of the distributed hash table is defined as the relation
VH ⊆ T × DHTs. A DHT system is consistent if in VH there is not a pair of nodes that
features different values of the same data item at the same time:
∀(t, ((di, n, ki), ec, FT(n))) ∈ VH,∄(t, ((di′, n′, ki′), ec, FT(n′))) ∈ VH :
di.k = di′.k ∧ di.d ̸= di′.d
□
Note, that the previous corollary also implies the two different nodes n and n′ to
feature different Finger Tables and different key identifiers w.r.t. the distributed data
item allocation inside the DHT:
n ̸= n′ ∧ ki ̸= ki′ ∧ FT(n) ̸= FT(n′)
3.3.1 Transaction Management
In order to ensure consistency of data, the transaction model can be exploited. In a
nutshell, transactions are logical data handling operations, provided by the applied data
management system, so as to guarantee ACID [GR92] properties of stored data. ACID
stands for the atomicity, consistency, isolation and durability of data that is subject to a
series of update operations. Thereby, the data can be touched by a set of transactions
that are executed sequentially or concurrently at runtime.
To handle concurrency transactional data management systems rely on concurrency
control mechanisms. Based on the read/write model [Vos09], a concurrency control
mechanism implies a set of read/write operations (r/w operations) stemming from con-
current transactions on the same data item that have to be ordered (i.e., serialized) at
runtime such that the ACID properties are preserved. In case the read/write operations
of concurrent transactions cannot be ordered we say that they are in a conflict. Any
two transactions are in conflict if they simultaneously feature r/w, w/r, w/w operation
intents on the same data item. Along the lines of ACID conflicting transactions have to
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be canceled and their effects on the data reverted. To this end our consistency model
extends a data item that is subject to transactional handling with the operation (i.e., a
read or a write intent) by means of a transaction item which is defined as follows:
Definition 3.13 (Transaction item – item). A data item, subject to a transactional handling
is defined as tuple item = (di, op) where di ∈ DI is the affected data item and op ∈ {R, W} is
the transactional operation. □
Note, that an read operation is denoted as op = R, whereas a write operation is
denoted as op = W in an item tuple. All transactions of a system are locally checked for
validity w.r.t. ACID for each data item operation by the concurrency control mechanism.
In case the affected data items are spanning multiple nodes, One-copy serializability of
their values has to enforced by means of distributed transaction [WV01] protocols.
3.3.2 Distributed Transactions
To extend the read/write model beyond one node only each distributed data item has
to be supported by a transaction, i.e., a concurrency control mechanisms, at the corre-
sponding node. Although local transactional handling can enforce the ACID properties
at the redundant nodes, from a global point of view this is not any more the case. Es-
pecially the isolation property of the replicated data items is difficult to uphold. For in-
stance, a concurrency control mechanism might serialize the r/w operations w.r.t. ACID
such that is not conflicting locally but is globally. To isolate the distributed data items
on the global level concurrency control mechanisms at the redundant nodes need to be
coordinated. Thereby, distributed transaction coordination protocols are built on top
of the existing replication scheme so as to coordinate the execution of the distributed
concurrency control mechanisms, in terms of r/w operation serialization.
Depending on the actual replication scheme of the underlying system, which can be
either synchronous (i.e., eager) or asynchronous (i.e., lazy), global serializability among
concurrency control mechanisms can be achieved in two different flavors. Either global
serializability conflicts are prevented or they are reconciled. A typical approach to pre-
emptive conflict prevention is pessimistic locking. This approach implies the locking of
all data items prior to the start of a distributed transaction upon which the updates can
be made. In case a transaction cannot obtain locks on all distributed data items it has to
wait and retry. Synchronous replication systems that feature a high conflict probability
usually imply pessimistic locking.
On the other hand, asynchronous replication systems usually apply optimistic seri-
alizability techniques which implement conflicts detection and reconciliation among the
concurrent transactions. To detect conflicts optimistic serializability techniques rely on
aids such as transaction timestamps which help to identify the transaction out of the set
of concurrent transactions with the latest updates. Reconciliation of conflicting trans-
actions is achieved by applying the operations of the latest one, whereas the outdated
ones have to be aborted.
Given an end-user application of the underlying data management system that fea-
tures transactions of lower conflict probability, the optimistic serializability technique
has the upper hand. That is, it allows concurrent transactions to execute at the same
56 Distributed Data Management
time and thus also favors higher throughput performance of the system. Formally, we
can define a distributed transaction as follows:
Definition 3.14 (Distributed transaction – dtx). A distributed transaction dtx is defined as
tuple dtx = (id, ts, Item,≺op, alg) where:
• id ∈ K is the distributed transaction key by which it is uniquely identified,
• ts ∈ IN+ ∪ {0} is the distributed transaction timestamp,
• Item is a finite set of transaction items that additionally contains a transaction termination
marker τac with:
Item = {item1, item2, ..., itemi} ∪ τac with i ∈ IN+, τac ∈ {A, C}
• ≺op is the partial precedence order relation among the transactional items with:
≺op⊆ (Item× Item)
• alg is the distributed transaction coordination algorithm with:
alg ∈ {2PC, PAXOS}
The set of all distributed transactions of a data management system is defined as DTX. □
Note, that global serializability is validated by consistently assessing the precedence
order ≺op of the transaction item for conflicts at all redundant nodes. A commit trans-
action termination marker is denoted as C ∈ Items, whereas an abort transaction termi-
nation marker is denoted as A ∈ Items in an distributed transaction Items set.
To enforce consistency of its data items, w.r.t. One-copy serializability, a distributed
data management system, such as our symmetric replication based Chord DHT, has to
apply a series of distributed transactions. To this end, we formally define the transac-
tional distributed hash table as follows:
Definition 3.15 (Transactional DHT – DHTtx). Given a symmetric replication distributed
hash table DHTs and the distributed transaction set DTX. A transactional distributed hash
table is defined as the relation DHTtx ⊆ DHTs × DTX where:
∀((di, n, ki), ec, FT(n)) ∈ DHTs ∃dx ∈ DTX : (di, W) ∈ dx.Items ∧ C ∈ dx.Items
□
Although distributed transactions guarantee One-copy serializability of redundant
data items they also incur additional overhead on the distributed data management
system w.r.t. coordination algorithm. We distinguish between more efficient ones over
more reliable ones. The remainder of this section discusses at first the most efficient
distributed transaction protocol – 2PC – and concludes it with the most reliable one –
Paxos.
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Two Phase Commit – 2PC
The most basic and the most widely utilized protocol to distributed transactions coordi-
nation is the two phase commit – 2PC [WV01]. 2PC seeks to prevent globally inconsistent
values of redundant data items, which can occur due to lack of coordination among the
redundant concurrency control mechanisms. For instance, some replica sites could be
committing their r/w operations to the local data management systems while others
could be aborting due to some local replica site issues. 2PC is an atomic commitment
protocol which enforces all redundantly started distributed transactions to finish their
execution in common by either committing or aborting their r/w operations.
To coordinate the distributed transactions 2PC introduces a transaction manager that
interacts with all replica sites – also referred to as participants – in two phases, i.e., in the
voting phase and the commit phase:
• Voting phase – In the first phase the manager queries all participants, for their readi-
ness to commit their ongoing transactions. That is, the manager sends a PREPARE
request to all participants on which they have to respond with a YES or NO vote.
In case the queried participant has locally taken the necessary step to commit its
operations the vote is YES. In case the queried participant has encountered replica
local issues and cannot commit its operation the vote is NO.
• Commit phase – In the second phase the manager collects all participant votes and
assesses them for so as to coordinate all participants as to act as an atomic unit.
In case there are no NO votes, the manager instructs the participants to commit
their operations with a COMMIT request. In case there is at least one NO vote
in the replies all participants have to abort their operations. For this purpose the
the manager sends to the participants an ABORT request. Upon reception of a
COMMIT or ABORT request all nodes will take the necessary steps to comply with
the manager request, i.e., commit or abort the local transactions. Once the local
transactions are finished the participants acknowledge the manager by sending
an ACK message.
The 2PC protocol is illustrated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 by means of a message flow
sequence diagram. Moreover, the Algorithms 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 show the 2PC coordi-
nation message exchange routines from an manager and participant point of view. As
we can observe, Algorithm 3.15 shows both phases of the transactional manager coordi-
nation. It starts by querying all participants for their local transaction readiness status.
First phase responses, i.e., votes, have to be collected till all of them have arrived. Once
all participants have cast their vote, and thus their local transaction commit readiness,
an assessment can be made whether the distributed transaction is to be committed or
aborted. Second phase responses have to be collected as well, so as to conclude whether
all participants have successfully concluded their local transactions and released locked
resources. Once this occurs the client call that started the distributed transaction, by
means of the commit() routine, can be informed about the outcome.
Based on the corresponding phase request participants either reply to the manager
with the readiness status of the transaction or carry out into execution the manager re-
quest by committing/aborting the local transaction. Each readiness response in the first
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Figure 3.6: Message flow sequence diagram of a successful 2PC commit among one
transaction manager (TM) and three transaction participants (TP).
phase is preceded by a locking of the local transactions, i.e., the database resources man-
aged by the local transaction. This way concurrency control among various distributed
transactions is facilitated w.r.t. pessimistic locking. Once a distributed transaction has
issued a COMMIT or ABORT request the locally running transactions are concluded
with a response to the manager and any locked away data items are released for other
distributed transactions to use.
To prevent conflicting situations in which concurrent transactions interfere with each
other data management operations, at runtime the participant has to be locked away by
the concurrency control mechanism. Precisely, each the encompassed data items by
the distributed transaction has to simultaneously be locked away. Even if one data
item at one replica site cannot be locked the isolation property could potentially be
violated and the distributed transaction has to abort. This way serializability conflicts
can be prevented and global serializability preserved among concurrent transactions.
In practice 2PC is leveraged in conjunction with the strict two phase locking protocol –
SS2PL [WV01]. Note, that the method lock() of Algorithm 3.16 performs the locking
of all data items affected by the transaction whereas the isCommitReady() checks for
conflicts w.r.t. the serializability of transactions.
Note, that the routines abortLocal(dtx) and commitLocal(dtx) of Algo-
rithm 3.17 release the locally held locks for the given distributed transaction dtx. More-
over, it locally commits (i.e., writes to local storage) the data items comprised by the
distributed transaction.
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Algorithm 3.15 tm.commit(dtx) starts the coordination of the given distributed transac-
tion dtx at manager tm by sending the prepare request to each participant tp. Collects
all votes and in case there is a NO vote in all participant votes set Votes, an ABORT de-
cision is concluded, otherwise a COMMIT decision is concluded. Afterwards it sends
the decision to all participants. This routine also collects all acknowledgments from the
participants and in case there is no NOACK response from the participants the outcome
of the transaction will be COMMIT. Otherwise the outcome of the transaction will be
ABORT. Finally, the outcome is returned to the caller.
1: Votes, AckVotes ← ∅
2: for all tp ∈ Participants do
3: Votes ∪ tp.prepare(dtx)
4: end for
5: if NO ∈ Votes then
6: decision ← ABORT
7: else
8: decision ← COMMIT
9: end if
10: for all tp ∈ Participants do
11: AckVotes ∪ tp.decided(decision, dtx)
12: end for
13: if NOACK ∈ AckVotes then
14: outcome ← ABORT
15: else
16: outcome ← COMMIT
17: end if
18: return outcome
Algorithm 3.16 tp.prepare(dtx) Returns a YES vote at the participant tp in case the given
distributed transaction dtx can be locally locked and is ready for a commit. Otherwise
it returns a NO vote.
1: if tp.lock(dtx) ∧ tp.isCommitReady(dtx) = true then
2: return YES
3: else
4: return NO
5: end if
The elaborated 2PC protocol offers efficient performances, in terms of distributed
transaction coordination, for normal execution scenarios that are free of extreme dis-
tributed transaction concurrency and node failures.
In case there are replica node failures in the environment 2PC based system are
severely affected as well. Depending on when the node failure occurs 2PC might find
itself in difficult situations. To mention some of the possible node failure scenarios,
for instance, a participant node could fail during the first phase. This kind of node
failure causes the corresponding manager to wait for all votes indefinitely (i.e.,, in Algo-
rithm 3.15 line 5 never occurs). During this time the data items at the running redundant
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Figure 3.7: Message flow sequence diagram of an unsuccessful 2PC commit among one
transaction manager (TM) and three transaction participants (TP).
Algorithm 3.17 tp.decided(decision, dtx) Commits and returns a ACK vote at the partici-
pant tp in case the given distributed transaction dtx is ready for a commit and the given
decision is COMMIT. Otherwise it aborts dtx and returns a NOACK vote.
1: if decision = COMMIT ∧ tp.isCommitReady(dtx) then
2: tp.commitLocal(dtx)
3: return ACK
4: else
5: tx.abortLocal(dtx)
6: return NOACK
7: end if
replica sites are locked away from other transactions and cannot be used. Even worse,
if the manager fails after after having issued the PREPARE requests to the participants
in any phase the system remains locked away as well. In case the manager fails, there
is no one to coordinate the participants so as to request them to release the locally held
data item locks (i.e., in Algorithm 3.15 lines 10 – 12 never occur).
To cope with node failures, 2PC relies on message logging in conjunction with time-
out detections. Precisely, any incoming message is always logged at all nodes to local
stable storage, so that in the event of a failed node recovery the handling of the saved
message can be repeated. Moreover, the coordinator can introduce time-outs on partici-
pant node interactions. Any delayed participant response can be treated as a failure and
handled with an abort of the distributed transaction. However, the mentioned solutions
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to 2PC robustness only help to overcome node failures of temporary nature. In general,
for 2PC to flawlessly function the assumption of temporary node failures, in conjunc-
tion failure incorruptible stable storage has to be made. The permanent manager failure
nevertheless prevails as the main disadvantage of the 2PC. This is why it is widely ac-
cepted in literature to be a blocking distributed transaction coordination protocol.
Paxos
The application of distributed transaction protocols to peer-to-peer environments can-
not be based on the assumption of temporary node failures. High dynamics (i.e., scal-
ability) of peer-to-peer networks suggests the nodes to frequently join/leave the exe-
cution environment, thus severely affecting ongoing 2PC distributed transactions. In
particular the departure of transaction managers, e.g., due to failure, leaves the ongoing
transactions blocked and their reserved resources (i.e., data items) locked away.
To cope with transaction manger failures the most straightforward solution is to
replicate it across a set of nodes, so that in the event of a temporary or permanent fail-
ure the coordination of the distributed transaction can be seamlessly taken over by a
substitution manager. To facilitate seamless recovery of failed managers, all involved
nodes have to be coordinated in a distributed fashion so as to reach common agree-
ment (i.e., consensus) on the current state of the ongoing transaction. One solution
to distributed consensus, in terms of the transaction state agreement, lies in the Paxos
atomic commit [GL06] protocol. As the name suggests this protocol is a member of
the Paxos [Lam98] distributed consensus protocols family specially designed for dis-
tributed transactions.
Basic Paxos
The main idea behind Paxos is to facilitate agreement on a value among a set of par-
ticipants of a distributed system that is resilient to failures (i.e., non-blocking) and con-
sistent. In Paxos, the participants cooperate, by exchanging messages, so as to choose
a common value among themselves. Thereby, the Paxos consensus protocol features a
guaranteed robustness to failures of a factor F, such that F stands for the number of
failed participants or the number lost (delayed) messages among them. To guarantee
fault tolerant consensus of F Paxos makes the following assumptions:
• The involvement of 2F + 1 participants to a consensus agreement process,
• Reliable communication channels among participants for the exchange of mes-
sages,
• Uncorrupted1 messaging among participants,
• Existence of an eventually perfect fault detector [CGR11] at all participants,
• Existence of an eventual leader detector [CGR11] at all participants.
1Delivery of corrupted (i.e., malignantly altered) messages by some of the participants are referred to
as Byzantine faults and necessitate the involvement of 2F participants.
62 Distributed Data Management
Hence, Paxos can succeed in reaching a consensus among the participants if the
majority of them is alive (i.e., F out of 2F + 1), if the reliably delivered messages have
not been altered (although they could have been delayed or duplicated) and that any
failure is detected by means of the eventually perfect fault detector. Thereby, the value
that is subject to agreement will be consistent among all participants.
The fault detector at a participant is in charge of periodically probing the other par-
ticipants by using heart beat messages. Induced by an unresponsiveness alert of the
fault detector, a suspected participant is considered to have failed. In case of a delayed
response by the suspected participant, the fault detector eventually revises its suspicion
and adjusts is unresponsiveness alert threshold with the latest derived value.
The eventual leader detector determines the leading participant among the set of
participants. In particular in the case of a node failure, when a new leader has to be
elected. Leader election is based on extrema finding in which an extreme value of a
participant attribute is chosen for the selection of the leader. For instance, the highest
participant key identifier space mapping value can be chosen for the selection of the
leader. Note, that determining a common leader among a set of nodes is a distributed
consensus problem itself that is only a part of the Paxos goal, i.e., the agreement on only
one value.
In a nutshell, the consensus protocol of Paxos is based on a series of ballots that
are started by participants who want to have their values asserted to others. Thereby,
the participant that starts a ballot tries to find a majority of other participants that are
willing to accept its value in which case Paxos mandates this value to be consistently
asserted as the common value to all participants. To distinguish among specific roles of
a ballot Paxos separates all participants into the proposers, the acceptors and the learners
as follows:
• Proposer – A proposer starts the ballot by proposing a value that is subject to con-
sensus. A proposer is also referred to as the leader of the ballot. The proposer
itself is a predetermined acceptor, that is usually selected by a client so as to start
the ballot.
• Acceptors – Acceptors are the backups of the proposer. They either accept or reject
an incoming proposal based on the proposals received so far. Each ballot features
a set of 2F + 1 acceptors out of which at most F can fail. To reach consensus on
some value among all acceptors a majority of F + 1 acceptors have to be alive and
accept the same proposed value.
• Learners – Store the accepted outcome of the ballot. That is, learners are the repli-
cation sites.
Note, that Paxos allows for the combination of different roles at the same node. For
instance, a node might be an acceptor and a learner at the same time.
In general, a Paxos ballot consists of two main phases, a read phase and write phase.
Each of this phases is further divided into additional sub-phases. In the read phase a
Paxos proposer queries a quorum of acceptors for its readiness to accept its proposed
value. Based on the responses of the acceptors from the read phase, that might feature
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Figure 3.8: The basic message flow sequence diagram of a successful Paxos consensus
among one proposer, the acceptors and the learners induced by client requests.
a new value to be accepted, in the write phase of Paxos the proposer tries to enforce a
value to the acceptors. The two ballot phases of Paxos are conducted as follows:
• Phase 1a − Prepare. The proposer p sends a PREPARE message to all acceptors
in conjunction with a new ballot number n. The ballot number n must be greater
than any other ballot number encountered so far by this proposer.
• Phase 1b− Promise. The acceptor a receives the PREPARE message and promises
to accept the proposal n if it is the highest ballot number encountered so far.
Otherwise, it rejects the proposal with a NACK message. In conjunction to the
PROMISE/NACK message each acceptor replies with the highest ballot number
encountered so far and its corresponding state, i.e., the previously accepted value
va and its associated ballot number na.
• Phase 2a− Accept. Upon reception of a majority of acceptor PROMISE messages,
the proposer enforces a value v with the ballot number n to the acceptors by means
of an ACCEPT message. Thereby, the value v corresponds to the initial value of
the proposer (received from a client) or the highest ballot number value vx re-
ceived as the replied acceptor state. The client value may only be sent if no accep-
tor states values are received that have been previously accepted.
• Phase 2b − Accepted. The acceptor acknowledges the proposer value v and the
ballot number n by returning an ACCEPTED message featuring n and v. How-
ever, in case another proposal with a higher ballot number (i.e., greater than n)
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has been issued to the acceptor in the meantime, the current ACCEPT request, in
terms of v and n, is rejected by means of a NACK message. Is such a scenario the
ballot of p starts all over with a higher ballot number n′.
Note, that basic Paxos features in literature a third phase that consists of sending the
accepted value, by the majority of acceptors, from the proposer to the learners. This
process can however be combined with the ACCEPTED message of Phase 2b so as to
improve the performance of Paxos by reducing the number of message delays.
The complete Paxos message flow among the participants is illustrated in the Fig-
ures 3.8 and 3.9. Note, that the acceptors are not sending any state back, which allows
the proposer to enforce its value v onto them (e.g., Acceptor 1 of Figure 3.8). In case
any of the acceptors fails, consensus can nevertheless be reached and the learners in-
formed if the remaining acceptors manage to cast their votes to the proposer. In case the
proposer fails (e.g., Proposer 1 of Figure 3.9) a substitution proposer with a new Paxos
instance can be elected, by means of the leader detector, that features a new value and
a higher ballot number (e.g., n + 1) as compared to the previous proposer. If failed pro-
poser returns to enforce its value to the acceptors, it will find its proposal out-dated (i.e.,
the ballot number lower compared to the actual one), by means of acceptor rejections,
in which case it can try to start all over with a new ballot. A drawback of the Paxos
consensus approach lies in the fact that concurrent proposers can find themselves in
mutually overbidding ballot number deadlock which can drag out over many rounds.
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Many siblings in literature [LM04, Lam06, Lam] exist aiming to optimize and overcome
the drawbacks of Paxos.
Paxos Atomic Commit
Due to its two phases, Paxos bears a certain resemblance to the 2PC protocol. In fact,
the two phases of the 2PC protocol can be easily fused with Paxos consensus features
so as to facilitate fault-tolerant coordination of distributed transactions. In a nutshell,
2PC distributed transactions can be made impervious to blocking transaction manager
failure if the transactional manager is replicated across a set of backup nodes. This
set of redundant transaction managers is subject to Paxos consensus agreement on the
outcome of the transaction.
Precisely, the redundant transactional manager set is mapped to the Paxos accep-
tors set. The initial Paxos leader (i.e., proposer) is thus the 2PC transactional manager
that is issued with the client request so as to coordinate the distributed transaction.
Consequently, the value that is subject to agreement among the redundant transaction
managers (i.e., acceptors) is the state of the transaction, i.e., the COMMIT/ABORT out-
come. In case the leader fails, after having sent out the PREPARE messages of 2PC, one
of the redundant managers can seamlessly take over the coordination of the distributed
transaction as they all share the same transaction state. In such a scenario the substi-
tution transaction manager can send to the participants a COMMIT/ABORT decision
and this way prevent blocking.
To facilitate seamless transfer of leadership each transaction manager redundantly
runs an instance of the Paxos protocol with itself as the leader, and all transaction man-
agers as the acceptor set. This way a substitution manager can start a new Paxos ballot
on the same managers set whenever it suspects the initial leader to have failed and try
to enforce its view of the transaction state on the others. Of course, Paxos guarantees
that only one consistent transaction state will exist among the redundant transaction
managers. Thereby, consensus can be reached if a majority of the redundant transaction
managers (i.e., F + 1 acceptors) remains alive. The new leader is elected by means of
the eventual leader detector whenever the initial leader failure occurs.
The transactional participants of 2PC, that locally manage the data items, correspond
to the learners of the Paxos ballot. However, they do not just learn the outcome of
the transaction but they also provide the transactional managers with initial state of
the transaction (i.e., the commit readiness status) which is subject to Paxos agreement.
Hence, an atomic commit of the distributed transaction is only possible, from a Paxos
enhanced 2PC point of view, if:
1. All transactional participants remain alive and are ready to commit,
2. A majority of transactional managers has agreed on the participant readiness state
and have this acknowledged by the leader.
To apply Paxos on top of 2PC a series of message exchange phases among all partic-
ipants is necessary. Before the transaction can even start, the leader needs to initialize
its acceptor set, i.e., the redundant transaction managers. Once the acceptors have been
initialized the initial transaction state needs to be retrieved from the learners, i.e., the
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transactional participants. Only after that, the Paxos ballot can be started so as to agree
on the same value at the acceptors and to decide on the outcome of the transaction. A
Paxos atomic commit execution is conducted as follows:
1. commit – A client issues the COMMIT request for a Item set to a transaction man-
ager that subsequently becomes the leader of the consensus.
2. initPaxos – The leader selects its set of replication transactional managers TM and
initializes instances of Paxos at them together with the Item set that is subject to the
commit. Initialization of the acceptors by the leader implies that their consensus
state is set to NULL such that a Phase 1a(Prepare) message would always result
in an empty state Phase 1b(Promise) message. Hence, by initializing the managers
(i.e., the acceptor set) itself the leader does not need to query the acceptors for their
state with a Phase 1a(Prepare) message and the first (i.e., read) phase of Paxos can
safely be omitted.
3. registerPaxos – The redundant managers and their Paxos instances acknowledge
their participation to the leader as acceptors for the Paxos consensus.
4. setTM – Once aware of all transactional managers TM, the leader further initial-
izes all Paxos instances at the managers with the acceptor set TM and learner set
TP so as to facilitate recovery in case of its failure.
5. prepare – Now that the leader has been replicated across the acceptor set the dis-
tributed transaction coordination can commence. For this purpose, leader has to
query the consensus value, i.e., the commit readiness status of the learners TPs,
for the set Item. Hence, the leader sends a PREPARE message containing Item
and the ballot number to the learner set TP.
6. vote – Depending on whether they have locally taken the necessary steps to com-
mit the Item set, learners have to respond with a (COMMIT or ABORT) vote. The
resulting vote can be submitted to the leader itself in which case the leader needs
to aggregate all votes and send them to the acceptor set TM as a Phase 2a(Accept)
messages. However, in order to improve the performance of Paxos commit the
responsibility of sending the votes is delegated directly to learners, thus removing
the unnecessary message delay via the leader. Essentially, the learner votes that
are sent to the acceptor set represent the Paxos Phase 2a(Accept) messages of the
leader that are directly sent by the learners.
7. voteAck – The acceptors aggregate all learner votes so as to decide on the out-
come of the transaction. Once all votes are aggregated and assessed each acceptor
sends a VOTEACK message to the leader which essentially corresponds to the
Phase 2b(Accepted) message of Paxos consensus. Thereby, an acceptor decides to
accept the distributed transaction to be commit ready only if all learners returned
a PREPARE vote in conjunction with a ballot number that is the highest so far. In
case even a single learner returns an ABORT vote, the VOTEACK message of the
acceptor will feature an ABORT consensus value.
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Figure 3.10: The message flow of the Paxos commit protocol
8. decision/outcome – Once the leader receives a majority of acceptor VOTEACK
messages featuring the same value (i.e., PREPARE or ABORT), a Paxos consen-
sus has been reached among the acceptors and the learner can conclude the trans-
action. Consequently, all participants of the transaction (i.e., the acceptors, the
learners and the client) can be can be informed about the outcome by means of
DECIDED and OUTCOME messages, respectively.
The complete Paxos commit protocol, and its message flow, is illustrated by means
of Figure 3.10. Moreover, the Algorithms 3.18 – 3.28 describe in detail the Paxos atomic
commit procedure. Note, that the Paxos commit algorithms feature a concurrency con-
trol mechanism that implements the optimistic serializability approach. Together with
transactional timestamps the elaborated concurrency control mechanism also exploit
locks so as to detect conflicting transactions. In face of multiple data items comprised
by concurrent transactions of the same timestamp, locks are necessary so as to maintain
integrity of an individual transaction between asynchronous replication requests. Pre-
cisely, only if a concurrent transaction features the latest timestamp and holds locks for
all of its data items it is resolved as a successful transaction. The others are not and thus
have to be aborted.
Given the Paxos commit algorithms, the initiation of a Paxos distributed transaction
is shown in Algorithm 3.18. In this routine the leading transaction manager starts off the
distributed transaction by immediately selecting the acceptors set (i.e., the redundant
transaction managers) and initializing them with Paxos instances.
Each acceptor needs to initialize an instance of Paxos locally with the same input
parameters as the leader such that seamless recovery of the leader for the current trans-
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Algorithm 3.18 leader.commit(dtx, client) Given the distributed transaction dtx this rou-
tine determines the replication transaction managers and initializes them with same
client input parameters: dtx and client.
1: leader ← this
2: for all item ∈ dtx.Items do
3: for i ∈ R do
4: tmi ← n.getTM(dtx, i)
5: tmi.initPaxos(leader, client, item, dtx)
6: end for
7: end for
action is possible. The initialization parameters feature the client (that commissioned
the transaction) and the item (that is subject to commit). Along the lines of Paxos con-
sensus, the state of each acceptor needs to be reset. An acceptor reset implies the setting
of the ballot number to 1 and transaction state value to null. This way any proposal, con-
sisting of a ballot number and transaction state, by the initial leader will be accepted,
since it will always be higher than the reset ballot number. As a consequence the Phase
1 message flow of Paxos can be skipped. Upon successful initialization the acceptors
have to register themselves with the leader. Algorithm 3.19 shows the initialization of a
Paxos commit acceptor transaction manager.
Algorithm 3.19 tm.initPaxos(l, cl, it, dtxr) Given the leader l, the client cl the transaction
dtxr and the transaction it it initializes the local Paxos instance at the transaction man-
ager. Subsequently, it resets the ballot numbers and the votes for the data item and
registers this instance of Paxos with the leader.
1: leader ← l
2: dtx ← dtxr
3: item ← it
4: client ← cl
5: for i ∈ R do
6: Votes[item.di.k][i]← (⊥, 1, 0)
7: AcksTMs[item.di.k]← ∅
8: end for
9: leader.registerForPaxos(this)
10: state ← COLLECTING_VOTES
Note, that in Algorithm 3.19 a Paxos commit transaction can feature more than just
one item. This implies that all items have to be distinguished, and agreed upon by
the acceptors. Only when consensus on all items has been reached a transaction be
concluded.
Once all acceptors have registered with the leader, the learners, i.e., the transactional
participants, need to be determined for this transaction. Learner readiness, with respect
to a commit on item, has to be determined so as to start the Paxos consensus with the
acceptors. To retrieve the commit readiness of the learners for item they have to be
queried by the leader by means of the prepare() routine. Just before the Paxos consensus
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can start all acceptors need be additionally initialized with the the registered acceptor
set TMs and the newly determined learner set TPs so as to fully replicate the leader and
thus facilitate its fault-tolerance. Algorithm 3.19 shows the registration of the acceptor
set and the subsequent determination of the learners.
Algorithm 3.20 leader.registerForPaxos(tmi) Aggregates all acceptors based on the regis-
tered tmi. Afterwards, retrieves all participants and queries them for the commit readi-
ness status. Finally, it initializes all acceptors with the acceptors set and the learner set.
1: TMs ← tmi
2: if |TMs| = r then
3: for all item ∈ dtx.Items do
4: for i ∈ R do
5: tpi ← n.getTP(item, i)
6: TPs ∪ (tpi, item, i)
7: tpi.prepare(dtx, item, i, TMs)
8: end for
9: end for
10: for tm ∈ TMs do
11: tm.setTM(TMs, TPs, dtx)
12: end for
13: end if
Each acceptor needs to be additionally initialized with the same parameters, i.e.,
the complete acceptor set and the complete learner set, as the leader so that seamless
recovery of the leader is possible. To facilitate the leader recovery, the eventually perfect
fault detector of each acceptor is supplied with all participants so as be able to detect
learner failures. Moreover, the leader detectors of each acceptor are supplied with all
acceptors so as to elect a new leader in case the initial one fails. Algorithm 3.21 shows
the completion of an acceptor initialization.
Algorithm 3.21 tm.setTM(TM, TP) Initializes the local fault detector with the given
learner set TP and initializes the local leader detector with the given acceptor set TM.
1: TMs ← TM
2: TPs ← TP
3: f aultDetector.init(TPs, dtx)
4: leaderDetector.init(TMs, dtx)
Once a learner receives a commit readiness query from the leader it has to take note
of the transactional item. Moreover, it has to perform conflict detection and reconcili-
ation w.r.t. global serializability. The vote of the learner will be based on the outcome
of the serialization conflict detection. Subsequently, the learner vote becomes the trans-
action state that is subject to consensus and it is proposed by the learner as a Phase 2a
Paxos consensus message. Algorithm 3.22 shows the commit readiness query at the
learner.
The optimistic serializability technique featured by concurrency control mechanism
of the learner is based on versioning timestamps in conjunction to read and write locks.
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Algorithm 3.22 tp.prepare(dtx , item i TMs) Stores the item locally as involved in the
transaction dtx. Locks the item and based on the success of the locking attempt proposes
a transaction state.
1: TxItems ∪ (dtx, item.di.k)
2: vote ← n.serialize(dtx, item, i)
3: n.propose(item, i, TMs, vote, 1)
The read and write locks locally store the operation intents of concurrent transactions
for each data item of it. Since we assume an asynchronous replication scheme, with
the help of locks, serializability conflicts are effectively detected between asynchronous
commit requests of concurrent transactions. Precisely, each data item has to be checked
for a lock w.r.t. the operation intent and if no other concurrent transaction has already
placed a lock on it, serializability is not affected.
Algorithm 3.23 tp.serialize((dtx, item, i) Given the item checks whether there are writing
locks in writeLock on it in which case an already existing lock results in an ABORT
vote. If not, the routine checks whether read locks exist in readLock. Sets another lock
in readLock and returns PREPARED for a read operation transaction. Checks a write
operation transaction for the timestamp as compared to the locally stored version. In
case of a higher timestamped transaction item places a lock in writeLock and returns
PREPARED. Finally, stores all learner votes to local logs.
1: ki ← n.getRep(item, i)
2: dbItem ← n.getItem(item, i)
3: vote ← ABORT
4: if writeLock[(item.di.k, ki)] = 0 then
5: if item.op = WRITE then
6: if readLock[(item.di.k, ki)] = 0∧ dts.ts > dbItem.ts then
7: writeLock[(item.di.k, ki)] = 1
8: vote ← PREPARED
9: end if
10: else
11: if ts.ts ≥ dbItem.ts then
12: readLock[(item.di.k, ki)] = readLock[(item.di.k, ki)] + 1
13: vote ← PREPARED
14: end if
15: end if
16: end if
17: n.storeToLog(dtx, item, i, ki, vote)
18: return vote
In general, the learner will not detect serializability conflicts if it tries to read the
data item and if there are no write locks, stemming from concurrent transactions, al-
ready placed on it. Likewise the learner will not detect conflicts if it tries to rewrite
the data item with a new version (i.e., a higher transaction timestamp) and there are
no write locks already placed on it by some other transaction. To this end, each locally
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stored data item needs to feature a timestamp of its most recent update (e.g., the dbItem
data structure). Only in these cases the concurrency control mechanism of the learner
approve of the transaction and vote to be PREPARED for a commit. This implies that
the approved transaction will place its locks, either on the write lock or on the read
lock (depending on the transaction operation), such that concurrent transactions are re-
jected. For all the other cases serializability conflicts will be detected and the transaction
reconciled with a rejection of the commit request.
Moreover, to facilitate learner recovery from temporary node failures all placed locks
are permanently persisted to local stable storage, i.e., logs. Algorithm 3.23 shows the
concurrency control mechanism of the learner.
Knowing that the reading phase (i.e., Phase 1a, 1b ) of Paxos is skipped in the first
proposal of the leader the learner can cast its vote directly to all acceptors if it is ad-
dressed with a ballot number 1. In such a scenario the learner vote corresponds to a
Phase2a message of the Paxos consensus. In case the ballot is higher than 1 a regular
Paxos consensus has been started by some acceptor. In a regular Paxos scenario learner
casts its vote as a Phase1a message to the acceptor set. Algorithm 3.24 shows the vote
casting by the learner.
Algorithm 3.24 tp.propose(k, i, TMs, vote, ballot) Casts the learner votes to all acceptors
TMs for the item key k and replication enumerator i.
1: for tm ∈ TMs do
2: if ballot = 1 then
3: tm.vote(k, i, vote, ballot)
4: else
5: tm.readVote(k, i, vote, ballot)
6: end if
7: end for
The learner votes are all aggregated by each acceptor so as to derive the proposed
value for the consensus. Thereby, each vote has to be checked against its ballot number
in accordance with Phase 2b(Accepted) of Paxos. Only if the received vote is of the high-
est ballot number encountered so far than it will get accepted by the acceptor, otherwise
it will not. When all learner votes have been accepted the value of the consensus can
be derived. That is, in case there is an ABORT response among the votes, some learner
could not guarantee serializability of the data item, in terms of concurrency control.
This means that the transaction needs to be aborted from the acceptor point of view
and the consensus value to be accepted is ABORT. On the other hand, if there are only
PREPARED votes the transaction can be committed by all learners and the consensus
value to be accepted becomes PREPARED. Once derived, the consensus value of the
acceptor has to be acknowledged to the leader by means of the Phase 2b(Accepted) mes-
sage. Algorithm 3.25 shows the acknowledgment of the leader votes by the acceptor.
Note, that in the Votes data structure of Algorithm 3.25 the read phase and the write
phase ballot numbers of Paxos are distinguished. The reason behind this lies in the fact
that the leader has to be able to select the vote value of the highest write phase ballot
number in Phase 1b(Promised) of Paxos.
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Algorithm 3.25 tm.vote(k, i, vote, ballot) Accepts a learner vote for a item key k if the ballot
number is higher than any number encountered so far. When all replica votes have been
received the routine acknowledges the acceptance to the leader with a PREPARED vote
in case no ABORT have been cast by the learners. Otherwise an ABORT is acknowl-
edged to the leader.
1: (currVote, rBallot, wBallot)← Votes[k][i]
2: if ballot ≥ rBallot ∧ ballot ≥ wBallot then
3: Votes[k][i]← (vote, rBallot, ballot)
4: end if
5: ReplicaVotes ← ∅
6: for j ∈ R do
7: ReplicaVotes ∪Votes[k][j]
8: end for
9: if |ReplicaVotes| = r ∧ ∄rVote ∈ ReplicaVotes : rVote.currVote =⊥ then
10: if ∄repVote ∈ ReplicaVotes : repVote.vote = ABORT then
11: tmVote ← PREPARED
12: else
13: tmVote ← ABORT
14: end if
15: leader.ackVote(k, ballot, tmVote)
16: end if
The leader collects all Phase 2b(Accepted) acknowledgment votes stemming from
the acceptors. When a majority of acknowledgment votes features the same value (i.e.,
ABORT or PREPARED) the leader is be able to conclude the transaction. A majority of
PREPARED votes acceptors will result in a commit of the transaction, whereas a ma-
jority of ABORT votes will result in an abort of the transaction. However, the majority
vote has to apply for all transactional items. If even a single item features a majority
ABORT vote outcome, the whole transaction has to be aborted. Algorithm 3.26 shows
the acknowledgment of the acceptor votes by the leader.
A decision of the leader has to change its internal state so as not to accept votes
any more. Moreover, the outcome decision has to be communicated by the leader to all
participations of the transaction, i.e., the acceptors, the learners and the clients. Algo-
rithm 3.27 shows the decision making by the leader.
Note, that the decided() routine of a transaction manager is not further considered as
it merely sets the internal state to a DECIDED value just as in line 1 of Algorithm 3.27.
A decision taken on the learner has however several effects. First any read or write
locks, held by this transaction on the data item, have to be released so that the item
can be updated in the future. In case, the learner successfully locked the data item away
with a writing operation intent and the outcome of the transaction was a COMMIT then
the data item value has to be persisted to the local data management system for good.
Moreover, the data item has to be removed from recovery log and from the transactional
item storage.
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Algorithm 3.26 leader.ackVote(k, tmVote, ballot) Collects acceptor votes tmVote for data
item key k and ballot number. In case of a majority of PREPARED votes for all items
a commit decision is issued, in case of a majority of ABORT votes for at least one item
then an abort decision is issued by the leader.
1: AckTMs[k] ∪ (tmVote, ballot)
2: Preps ← ∅
3: Abs ← ∅
4: ItemOutcomes ← ∅
5: for all item ∈ dtx.Items do
6: for all prep ∈ AckTMs[k] : prep.vote = PREPARED do
7: Preps ∪ prep
8: end for
9: for all abs ∈ AckTMs[k] : prep.vote = ABORT do
10: Abs ∪ abs
11: end for
12: if |Preps| ≥ ⌊r/2⌋+ 1 then
13: ItemOutcomes[k] ∪ COMMIT
14: end if
15: if |Abs| ≥ ⌊r/2⌋+ 1 then
16: ItemOutcomes[k] ∪ ABORT
17: end if
18: end for
19: if |ItemOutcomes| = |dtx.Item| then
20: if ABORT ∈ ItemOutcomes then
21: leader.decide(ABORT)
22: else
23: leader.decide(COMMIT)
24: end if
25: end if
Algorithm 3.27 leader.decide(decision) Changes the leader state. Informs all acceptors, all
learners and the client about the leader decision on the outcome of the transaction.
1: state ← DECIDED
2: for tp ∈ TPs do
3: tp.decided(decision)
4: end for
5: for tm ∈ TMs do
6: tm.decided(decision)
7: end for
8: client.outcome(decision)
In the meantime of the transaction conclusion, nodes might have subscribed to the
learner for the outcome of the transaction with regard to the data item. Node outcome
subscriptions can happen due to the change of responsibility over the data item by the
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underlying data management system. In such an event, whenever the data item changes
due to the transaction outcome the subscribed nodes have to be updated, as well. That
is, if the data item is not involved any more in any other transaction and if nodes are
subscribed to it, then they all have to be updated. Algorithm 3.28 shows the steps taken
by the learner when the transaction is concluded.
Algorithm 3.28 tp.decided(decision) Releases the write lock or the read lock if any for
all transactional items. In case of a commit decision this routine persists the item to
local storage. Afterwards finds all subscribed nodes for item and removes them from
the Subscribers list. Updates the subscribed nodes with item, based on the replication
enumerator i, if item is not involved in any other transaction.
1: StoredItems ← getFromLog()
2: for all (dtx, item, i, vote) ∈ StoredItems do
3: ki ← n.getRep(item, i)
4: if item.vote = PREPARED then
5: if item.op = WRITE then
6: writeLock[(item.di.k, ki)] = 0
7: if decision = COMMIT then
8: n.putItem(item, i)
9: end if
10: else
11: readLock[(item.di.k, ki)] = readLock[(item.di.k, ki)]− 1
12: end if
13: end if
14: for all s ∈ {s|(s, stdtx) ∈ Subscribers[item.di.k] ∧ stdtx = dtx} do
15: Subscribers[item.di.k] \ (s, dtx)
16: if ∄(sx, tx) ∈ Subscribers[item.di.k] : sx = s ∧ tx ̸= dtx then
17: s.putItem(item, i)
18: end if
19: end for
20: TxItems \ (dtx, k)
21: end for
22: storeToLog(decision)
The considered algorithms so far describe the execution of Paxos commit in a failure-
free setting. In case node failures do happen, Paxos commit has to ensure consensus of
the transaction outcome among the remaining nodes. Unlike 2PC, Paxos commit should
feature failure handling that overcomes blocking of the consensus agreement for any
kind of node failure.
Thereby, Paxos commit distinguishes between node roles when performing failure
handling. That is, leader failures, acceptor failures, and in particular the failure of the
leading acceptor are treated separately. The transactional participants role based fail-
ures are handled as follows:
• Learner failure – If a learner fails the transaction has to result in an ABORT out-
come due to the atomicity requirement of any distributed transaction. Whenever
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Figure 3.11: The Paxos commit algorithm in the event of a leader failure.
a learner failure is detected, by means of the fault detector, the leader proposes an
ABORT vote on behalf of the failed learner, by means of a new Paxos ballot, thus
causing the transaction to conclude in an ABORT outcome.
• Acceptor failure – If an acceptor fails the transaction is not affected if it the failed
acceptor is not the leader. That is, as long as a majority of acceptors is alive con-
sensus agreement can be reached and the transaction will eventually conclude.
• Leader failure – If the leader fails a new leader has to be elected, by means of the
leader detector. The new leader, has to learn the status of the ongoing transaction
by means of a new Paxos ballot. In case a consensus has been reached the new
leader can decide on the outcome of the transaction. If no votes have been cast the
leader can preemptively abort the transaction.
The described Paxos commit failure handling, that distinguishes among the node
roles, is illustrated by means of the Figures 3.11 and 3.12. Moreover, the Algorithms 3.29
– 3.11 describe in detail the Paxos atomic commit routines that are executed whenever
a node failure occurs.
The failure of a leader is always detected by the leader detector, upon which a new
leader is automatically elected. The newly elected leader starts a new Paxos ballot as
it has to learn the current consensus status of the transaction before making a decision.
To learn the transaction status the new leader sends a Phase1a(PREPARE) message to
all acceptors featuring a new ballot number and no proposed value. Naturally, the new
ballot number has to be highest ballot number encountered so far. An usual way of
76 Distributed Data Management
Client 
commit(item) 
TP1 TP2 TM3 TM2 TM1 
initPaxos(item) 
registerPaxos 
setTM(TMs, TPs) 
prepare(TMs,item,1) 
vote(PREPARED,1) 
readVote(2) 
decided(ABORT,2) 
outcome(ABORT) 
Leader 
readVoteAck(∟,2) 
vote(ABORT,2) 
voteAck(ABORT, 2) 
suspect(TP3) 
Figure 3.12: The Paxos commit algorithm in the event of a participant failure.
selecting a higher ballot number is to exploit the node key identifier number increased
by one, i.e., fn(newLeader) + 1 . Precisely, as leader election is based on key identifier
number extrema finding the new leader (with the highest key identifier number) can
use its key number, however increased, to propose a new ballot. New ballot selection
is provided by means of the nextBallot() routine. Algorithm 3.29 shows the steps
taken by the new leader when elected by the leader detector.
Algorithm 3.29 tm.trust(dtx, newLeader) Creates a new ballot number for the given
transaction dtx. In case the transaction has not been concluded and this acceptor is
the new leader it starts a new ballot.
1: leader ← newLeader
2: newBallot ← n.nextBallot(dtx)
3: if state ̸= DECIDED ∧ leader = this then
4: for all item ∈ dtx.Item do
5: for i ∈ R do
6: Votes[item.di.k][i]← (⊥, 1, 0)
7: n.propose(dtx, item.di.k, i,⊥, newBallot)
8: end for
9: end for
10: end if
The proposal by the new leader is aggregated by each acceptor as in accordance to
Paxos consensus in Phase1a. In case the proposal features the highest ballot number
encountered so far the acceptor forwards a Phase1b message. Thereby, the Phase1b mes-
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sage features the current transaction state of the previously accepted Phase2b consensus
value and its associated writing ballot number. Algorithm 3.30 shows the acknowledg-
ment of the leader proposal by the acceptor.
Algorithm 3.30 tm.readVote(k, i, vote, ballot) Reads the current vote for an item, in terms
of key k and replica identifier i, if the ballot number is highest so far. Afterwards, ac-
knowledges the current vote to the learner.
1: (currVote, rBallot, wBallot)← Votes[k][i]
2: if ballot > rBallot ∧ ballot > wBallot then
3: Votes[k][i]← (currVote, ballot, wBallot)
4: leader.readVoteAck(k, i, ballot, currVote, wBallot)
5: end if
In accordance to Phase 1b of Paxos the new leader aggregates all acceptor PROMISED
(i.e., readAck) messages by means of the ReadVotes data structure. Upon reception of
a majority of acceptor read votes the new leader learns the transaction status value by
selecting the read vote of the highest ballot number. It case a consensus has been reached
among the acceptors and the new leader can try to enforce the consensus value at all
acceptors by means of the second (i.e., write) phase of Paxos. Highest ballot number
based vote selection is provided by means of the routine highest(). Algorithm 3.30
shows the learning of the transaction status by the new leader within the context of
Phase 1b of Paxos.
Algorithm 3.31 leader.readAckVote(k, i, ballot, tmVote, wBallot) Aggregates all acceptor
votes, in terms of value tmVote and wBallot, for a item of key k and replication fac-
tor i. In case a majority of acceptor votes for the current leader ballot has been reached
selected the vote of the highest ballot number wBallot. Finally, the selected vote is sent
to all acceptors for acceptance.
1: ReadVotes[k][i][ballot] ∪ (tmVote, wBallot)
2: if |ReadVotes[k][i][ballot]| ≥ ⌊r/2⌋+ 1 then
3: (hVote, hBallot)← n.highest(ReadVotes[k][i][ballot])
4: if hVote =⊥ then
5: vote ← ABORT
6: end if
7: for tm ∈ TMs do
8: tm.vote(tid, k, i, vote, ballot)
9: end for
10: end if
The failure of a learner is handled in a similar fashion to the failure of an acceptor.
However, the failure of the learner is detected by the fault detector and triggered with
an suspicion message. To validate its failure suspicion the leader has to learn the sta-
tus of the transaction with respect to the failed learner votes. Just like in the case of an
acceptor failure, the leader has to start a new Paxos ballot with a higher ballot num-
ber and no actual value so as the learn the transaction status. In case no votes by the
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suspected learner came through the leader will propose an ABORT vote on its behalf
eventually (Algorithm 3.31, line 4 ), thus causing the whole transaction to be aborted.
Algorithm 3.32 shows the learner failure detection steps taken by the leader.
Algorithm 3.32 tm.suspect(dtx, tp) Creates a new ballot number for the given transaction
identifier dtx. Starts a new Paxos ballot for the suspected learner tp for all of its affected
dat items.
1: IT ← {(tpi, i, item)|(tpi, i, item) ∈ f aultDetector.Data ∧ tpi = tp}
2: for (tpi, i, item) ∈ IT do
3: n.propose(dtx, item.di.k, i, TMs,⊥, n.nextBallot(dtx))
4: end for
Paxos commit with symmetric replication
The elaborated Paxos commit distributed transaction protocol can be applied to any dis-
tributed data management system so as to facilitate consistency of the managed data.
We however, consider only Chord based DHT systems in conjunction with a symmetric
replication scheme. To apply Paxos commit on top of a Chord system, so as to enhance
symmetric replication for consistency, a number of Paxos commit algorithms have to be
adapted to the features of the underlying data management system. Algorithms 3.33 –
3.37 address the access to nodes and data items of Paxos commit in a symmetric replica-
tion Chord. In case of a different data management system is used they have be adapted
accordingly.
Regarding Paxos items that are subject to transactional processing, they do not con-
vey key identifier space information. Since symmetric replication DHT data manage-
ment operations are based on key identifiers Paxos items have to be mapped into
KI. Thereby, the replica enumerator, provided by Paxos item counting (e.g., Algo-
rithm 3.34), can be exploited for the symm operator so as to compute the equivalence
class key identifier and to provide the replica enumerator.
To select the acceptors of a transaction (as in Algorithm 3.18, line 3 ) any node of the
Chord DHT environment can be chosen. However, to inherently facilitate uniform load
distribution among the DHT nodes, in terms of participation to acceptor sets, key iden-
tifier space mapping can be exploited. Precisely, by mapping the transaction identifier
tid, which can be generated randomly, into the Chord key identifier space, the consis-
tent hash function will always uniformly distribute the transaction identifiers among all
nodes of the environment. Consequently, these nodes will become the initial leaders of
the corresponding transactions. To determine the remaining acceptor set managers the
equivalence class of the mapped transaction identifier dtx.id can be exploited. That is,
all nodes responsible for an equivalence class containing the mapped transaction identi-
fier dtx.id can be assigned to the acceptor set as redundant transaction managers to the
leader. Algorithm 3.33 shows the symmetric replication based retrieval of replication
transactional managers, i.e., Paxos acceptors.
Similar to the acceptor set, the learner set retrieval (as in Algorithm 3.20, line 4) is
bound to the underlying symmetric replication Chord DHT. This means that the learn-
ers have to be determined by mapping item (i.e., its key) into the key identifier space
3.3 Data Consistency 79
Algorithm 3.33 n.getTM(dtx, i) Computes the equivalence class key identifier given the
identifier of the transaction dtx and the replication factor enumerator i. The first succes-
sor node of the computed equivalence class key identifier is returned to be an acceptor
set node.
1: repi ← n.symm( fhdtx.id, i)
2: tmsucc ← n. f indSuccessor(repi)
3: return tmsucc
and subsequently finding all responsible nodes for the key identifier space equivalence
class of item. Algorithm 3.34 shows the retrieval of the learner set.
Algorithm 3.34 n.getTP(item, i) Computes the equivalence class key identifier given the
item and the replication factor enumerator i. The first successor node of the computed
equivalence class key identifier is returned to be a learner set node.
1: repi ← n.symm( fh(item.di.k), i)
2: tpsucc ← n. f indSuccessor(repi)
3: return tpsucc
To compute the keys that are used for locking of the data item (as in Algorithm 3.23,
line 1) the equivalence class key identifiers are exploited. Algorithm 3.35 shows the
symmetric replication based lock key computation.
Algorithm 3.35 n.getRep(item, i) Returns the equivalence class key identifier given the
item and its replica enumerator i.
1: repi ← n.symm( fh(item.di.k), i)
2: return repi
Retrieval of data items from the local symmetric replication DHT storage (as in Al-
gorithm 3.23, line 2) is shown in Algorithm 3.34.
Storage of data items to the local symmetric replication DHT storage (as in Algo-
rithm 3.28, line 7) is shown in Algorithm 3.37.
During the course of a Paxos commit transaction nodes that do not participate to a
transaction itself can join and leave the execution environment. In the context of the ap-
plied symmetric replication DHT this means that node responsibilities over data items
are subject to change. In case a data item that is participating to the transaction changes
its responsible DHT node, the new responsible DHT node has to be informed about the
outcome of the transaction so as to stay consistent. To update the DHT nodes with the
latest values of the newly assigned data items the corresponding learner of the trans-
action has to propagate the outcome to the DHT node. In turn, newly assigned nodes
have to subscribe at the learners for data items of interest that are involved in ongoing
transactions. Algorithms 3.38 – 3.40 address the address the propagation of transaction
outcomes to newly assigned responsible nodes in the context of a symmetric replication
Chord.
To adapt for Paxos commit a symmetric replication DHT node has to feature learner
subscription capabilities for newly assigned data items. Whenever a DHT node extends
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Algorithm 3.36 n.getItem(item, i) Computes the equivalence class storage key of item
with respect to the replication factor enumerator i. Uses the storage key and i so as to
retrieve the item at the local node n.
1: ki ← n.getRep(item, i)
2: return di ← n.gets(ki, i)
Algorithm 3.37 n.putItem(item, i) Computes the storage equivalence class storage key of
item with respect to the replication factor enumerator i. Uses the storage key to store
item at the local node n.
1: ki ← n.getRep(item, i)
2: n.puts(item.di, ki, i))
its key identifier space partition it has to query the replicas sharing the same equiva-
lence class so as to restore replication factor of data items. In a Paxos commit based
symmetric replication, the extension of the key identifier space partition, induced by
the change of the predecessor, all equivalence class sharing replicas have to be queried.
Only when a majority of equivalence class sharing replicas features the same data item
value, consistency of the value is guaranteed, and it can be taken over by the newly
assigned DHT node. Algorithm 3.38 shows the adaptation of the symmetric replication
updatePredecessor() routine to Paxos commit.
Algorithm 3.38 n.updatePredecessor(n’) applies the symm on the extended key identifier
space partition interval determined by the new predecessor n′ and sends queries the all
replica nodes of the same equivalence class, by means of obtainInterval().
1: end ← fn(predecessor)
2: start ← fn(n′)
3: predecessor ← n′
4: if start < end then
5: for i ∈ R \ 1 do
6: x ← n.symm(start, i)
7: y ← n.symm(end, i)
8: nrsp ← n. f indSucc(x)
9: nrsp.obtainInterval(x, y, n)
10: end for
11: end if
Whenever a DHT node is requested to yield data items of a key identifier space inter-
val, by means of an obtainInterval request, it has to examine the data items for involve-
ment in Paxos commit transactions. In case they are involved in transactions they are
not propagated, rather the requesting node is subscribed for the outcome of the transac-
tion upon which the propagation will be made. To combine them, a symmetric replica-
tion DHT has to share the TxItems and Subscribers data structures with Paxos commit.
Algorithm 3.39 shows the adaptation of the symmetric replication obtainInterval()
routine to Paxos commit.
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Algorithm 3.39 n.obtainInterval(x, y, n′) given the bounds x and y selects all data items
located within these bounds at node n. It returns the data items to the specified node n′
by means of the replicate() operator if they are not participating to transactions. Other-
wise, subscribes n′ to the outcome of the involved transactions.
1: DataItems[][]← ∅
2: for i = x to y do
3: for j =∈ R do
4: dataItem ← n.gets(i, j)
5: InTx ← {(tx, k)|∀(tx, k) ∈ TxItems ∧ k = dataItem.di.k})
6: if InTx = ∅ then
7: DataItems[i][j]← dataItem
8: else
9: for (tx, k) ∈ InTx do
10: Subscribers[dataItem.di.k] ∪ (n′, tx)
11: end for
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: n′.replicate(x, y, DataItems)
All received data items at the newly responsible DHT node have to be buffered first
till a majority of replica nodes responses have arrived. Only when a majority of replicas
share the same data item value and this value features a higher timestamp then the
currently stored one (if any), global serializability is preserved and the received data
item can be accepted.
Propagation of data item transaction outcomes does not only restores the replication
factor but also it preserves consistency, i.e., global serializability. Omitted updating
of the data items will result in inconsistency among the replicas and incapability of
future transactions to change the data item. Recap, an optimistic serializability locking
attempt in face of outdated replica version (even at one node only) will never result in
a PREPARED vote and thus no commit.
Paxos commit discussion
Although Paxos commit facilitates a predictable (i.e., F failures out of 2F + 1 acceptors)
reliability and consistency of distributed transactions, the enhanced reliability does not
come without price. In general, Paxos commit introduces a significant message over-
head as compared to 2PC and additional message flow delays.
Whereas 2PC features a linear complexity O(r), in terms of exchanged messages
among participants, with respect to the replication factor r, Paxos commit features a
quadratic complexity O(r2). Namely, 2PC requires in an ideal case, which is free of
conflicts and failures, for each phase r messages. Given the four phases of 2PC (i.e.,
prepare, prepareAck, commit and commitAck) 4r messages are necessary to complete a
transaction.
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Algorithm 3.40 n.replicate(x, y, DataItems) stores to the buffer TempData at node n all
received DataItems after rearranging them so as to match the local equivalence class
key identifiers and replica identifiers. Once the buffer features a majority of data items
it stores value locally only if it is the latest one.
1: for i = x to y do
2: it ← n.symm(i, r)
3: for j ∈ R do
4: dataItem ← DataItems[i], [j]
5: rep ← n.symm(j, r)
6: TempData[(it, rep)] ∪ dataItem
7: if |TempData[(it, rep)]| ≥ ⌊r/2⌋+ 1 then
8: iteml ← n.latest(TempData[(it, rep)])
9: itemc ← n.gets(it, rep)
10: if iteml.ts > itemc.ts then
11: n.puts(item, it, rep)
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
On the other hand, Paxos commit features 7 phases (i.e., initPaxos, registerPaxos,
setTM, prepare, vote, voteAck and decision/outcome) out of which two phases feature
more than just r messages. That is, the decision/outcome phase features 2r messages as
r messages have to be sent to the acceptors and r to the learners. In turn, the vote phase
features r2 messages as each of the r learners has to inform the r acceptors about its
status. Hence, due to all phases and their individual message flows an ideal Paxos com-
mit amounts to r2 + 7r messages in total. Given the quadratic complexity (i.e.,O(r2))
Paxos commit is generally considered to be prohibitively expensive for replication fac-
tors higher than 5 (i.e., r > 5).
The aforementioned analysis of Paxos commit and 2PC assumes only one data item
subject to the transaction. In case of more data items, the complexities increase even
more and can be multiplied by the number of items i, thus making the protocols even
more expensive, i.e., i(r2 + 7r).
4
Distributed Workflow Management
Model
While the previous chapter introduced concepts w.r.t. the distributed management of
data, in this chapter theoretical background of our work is provided that addresses the
management of workflow definitions in a distributed fashion. This includes the formal
workflow definition model, distributed execution control concepts and systems descrip-
tions that conduct them. The complete model covers even the service heterogeneity
aspects of the use case scenario (i.e., modern emergency management) as discussed in
Chapter 2. That is, it compasses discrete and continuous service types as well. Towards
the end of this chapter an example of the distributed execution model is provided so as
to illustrate their applications in similar setting as in the motivation use case scenario.
The concepts elaborated in this chapter lay the formal groundwork for our contribution
in the upcoming chapters, but to some extent also correspond to the state-of-the-art in
the domain of distributed workflow execution.
4.1 Workflow Management
In order to comprehensively understand workflow definitions, we provide in this sec-
tion a formal model that declares them. Precisely, a workflow definition specifies a
dynamic execution process that combines various entities of a distributed system so as
to accomplish a comprehensive functionality or goal. The cornerstone of the workflow
definition are the services which represent steps in the execution process. That is, a ser-
vice and its corresponding invocation represents one step in the process of a workflow
definition execution.
A service encompasses a set of atomic operations that are subject to completion upon
its invocation. These operations are usually hidden from the end-user in a black-box
fashion. Different internal configurations of atomic operations constitute different types
of services. Different service types can interact among each other by exchanging data
that is produces as a consequence of their executions.
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In order for a service type to be compatible with any other service types, in terms of
data exchange, all service types have to adhere to a common data space. The common
data space can be encoded by means of a common data alphabetΦ. This way data can be
communicated among the service types and consumed without any preconditions. One
unit of communication among service types is the data item – di ∈ DI that conveys plain
payload information, represented with the common data alphabet Φ, and is identified
by unique key.
The payload conveyed by a data item can correspond to any entity (e.g., a blob, a
String, a complex data structure etc.) that can be encoded by means Φ. Data items
may also convey an empty information payload. Such data items are featured by ser-
vice types that are not relying on data at all (e.g., delay activities) for activation. As
suggested in the motivation chapter (i.e., Section 2.3) there might be different kinds of
interaction among the services when it comes to transfer data among them. While some
services feature simple transmissions of a few data items, others feature continuous
transmissions of potentially unlimited data item numbers. At the same time, the setting
of the execution environment does not have to be limited to one type of service only
as suggested in Section 2.3. Various (i.e., hybrid) combinations of services of different
interaction scenarios should be possible as well. To encompass the different interaction
scenarios among with our model we distinguish between discrete and continuous service
types.
In general, discrete service types are characterized by short lasting execution dura-
tion and limited produced/consumed data volumes. Moreover, discrete services do not
exhibit any internal state. In case they do, it is generally hidden away from the workflow
definition (i.e., the end-user) in a black-box fashion. Activation of discrete service types
is performed at runtime by means of invocation requests, that are usually accompa-
nied by data. Thereby, the invocation data features a finite set of semantically unrelated
data items. Once activated, the discrete service type executes its internal operations in
processing the incoming data items and produces new ones as the invocation result.
The newly produced data items can subsequently be transferred to other service types
which react to them in the same way. The actual transformation of incoming data items
into outgoing data items is determined by the service type (possibly stateless) business
logic that is hidden away from the end-user in a black-box fashion. Once its execution
finishes, the discrete service type is not any more active from a workflow definition exe-
cution point of view. Moreover, the finished service type is free to process new requests
from other workflow definitions in a completely new context independent of the previ-
ous one. This style of service type invocation constitutes the request-response fashioned
discrete execution of data. Formally, the discrete service type definition is provided as
follows:
Definition 4.1 (Discrete service type – sd). A discrete service type sd is defined as tuple
sd = (id, Id, Od, fp)
• id ∈ Φ is the service type identifier,
• Id is the set of input data items that are subject to processing with:
Id ⊆ DIn with n ∈ IN+ ∪ {0}
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• Od is the set of output data items that have been produced as a result of processing with:
Od ⊆ DIm with m ∈ IN+ ∪ {0}
• fp is the black-box business logic function that processes input data items into output data
items:
fp : Id ↦→ Od
□
Note, that a discrete service type can feature multiple input data items stemming
from different service types that are needed for its activation (i.e., n > 1). These are
referred to as the joining discrete service types. Likewise, multiple data items can be
created as output (i.e., m > 1) that are delivered to different service types for activa-
tion, as well. These kind of service types are referred to as the forking discrete service
types. In general, the input and output data items cardinalities do not have to match
necessarily (i.e. n ̸= m) and are dependent on the internal business logic.
However, not all service types tend to finish their execution in a foreseeable amount
of time. For instance, sensor device hosted service types execute their operations in-
definitely once activated. As a consequence of indefinite activation, continuous service
types tend to produce massive amounts of data items that are subject to consumption
by other service types of interest.
The processing of continuous data cannot be operated randomly on a first-come,
first-serve basis. This way the data production semantics of the continuous service type
will not be preserved in face of inherent distributed systems characteristics such as net-
work congestions. Rather, a continuous flow of data is always subject to a logical total
order that reflects the creation time of the containing data items. In other words, a con-
tinuous flow data item that has been produced before another data item must also be
sequentially processed before that other data item at a consuming service type. The to-
tally ordered continuous flow of data items is referred to as a data stream and is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 4.2 (Data stream – DST). A data stream DST is defined as potentially infinite and
totally ordered set of tuples DST = {(i, di)|i ∈ IN+, di ∈ DI} where i corresponds to the
logical creation sequence number within the data stream and di to the data payload information
represented by means of a data item. □
Since no service hosting node is physically capable of locally managing a potentially
infinite stream of data, the results of data stream processing have to be stored in some
form at the node. To this end service types employing the continuous data stream in-
troduce a internal state into which transient streaming data items are condensed (i.e.,
transformed) into. This internal state is subject to constant change and reflects the pre-
cessing results on the whole data stream encountered so far. However, since the state
affecting data streams are potentially infinite so can the state changes be. To denote
the continuously changing internal state of all data stream employing service types the
infinite set SS is used:
SS = {ss1, ss2, ss3, ...}
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The actual change in state is determined by the service type business logic (i.e., its
internal operations) that is hidden away from the end-user in a black-box fashion. The
business logic specifies how input data items are used to change the internal state and
how this change is propagated downstream by means of output data items. Once pro-
cessed and reflected in the internal state, each input stream data item can be physically
discarded at some point in time, thus offering room for future data item processing.
The businesses logic however, does not have to rely on input data necessarily so as to
change the internal state. When subjected to temporally scheduled processing business
logic may alter the internal state even though no data items are available at the input
stream. Formally, the continuous service type is defined as follows:
Definition 4.3 (Continuous service type – sc). A continuous service type sc is defined as
tuple sc = (id, ss, Ic, Oc, fc) where:
• id ∈ Φ is the service type identifier,
• ss ∈ SS is the current internal state,
• Ic is the potentially infinite set of data items as a Cartesian product over i input data
streams with:
Ic =
i
∏
x=0
DSTx with i ∈ IN+
• Oc is the potentially infinite set of data items as a Cartesian product over o output data
streams with:
Oc =
o
∏
x=0
DSTx with o ∈ IN+
• fc is the black-box business logic function that processes input streaming data items in
conjunction to the state to a new service type state and output data items:
fc : Ic × SS ↦→ SS×Oc
□
Note, that a streaming service types can feature multiple input (i.e., i ≥ 0) and output
(i.e., o ≥ 0) streams whose cardinalities do not have to match necessarily (i.e., i ̸= o).
These kind of continuous service types are responsible for the merging and/or forking
of the data flow. While forking a data stream is as simple as sending the same output
data item of a the stream to multiple disjoint service instances, merging is not as trivial.
Usually, windows on the incoming data streams, in terms on the number of data items,
are asserted which are then joined based on the specific implementation of the service
type business logic. Since data stream joins are streaming service type implementation
specific, they are not further discussed in the follow up of this section. Other important
information about streaming service types such as currently processed data items for
each input/output data streams are subsumed inside the internal state ss ∈ SS.
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Observe from the previous definition that continuous service types do not have to
feature any incoming or outgoing data streams (i.e., i = 0 ∨ j = 0) as well. In or-
der to qualify as of continuous type service types should not lack both input and out-
put streams at the same time. Continuous service types that do not feature input data
streams but feature output data streams (i.e., i = 0∧ j ̸= 0) are referred to as data sources.
Such service types are usually located at sensor devices and continuously produce data
items and for the subsequent service types to consume. Continuous service types that
do not feature output data streams but feature input data streams (i.e., i ̸= 0∧ j = 0) are
referred to as data sinks. Such service types are the end consumers of the data streaming
stemming from the data sources.
Given all possible discrete and continuous service types they can be encompassed
by one general set of all service types. The formal definition of the general service type
set is provided as follows:
Definition 4.4 (Service types – S). Let Sd be the set of all discrete service types and Sc be
the set of all continuous service types. The set of all service types is defined as the union of the
discrete and continuous service type sets:
S = Sd ∪ Sc
□
When it comes to deployment, all service types, both continuous and discrete, can
be offered by numerous nodes of an execution environment. The actual deployment of
a service type at a node corresponds to an instance of that service type. A workflow
definition execution environment is thus comprised by the sum of all service instances.
The formal definition of a service instance is provided as follows:
Definition 4.5 (Service instances – SI). The set of all service instances SI is defined by the
binary relation SI ⊆ (S× N) where S is the service type set and N is the set of nodes. □
Service types and their concrete instances are the cornerstones of workflow mod-
eling. They are subject to combining for execution and data exchange so as to create
comprehensive high-level functionality. Finally, the continuous data item model, of this
thesis corresponds to an abbreviated version of the formal data stream management
model as introduced by the OSIRIS-SE [BS11a] framework.
4.1.1 Workflow Definition Structure
A workflow definition is constituted by a set of service types and their binary relations.
The relations among the service types are structurally ordered so as to uphold the prece-
dence semantics of the workflow execution process. That is, an order of service types
invocations has to be specified that ultimately leads to the comprehensive functionality
of the end-user application modeled by the workflow definition.
In order to uphold the structural semantics of a workflow definition, in terms of in-
vocation precedence orders, instances of the specified service types have to be traversed
and invoked. Service instances that have been invoked and are currently active (i.e., in
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case there are concurrent ones) participate to the execution workflow definition and
share their results with the subsequent service instances. The consecutive invocation of
service instances in a ordered fashion is referred to as the control flow.
The execution of workflow definitions is additionally characterized by the data that
is exchanged among the service instances at each step of the execution. At service in-
stance invocation time data is consumed, and as a result of it new data is produced that
is in turn forwarded to the subsequent service instance for consumption and so on.
However, the nature of the encompassed activities does not have necessarily to co-
incide the with the nature of the control flow model from a data exchange point of view.
In practice, there might exist activities that are not relying on data at all (e.g., a delay or
synchronization activities) for invocation. On the other hand, there might exist activi-
ties that are relying on data that has been produced far back in the precedence order of
the control flow. Data agnostic service types can be omitted from the structure of the
workflow definition in the context of data exchange but not in the context of the control
flow.
Since the control flow cannot accurately capture all possible scenarios of data ex-
change a new model has to be introduced. The new model orders data exchange so as
to conform with the flow of control. For instance, only invoked activities can produce
data and exchange this data with other activities that are also subject to invocation.
The control flow bounded and ordered exchange of data constitutes the data flow of the
workflow definition. For the data flow to coincides with the control flow its data ex-
change relations have to correspond to a sequence of service invocation control flow
relations. This implies the relations of data flow model to be transitive closures of the
control flow relations. With respect to the structure of the control flow and data flow
relations a formal workflow definition is described as follows:
Definition 4.6 (Workflow definition – wf). A workflow definition w f is defined as tuple
w f = (A,≺c f ,≺d f ) where:
• A is a finite set of activities that corresponds to a subset of service types that are subject to
invocation with:
A ⊆ S
• ≺c f is the finite set of control flow binary relations among the activities, such that they
represent the invocation order of the specified activities with:
≺c f⊆ (A× A)
• ≺d f is the finite set of data flow binary relations among the activities such that they rep-
resent the data exchange order of the specified activities and they are transitive closures of
the control flow relations with:
≺d f⊆ (A× A)
The set of all workflow definitions is denoted as WF. □
Note, that activities correspond to invocations of service types. The actual selection
of the concrete service instance to carry out the activity takes place at runtime. This
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is referred to as late binding of the activity to a service instance. Regarding the control
flow, the precedence order semantics represent the order in which the service types are
invoked. For instance, a relation (x, y) ∈ ≺c f with x ∈ A and y ∈ A refers to the fact
that an instance of service type x is invoked before an instance of service type y. On the
other hand, in the context of the data flow, the precedence order semantics represent the
order in which data is produced and subsequently consumed. For instance, a relation
(x, y) ∈≺d f with x ∈ A and y ∈ A refers to the fact that activity y consumes data which
is produced by activity x.
In order to ensure semantically meaningful structuring of workflow definitions
which result in coherent wholes, we mandate the workflow definition structures to be
strongly connected. Strong connectivity of workflow definition structures implies con-
trol flow precedence order relations that guarantee invocations of all specified activities
inside the workflow definition. Activities that will not be eventually invoked, given
thee control flow relations structure, cannot exist in a strongly connected workflow def-
inition.
Strong connectivity necessitates our service type model to be further enhanced with
two artificial service types which denote the start and the end of a workflow defini-
tion execution. In other words, only the invocation of those two special service types
can start/end the workflow definition execution process, respectively. While structur-
ing a workflow definition, we restrict ourselves to only one encompassed start activity,
whereas the end activity can be encompassed multiple times. To achieve strong con-
nectivity there has to exist a transitive closure inside the control flow between the start
activity and the set of end activities. Moreover, any activity has to be in a transitive
closure relation with the start activity and the set of end activities w.r.t. the control flow.
For all the aforementioned structural requirements we specify a well-formed workflow
definition formally as follows:
Definition 4.7 (Well-formed workflow definitions). A workflow definition w f is well-
formed if:
• For each workflow definition there exist only one start activity as and a set of end activities
Ae with:
{as} ∈ A, Ae ⊆ A
• With respect to the control flow there is no other activity that comes before the start activity
as and no activity that comes after the end activities in Ae:
∀ax ∈ A \ as : ∄(ax, as) ∈≺c f and ∀ay ∈ A \ Ae ∧ ∀ae ∈ Ae : ∄(ae, ay) ∈≺c f
• Every activity of Ae is transitively connected to as in ≺c f ,
• Every activity ax ∈ A \ {as ∪ Ae} is transitively connected to as and at least one activity
of Ae in ≺c f . □
By being strongly connected from an control flow point of view, workflow defini-
tions are also strongly connected from an data flow point of view. Recap, all data flow
activity relations are transitive closures of strongly connected control flow relations,
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hence they also must be strongly connected. This implies that for any data produc-
ing activity, except the artificial start and end activities, there must be an activity that
consumes this data.
Analogous to SOA encapsulation whole workflow definitions themselves can map
to superordinate service types in which case they can be used recursively as activities
of other workflow definitions. The structure of a workflow definition can be repre-
sented with a directed graph that consists of nodes and edges among them. Naturally,
the nodes correspond to the activities, whereas the edges to precedence order relations
among them. Given the two types of relations among activities (i.e., data and control
flow) there also exist two types of graphs.
Example 4.1
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example of a well-formed workflow definition. The example
workflow corresponds to a simplified version of the workflow as introduced in the mo-
tivation chapter, i.e., Figure 2.3. As this figure shows this structure is composed of six
activities. Namely, the start activity, the location activity, the weather activity, the map
activity, the heat-map activity and the end activity. The precedence order relations of the
control flow are depicted with the directed arrows, such that the preceding activity di-
rects the arrow to the succeeding activity. In accordance Definition 4.7 the start and end
activities are necessary so as to start and end the execution.
This workflow definition is structured in such a way so that start activity precedes
the location activity. This service type queries the GPS location of an person given its id
with the start service type. Once the coordinates of this person have been determined
they are used to query the weather as well as the topological map of these coordinates
by means of their corresponding activities. The querying of the weather activity and the
map activity can be achieved in parallel as they are independent activity. Once all of the
data has been retrieved it is sent to the heat-map activity which subsequently computes
a heat-map for the specified person. As the heat-map activity precedes the end activity
the execution of the workflow definition is finished by sending the heat-map to the end
activity.
4.1.2 Workflow Definition Execution
In order to uphold the structural semantics of a workflow definition regarding the prece-
dence order of invocations, the specified activities have to be traversed and invoked in
an ordered fashion at runtime. This implies certain service instances only to be in-
vokable once the invocation of their preceding service instances has finished and not
before that. Given the characteristics of a distributed system such as concurrency, fault-
tolerance and scalability of service instances, one can assume that no two executions of
a workflow definition are likely to behave in the exact same way.
To describe the runtime execution behavior of a workflow definition late-binding of
service instances is considered. Precisely, at runtime a workflow definition execution ex-
hibits a dynamically changing state that features the currently invoked (i.e., late-bound)
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Figure 4.1: The structure of a workflow definition.
activities, the competed activities and the subsequent activities that still have to be late-
bound. Moreover, the workflow execution state features the set of service instances that
are currently late-bound of the invoked activities. To keep a track of the late-binding in
the course of the workflow instance execution a history of the invoked service instances
is maintained as well. The dynamically changing execution state is conveyed by means
of an instance of the workflow definition that traverses the specified service instances
and triggers their execution. Formally, an instance of a workflow definition is defined
as follows:
Definition 4.8 (Workflow instance – wi). An instance wi of a workflow definition is defined
as tuple wi = (w f , Ac, Aa, As, SIc, SIa) where:
• id ∈ K is the unique identifier of the workflow instance,
• w f ∈ WF is the workflow instance’s definition,
• Ac is the subset of activities of the workflow definition w f that have been completed with
Ac ⊆ w f .A
• Aa is the subset of activities of the workflow definition w f that are currently active with
Aa ⊆ w f .A
• As is the subset of activities of the workflow definition w f that are subsequent for activa-
tion invocation with Aa ⊆ w f .A
• SIc is the finite subset of service instances that have carried out the execution of the com-
pleted activities with:
SIc ⊆ SI where ∀ac ∈ Ac∃sic ∈ SIc : sic.s = ac
• SIa is the finite subset of service instances that are carrying out the execution of the cur-
rently invoked activities with:
SIa ⊆ SI where ∀aa ∈ Aa∃sia ∈ SIa : sia.s = aa
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The set of all workflow instances is denoted as WI. □
Note, that the subsets are Ac, Aa and As are all disjoint but together correspond to
the activity set of the workflow definition w f :
Ac ∩ Aa ∩ As = ∅ ∧ Ac ∪ Aa ∪ As = w f .A
In practice, the existence of multiple instances of the same workflow definition is very
likely, e.g., in case of parallel branches. Our model mandates however that each in-
stance can only be in charge of its own state and does not interfere with the state of other
instances. Multiple instances do not share their execution state for the purpose of col-
laborative change. From an practical point of view however, this assumption strongly
depends on implementation of the storage facility that manages the instances and might
be capable of accessing other instances.
The state of the workflow instance is subject to change in the course of time. During
the execution of a workflow instance activities are invoked and subsequently completed
only to be succeeded with new activities of the predefined control flow. The change to
the invoked activity set Aa in time is consequently attended to in the active service
instances set SIa and the completed service instance set SIc. That is, active service in-
stances that carry out the execution of activities in Aa will be located in SIa whereas the
finished ones in SIc. The workflow instance state does not have to change only w.r.t.
the activity sets. Activities of longer lifespan are also subject to change in time w.r.t.
their internal state. For example, streaming service instances continuously process in-
coming/outgoing data stream objects and as a result change their internal state. The
temporal change to workflow instance execution state is summarized as follows:
Corollary 4.9 (Temporal workflow instance state transition). The temporal version history
of all workflow instances is defined by the binary relation WIt ⊆ (T ×WI) where T is the
timestamp set and WI workflow instance set subject to versioning.
A workflow definition instance wi has advanced its execution state if in the instance history
WIt exists a newer version of the instance:
∃(tx, wi), (ty, wi) ∈ WIt =⇒ tx < ty
□
Given that service instances can have different state change semantics, we have to
distinguish the temporal changes of workflow instance by taking separately into con-
sideration the control-flow and the data-flow. Any change to workflow instance state,
induced by the flow of control, necessary implies the change in one of the activity sets,
i.e., Ac, Aa or As. Control flow based invocations and completions of service instances
cause transitions of the corresponding activities through the activity sets starting at As
and ending at Ac. This is in particular the case for service instances of discrete type.
Changes to workflow instance state, induced by the flow of data, implies the change to
the internal state of the activated service instances. The data flow caused transition of
data items among the activated service instance results in data item transformation and
4.1 Workflow Management 93
possibly change of the internal state of the traversed service instances. Data flow based
change to workflow instance state mainly affects streaming service instances.
The control flow based change of a workflow instance w.r.t. its activity sets (i.e.,
Ac, Aa, As) between two versions (tx, wi), (ty, wi) ∈ WIt is denoted as:
wi.Ac
≺c f−−→ wi.A′c
wi.Aa
≺c f−−→ wi.A′a
wi.As
≺c f−−→ wi.A′s
This implies that the set of currently active activities Aa of the workflow instance wi at
timestamp tx has changed at timestamp ty because:
• Either some activities have finished their execution and have flowed over into the
completed activity set:
wi.Ac
≺c f−−→ wi.A′c =⇒ Ac ̸= A′c ∧ (wi.A′c ∩ wi.Aa) ̸= ∅ ∧ (wi.Ac ∩ wi.A′a) = ∅
• Or some activities scheduled for activation have been activated and have flowed
over into the currently active set:
wi.As
≺c f−−→ wi.A′s =⇒ As ̸= A′s ∧ (wi.A′s ∩ wi.Aa) = ∅ ∧ (wi.As ∩ wi.A′a) ̸= ∅
If at least one of the two cases occurs and either As or Ac over time then Aa must
also change for wi by default:
wi.Aa
≺c f−−→ wi.A′a =⇒ wi.Ac
≺c f−−→ wi.A′c ∨ wi.As
≺c f−−→ wi.A′s
Naturally, the changes to the invoked activity set Aa have to be accompanied by
changes of service instance sets SIa and SIc. For every invoked activity there has to
exist a corresponding service instance in SIa that carries out the execution. Likewise,
activities that have been completed and are not any more located inside the active set
Aa should represented with service instances in completed service instance set SIc:
wi.SIa
≺c f−−→ wi.SI′a =⇒ (wi.SIa \ wi.SI′a) ∩ wi.SI′c ̸= ∅
Given the temporal changes of a workflow instances, at runtime activities of a work-
flow definition are flowing over from the subsequent activity set As to completed ac-
tivity set Ac through the invoked activity set Aa. Hence, the initial state of a workflow
instance wi assumes only the subsequent activity set As to feature activities, whereas
the other ones to be empty:
∃(ts, wi) ∈ WIt ∧ ∄(tx, wi) ∈ WIt :
tx < ts ∧ wi.Ac = ∅ ∧ wi.Aa = ∅ ∧ wi.As ̸= ∅ ∧ wi.SIa = ∅ ∧ wi.SIc = ∅
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The end state of a workflow instance is not as clear as the initial. In the presence
of non-deterministic activities in the workflow definition, some activity branches might
not get invoked at runtime. As a consequence, they will never leave the subsequent
activity set As and feature corresponding service instances in SIc. This implies that As
does not have to be completely empty for a workflow instance to complete its execution.
Hence, we conclude a workflow instance to be completed if it does not feature active
service instances and if there does not exist a newer one in the temporal version history
WIt:
∃(te, wi) ∈ WIt ∧ ∄(tx, wi) ∈ WIt :
tx > te ∧ wi.Ac ̸= ∅ ∧ wi.Aa = ∅ ∧ wi.SIa = ∅ ∧ wi.SIc ̸= ∅
Advanced Discrete Workflow Execution Models
The distributed workflow execution model naturally assumes well-formed structures of
workflows so as to guarantee successful completion of a distributed execution. Given
the inherent characteristics of distributed systems such as node failures or uniqueness
of certain service types, the distributed model is subject to advancement so as to guar-
antee the termination of a workflow instance at runtime for any kind of unforeseeable
circumstances. For example, if a service type that is provided at only one node fails
as a consequence other workflow instances in the context of their subsequent activity
sets are affected. Since invocations of encompassed activities of a workflow definition
are of atomic nature it is desirable to extend atomicity of execution on the whole work-
flow definition, as well. In turn, the whole workflow definition can be abstracted as an
atomic service type itself and encompassed by other workflow definitions.
By enhancing the distributed workflow execution model along the lines of activity
semantics, alternative execution paths of the same semantical meaning, can be sup-
ported so as to guarantee termination of execution for any kind of activity outage. Se-
mantic distributed workflow execution implies the distinction of all activities into com-
pensatable, retriable and pivot activities in conjunction to a preference order control flow.
• Compensatable – A compensatable activity features an inverse that can undo its
effects on the execution. The compensatable-inverse activity pairs have to be ex-
plicitly specified.
• Retriable – A retriable activity features multiple retires until its invocation is suc-
cessful.
• Pivot – A pivot activity is neither compensatable nor retriable. Pivots are the safe-
points of the semantic execution.
While the semantically alternative execution paths need to be constructed out of
the aforementioned activity types their sequential ordering is explicitly determined by
means of the preference order. Precisely, the preference order defines paths that lead
back to the most recent pivots, by activating compensating activities, upon which an
alternative (composed of retriable activities) path may be chosen. If provided explicitly
at the time of workflow structuring, precedence order paths guarantee termination of
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execution at runtime. By falling back to alternative paths in case of node failures the
execution of workflow instances can be always continued.
In order to adhere to the advanced distributed workflow execution models, prefer-
ence order paths need to be added to the workflow definition model explicitly. This
in turn necessitates all compensation activities to be added to the subsequent activity
set As at all workflow instances whenever a node failure occurs. The compensation ac-
tivities can be added dynamically for each workflow instance, while recovering node
failures, or at workflow instance creation time. The later case however, implies that
workflow instances can finish their execution with an non empty subsequent activity
set (i.e., As ̸= ∅ – in case there are no failures). Regardless of the approach, addition
of new activities to the subsequent activity set As enables atomicity of the distributed
workflow instance execution model.
Streaming Workflow Execution Model
Execution of workflow instances which are encompassing streaming service types are
not as much influenced by the control flow as in the case of discrete service types. At
best, the control-flow represents for the streaming instances the order in which they are
invoked (i.e., activated). Rather streaming instances of a workflow feature a consequent
sequence of As set changes upon which they are all continue to be active for a longer
period in time. During this time the streaming service instances jointly process the
transient data streams and will not change from a control flow point of view any more.
At a much later point in time, once all the data streams have been processed streaming
workflow instances feature a consequent sequence of Ac set changes which effectively
stop their execution.
Therefore, streaming service instances are predominantly influenced by the data
flow instead of the control flow. Caused by the continuous processing of data streams
for any given point in time streaming service instances will feature an updated internal
state (i.e., si.s.ss) of the corresponding service type. Either they will have processed an
input data item and as a consequence of this updated the internal state, or they will
have produced an output data item based on the current state.
Hence, the state of a workflow instance, that is characterized by a continuous data
flow, can at a certain point in time (i.e., wit) be represented with the state function fst
as the Cartesian product over the internal states of each active streaming instance (i.e.,
wit.wi.SIa) as follows:
fst : WIt ↦→ SSi with i ∈ IN+ ∪ 0 where fst(wit) = ∏
si∈wit.wi.SIa
si.s.ss
The data flow based change of a workflow instance wi w.r.t. its active service instance
set SIa between two versions (tx, wi), (ty, wi) ∈ WIt is denoted as:
wi.SIa
≺d f−−→ wi.SI′a
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This temporal change implies that there is at least one streaming service instance has
changed its internal service type state and two temporal versions of the same instance
cannot be same w.r.t. to fst :
wi.SIa
≺d f−−→ wi.SI′a =⇒ wi.SIa = wi.SI′a where
∀(tx, wi) ∈ WIt ∄(ty, wi) ∈ WIt : fst((tx, wi)) = fst((ty, wi))
In general, there is more to the internal state of a continuous service type than just
plain data item processing results. Internal state conveys also other important runtime
information such as unprocessed data items of the corresponding input/output data
streams. Input stream data items usually reside (sequentially ordered) inside buffers
and wait for their turn to be processed by the business logic. Likewise, output stream
data items also reside in buffers and wait to be sent through the network to the subse-
quent service instances. While waiting for their processing turn streaming data items
are subsumed by the internal state of a service instance. More details on streaming ser-
vices state in conjunction to a formalized description of it can be found under [BS11b].
The continuous data flow can be in a real world distributed system subject to in-
terruption due to network congestions and failures etc. Especially if mobile nodes are
involved in workflow instance, data items of a stream might get lost or delayed, nodes
processing them might fail etc. For most end-user application scenarios even the slight-
est disruption of the data flow (e.g., the loss of a single streaming data item) is not an
option as it might cause the loss of crucial information (e.g., the emergency management
scenario). In order to prevent the disruption of the continuous data flow due to node
failures, the internal state of activated service instance (and everything it subsumes)
has to be applied redundantly. To this end streaming systems generally apply one of
the redundancy strategies, that are widely known in literature as i.e., active-standby and
passive-standby.
Active-standby imposes the creation of completely redundant and secondary data
flow that is carried out by redundant service instances in parallel. This redundant data
flow is only used in case there is a failure in the primary data flow, otherwise the tran-
sient data items are discarded. Given a highly voluminous data flow, that is composed
of numerous service instances, active-standby is commonly considered as a very ex-
pensive redundancy strategy w.r.t. resource consumption. A far more resource friendly
approach to data flow redundancy, i.e., passive-standby, imposes periodic backups of
the internal state for each service instance at a backup node. Passive-standby saves re-
sources (e.g., bandwidth and storage) by storing the state of streaming instance at the
backup node in regular intervals and not for every change of the internal state.
Periodic backups in passive-standby do not only help to save resources, they also fa-
cilitate seamless recovery of the data flow by redirecting the affected data streams to the
backup node in the event of an original service instance failure. In case a failure occurs,
the upstream service instance detects by means of periodic timeouts the disappearance
of the downstream service instance and redirects the whole data stream to the backup
node. Figure 4.2 illustrates the passive-standby recovery strategy.
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Figure 4.2: Continuous data flow with periodic backups that is subject to node failure.
Example 4.2
The example shown in Figure 4.2 depicts the passive-standby recovery of a data flow
node failures. As the figure shows the nodes A, B and C are streaming instances.
Thereby, node A is of different service type (depicted with the maps icon) than the
nodes B and C (depicted with the sink icon). Being of continuous service type all nodes
also feature an internal state (depicted with the cylinder icon). As illustrated node A
is the upstream streaming instance of node B and sends a data stream (i.e., DST1) of
data items to it, whereas node C is the backup node for node B. In conjunction to the
data stream DST2 which node B sends downstream to some other node, it also sends
periodic backups of its state SSb (depicted with the orange thick arrow) to node C. In
turn, node B acknowledges successful backups at (i.e., depicted with the black arrow) B
to node A
In case of a failure of node B the data flow is recovered in the passive-standby sense
by redirecting the data stream DST1 to the backup node C. Based on the locally existing
backed-up state SSb at node C and the redirected data stream DST1, node C resumes
the streaming of the data flow DST2. Moreover, node C finds its backup site of the same
service type at the node D, which is thereafter provided with regular checkpoints of
node C’s state.
The longer the backup intervals are the more resources are saved, but also the longer
it takes for the backup node to recover the state at which the original streaming instance
failed. It is reasonable to assume that the backup will not feature the latest state of
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the failed service instance at the time of a failure. Rather the difference of the backup
node state and the state failed service instance will correspond to the number of data
items that have been processed since the last checkpoint. The lost state can however be
recovered by replying the state transitions at the backup node with the same data items
as the failed service instance did. For this purpose the upstream service instance has to
resend the missing data items to the backup node. In order to be able to know which
data items to send, a downstream node has to acknowledge its checkpoint, i.e., the
backed up state along with the last input data item, to the upstream node. Based on the
checkpoint the upstream node can deduce the data items to be resent, and the backup
can based on its state resume stream processing The exact backup interval duration is
usually end-user application specific and is provided by means of ωch. Algorithm 4.1
shows the continuous data flow processing in conjunction to periodic check-pointing of
the service instance state.
Algorithm 4.1 si.dataFlow(). Continuously reads all data items (DII1, DII2, ..., DIIn) for
each input stream of Ic. Updates the internal state of the service instance si to ssnew
and creates output data items (DIO1, DIO2, ..., DIOm) for each output stream Oc. In case
the checkpoint window ωch has been exceeded at current timestamp τcurrent it performs
the checkpoint at the backup service instance set SIch. For a successful backup it sends
an acknowledgment message to each upstream service instance of SIup that features a
return value of the backup procedure and the last processed data item of each upstream
service instance.
1: while true do
2: (DII1, DII2, ..., DIIn)← n.getDI(Ic)
3: ((DIO1, DIO2, ..., DIOm), ssnew)← fst((DII1, DII2, ..., DIIn), si.s.ss)
4: si.s.ss ← ssnew
5: n.putItem(Oc, (DIO1, DIO2, ..., DIOm))
6: if τcurrent − τch ≥ ωch then
7: retVal ← n.backup(ssnew, SIch)
8: τch ← τcurrent
9: if retVal ̸= null then
10: SIup ← n.getUpstreamNodes()
11: for i = 1 to |SIup| do
12: sii ← SIup[i]
13: sii.acknowledge(DIIi, retVal)
14: end for
15: end if
16: end if
17: end while
Note, that the backup routine backup() is in charge of replicating the latest service
instance state to the backup service instance set SIch. In the traditional passive-standby
sense this set features only one service instance (i.e., |SIch| = 1). Acknowledgment does
not only help to deduce the missing data items for failure recovery, it also facilitates
the detection of downstream node failures. In case the downstream service instance
acknowledgments are delayed for a longer period of time, the service instance can as-
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sume the downstream service instance to have failed. In such a situation the affected
data stream can be redirected to the backup service instance and all data items starting
from the last acknowledgment resent. Algorithm 4.2 shows the recovery of a down-
stream service instance induced by an missing acknowledgment timeout.
Algorithm 4.2 si.ackTimeout(si f ) In the event of service instance si f failure redirects its
output stream DSTs to the backup service instance sibk.
1: DSTs ← si.getStream(si.s.ss, si f )
2: ∃sibk ∈ SIch : sibk.s.ss = si f .s.ss
3: si.setStream(si.s.ss, sibk, DSTs)
Observe from Algorithm 4.1 (i.e., line no.8), that the throughput of the service in-
stance data flow depends on the efficiency of the backup process itself. In case the
backup process is fast, the streaming instance will instantaneously address the input
data streams so as to consume their data items and to transition its state. On the other
hand, if the backup process is blocking due to the way it is implemented, then pro-
cessing of the subsequent data items has to wait until the backup has been completed.
Depending on the end-user application the service instances the routine backup can
be implemented to be synchronous (i.e., blocking) or asynchronous (i.e., non-blocking)
w.r.t. the data flow. Asynchronous backup processes feature high throughput of the data
flow at the price of higher recovery time. That is, upstream service instances can only
be acknowledged once the backup has been asynchronously completed thus causing a
greater gap between the current and the backed-up state.
4.2 Workflow Execution Environment
The purpose of this section is to provide conceptual insights on the execution model
for workflow definition on which our work is founded. First we elaborate the distribu-
tion concepts behind workflow engine system services. Afterwards, we shed light on
the distributed data management concepts on which the system service distribution is
built. Finally, we provide an illustrative example that demonstrates the execution of a
workflow definition based on our approach.
4.2.1 Distributed Orchestration Service
As discussed in the motivation chapter (i.e., Chapter 2) of this thesis an ideal workflow
engine implies scalability and resource conservation. Precisely, it should be possible
to distribute the engine to the biggest available set of nodes (e.g., at all nodes in the
execution environment) while consuming only very few memory, CPU and network
resources at them.
So far the Peer-To-Peer approach has been identified as a convenient way to dis-
tribute critical functionalities (e.g., data management) among all available nodes so as
to overcome the drawbacks of centralization. In the context of workflow instance ex-
ecution, this implies that the overall orchestration workload of the engine has to be
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collaboratively shared among all available nodes. That is, all nodes in the environment
should be able to orchestrate workflow instances and thus invoke application service in-
stance. Therefore, the global orchestration functionality is partitioned among all nodes
in a Peer-to-Peer fashion by distributing the orchestration system service to them – this
primarily includes the application service providers. The service type so is henceforth
referred as the orchestration service and offers the functionality of distributed orches-
tration of workflow instances, such that it is deployed at nodes of interest inside an
execution environment:
∃so ∈ S ∧ ∃SIo = {sio ∈ SI|∀sio ∈ SI sio.s = so}
Nodes hosting the orchestration service are referred to as the orchestrator nodes. The
global orchestration functionality is partitioned in a way, which enables each node to
orchestrate only locally available application services. Since in practice, no orchestrator
is locally equipped with all possible application service types for all existing workflow
definitions they have to collaborate by forwarding an instance of a workflow definition
among each other. Thereby, only the orchestrator in possession of the instance can in-
voke the locally available application service instances and thus change its execution
state whereas the other ones have to wait for their turn. Upon completion of the local
application service instance invocations the control over the running workflow instance
has to be transferred to another orchestrator node capable of advancing the execution.
This approach to orchestrator collaboration naturally fits the control flow execution
semantics of our workflow definition model. The forwarding of a workflow instance
among the distributed orchestration services at runtime follows (is bound to) the state
transition semantics of a workflow instance. Whenever the active service instance set
(SIa) of a workflow instance changes, late-binding of orchestrators that locally host the
currently active service instances will be performed. That is, they will receive the work-
flow instance from the previous orchestrator.
4.2.2 Orchestration Service Metadata
The distribution of the workflow engine among application service providers in a Peer-
to-Peer fashion is feasible only if the corresponding system services are empowered
with local data. In case of the orchestration service, for a node to be able to au-
tonomously migrate workflow definition instances it has to be locally informed about
the current state of the global execution environment. In particular, information on the
currently available service instances, their host workloads, their host locations etc. is
of the utmost interest to an orchestrator. Service instance host metadata empowers the
orchestrators to make sound decisions as on where to forward the workflow definition
instances at control flow migration time. In case this metadata is provided locally in-
terference of a centralized authority is averted and thus scalability of the control flow
migration is guaranteed. The formal definition of the service instance host metadata
used for late-binding of the workflow instances is provided as follows:
Definition 4.10 (Service host metadata – h). The host metadata of a node n ∈ N at timestamp
t ∈ T is defined as tuple h(n, t) = l where l is current workload of node n with 0 ≤ l ≤
100∧ l ∈ IR+. □
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Note, that H is disjoint based on the node identifier value n. A node can only fea-
ture one load and location address value at the same time. In order to prevent overload
at the orchestrator nodes with excessive information on whole execution environment
downsizing of the metadata volumes has to be performed. Thereby, nodes locally only
maintain metadata that is relevant to their orchestration tasks. Selection of relevant
metadata is performed on a need-to-know basis depending on locally available appli-
cation service instances and the workflow structures that encompass them.
Precisely, given all workflow definitions structures, only execution environment
metadata that characterizes remote service instance hosts which are direct successors to
the locally available services instances are considered as relevant. In other words, only
possible control flow successor host metadata is locally stored. Metadata on service in-
stance hosts which will never be used for workflow instance migration, due to lack of
subsequent application services, can be omitted. This way the amount of metadata at
a peer can be significantly reduced. The actual amount of shipped data is dependent
on the number of existing workflow definitions and the number of application service
instances. For this to work, each peer additionally requires data on all workflow def-
initions. Based on this data a peer can autonomously determine the next step of the
execution path for all succeeding application services.
An important aspect of the Peer-to-Peer metadata maintenance is its complete sep-
aration from the control flow. Peers should not have to query other peers, or some
centralized authority for metadata at workflow definition instance migration time and
thus slow down the orchestration process. Rather, the metadata should be locally avail-
able even before the migration happens so as to facilitate efficient (i.e., immediate) local
migration decision making.
Separation of data management from the control flow facilitates scalability of the dis-
tributed orchestration service as arbitrary numbers of workflow definition instances can
easily be ceded to the orchestrator nodes for autonomously steering of their executions.
In order to empower the nodes with the most necessary metadata in a timely fashion
data replication has to be applied. The data replication should operate in concurrence to
the control flow migration, and continuously update the node metadata for any change
of it. Given the continuous metadata replication process, the distributed orchestration
service at a peer can rely upon the locally available metadata whilst deciding on where
to migrate the workflow definition instances.
To keep the data replication process free of uncontrolled flooding, and thus efficient,
our approach is based on a publish-subscribe (i.e., pub/sub) replication scheme. Or-
chestrator nodes issue subscriptions with a clear intent for interested host metadata,
that is based on workflow definition precedence orders. Precisely, for a given workflow
definition orchestrator nodes only subscribe for metadata of hosts that feature successor
activities for the locally hosted service types. In turn, they are supplied with the sub-
scribed metadata whenever there is a significant update to it. For the pub/sub scheme
to work all orchestrator nodes also have to publish significant changes of their metadata,
which is further propagated for any existing subscription to them.
Subscription creation is only a feature of the orchestration service functionality. Each
orchestration service enabled node, has to create subscriptions for all of its locally hosted
service instances, such that all workflow definitions, that could request orchestration
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decisions from it, are covered. The formal definition of a subscription is provided as
follows:
Definition 4.11 (Metadata subscriptions – sub). A subscription for execution environment
metadata, issued by the orchestrator service instance sio ∈ SIo, is defined as tuple sub(sio) =
(w f , sil, Asucc) where:
• w f ∈ WF is a workflow definition,
• sil is the local service instance for which the subscription is issued by sio:
sil ∈ SI ∧ sil.n = sio.n
• Asucc is the activity subset of w f .A that sio subscribes to such that service instances
featuring activities of Asucc succeed sil, w.r.t. control flow, with:
Asucc = {a ∈ wi.A|∀a ∈ wi.A ∃(sil.s, a) ∈ w f . ≺c f }
The set of all subscriptions issued by one orchestrator service instance is denoted as SUB(sio),
whereas the set of all subscriptions for all orchestrator service instances SUB. □
The global metadata repository maintains all information that is necessary for au-
tonomous control flow migration. The specific sets that are necessary so as to power the
orchestration service consists of the workflow definition set WF, the service instance set
SI, the subscription set SUB and the hosts set H. That is, the global metadata repository
aggregates all existing workflow definitions, all existing service instances, all metadata
subscriptions for all nodes and all current workloads for all nodes. The formal defini-
tion of the repositories is provided as follows:
Definition 4.12 (Global metadata repository – ρ). The global repository ρ is defined as union
of the workflow definition set WF, the service instance set SI, the subscriptions set SUB and the
hosts metadata set H with:
ρ = WF ∪ SI ∪ SUB ∪ H
. □
By default all service orchestration nodes of an execution environment are always
subscribed to the global metadata repository ρ. The mandatory subscription to ρ enables
the orchestrator nodes to learn about new workflow definitions and to consequently
deduce new successor application activities they are obliged to subscribe for.
∀sio ∈ SI where si.s = so =⇒ SUB(si.n) ̸= ∅
Whenever a new workflow definition is added to the repository subscriptions are cre-
ated based on control flow precedence orders. Precisely, each service instance is pro-
vided with subscriptions on other service instances that are succeeding it in the prece-
dence order of the control flow of the newly added workflow definition. Only metadata
on the subscribed succeeding service instances thus needs be replicated to the orches-
trator nodes. Algorithm 4.3 describes in detail the subscription creation in the event of
a new workflow definition addition.
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Figure 4.3: Repository metadata exchange.
Control flow based subscriptions imply that orchestrator nodes rely on parts (i.e.,
subsets) of the global repository metadata. That is, orchestrator are only interested in a
subset of the global metadata repository ρ that reflects the current state of the succeeding
service instances for a given subscription. This metadata subset is locally stored at the
orchestrator nodes so that they can manage workflow instance runtime without having
to query the repository. Formally, the orchestrator node local metadata is defined as
follows:
Definition 4.13 (Orchestrator service metadata – md). Execution environment metadata
md locally maintained by the orchestrator sio is defined by the tuple md(sio) = (subl(sio), ρh)
such that:
• subl(sio) ∈ SUB is the subscription issued by the orchestrator sio on behalf of a local
service instance,
• ρh is the locally maintained subset of the global repository, w.r.t. the local subscription
subl(sio), with:
ρh = {h(n, t) ∈ H|∀asucc ∈ subl(sio).Asucc∃(asucc, n) ∈ SI}
The set of all execution environment metadata for one orchestrator service instance is defined
as MD(sio), whereas the set of all metadata for all orchestrator service instances is defined as
MD. □
The orchestrator service metadata is subject to continuous updates by means of the
pub/sub replication mechanism. Whenever a subscription is issued to the subscriptions
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Algorithm 4.3 ρ.addW f (w f ) creates subscriptions for all service instances of SI on suc-
ceeding service instances for the control flow of w f , in the global repository ρ.
1: WF ∪ w f
2: for si ∈ SI do
3: Asucc = {asucc ∈ w f .A|∀asucc ∈ w f .A(si.s, asucc) ∈ w f . ≺c f }
4: if Asucc ̸= ∅ then
5: sub((so, si.n))← (w f , si, Asucc)
6: SUB ∪ sub
7: for all a ∈ Asucc : a.isSecondary do
8: if a.isSecondary() then
9: ρ.subscription(sub((so, si.n)), false)
10: else
11: ρ.subscription(sub((so, si.n)), true)
12: end if
13: end for
14: end if
15: end for
repository, the hosts metadata has to be selected that is featured by the subscribed ser-
vice instances. Subsequently, the selected hosts metadata is published to the subscribed
orchestrator node. Algorithm 4.4 shows the metadata publishing routine.
Algorithm 4.4 ρ.subscription(sub(sio), f orward) selects metadata out of the hosts set H
that is featured by the service instances of the given subscription sub. Publishes the
metadata to the orchestrator service instance of sub if specified in f orward.
1: if f orward then
2: Hosts = {h(n, t) ∈ H|∀h(n, t) ∈ Hosts ∃asucc ∈ sub(sio).Asucc : (asucc, n) ∈ SI}
3: md(sio)← (sub(sio), Hosts)
4: sio.replicate(md(sio))
5: end if
The routine shown in Algorithm 4.4 is not only executed whenever workflow defi-
nitions are added. In case there is a significant change in the services instance set (i.e.,
newly added or removed service instances) or the hosts set (i.e., updated workload in-
formation) that affects the already existing subscriptions, the routine subscription()
is executed.
The pub/sub scheme replication mechanism asserts another important system ser-
vice, that is the pub/sub repository service sρ, along with the orchestration service so.
So far sρ and so constitute the distributed system services that can be deployed to any
peer of the execution environment. Following the publish/subscribe replication schema
the repository itself can subscribe to other repositories (if existent) in a recursive man-
ner. This way hierarchical repository trees can be spanned that in conjunction with
intelligent subscription configuration can provide powerful means of Peer-to-Peer data
propagation. Further details on the publish/subscribe replication mechanism can be
found in [SST+05, STS+06].
4.2 Workflow Execution Environment 105
Example 4.3
Figure 4.3 illustrates an example of the metadata propagation among the peers of an
execution environment. As the figure shows, the execution environment is composed of
eight nodes (i.e., A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H) out of which only one is a simple client node
(i.e., A), whereas the other ones are system nodes. Out of this set of system nodes, only
node B is responsible for hosting the metadata repository ρ and is thus the repository
peer (i.e., displayed with the red service color and the database icon). The other system
nodes are in charge of hosting the orchestration service along with their corresponding
application services (i.e., displayed with the green service color, the orchestrator icon
and the corresponding application service icon).
The workflow structure consists of four application services types, i.e., a heat-map, a
map, a weather forecast and a location service type. The structure of the workflow def-
inition corresponds to the one of Figure 4.1. However, the smaller, dashed and red and
blue arrows are new to this example and represent the metadata exchange among the
system nodes with the repository peer. The red arrows correspond to metadata being
published to the orchestrator service at the system nodes. Whereas the blue arrows cor-
respond to the metadata changes being updated at the repository by the system nodes.
The interaction sequence is represented with the numbered white circles on top of the
interaction arrows. Regarding the service instances SIapp, the execution environment is
composed as follows:
SIapp = {(s2, H), (s3, E), (s3, G), (s4, D), (s4, F), (s5, C)}
Regarding the orchestration service instances, the environment is composed as follows:
sib = (so, B) ∧ sic = (so, C) ∧ sid = (so, D) ∧ sie = (so, E) ∧
si f = (so, F) ∧ sig = (so, G) ∧ sih = (so, H)
SIs = {(srep, B), sib, sic, sid, sie, si f , sig, sih} where SI = SIapp ∪ SIs
Whenever a workflow definition w f ∈ WF enters the system (by a client execution
request) it is in a first step forwarded to the repository ρ hosted at the super peer, i.e.,
ρ.addW f (w f ). Since all system nodes are at all times subscribed to the repository ρ
they have to be updated (i.e., step no.2) with the latest metadata in the next step with
succeeding service instances. That is, for each system node subscriptions have to be
created that feature succeeding service instances. Precisely, node H subscribes for the
map and weather forecast services as they are succeeding the location service according
to w f with:
sub(sih) = (w f , {(s2, H)}, {(s3, E), (s3, G), (s4, D), (s4, F)})
Jointly, nodes D, E, F and G subscribe for the heat-map service with:
sub(sid) = (w f , {(s4, D)}, {(s5, C)}) ∧ sub(sie) = (w f , {(s3, E)}, {(s5, C)}) ∧
sub(si f ) = (w f , {(s4, F)}, {(s5, C)}) ∧ sub(sig) = (w f , {(s3, G)}, {(s5, C)})
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The newly created subscriptions are added to the subscription set at ρ by means of
subscription() routine. This causes the selection and replication of hosts metadata
to system nodes. Node H receives hosts metadata on nodes G, E, D and F, whereas E
and G receive metadata on C with:
md(sih) = (sub(sih), {10.01, 20.01, 40.01, 30.01} ∧
md(sie) = (sub(sie), {50.01} ∧md(sig) = (sub(sig), {50.01})
Nodes D and F will not receive metadata as they are their application services are sec-
ondary activities. Secondary activities will be described in the next section. In the final
step (i.e., step no.3) system nodes start to update the repository with metadata changes
so that the other subscribed system nodes can be informed. The propagation of node
metadata to the repository and back goes on in the background even after the subscrip-
tion creation has finished and continuously updates the local metadata at nodes for any
state change of the subscribed nodes.
Finally, the applied approach to data management does not come without a price.
As the peer metadata accuracy is solely dependent on the propagation performance of
the repository service node it might feature (e.g., overload situations) staleness issues
at times. However, since the maintained data merely reflects the state of the execution
environment this should not lead to incorrect control flow migration in general. Rather,
it could lead to suboptimal migration decisions based on the current metadata on the
execution environment (e.g., stale workload node metadata), which is in the case of
the distributed orchestration service acceptable. More severe inaccurate metadata situ-
ations (e.g., stale service instance metadata) should be occurring less frequently and can
be handled at control flow migration time with retries.
Distributed Workflow Definition Execution
Only when all orchestrator nodes have been locally provided with metadata the dis-
tributed execution of an instance of a workflow definition can commence. Based on the
locally available metadata, orchestrator nodes can autonomously make decisions as on
how to steer the execution of a workflow instance, i.e., how to perform late-binding.
That is, whenever the invocation of local service instances has been completed the or-
chestrator decides to which succeeding service instances should be late-bound and the
workflow instance be forwarded to.
In order to late-bind an activity to a service instance, the orchestrator has to chose
a subsequent activity out of the set of subsequent activities As such that it succeeds
the finished invocation activity w.r.t. the control flow. Based on the locally available
hosts metadata, the orchestrator chooses a service instance whose host features the best
runtime characteristics for some end-user application requirement. If not specified ex-
plicitly, the orchestrator will always late-bind the service instance that features the least
current workload with the workflow instance. Algorithm 4.5 shows the optimal peer
selection with regard to minimal workload.
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Algorithm 4.5 n.getSI(anext) Finds the metadata that reflects the given activity anext.
Selects the node with the minimal workload out of the hosts metadata subset ρh and
returns it as a optimal service instance.
1: ∃md(so, n) ∈ MD(so, n) : anext ∈ md.Asucc
2: ∃(lopt, topt) ∈ md(so, n).ρh : ∀(lx, tx) ∈ md(so, n).ρh nopt ̸= nx ∧ lopt < lx
3: return (anext, nopt)
Once the optimal succeeding service instance has been picked the orchestrator can
migrate the workflow instance to it so as to continue the execution. To complete the
migration the orchestrator has to update the workflow instance just before sending it.
The orchestrator has to change the state of the workflow instance by shifting the sub-
sequent activity from the subsequent activity set As to the currently active set Aa and
by adding the optimal succeeding service instance to the activated service instances set
SIa. In case the completed invocation was of discrete service type the completed activ-
ity has to be consequently shifted from currently active set Aa to the completed activity
set Ac and the finished service instance has to be removed from the activated service
instances set SIa and added to the competed activity set SIc. Activities of streaming
type usually do not finish their execution with one invocation, thus they do not need
to be removed from the active set Aa of a workflow instance. Algorithm 4.6 shows the
standard workflow instance migration routine.
If parallel activities exists in the control flow their invocation results might be subject
to merging at some subsequent join activity. In order for parallel orchestrator nodes to
migrate their workflow instances in a Peer-to-Peer fashion, they have to agree on one
service instance to accept all parallel workflow instances. Parallel orchestrator node
agreement is achieved by entrusting one parallel activity with the responsibility of se-
lecting the joining service instance. This responsible activity is referred to as the primary
activity. The other parallel activities are referred to as the secondary activities. The or-
chestrator node invoking a primary activity migrates its workflow instance in the stan-
dard migration routine sense, by selecting the optimal successor and forwarding it the
workflow instance. To inform the secondary service instances about the optimal joining
service instance the primary exploits the repository at runtime so as to propagate its
selection to them. That is, the primary creates at runtime execution metadata, i.e., the
information on the joining service instance, and stores this metadata at the repository.
The joining metadata is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.14 (Join metadata - j). Joining service instance metadata is defined by the tuple
j = (wi, aj, sij) where:
• wi ∈ WI is the workflow instance to be joined,
• aj ∈ wi.w f .A is the join activity,
• sij ∈ SI is the service instance at which wi is joined with:
sij.s = aj
The set of all joining service instance metadata is denoted as J. □
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Consequently, the joining metadata set J is also maintained by the global metadata
repository with:
ρ ∪ J
Hence, just before the orchestrator of a primary activity migrates its workflow in-
stance it updates the repository ρ with the joining service instance metadata. On the
other hand, the secondary activity orchestrator nodes wait for an update from the repos-
itory. Once the secondaries receive the joining service instance metadata they can mi-
grate their workflow instances towards it and not before that.
Algorithm 4.6 sio.migrate(wi) Invokes all local service instances. Updates the given
workflow instance wi state by removing the invoked service instances of discrete type
and their activities from it. Afterwards it finds the optimal succeeding service instances
for the subsequent activities and migrates updated wi, in terms of Aa, As, SIa and SIc,
to them. In case the subsequent activity is parallel, it updates the repository ρ with the
optimal succeeding service metadata.
1: for si ∈ wi.SIa : si.n = this do
2: si.invoke(wi)
3: if si.a ∈ Sd then
4: wi.Aa \ si.a
5: wi.SIa \ si
6: wi.Ac ∪ si.a
7: wi.SIc ∪ si
8: end if
9: Anext = {anext ∈ wi.As|∀anext ∈ wi.As (si.s, anext) ∈ wi.w f . ≺c f }
10: for anext ∈ Anext do
11: if ¬anext.isSecondary() then
12: sinext ← n.getSI(anext)
13: wi.As \ anext
14: wi.Aa ∪ anext
15: wi.SIa ∪ sinext
16: sio ← (so, sinext.n)
17: if anext.isPrimary() then
18: sio.migrateJoin(wi, anext)
19: ρ.addJoin(wi, anext, sinext)
20: else
21: sio.migrate(wi)
22: end if
23: end if
24: end for
25: end for
Although being subscribed at ρ for succeeding activities, that are joining, secondary
activity orchestrators will not be updated with metadata initially. There exists no need
to update the secondary activities, with potential successors at subscription creation
time, as they will never get to choose a succeeding service instance. Hence, whenever a
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new workflow definition is added and consequently subscriptions are created, the sec-
ondary activities are omitted from metadata publishing (i.e., Algorithm 4.3, line no.9)).
When the primary activity orchestrator informs the repository about the joining service
instance the secondary orchestrator nodes will be updated with this information, as
well. However, the secondary orchestrator nodes will be updated with metadata of only
one succeeding host. Afterwards, the secondary orchestrator nodes will be instructed to
do the join of their workflow instances by means of the routine doJoinMigration().
Algorithm 4.7 shows the joining service instance addition to the repository.
Algorithm 4.7 ρ.addJoin(wi, aj, sij) Adds the join service instance to the join metadata
set J. Selects all subscriptions that are subscribed for the given join activity aj. Updates
the subscribed orchestrator nodes with hosts metadata on given the join service instance
sij.
1: J ∪ (wi, aj, sij)
2: Subs = {sub(sio) ∈ SUB|∀sub(sio) ∈ SUB ∃aj ∈ sub(sio).Anext ∧
sub(sio).sil.isSecondary() = true}
3: for sub(sio) ∈ Subs do
4: ∃h(n, t) ∈ H : sij.n = n
5: sio.replicate(sio, sub(sio), h(n, t))
6: sio.doJoinMigration()
7: end for
Once the secondary orchestrator nodes have migrated their workflow instances to
joining service instance the they can be merged into one. The end-user specific merging
of parallel workflow instances is performed by means of the routine merge(). Con-
sequently, the merged workflow instance can be sent to the local joining activity for
invocation. Algorithm 4.8 shows the joint workflow instance migration.
Algorithm 4.8 sio.mirgateJoin(wi, aj) Aggregates all parallel workflow instances wi.
When all have been received merges them into one and forwards it for invocation.
1: JoinWis[aj] ∪ wi
2: Preds = {a ∈ wi.w f .A|∀a ∈ wi.w f .A ∃(a, aj) ∈ wi.w f . ≺c f }
3: if |JoinWis[aj]| = |Preds| then
4: wi ← n.merge(JoinWis[aj])
5: sio.migrate(wi)
6: end if
Now that we have elaborated in detail the concepts behind the distributed workflow
instance execution we bring them together with an illustrative example in Figure 4.4.
The displayed example plays through the execution of the already introduced workflow
definition w f ∈ WF of Figure 4.3 in a step-by-step fashion.
Example 4.4
As we can observe, the execution environment in Figure 4.4 is composed in the exact
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Figure 4.4: Distributed orchestration service execution model.
same way as in Figure 4.3. This example assumes however, does not cover the initial
metadata exchange as in Figure 4.3 so that actual execution can start. Hence, the work-
flow definition execution is conducted as follows:
1. Whenever a workflow definition w f ∈ WF enters the system (by a client execution
request) it is in a first step forwarded to the workflow definition set at ρ hosted at
the super peer and the metadata is exchanged.
2. The super peer creates then an instance of the corresponding workflow definition
wi ∈ WI and forwards it to the first node capable of advancing the execution, by
means of the migrate(wi) routine. In this example only node H applies for the
fist execution step. The internal state of the instance wi is updated accordingly:
wi = (w f , {∅}
Ac
, {s2}
Aa
, {s3, s4, s5, ae}  
As
, {∅}
SIc
, {(s2, H)}  
SIa
)
The currents state of the instance wi of timestamp 1 is also reflected in the work-
flow instance history, i.e., wi1 = (1, wi) ∈ WIt. When node H receives wi it as-
sumes control over the execution of the workflow instance and contributes to it by
invoking the locally available hat map service.
3. Once node H has finished with the invocation of its application service instance it
advances the execution of wi in this step by migrating it to the succeeding appli-
cation service instance. Since the next step mandates two succeeding application
service types (i.e., the map service and the weather forecast service) node H sends
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in parallel two instances to the best corresponding providers, i.e., nodes E and F.
The other providers of those service feature a higher individual workload so they
are overlooked for migration. Hence, workflow instance is updated at timestamp
2 to (2, wi) ∈ WIt where:
wi = (w f , {as, s2}  
Ac
, {s3, s4}  
Aa
, {s5, ae}  
As
, {(s2, H)}  
SIc
, {(s3, E), (s4, F)}  
SIa
)
4. In the fourth step of the execution the parallel invocations at nodes E and F have to
be merged into one. In our case, the weather retrieval application service branch
(i.e., node E) is selected to be the primary activity branch. Once node E has fin-
ished the invocation of its application service type it selects the succeeding appli-
cation service instance (i.e., node C) and migrates its instance copy to it at times-
tamp 3 to (3, wi) ∈∈ WIt where:
wi = (w f , {as, s2, s3}  
Ac
, {s5, s4}  
Aa
, {ae}
As
, {(s2, H), (s3, E)}  
SIc
, {(s5, C), (s4, F)}  
SIa
)
Moreover, it additionally informs the repository ρ about the fact that this instance
of the workflow definition is joined on node C, i.e., J ∪ (wi, s5, ((s5, C))).
5. The secondary activity node F eventually gets updated by the repository ρ with
this information:
F ← md(si f ) = (sub(si f ), (50.01))
6. Consequently, node F migrates wi to node C at timestamp 4 to (4, wi) ∈ WIt
where:
wi = (w f , {as, s2, s3, s4}  
Ac
, {s5}
Aa
, {ae}
As
, {(s2, H), (s3, E), (s4, F)}  
SIc
, {(s5, C)}  
SIa
)
In turn, node C migrates the received parallel workflow definition instances and
invokes its application service.
7. In general, steps no.3 through no.6 are iteratively repeated for as long as there are
activities to be invoked within the scope of the workflow definition. However,
since step seven is the final step for this example and there are no more activities
to be invoked, the execution of this instance completes with the forwarding of the
results overall execution to the client that issued the request at timestamp 5 to
(5, wi) ∈ WIt where:
wi = (w f , {as, s2, s3, s4, s5}  
Ac
, {ae}
Aa
, {∅}
As
, {(s2, H), (s3, E), (s4, F), (s5, C)}  
SIc
, {∅}
SIa
)
Depending on the executional duration of the parallel activities, their service in-
stance invocations tend to finish at different times. In case secondary activity branches
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complete their invocations before the primary activity they are confined to waiting till
they get updated with the latest joining service instance information. This is why in
practice, the activity with the smallest execution time has to be manually (by estima-
tion) chosen to be the primary activity. Finally, in this example we have omitted the
flow of data during the course of execution for simplicity reasons. However, as men-
tioned in the previous sections the data flow of a workflow definition is stored within
the instance wi for discrete service types.
4.3 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced a formal model of distributed execution is based
on workflow definitions that feature arbitrary combinations of service types. The com-
prised service types can be of any type, i.e., discrete or continuous. The only prerequi-
site is that they are structured in a well-formed precedence order of their invocations.
This is also referred to as the control flow. A well-formed workflow defines the order
in which the data is exchanged among the service types such that is coincides with the
control flow. This is also referred to as the data flow.
The introduced formal model of distributed execution mandates that at runtime ser-
vice instances of specified service types by workflow definition are invoked according
to the control flow and supplied with data according to the data flow. This is also re-
ferred to as late-biding of service instances at runtime. The currently invoked service
instances represent the execution state of the workflow definition. This state is subject
to constant change in time and is conveyed by means of an instance of the workflow
definition.
To perform late-binding of service instances orchestrator nodes are introduced
within the context of the formal model. That is the orchestration system service is intro-
duced that enables the hosting nodes to perform late-bindings w.r.t. precedence orders
of workflow definitions. The orchestrator nodes autonomously migrate the workflow
instance among each other according to the control flow, thus changing its state. In or-
der to be able to do so, orchestrators rely on metadata on the execution environment. In
particular metadata on subsequent service instances according of the control flow. This
metadata is supplied to them from the repository system service in a pub/sub fashion
which is decoupled from the control flow.
The introduced formal model offers two main benefits: load balancing and scalabil-
ity. An orchestrator can choose the best subsequent service instance at runtime and the
orchestration service can be deployed to an arbitrary number of nodes.
5
Self-organizing Workflow Execution
Engines
In the previous chapters of thesis we have thoroughly discussed distribution concepts
for data and workflow definition management. These concepts have been observed
from a point of view of an ideal execution environment setting. However, workflow
definitions require systems that manage the executions of their instances no matter what
the circumstances in the execution environments are. The purpose of this chapter is to
shed light on the distributed workflow management model in certain situations which
are far from ideal. This includes service instance failures, highly heterogeneous execu-
tion environments, poor application service allocations at devices etc. In this chapter
we merge the approaches to data and workflow management distribution in a concep-
tually novel fashion, by means of novel system services, that is driven by the goal of
providing an ideal workflow instance execution.
First, we will set the stage by elaborating the distributed execution model for work-
flow instances, in face of pervasive node failures inside an execution environment. Then
we will provide a fault-tolerance concept for the control flow that addresses node fail-
ure situations in the form of a self-organizing system service that is referred to as the
Safety-Ring. The Safety-Ring service represents the most important contribution of this
thesis. Moreover, the workflow execution model will be applied to domains that fea-
ture a high degree of heterogeneous nodes. To address heterogeneity in the context of a
reliable control flow, novel concepts, i.e., Compass, are introduced that adapt the Safety-
Ring service even to such environments. Since the workflows are also characterized by
a flow a data we will expose the traditional reliability mechanisms to redundancy con-
cepts in the form of the redundant passive-standby strategy. Finally, we introduce con-
cepts that additionally improve the workflow execution model, in terms of improved
instance throughput, in dynamically allocating service types at the most suitable nodes
in the environment by means of a concept that features self-optimizing deployments of
services.
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Figure 5.1: Distributed execution model with node failures
5.1 Self-healing Execution of Workflow Definitions
The workflow definition model introduced in Section 4.2 assumes execution conditions
that are ideal, i.e., an environment in which nothing goes wrong. This assumption can-
not always hold in dynamic environments that are concealed behind SOA and that fea-
ture a high degree of scalability (i.e., Clouds) or heterogeneity (e.g., Peer-to-Peer). In
practice, it is reasonable to expect that in highly distributed environments participat-
ing nodes suddenly disappear due to internal hardware failures, resource depletion, or
external damages etc.
Example 5.1
Figure 5.1 illustrates such an example in which the workflow definition model (as al-
ready introduced in Figure 4.4) is subjected to node failure issues. This implies that our
example builds upon the same configuration of executing service instances and their
exchanged metadata. Moreover, the execution steps bear the same meaning as in the
example of Figure 4.4).
Depending on the current state of a running workflow instance wi w.r.t. to the con-
trol flow the failure of service instances might have severe effects on the further execu-
tion. Thereby, we distinguish between the featured activity types by the failed service
instances w.r.t. the state of wi as follows:
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• Completed activity sets failures – Ac, SIc. If for example service instances fail that
feature activities of the completed activity set in the workflow instance (i.e., wi.Ac)
then such failures should not have any effects on the further control flow of wi.
Unless advanced execution models are applied (e.g., based on semantic recovery)
completed service instances of SIc should not be traversed again in the course of
a workflow instance migration. Therefore, their failure is insignificant from a late-
binding point of view. In the context of semantic recovery model however, the
failure of finished service instance makes the resolution of alternative compensat-
ing paths not possible, thus invalidates semantic recovery.
• Succeeding activity set failures – As. In case service instances fail that feature ac-
tivities of the succeeding activity set (i.e., wi.As) in the workflow instance (e.g.,
node G before step no.3) then such failures should not have effects on the con-
trol flow whatsoever. The applied late-binding of activities will always resort to
the remaining service instances of the same type. In case there are no service in-
stances of the subsequent activity type (e.g., failure of node C), then the execution
of the workflow instances cannot proceed and has to abort. Hence, late-binding of
activities secures workflow instance migration from subsequent service instance
failures.
• Active sets failures – Aa, SIa. If service instances fail that feature activities of the
active activity set (e.g., node C at step no.6) in the workflow instance (i.e., wi.Aa)
and thus are invoked for execution (i.e., wi.SIa) at the moment of failure than the
effects are critical. With the failure of a active service instance the execution is
permanently lost and so are the invocation results up to this point. As such service
instances are in possession of the workflow instance wi their failure will cause wi
to vanish. Being the control flow token that enables an orchestrator to invoke
application service instances, the loss of wi will break the migration of the control
flow and thus the execution will never conclude.
The aforementioned failure scenarios assume node failures of permanent type. That
is, once failed the nodes do not come back ever again to contribute to the execution
in the same context as of before the failure. On the other hand, temporary failures of
service instances are not as troublesome as permanent ones. In most cases temporary
failures can be easily overcome by means of workflow instance backups to local persis-
tent storage. The backed-up workflow instances can be replayed (re-invocation of local
application service instances) at the restart of the temporary failed orchestrator, in case
the failure affects active service instances. Therefore, with respect to all possible failure
scenarios, we conclude the distributed execution model based on workflow instance
migration to be critically vulnerable to node failures of permanent type.
5.1.1 The Safety-Ring
In order to prevent losses of workflow instances and thus the interruption of the control
flow they have to be made redundantly available. The most straightforward approach
to workflow instance availability is permanent storage across a set of back up nodes
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by means of timely replication. Whenever the execution state of a workflow instance
changes it should be redundantly stored. Moreover, the service instance currently in
control of the workflow instance, i.e., currently carrying out the invocation of active
service types, has to be monitored so as to detect its failures. For each active service
instance, there has to exist a recovery node that monitors it, and in the event of failure
recovers it.
The set of monitoring nodes that recover failures of service instances constitutes a
failure-recovery mechanism. Since the workflow engine is bounded to a set of require-
ments (e.g., Reliability – Section 2.4) so as to be considered ideal, we have to introduce
a failure-recovery mechanism into the workflow engine. Thereby, the failure-recovery
mechanism has to be designed to meet the requirements of an ideal workflow engine
as well. Otherwise the distributed workflow execution model would be implicitly af-
fected. To this end, we subject the failure-recovery mechanism itself to the following re-
quirements, that are specific to the reliability requirement of an ideal workflow engine.
The failure-recovery mechanism of an ideal workflow engine should feature efficiency,
scalability, reliability and consistency as follows:
• Efficiency – The overhead of the recovery mechanism, that is reflected in the re-
dundancy of backup data, should be minimal so as affect the execution of running
workflow instances as least as possible. Moreover, the failure of service instances
should be detected in a timely fashion. Whereas the handling of failures should
feature fast recovery times such that the execution of affected workflow instances
can be resumed as fast as possible. Moreover, its applicability on resource limited
devices should also be an option.
• Scalability – The increase in available service instances and concurrently running
workflow instances in the execution environment should not affect efficiency of
recovery. Rather increase of service/workflow instances should be accommo-
dated with the increase of recovery nodes in a scalable fashion by the recov-
ery mechanism. Thereby, the overhead of the recovery mechanism (i.e., data re-
dundancy and assignment of monitoring responsibilities) should be evenly dis-
tributed among the recovery nodes. With the change of workflow instances and
service instances numbers the load and the number of recovery nodes should be
automatically balanced.
• Reliability – The recovery nodes should be reliable themselves. In a Peer-to-Peer
execution environment no node can be assumed to be stable at all times, not even
the recovery nodes. The failure of a recovery node, should be recovered as effi-
ciently as the failure of a service instance itself. Hence, each recovery node should
be organized redundantly across a set of nodes regarding its failure-recovery re-
sponsibilities. Given that recovery of service instances is limited by the availability
of the substitution service instances of the same type, this should not be the case
for recovery nodes. It should be possible to organize the recovery nodes redun-
dantly at any distributed workflow engine node.
• Consistency – The workflow instances of the same definition and the same input
data should finish with the same result despite of any failure at the involved ser-
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vice instances. The recovery of failed service instances should feature the same
invocation data at any substitution service instance. An active service instance
should be assigned only to one recovery node that handles its failures, whereas
the others should not interfere with it. In case of redundant recovery nodes, as-
signment of service instances among them should be unique and consistent, as
well.
A straightforward approach to reliability of distributed workflow execution, in an
ideal sense, implies the exploitation of metadata repositories for the replication of work-
flow instances. Although such an approach is as simple as publishing the workflow
instance to a repository (upon a completion of an activity) it does not favor scalability
and consistency.
Given a high workload on the system, that is reflected in a high number of concur-
rently running workflow instances, all succeeding service instances, that are subscribed
for this data at the repository, would entail a huge data propagation overhead. Espe-
cially, if the repository service is concentrated to a limited number of nodes, the data
propagation would constantly be affected by overload situations (e.g., as illustrated in
Figure 1.4)). Due to overload at repositories, subscribed service instances would have
to wait for workflow instances thus delaying their execution. To cope with overload,
repositories could sacrifice consistency of the propagated data causing this way possi-
bly incorrect recovery of service instance failures. For instance, repositories could either
propagate data items as they come in without ordering them logically. Moreover, in
face of a failure the repository would have to decide on the substitution service in-
stance, thus further increasing its centrality characteristics and worsens its scalability
issue. Another important negative aspect to repository fault-tolerance is its uneconomi-
cal resource consumption. That is, each workflow instance would have to be replicated
to all subscribed service instances, which is in the absence of node failures a significant
waste of resources (e.g., storage, bandwidth etc.). On top of all, the repository nodes
would always remain single point of failure.
Safety-Ring Concept
To meet the requirements of an ideal distributed workflow management engine to the
biggest possible extent, in the context of reliable execution, we introduce the Safety-Ring
system service:
ssr ∈ S
The main idea behind the Safety-Ring service is to support the reliability of the control
flow by a set of peers that monitor the migration of workflow instances and recover
failures of active service instances, i.e., SIa, that would otherwise disrupt the control
flow. The peers equipped with Safety-Ring service are referred to as the SR-nodes and
are denoted with the set SIsr:
SIsr = {sisr ∈ SI|∀sisr ∈ SI : sisr.s = ssr}
Essentially, the SR-nodes perform monitoring of active service instances for each run-
ning workflow instance. If necessary, SR-nodes recover failed service instances at a
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replacement node of the same service type by invoking the replacement node with the
same workflow instance. The assignment of active service instances to SR-nodes w.r.t.
monitoring and recovery responsibility is determined by the mapping function fmt as
follows:
fmt : SIa ↦→ SIsr with fmt(sia) = sisr
Thereby, each active service instance necessarily has to be assigned to a SR-nodes if the
control flow is to be completely reliable:
∀sia ∈ SIa∃sisr ∈ SIsr : fmt(sia) = sisr
The SR-nodes are not dedicated resources of an external system that is assumed to be
stable. Rather, any node of our Peer-To-Peer environment can freely participate to the
Safety-Ring as well. All it takes is to locally instantiate the Safety-Ring service ssr. Since
we operate in heterogeneous environments we cannot assume the SR-nodes to be stable
or reliable by default. This implies that even the SR-nodes need to be recovered, in the
event of their failure, if the control flow is to be fully reliable. In order not to endlessly
delegate the responsibility of SR-node recovery to some higher level or external moni-
toring authority1 novel approaches have to be devise. The straightforward yet effective
solution of Safety-Ring to this problem is association of SR-nodes among each other for
monitoring and recovery purposes.
Given the biggest possible set of SR-nodes, which is N, it is important that associa-
tion among SR-nodes is achieved efficiently and unanimously such that in the end no
SR-node is left unassociated. A failure of a monitoring SR-node should be also immedi-
ately and unanimously handled by some other SR-node out of the set of all remaining
SR-nodes. Likewise, a new node joining the Safety-Ring should be immediately and
unanimously assigned to a SR-node for monitoring and should be assigned with a SR-
node which should be monitored by the new SR-node. To this end we need to devise an
way of assigning SR-nodes among each other (for monitoring purposes) that can easily
incorporate changes in face of SR-node joining and leaving such that the least possible
amount of existing SR-nodes is affected. The Safety-Ring approach rules each SR-node
to be assigned with exactly one other monitoring SR-node, such that all SR-node mon-
itoring associations are unique. The bijective mapping function fsr thus determines
unique assignment among nodes as follows:
fsr : SIsr ↦→ SIsr where ∀sisr ∈ SIsr∄six ∈ SIsr : fsr(sisr) = fsr(six)
By consequently applying the function fsr on all SR-nodes of SIsr we will obtain a
closed chain of monitoring assignments that is of at least length 3. In other words, we
will obtain a set of SR-node relations ≺sr that is a transitive closure as follows:
≺sr= {(sisr, si′sr)|∀sisr ∈ SIsr∃si′sr ∈ SIsr : fsr(sisr) = si′sr}
The big idea behind the Safety-Ring is to implement the closed chain of monitoring asso-
ciations (i.e., ≺sr) by means of a node ring topology. Thereby, the chosen ring topology
should produce a structuring of SR-nodes, such that it semantically corresponds to the
1Quis custodiet ipsos custodes.
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Figure 5.2: Safety-Ring transformation of the SR-nodes into a ring topology.
monitoring associations obtained by means of ≺sr. In exploiting the circular identifier
space KI of Chord, associated SR-nodes can be placed in a way such that the monitoring
SR-node succeeds the other one within KI. This implies that the SR-node monitoring
assignment function fsr is implemented in Safety-Ring as the node successor function
succ of a Chord ring topology:
succ(sisr.n) = n′ ⇐⇒ (sisr, (ssr, n′)) ∈≺sr
Figure 5.2 illustrates the Safety-Ring intuition behind the transformation of SR-nodes
into a ring topology.
Therefore, the SR-nodes construct a ring topology of Chord. In doing so, an abun-
dance of inherent benefits is reaped. First of all, the self-organization feature of the ring
topology can be exploited so as to efficiently add SR-nodes into system – remove SR-
nodes from the system – while leaving the majority of SR-nodes unaffected. Based on
Chord only three SR-nodes are affected whenever a new SR-node joins or leaves the
environment. In the former case a new SR-node is interjected between two adjacent
SR-nodes of the ring topology. In the later case a failed SR-node is handled by connect-
ing the preceding SR-node and the succeeding SR-node of the ring topology. Moreover,
scalable means of communication, such as the Finger Tables, among the nodes can be
exploited as well. By applying Chord on top of the SR-nodes ring topology scalable data
lookup and sharing is possible. This allows for the utilization of reliability mechanisms
of Chord so as to enforce reliability of the SR-nodes themselves. For instance, all the
data a SR-node locally maintains can be replicated to a set of other SR-nodes by means
of symmetric replication.
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Figure 5.3: Safety-Ring assignment of workflow instance encompassed service instances
to the SR-nodes.
The most important benefit of Chord ring construction out of the SR-nodes is how-
ever the inherent possibility to efficiently assign active service instances to SR-nodes
for monitoring purposes. Given the circular key identifier space KI that is partitioned
among the constructing SR-nodes, service instances can be mapped into it as well. In
the context of workflow instance execution, active service instances (i.e., in SIa) are al-
ways determined at runtime by late-binding logic of the orchestrator nodes. Thereby,
the selection of the concrete active service instances is completely independent of the
current workload of the SR-nodes. Note, that SR-node workload is reflected in num-
ber of already assigned service instances for monitoring. Mapping the active service
instances directly into KI (i.e., by means of fn) could potentially result in uneven load
at the SR-nodes. For example, given a high number of concurrently running workflow
instances, a majority of them could bind different service instances that in turn directly
map to the same (overladed) SR-node, while the other SR-nodes are underutilized.
Hence, Safety-Ring decouples the SR-node workload distribution from orchestrator
late-binding, which is agnostic to SR-node workload. Instead Safety-Ring maps each
workflow instances directly into KI by means of its identifier (i.e., wi.id) and thus into
a key partition of a SR-node. In doing so, the whole active service instance set of an
assigned workflow instance (i.e., wi.AIs) becomes subject to monitoring and recovery
by the responsible SR-node.
∀wi ∈ WI∃sisr ∈ SIsr : ∀sia ∈ wi.SIa =⇒ resp(wi.id) = sisr.n ∧ fmt(sia) = sisr
The resulting mapping will yield an efficient and uniform assignment of workflow in-
stances among SR-nodes. Due to mapping of workflow instances into KI based on the
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consistent hash function the load distribution is inherently guaranteed to be uniform
even in face of high workflow instances numbers. Figure 5.3 illustrates the assignment
of workflow instances to SR-nodes.
Observe from Figure 5.3 that application service instances can be overlapping w.r.t.
encompassed workflow instances at the same time. Due to late-binding of the control
flow, different workflow instances can bind the same service instance in a different con-
text. This implies, that the overlapping service instances can be monitored by multiple
SR-nodes at runtime as well.
As an alternative to workload distribution at SR-nodes based on workflow instances
is the enrichment of the late-binding logic with SR-node workload metadata. This in-
curs however additional runtime overhead in mapping the candidate selected service
instances to SR-nodes by the orchestrator for decision making. Mapping of service in-
stances into KI by an orchestrator necessitates external network communication (with
the Safety-Ring) at runtime and thus significantly reduces the late-binding performance.
We conclude this alternative to be less efficient as compared to workflow instance as-
signment to SR-nodes.
The current state of a SR-node is reflected in the set of all currently assigned work-
flow instances. To conduct the recovery of failed service instances each SR-node needs
to keep a backup of the encompassed workflow instances so that it can invoke a re-
covery node with the same workflow instance. Moreover, the SR-node state should be
shared with other SR-nodes for reliability purposes. Each workflow instance is materi-
alized in the context of the Safety-Ring as a Chord data item that is subject to storage
at SR-nodes. For this purpose the mapping functions fwd and fdw are introduced as
follows:
fwd : WI ↦→ DI ∧ fdw : DI ↦→ WI
State sharing among SR-nodes is consequently conducted by means of (symmetric)
replication. To enforce consistency of the replicated SR-node state distributed trans-
actions are necessary. Every change to SR-node state, i.e., workflow instance updates,
thus needs to be powered by a distributed transaction (e.g., Paxos commit) at the con-
gruent SR-nodes of the corresponding equivalence class.
Therefore, to meet the requirements of an ideal distributed workflow management
engine, from a reliability point of view, the Safety-Ring service is essentially tailored to
be a synergy of the distributed workflow execution model and a transactional Chord
DHT. The Safety-Ring service is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 (Safety-Ring – SRS). The Safety-Ring is defined as SRS ⊆ (DHTt ×WI)
where DHTt transactional Chord DHT and WI the set of all workflow instances subject to
safeguarding by the Safety-Ring. □
The aforementioned Definition 5.1 implies that each workflow instance wi is stored
by means of a distributed transaction dtx inside a (symmetric replication) Chord DHT
such that it stores wi at a node n which is the SR-node responsible for wi:
∀wi ∈ WI∃((dhts, dtx), wi)) ∈ SRS =⇒
(dhts.dht.n, ssr) ∈ SIsr ∧ resp(wi.di) = dhts.dht.n ∧ fwd(wi) ∈ dtx.Items
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Control Flow Support by Safety-Ring
To enhance the control flow execution model for reliability, it has to be slightly altered
in extending it with an additional migration step of the workflow instance. This step
features the reliable storage of the workflow instance at the Safety-Ring. Being a subject
to loss, whenever an activated service instance fails, the workflow instance has to be
reliably stored as a backup.
Whenever a service invocation completes a succeeding one is chosen for invocation.
The succeeding service instance thus becomes subject to monitoring in place of the fin-
ished one. Hence, the control flow based change of the workflow instance state (i.e.,
change in active activities sets Aa and SIa) has to be propagated to the Safety-Ring as
well. Otherwise the corresponding SR-node would feature an out-of-date state w.r.t. the
workflow instance sets Aa and SIa. Correct recovery based on stale is not possible.
Since the change of workflow instance state is conveyed by means of migration to
the succeeding service instance, the control flow has to be redirected towards the Safety-
Ring first. Simply put, the late binding of the succeeding service instance has to be
presumed with a transactional write of the workflow instance to the Safety-Ring:
wi.Aa
≺c f−−→ wi.A′a =⇒ ∃((dhts, dx), wi) ∈ SRS : C ∈ dx.Items
Once the distributed transaction has been completed the workflow instance can be mi-
grated to the succeeding application service instance, in the traditional control flow
sense.
In opting for a SR-node workload distribution that is based on workflow instance
identifiers we reap another significant benefit. Assuming the workflow instance iden-
tifiers (i.e., wi.id) to be unique, each distributed transaction will feature only one data
item, i.e., the workflow instance itself, for write operations:
∀dtx ∈ DTX∃wi ∈ WI : dtx.Items = {( fwd(wi), W), C}
As a result the distributed Paxos commit transactions will feature a better performance
due to the reduced message overhead. As workflow instance identifiers are unique,
transactional writes of concurrent workflow instances will not interfere with each other
at the data store of the Safety-Ring and thus reduce the commit conflict probability of
the concurrency control mechanism. As the matter of fact, commit conflict potential is
reduced to concurrent writes of the same workflow instance. This can only occur when
service instances of parallel activity branches migrate the workflow instance at the same
time, i.e., write to the Safety-Ring.
Algorithm 5.1 presents the reliable migration of workflow instances that is provided
by the Safety-Ring. Observe that in case of the Safety-Ring service type (i.e., Algo-
rithm 5.1, line no.15) the decision is not based on any metadata provided by repository.
In principle, any SR-node can be addressed with a workflow instance write request, as
the routing of it towards the responsible SR-node will be performed by means of Chord.
Hence, we say the service instances interact with the Safety-Ring itself rather than with
a specific SR-node.
Only when the updated workflow instance state has been successfully stored to the
Safety-Ring, the SR-nodes can correctly recover failures of the active service instances.
5.1 Self-healing Execution of Workflow Definitions 123
Algorithm 5.1 sio.migrateSR(wi) Invokes activated service instances. Updates after-
wards the given workflow instance wi state, in terms of activity sets wi.Ac, wi.Aa and
As. Writes the updated workflow instance to Safety-Ring.
1: for si ∈ wi.SIa : si.n = this do
2: si.invoke(wi)
3: if si.a ∈ Sd then
4: wi.Aa \ si.a
5: wi.SIa \ si
6: wi.Ac ∪ si.a
7: end if
8: Anext ⊆ wi.As : ∀anext ∈ Anext (si.s, anext) ∈ wi.w f . ≺c f
9: for anext ∈ Anext do
10: (sinext, rk)← n.getSI(anext)
11: sio.updateStatistic(anext, rk)
12: wi.As \ anext
13: wi.Aa ∪ anext
14: wi.SIa ∪ sinext
15: sisr ← n.getSI(ssr)
16: sisr.commit(n.getItem(wi))
17: end for
18: end for
The stored workflow instance features the latest execution state that can be used by the
responsible SR-node to invoke a replacement service instances with the latest workflow
instance. Hence, late-binding of succeeding service instances can only occur following
a successful Safety-Ring write. For this to happen the failure prone execution model
as shown in Figure 5.1 has to undergo slight changes. The reliable workflow instance
execution model based on Safety-Ring is illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Example 5.2
Figure 5.4 depicts an example of the reliable execution model for workflow instances.
This illustration is based on the example model already introduced in Figure 4.4. How-
ever, in Figure 5.4 the SR-nodes I, J and K are additionally introduced to the execution
environment. The SR-nodes are depicted with purple colored circular shapes and the
monitor icon. Moreover, their interaction with the other nodes (i.e., workflow instance
storage at them) is depicted by means of purple arrows. The Safety-Ring nodes are
organized into a ring topology, depicted with dashed and blue circle.
As Figure 5.4 shows each service instance has to migrate the workflow instance (i.e.,
write it) to the Safety-Ring before the subsequent service instance can be activated. On
the other hand, once the migration towards the Safety-Ring has been successfully com-
pleted, the subsequent service instance invocation is performed by one of the SR-nodes.
Moreover, joining of the workflow instances is also performed at the Safety-Ring.
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Figure 5.4: Distributed orchestration service execution model with Safety-Ring
As Figure 5.4 suggests, there is more to the Safety-Ring than just plain storage of
workflow instances. By being reliable (i.e., consistently replicated), SR-nodes can be en-
trusted with the responsibility of migrating and joining the control flow in conjunction
to monitoring of active service instances.
A workflow instance is not just stored at the SR-nodes for back-up purposes as the
result of a transactional write. It is also analyzed w.r.t. its featuring activity sets Aa and
SIa. The storing SR-node of the workflow instance monitors all service instances of the
set SIa at the same time. Once the storing SR-node receives the commit outcome of the
transaction (i.e., successfully stores the workflow instance) it triggers the migration of
the control flow, in the traditional sense, by late-binding the all service instances of SIa
with the workflow instance itself. In other words, the SR-node migrates the workflow
instance instead of the finished service instance.
In late-binding the succeeding service instances the SR-node reviews their activity
types w.r.t. potential joins. In case the succeeding activity is not a joining one the SR-
node can immediately late-bind the succeeding service instances. On the other hand,
if the succeeding activity is a joining one, then the SR-node has to wait till all service
instances have written their workflow instances to it before it can proceed. Once all
parallel service instances have written their updated workflow instances to the Safety-
Ring the corresponding SR-node can merge all updates and trigger the late-bind of the
succeeding service instances.
Given the symmetric replication of data items in the Safety-Ring, each workflow
instance state update will be shared by a set of SR-nodes. However, only one of them
takes an active monitoring and late-binding role, whereas the other ones only serve as
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plain data item storage sites, in the traditional DHT sense. Otherwise, active monitoring
by the entire workflow instance SR-node sharing set, would entail unnecessary resource
consumption (e.g., redundant heart beat messaging) and additional coordination (e.g.,
in the event of a service instance recovery) overhead among the SR-nodes. To select
the active SR-node out of the set of congruent SR-nodes we chose the SR-node that is
responsible for the data item with the replication factor enumerator 1 of the congruent
equivalence class.
The handling of a written workflow instance at the corresponding SR-node is shown
in Algorithm 5.2. This algorithm represents a redefinition of the symmetric replication
DHT data item storage routine as shown in Algorithm 3.37. To merge the parallel ac-
tivity workflow instances into one the routine mergeWfInstances() is provided. By
default mergeWfInstances() performs an union of all parallel workflow instances.
By redefining this routine custom merging can be provided as well. Late-binding of the
service instances with the workflow instance is conducted by the SR-node by means of
the routine migrateSR().
Algorithm 5.2 n.putItem(item, i) Aggregates all data items under the same key ki. When
all workflow instances have arrived merges them. In case this node is replication fac-
tor enumerator is 1, ads activated service instances to the fault detector and removes
finished service instances from it. Finally, it migrates the workflow instance to the acti-
vated service instances.
1: ki ← n.getRep(item, i)
2: (wi, a)← n.getWI(item.di.d)
3: JoinWIs[a] ∪ wi
4: Preds ⊆ wi.w f .A : ∀ap ∈ wi.w f .A∃(ap, a) ∈ wi.w f . ≺c f
5: if |Preds| = |JoinWis[a]| then
6: wim ← n.mergeW f Instances(JoinWis[a])
7: migrate ← true
8: itemm ← getItem(wim)
9: end if
10: n.puts(itemm.di, ki, i)
11: if i = 1 then
12: Discrete ⊆ wim.SIa : ∀(s, n) ∈ Discrete, s /∈ Sd
13: Monitored ∪ Discrete
14: Finished ⊆ Monitored : ∀(s, n) ∈ Finished, s ∈ wim.Ac
15: Monitored \ Finished
16: f aultDetector.update(Monitored)
17: if migrate = true then
18: for all (si, ni) ∈ wim.SIa do
19: ni.migrateSR(wim)
20: end for
21: end if
22: end if
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Figure 5.5: Workflow instance late-binding based on the Safety-Ring
Example 5.3
An example of a workflow instance migration enforced by means of Safety-Ring is
shown in Figure 5.5. As this example shows the nodes I, J, L and M are organized
into a ring topology and are equipped with the Safety-Ring service (denoted with the
monitor icon). The positioning of the SR-nodes inside the ring topology implies that
I monitors M, M monitors L, L monitors J, and J monitors I per default. As in the
examples of Figure 3.4, 5.4 the interactions among nodes are denoted by means of di-
rected and numbered arrows. Thereby, the numbers represent the interaction order, the
thin orange arrows internal Safety-Ring node interactions and the thick arrows external
interactions with SR-nodes.
In this example the service instance at the node H tries to migrate a workflow in-
stance to the Safety-Ring by addressing the SR-node I (step no.1) first. In turn, the
workflow instance is routed as a transformed data item (i.e., ⟨K2,Φ, 4, w⟩) towards the
responsible node J at which a Paxos transaction is started (step no.2). Upon success-
ful completion of the workflow instance storage (orange arrows of step no.3) to the
SR-nodes I, L and J the data item storage routine puts is executed. This leads to the
migration of the workflow instance towards the service instances at nodes F and E (step
no.5), as well as their monitoring (step no.4) by the responsible SR-node J.
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Safety-Ring Fault Handling
In case of an active service instance failure, all workflow instances featuring it have to
be recovered. To this end the SR-node monitoring the failed service instance has to lo-
cate a suitable service instance so as to perform late-binding on it with the backed-up
workflow instance. A service instance is considered to be suitable as a replacement if it
features the same service type but a different deployment node. To facilitate the lookup
of replacement service instances, the fault handling SR-node relies on local metadata
stemming from the pub/sub repository. A SR-node creates a subscription at the repos-
itory for service instance metadata only when fault handling is performed for the first
time. This way metadata propagation is reduced.
Before the actual late-binding of the replacement service instance can take place, the
affected workflow instances have to be updated with the replacement service instance,
in terms of the set SIa. In accordance to the reliable control flow model of Safety-Ring,
the updated workflow instances have to be written first to the Safety-Ring by the fault
handling SR-node. In turn, a successful write to Safety-Ring will trigger the responsi-
ble SR-node (i.e., the Algorithm 3.37 will be executed) to perform a late-binding of the
replacement service instance. Hence, the distributed control flow will be recovered. To
select an optimal replacement service instance out of the set of all service instances the
routine getSI() is provided. The complete fault handling routine for a failed service
instance is shown in Algorithm 5.3.
All service instance failures (both application and system) in the environment are
detected by means of an eventually perfect fault detector [CGR11] that is applied in the
Paxos commit (as elaborated in Section 3.3.2) protocol as well.
Algorithm 5.3 n.fails(si f ) Retrieves all affected workflow instances by the failed service
instance si f . Updates them with a substitution service instance and writes the update
to the Safety-Ring.
1: Monitored \ si f
2: WIs ← n.getA f f ectedWIs(si f )
3: n.updateStatistics(si f .n, τ)
4: for wil ∈ WIs do
5: wil.SIa \ si f
6: sir ← n.getSI(si f .s)
7: wil.SIa ∪ sir
8: sisr ← n.getSI(ssr)
9: sisr.commit(n.getItem(wil))
10: end for
In case of a SR-node failure, the self-healing feature of Chord ring topology is ex-
ploited. Recap, in Chord the key partition a departed ring node is automatically taken
over by the successor in the ring. In the context of the Safety-Ring, the newly responsible
SR-node will obtain the running workflow instances (i.e., by means of Algorithm 3.38)
from the other SR-nodes that share the same equivalence class of the key identifier space
partition belonging to the failed SR-node. By locally storing the obtained workflow in-
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Figure 5.6: Workflow instance late-binding based on the Safety-Ring
stances (i.e., by means of Algorithm 5.2) the fault handling SR-node will resume the
monitoring responsibilities of the failed SR-node eventually.
Multiple simultaneous failures of nodes can be handled in the same fashion as well.
Each failed application service instance is handled by the responsible SR-node. If the
multiple failed service instances are assigned to different SR-nodes they will be recov-
ered in parallel by their corresponding SR-nodes. If multiple failed service instances are
assigned to one SR-node, they will be iteratively handled one-by-one by that SR-node.
Multiple simultaneous failures of SR-nodes are handled by the self-organization fea-
ture of the ring topology as well. Each successor SR-node will individually recover the
failure of its preceding SR-node. In the meantime, the data lookup Finger Tables of
the remaining SR-nodes will be inconsistent due to the absence of the failed SR-nodes
but will converge eventually once the failed SR-nodes have been handled. However, if
multiple and simultaneous failures of SR-nodes occur too frequently the ring topology
might split into multiple ones. This is known as the Chord churn problem and has been
extensibility addressed in literature [KEAAH05, RGRK04].
Example 5.4
Finally, Figure 5.6 illustrates an example of the reliable execution model provided by
Safety-Ring. It builds on the same node environment as introduced in Example 5.2,
i.e., Figure 5.4. The node interactions bear the same meaning as well as their equipped
services. New to this example are the node failures, illustrated with the red stop icon,
and the node L featuring the heat map service, illustrated with the corresponding icon.
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Let us assume that SR-node K is responsible for the service instance that enters the
system at interaction step 1. Hence, the workflow instance is written to SR-node K
in interaction 2 which results in a late-binding of node H. Once node H completes its
invocation it writes the workflow instance again to SR-node K which performs a parallel
late-binding of the nodes E and F. In after step 3 the node F should fails, only node E
will migrate its invocation results to the Safety-Ring at step 4. SR-node K will take notice
of the disappearance of node F and initiate the recovery of it. However, if also SR-
node K failed before having recovered F the recovery will be performed by some other
SR-node. In this example we assume that SR-node J monitors K and thus performs a
recovery of it. Since the workflow instance is replicated across the Safety-Ring SR-node
J will obtain a copy of the workflow instance from e.g., SR-node I. Once J obtains the
workflow instance it will realize that it has to monitor node F only, since in step 4 node
E successfully committed its results. Once J notices the disappearance of F as well it will
initiate the recovery of it in late-binding node D with the workflow instance. In step 6
node D will write its results to SR-node J where the parallel execution branches of the
workflow are merged and forwarded to node C. In case node C fails in the process of
late-binding, the workflow instance will be recovered at the node L instead at step 7.
Finally, step 8 concludes the execution of the workflow instance.
Safety-Ring Discussion
The Safety-Ring has been built from the bottom up by combining various building
blocks (i.e., such as Chord, symmetric replication and Paxos) so as to meet the require-
ments of an ideal fault-tolerance mechanism. In light of these requirements Safety-Ring
fully exploits the benefits of its underlying building blocks in a way which is best sum-
marized as follows:
• Reliability – By delegating the responsibility of late-binding the service instances
to the SR-nodes, all possible node failure scenarios of the control flow (e.g., SIa
failures, join failure) are essentially subsumed into two classes of failures:
– Application service instance failures.
– SR-node failures.
Since those failure classes are conceptually overcome again by means of the self-
organizing SR-nodes themselves, we conclude the Safety-Ring to be an effective
fault-tolerance mechanism for the control flow.
• Efficiency – The Chord based design of the Safety-Ring features efficient self-
organization of the ring topology for the purpose of SR-node monitoring assign-
ments, with each SR-node being assigned only one predecessor. This applies even
if multiple SR-nodes are frequently joining/leaving the Safety-Ring. In turn, sym-
metric replication in Safety-Ring facilitates almost immediate restoration of the
replication factor in the event of a SR-node failure, i.e., with just one addressed
congruent SR-node.
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• Scalability – In case, a vast number of workflow instances is run against the Safety-
Ring, the load can be accommodated in a scalable fashion by adding new SR-
nodes to the ring topology based in a Chord fashion. At the same time uniform
load distribution is inherently guaranteed due to consistent hashing of workflow
instances in assigning them to SR-nodes.
• Consistency – Symmetric replication based redundancy of workflow instances is
always powered by means of distributed transactions (i.e., Paxos commit) for ev-
ery update of their states. Thereby, consistency is guaranteed even in the case of F
SR-node failures out of r = 2F + 1 involved SR-nodes.
However, the improved reliability of the control flow by the Safety-Ring does not
come without a price. The benefits of Safety-Ring are payed by absorbing the drawbacks
of underlying building block.
For instance, the transactional writes towards the Safety-Ring enforce consistent re-
dundancy of the workflow instances, but they also delay their control flow performance.
The message intensive transactions of Paxos commit delay the migration throughput of
workflow instances at each activity. Each migration step needs to be acknowledged
by a transaction before it can proceed to the succeeding service instance. A significant
transaction processing load is burdened upon the SR-nodes when a large number of
workflow instances (featuring many migration steps) is run against the system. In the
meantime, workflow instances have to wait for their migration to the succeeding ser-
vice instance. The scalable underlying architecture of Safety-Ring (i.e., Chord) helps to
mitigate this price in distributing the load to additional SR-nodes in the topology. On
the other hand, it additionally increases the ring maintenance overhead per node by
consuming additional bandwidth and storage for the larger Finger Tables.
Moreover, Safety-Ring writes are also susceptible for transactional conflicts. Con-
flicted transactions have to be resolved with aborts and delayed retries, which as a re-
sult incurs additional transaction processing load on the SR-nodes and thus workflow
instance delay. Join activity migration steps are especially susceptible for transactional
conflicts as concurrent service instances may try to write their workflow instances to the
Safety-Ring at the same time. Transactional conflicts do not have to occur due to join
migrations only. Node failures in acceptors set or the learners set of a Paxos commit
transaction can also cause aborts of transactions that have to be compensated. Eventual
consistency of the underlying Chord Finger Tables can also cause the transactional pro-
cessing to fail. For instance, Paxos commit PREPARE requests might end up at learner
nodes which do not posses the requested data item. This in turn will result in aborted
transactions as long as the Finger Table based routing is inconsistent among the nodes.
Mainly, due to this significant overhead of the Paxos commit building block inside
the Safety-Ring concept, it should be limited to control flow reliability only. This implies
that SR-nodes should monitor and recover discrete services only as they are the primar-
ily carry out the control flow. It would be theoretically possible to apply the Safety-Ring
in the context of streaming services by storing the continuous data flow redundantly
at the SR-nodes. The price of such an approach would be however significantly de-
layed data flow throughput as a result of burdening the inherently resource limited
(streaming) nodes with the Paxos overhead. For instance, writing frequently batches
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of the continuous data items for multiple streaming instances to the Safety-Ring would
certainly overload the SR-nodes and thus affecting the whole data flow. Moreover, It
is also very unlikely that the Safety-Ring could successfully store a potentially infinite
data flow even if it is continuously scaled out with new SR-nodes. Hence, continuous
data flows necessitate more resource friendly approaches to fault-tolerance.
In general, the Safety-Ring reliability mechanism can only work as long as there
are enough SR-nodes and application service instances in the execution environment to
substitute the failed ones. Moreover, we assume all discrete service types to be fail-safe,
i.e., they do not leave behind any uncompensated side effects when they fail. Failures of
service types with side effects could be handled by the Safety-Ring mechanism though if
the side effects were exposed to the Safety-Ring by storing them inside its data store. Se-
mantic recovery of failed service instances that is characterized by compensations, i.e.,
a set of semantically equivalent service invocations, is outside the scope of Safety-Ring
recovery mechanism as well. Although SR-nodes are capable of late-binding service
instance they lack the reasoning about semantic equivalence. For this to work the work-
flow definitions would have be enhanced with semantical preference orders, and the
Safety-Ring nodes would have to be equipped with the reasoning tools so as to deduce
and enforce the semantically equivalent alternative paths on the fly.
The aforementioned issues leave room for improvement of the basic Safety-Ring con-
cept as we shall see in the upcoming sections. However, Safety-Ring ensures reliability
of the distributed workflow model only at the price of slightly reduced throughput but
not at the price of scalability as we shall se in the evaluation chapter of this thesis.
5.1.2 The Safety-Ring Compass Extension
The backbone of the Safety-Ring is the Chord protocol that offers a distributed approach
to data management. Essentially Chord avoids any bottleneck and single point of fail-
ure while guaranteeing scalable data access with a asymptotic complexity of O(log(n))
node traversing steps in a network consisting of at most 2m nodes, i.e., n ≤ 2m. By opti-
mizing the number of node forwarding steps for data access, Chord implicitly assumes
that all connections between nodes have comparable bandwidth and latency charac-
teristics. However, in heterogeneous Peer-to-Peer systems that consist of both mobile
and static nodes, the Chord approach, despite all of its benefits, is not feasible for its
unawareness to network dynamics.
Due to the mobility of some participating nodes, connection parameters can dynami-
cally change over time. For instance, nodes might move away from static ones and thus
decrease their data transmission capability or nodes might move closer to static ones
and thus increase their data transmission capability. Focusing on a minimal number
of node forwarding steps so as to access data in Chord will inevitability entail mobile
nodes on the path that decrease the data transmission capability. An example of such a
scenario is provided in Figure 5.7.
Example 5.5
Figure 5.7 illustrates a Chord ring that has been already introduced in Figure 3.2, how-
ever in this example the ring is composed of heterogeneous nodes. Precisely, the nodes
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Figure 5.7: The heterogeneous environment Chord problem.
D and A have been substituted with less powerful and mobile devices (depicted with
the laptop and handy icons). As a consequence, those two nodes will feature re-
duced network connectivity capabilities. To denote dynamic connectivity among nodes,
dashed, gray and directed arrows are used which represent the forwarding directions of
the Chord Finger Tables for each node. Moreover, each Finger Table connection is char-
acterized by the current network transmission capability which is represented in our
case by means of node round trip latency. As the figure shows the latencies between
static nodes are lower (e.g., between node C and E – 10ms) whereas latencies between
mobile nodes are higher (e.g., between node A and D – 210ms).
A data lookup for the key identifier value 1 at node C would in the default Chord
sense (i.e., depicted with the red arrow) require the traversal of node A, which is a
mobile node. As a result the lookup time would incur a total latency cost of 355ms.
However, as the figure shows, this is not the best path there exists. If node were to use
another Finger Table node instead for forwarding, i.e., node E, and node E directly node
B (i.e., depicted with the green arrow), then the total lookup time by summing up the
latencies would incur a total cost of 25ms. This path is by far more efficient than the
default Chord data lookup path. Obviously, even is such a simple example, a mobile
node may impact overall latency and the deviation from standard Chord routing can
yield significant performance improvements when accessing data.
In the context of Safety-Ring default Chord implies affected transactional process-
ing of workflow instances (at migration time) due to significantly delayed data access
paths. As a consequence, the overall system performance, in terms of workflow instance
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throughput, should be lowered as well. Hence, efficient data access inside the Safety-
Ring, facilitates in the long run better throughput and faster failure recovery. As the
example in Figure 5.7 suggests, given a mobile Peer-to-Peer environment, Chord data
access should aim at reducing the overall data lookup times, rather than the number of
hops in the network.
The Compass Concept
The obvious solution to making Chord feasible in heterogeneous environments involves
optimizing the data lookup routine for latency, even if this necessitates additional hops
in the network as compared to default lookup routine. Compass, a latency-based global
optimization algorithm for Chord, addresses this issue. The idea behind Compass is to
dynamically derive data access paths that feature a minimal overall latency as a distance
metric – which are predominantly composed of powerful (i.e., static) nodes – while pre-
serving the fundamental data access features of Chord such as scalability and consis-
tency.
Since Chord bases its data lookup routine on the key identifier space KI for the pur-
pose of destination identification a latency optimal path has to be based on the same
metric as well. However, maintaining latency optimal paths for every key identifier in
KI is certainly not scalable and efficient w.r.t. storage. In order not to extend our view
of nodes beyond the scalable Finger Table size (i.e., log(|KI|)), Compass selects at each
node for any key identifier a local Finger Table node (i.e., f n) that leads to it in the least
possible distance w.r.t. total latency. Simply put, Compass assess the finger nodes w.r.t.
their capability to reach a key identifier in minimal latency distance. In doing so we
complement the hop optimal of Finger Tables with latency information. This implies
that in case of missing latency optimal paths towards key identifiers the default Finger
Tables can be used so as to advance the data lookup process. Hence, Compass defines a
latency optimal path with a destination key identifier, a local finger node that leads to it,
and the latency distance metric that is needed to reach it. The union of all optimal for-
warding nodes for all key identifiers, of minimal latency, constitutes the Compass Table.
Formally, the Compass Table is defined as follows:
Definition 5.2 (Compass Table – ct). A Compass Table entry at a node n ∈ N is defined as
tuple ct(n) = (n f w, KIct, lt) where:
• n f w ∈ FT(n) is optimal forwarding finger node,
• KIct ⊆ KI is set of destination key identifiers for which n f w is optimal,
• lt ∈ IR+ is approximated latency towards the destination key identifiers KIct from node n
The set of all Compass Table entries for node n is defined as CT(n), whereas the set of all Compass
Table entries for nodes is defined as CT. □
Note, that multiple key identifiers are likely to feature the same optimal forward-
ing node and the same latency distance at runtime, hence they can be subsumed into
one Compass Table entry featuring the unified destination key identifier set, i.e., KIct.
Naturally, the key identifier partitions that are assigned to the directly connected finger
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nodes can be immediately derived by means of periodical latency probing. To associate
two nodes w.r.t. their relative and directly probed latency the function flat is introduced
as follows:
flat : N × N ↦→ IR+ ∪ 0
The joint key identifier partitions of all finger nodes will however only cover a portion
of KI:
KIPn =
⋃
∀ f n∈FT(n)
KIP( f n) where KIPn ⊂ KI
The rest of the key identifier space (i.e., KI \ KIPn) is not directly reachable, but it can
be reached via a series of hops beginning from one of the finger nodes. To select the
optimal forwarding finger node, that features the smallest latency towards a destination
key identifier, the distance on the whole path to the remote destination key identifier has
to be approximated. To this end Compass exploits greedy shortest paths algorithms, in
particular the Bellman-Ford [Bel58] algorithm on top of the Compass Table.
Optimal Path Computation
The Bellman-Ford algorithm initially associates to a path a maximal distance value (∞),
which is then based on the relaxation principle, gradually minimized until the optimal
value is computed. Relaxation of the current distance value to a key identifier is per-
formed in iterations, by greedily assessing all finger nodes for the distance towards the
destination key identifier for each iteration. Consequently, the finger node that features
the smallest distance towards the destination key identifier is greedily chosen to be the
new forwarding node n f w and its destination value is taken over. The Bellman-Ford
relaxation process on top of Compass Tables can be summarized by the following equa-
tion:
∀ct(n) ∈CT(n)
ct(n).lt = arg min
f n∈FT(n)
{ct( f n).lt+ flat(n, f n)} ∧ ct(n).n f w = f n :
ct( f n) ∈ CT( f n)∧ct(n).KIct = ct( f n).KIct
(5.1)
For the relaxation process to result in latency minimal paths for each key identi-
fier the Bellman-Ford algorithm mandates that all finger nodes have to be assessed |N|
times, i.e., for each node in the environment one iteration is necessary. Since each Com-
pass node is only aware of the directly connected finger nodes it has to retrieve knowl-
edge on the other nodes implicitly. To this end each Compass node periodically obtains
the Compass Tables of its finger nodes. Likewise, each node forwards its Compass Ta-
ble to all other nodes for which it is a finger node. The information inside the Compass
Tables, stemming from the finger nodes, is exploited for the relaxation of the latency
paths, in updating the forwarding nodes and latencies, as shown in Equation 5.1. Hence,
Compass applies a gossip based protocol for Compass Table retrieval among the nodes.
Given the location of finger nodes in the Finger Table the size of is of logarithmic w.r.t.
the key identifier space if the size of KI is an exponent of 2:
|FT(n)| = log2(|KI|) = m with |KI| = 2m
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Then it also takes at most m iterations of the gossip protocol to cover the whole KI by
combining all destination key identifier sets KIct and propagating the Compass Tables
among all nodes. This implies that the asymptotic complexity of Compass, in terms of
the number of iterations to obtain all nodes, is logarithmic as well:
Compass convergence = O(log(|KI|)) ≈ O(m) where |KI| = 2m
To start the optimal path relaxation process each node needs to initialize its Compass
Table, such that it reflects the node’s current knowledge on optimal paths. Initially, the
latency distance towards a node’s key identifier space partition is clearly 0 whereas the
latency distance towards the rest of KI is unknown. To represent an unknown view
of KI, a node adds an entry (i.e., ctuknw(n)) to the Compass Table that features a null
forwarding node and a latency distance of value ∞ as follows:
ctuknw(n) = (null, KI \ KIP(n),∞)
For parts of KI that are featured by the unknown Compass Table entry default Chord
routing is used as a fall-back. In case a node is alone in the ring than the latency distance
for all of KI is 0 until another node joins the ring. The Compass Table initialization
routine is shown in Algorithm 5.4.
Algorithm 5.4 n.initCompass() creates a Compass Table entry for node n as itself being
the forwarding node with a latency of 0. If n is preceded by prdecessor, the encom-
passing key identifier space KIct is set to be the key identifier space partition of n, i.e.,
KIP(n). Moreover, a unknown Compass Table entry is created. In case n is alone KIct is
set to be the whole KI.
1: if predecessor ̸= null then
2: KIct ← KIP(n)
3: KIrest ← KI \ KIct
4: CT(n) ∪ (n, null , KIrest,∞)
5: else
6: KIct ← KI
7: end if
8: CT(n) ∪ (n, n, KIct, 0)
The fully initialized Compass Table is further iteratively refined by means of the
Bellman-Ford algorithm (i.e., Equation 5.1) based on the Compass Tables of the finger
nodes. In doing so, each node is likely to feature in the course of the relaxation process
a different view on KI w.r.t. key identifier sets encompassed by Compass Table entries.
Two entries of different nodes might feature key identifier sets which not the same (i.e.,
are differently fragmented) but are partially overlapping. In order to be comparable for
latency distance overlapping key identifier sets have to realigned. Thereby, realignment
is achieved by partitioning the local Compass Table entries into new ones encompassing
the overlapping key identifier set only. That is, whenever a local Compass Table entry
is overlapping with a f n Compass Table entry for an encompassed key identifier set
KIct, locally a new entry is created that features the overlapping key identifier set, thus
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reducing KIct of the already existing local Compass Table entry by the overlapping part.
The newly created Compass Table entry additionally features the smaller latency value
by means of relaxation of the two comparing entries along with the optimal forwarding
node.
Example 5.6
For instance, the Compass Table entry of node C, i.e., ctC = (c, A, [13, 2], 205), and entry
of node E, i.e., ctE = (e, B, [1, 2], 15) are at a certain point in time overlapping for KIct.
In this example the encompassed key identifier sets of C and E are denoted by means
of closed intervals encompassing all key identifiers that are located within the bounds.
Precisely, the overlapping key identifier set is [1, 2], i.e., ctC.KIct ∩ ctE.KIct = [13, 2] ∩
[1, 2] = [1, 2]. In order to realign these entries, the entry ctC is partitioned into two new
ones ctC1 and ctC2 such that ctC2 can be compared with ctE. Thereby, ctC1 denotes the
old entry reduced by the overlapping interval (i.e., ctC1 = (c, A, [13, 0], 205)), whereas
ctC2 features the overlapped interval (i.e., ctC2 = (c, A, [1, 2], 205)). Now that the entries
ctC2 and ctE are comparable they can be assessed with the relaxation process. Since
node E features a much lower latency distance towards [1, 2] than the current value of
ctC3, also by accounting for the direct latency towards E (i.e., ctE.lt + directLatencyE <
ctC2.lt ≈ 15+ 10 < 205), the latency value has to be relaxed to the lower value and the
forwarding node to set to be E, i.e., ctC2 = (c, E, [1, 2], 25).
The relative latency values among a node and its direct finger nodes are subject to
constant change, i.e., they can decrease but they can also increase over time. These
changes have to be passed on to the Compass Tables if the computation of optimal
paths is to be continuous. For instance, if the direct latency towards one finger node
increases then some other finger node is maybe more suitable as an optimal forwarding
node. Precisely, the relaxation process converges after m iterations resulting in optimal
paths for each key identifier. In case the increase of direct latency is not passed on, the
converged paths will never change although they might be out-of-data and suboptimal.
That is why the relaxation process of Compass has to be periodically repeated. In do-
ing so, the updated latency values, obtained by the results of the function flat, will be
propagated to the Compass Table entries according to Equation 5.1.
Algorithm 5.5 shows the periodic maintenance process of Compass Tables that in-
corporates the Equations 5.1. Note, that once the iterative relaxation process of Com-
pass tables has converged, the amount of their entries will always match the number of
nodes in Chord:
∀n ∈ N =⇒ |CT(n)| = |N|
Moreover, all Compass Table entries will feature the same encompassed key identifier
sets. This is due to the fact that each Chord node features a unique key identifier space
partition that cannot be further partitioned within the scope of the relaxation process:
∀n ∈ N∄nx : KIP(n) ⊆ KIP(nx)
The unknown Compass Table entry (i.e., ct(n)uknw), which represents the rest KI, will be
gradually partitioned into smaller pieces, in the course of the relaxation, by chopping off
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Algorithm 5.5 n.maintainCompass() Periodically iterates at node n over all finger nodes
f n and obtains their Compass Table entries. Checks for overlapping key identifier sets
CToverlap w.r.t. with f n Compass Tables CT( f n). In case a f n is already the forward-
ing node n f w for an overlapping key identifier set KIoverlap then the latency value is
accounted for with the directly measured latency lt f n of f n. In case a f n features a
lower latency for KIoverlap, also wile accounting for lt f n, it selects f n as the new optimal
node with the new latency value. For any update of an existing Compass Tables entry,
it creates a new entry which is added to the set Temp. Finally, it joins all newly created
entries of Temps that feature the same n f w and lt into one entry w.r.t. to KIct and adds it
to the local Compass Table.
1: for all f n ∈ FT(n) do
2: lt f n ← f n.getProbedLatency()
3: for all ct ∈ CT( f n) do
4: Temp ← ∅
5: CToverlap ⊆ CT(n)|∀cto ∈ CToverlap =⇒ cto.KIct ∩ ct.KIct ̸= ∅
6: for all cto ∈ CToverlap do
7: KIoverlap ← cto.KIct ∩ ct.KIct
8: if cto.n f w = f n then
9: if ct.n f w = n then
10: Temp ∪ (n, null , KIoverlap,∞)
11: cto.KIct \ KIoverlap
12: else
13: Temp ∪ (n, f n, KIoverlap, lt f n + ct.lt)
14: cto.KIct \ KIoverlap
15: end if
16: else if cto.lt > lt f n + ct.lt ∧ ct.n f w ̸= n then
17: Temp ∪ (n, f n, KIoverlap, lt f n + ct.lt)
18: cto.KIct \ KIoverlap
19: end if
20: if cto.KIct = ∅ then
21: CT(n) \ cto
22: end if
23: end for
24: for all ctt ∈ Temp do
25: CTs ⊆ Temp|∀cts ∈ CTs ctt.lt = cts.lt ∨ ctt.n f w = cts.n f w
26: Temp \ CTs
27: for all cts ∈ CTs do
28: ctt.KIct ∪ cts.KIct
29: end for
30: CT(n) ∪ ctt
31: end for
32: end for
33: end for
34: n.compressTable()
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the atomic units from it, i.e., the key identifier space partitions of each individual node.
Thus after m iterations we will obtain |N| atomic partitions of KI for each Compass
Table.
Compass Data Lookup
Once the Compass Tables have fully converged they can be used for latency optimal
data access. Given a destination key identifier at data lookup time, the Compass Table
is queried for the entry that encompasses it. In case the optimal forwarding node is the
queried node itself, the search is concluded, by declaring the queried node the desti-
nation. Otherwise the data lookup query is forwarded to the optimal forwarding node
until the destination node is reached. In case a Compass Table does not contain informa-
tion as on where to forward the lookup for a given destination identifier, Compass con-
sults the Finger Tables instead. In such a situation the forwarding node is determined
on the basis of the Finger Table hop optimized forwarding. This way the forwarding
process remains uninterrupted. Hence, Compass and Chord are jointly responsible for
the data access routine and do not mutually exclude each other, rather Compass extends
Chord’s data access routine for latency. Note, that unknown optimal forwarding node
information in Compass Tables are only possible immediately after a table reinitializa-
tion, that is while the optimal path computation is still in the process of convergence.
Algorithm 5.6 shows the reimplemented data lookup routine so as to feature Compass
as well.
The data access paths derived from the Compass Tables are expected to deviate from
the Finger Tables paths due to the completely different optimization grounds goals (i.e.,
latency vs. number of hops). In order for both tables to be nevertheless consistent,
in terms of destination node, an important precautionary measure has to be taken by
Compass. While Chord based data lookup routine stops at the predecessor of destina-
tion node, Compass destination resolution has to take place directly at the destination
node itself.
Since Chord is designed to optimize for the number of hops it can afford to stop a
lookup at the predecessor. Compass on the other hand, bases its forwarding decision on
a metric that is constantly changing (i.e., latency) and cannot be certain about a destina-
tion but at destination node itself. Hence, Compass lookup has to always make the ex-
tra forwarding step and stop at the destination node only. Hence, consistency between
Chord and Compass relies on the on correctness of successor entries at each node for
Chord, whereas in Compass consistency relies on the correctness of predecessor node
entries. In other words, lookup consistency is determined by the correct predecessor-
successor values for each node in the ring topology. Since these values are set by the
periodic stabilize() (i.e., Algorithm 3.4) routine Compass can be out of sync with
Chord for at most as a stabilize() invocation period lasts. Therefore, consistency
of the lookup routines can be improved by increasing the frequency of stabilize()
routine invocations. This implies for Chord lookup consistency in general. An example
of a Compass based data lookup is illustrated in Figure 5.8.
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Algorithm 5.6 n.findSuccessor(id) Looks at node n’s Compass Table for an entry that en-
compasses the given key identifier id if Compass is enabled and n has a predecessor.
In case an entry exists and the forwarding node n f w is the same as n then it concludes
the search by returning n. If the entry exists and n f w is not the same as n then it for-
wards the search to n f w. For all other cases the Finger Table is consulted by calling its
f indSuccessor(id) routine.
1: if compassEnabled = true then
2: HopHistory ∪ n
3: if CT(n) ̸= ∅ ∧ predecessor ̸= null then
4: ∃ct ∈ CT(n)|id ∈ ct.KIct
5: if ct.n f w ̸= null then
6: if ct.n f w = n then
7: return n
8: else
9: if ct.n f w /∈ HopHistory then
10: return ct.n f w. f indSuccessor(id)
11: else
12: ct.lt ← ∞
13: ct.n f w ← null
14: end if
15: end if
16: end if
17: end if
18: end if
19: return FT(n). f indSuccessor(id)
Example 5.7
Figure 5.8 bases the Compass node environment on the Chord ring as already intro-
duced in the example of Figure 3.2. In this example however, the Finger Tables have
been replaced with Compass Tables instead. As the figure shows the all nodes feature
completely converged Compass Tables that feature the same encompassed key iden-
tifier sets but different latencies w.r.t. their corresponding Finger Table nodes. For in-
stance, the Compass Table of node C features five entries, each entry encompassing a
key identifier set that corresponds to one partition of one node in the ring, i.e., ctC1 =
(c, E, [1, 2], 25), ctC2 = (c, C, [3, 6], 0), ctC3 = (c, D, [7, 9], 130), ctC4 = (c, E, [10, 13], 10)
and ctC5 = (c, E, [14, 0], 170). As depicted node E is the only static node out of all Finger
Table nodes (i.e., D, E and A) for C, thus it is selected as the optimal forwarding node
n f w for most of the entries (i.e.,, ctC1, ctC4 and ctC5).
The same data lookup for the key identifier value 1 at node C as in example Fig-
ure 5.7 not result in the red path but rather in the green path. That is, consultation
with the Compass Table would yield ctC1 as the encompassing entry and thus node
E as the forwarding node. At node E the same lookup for 1 would yield the entry
ctE1 = (e, b, [1, 2], 15) and node B as the forwarding node. Finally, at node B the lookup
would be concluded as id = 1 as the Compass Table would return an entry that features
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Figure 5.8: Compass routing
the node itself as the optimal forwarding node, ctB1 = (b, b, [1, 2], 0). By exploiting the
Compass Table the lookup would incur latency costs of about 25ms in total which is by
far more efficient than the default red path.
Compass Dynamics
The latency distance metric on which the Compass is founded is measured value and
thus subject to dynamic changes at runtime. Due to propagation of these changes to
the Compass Tables the optimal forwarding nodes value tends to constantly change in
the process of relaxation. The biggest consequence of frequent (i.e., volatile) optimal
forwarding nodes changes is the prolonged convergence and/or even the divergence
of the relaxation process itself. Although prolongation of relaxation will not obstruct its
goal in minimizing the latency it may however have significant effects on its outcome
by devising paths which are far from optimal from a global point of view.
The most common issue to Bellman-Ford based data lookup algorithms, that are
caused by volatile latency oscillations, lies in the count-to-infinity problem. In the count-
to-infinity problem a certain number of forwarding nodes from in the course of a volatile
relaxation process an optimal path that corresponds to a loop:
∃ct(n) ∈ CT(n) ∧ ∃ct(nx) ∈ CT(nx) :
ct(n).KIec = ct(nx).KIec ∧ ct(n).n f w = nx ∧ ct(nx).n f w = n
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Once a lookup enters this loop it undefinability advances its lookup request only among
the nodes forming the loop and thus never reaches its destination.
The count-to-infinity loops are formed when due to a sudden change in direct la-
tency some node reevaluates a new f n to be optimal. At the new optimal node the
latency burst affected node is already seen as optimal, for the same key identifier set,
thus the loop is formed. In a loop all participants increase the distance metric in a spiral
fashion w.r.t. Equation 5.1 by increasing the direct latency to each other until infinity. In
theory the count-to-infinity problem should resolve itself after some time, i.e., whenever
the distance metric has been increased so much such that another f orwardingNode be-
comes optimal (i.e., in case there is one). However, in practice the resolution of circular
paths tends to last be rather lengthy, which in the meantime nullifies the optimal data
access paths of Compass. Moreover, infinite lookup looping at such nodes results in an
unnecessary waste of local computational and communication resources likely needed
for other system functionalities.
To overcome the count-to-infinity problem a number of proactive and reactive mea-
sures can be taken. Compass applies latency flattening in conjunction to Poison Reverse.
These two solutions can be described as follows:
• Latency flattening – First, volatile oscillations of latency measurements, which tend
to frequently occur in heterogeneous networks, can be flattened out in a proac-
tive fashion. To this end Compass follows the suggestions presented in liter-
ature [RGRK04] by applying an exponentially weighted moving average value
on the latency measurements. The following equation shows the oscillation
smoothening of latency measurements at each periodic probe:
flat(n1, n2)new = α · probe(n1, n2) + (1− α) · flat(n1, n2)old (5.2)
Note, that function probe(n1,n2) returns the measured relative latency among the
specified nodes.
• Split Horizon with Poison Reverse – Compass also applies proactive Split Horizon
with Poison Reverse [Bla00] techniques so as to prevent circular path formation.
Whenever a loop is suspected in the process in relaxation, preemptively the sus-
pected Compass Table entry is reset to unknown. This way the unknown value
is propagated rather than a potential loop path to the other nodes. For instance,
Algorithm 5.5 features Poison Reverse constructs (i.e., lines 9− 11) in setting the
optimal forwarding node.
• Reactive Poison Reverse – Poison Reverse in conjunction to filtered latency mea-
surements facilitate the count-to-infinity prevention for simple loop path situa-
tions that involve only two succeeding nodes. To dissolve more complex circular
paths (e.g., of three or more involved nodes), which are however rather seldom in
practice, reactive Poison Reverse techniques have to be applied. Reactive count-
to-infinity prevention approaches focus on detecting the loops while traversing
the nodes at data lookup time. In case a loop is detected, the loop closing Com-
pass Table entry is reset to unknown and thus Poison Reverse is applied. Loop
detection is made possible by maintaining a the lookup history state. Thereby, the
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state can be represented by means of a hop counter or a list of traversed nodes.
In Compass, a node hop history is maintained and exploited by the data lookup
routine findSuccessor(id) (i.e., Algorithm 5.6, lines 1 and 11− 14). That is,
in calling findSuccessor(id) each traversed node is added to the hop history
and in case the optimal forwarding node to be queried for data is already con-
tained in the hop history the loop is detected and Poison Reverse is applied.
Finally, dynamics in the Chord ring topology also have a significant influence on the
Compass Tables as well. Inconsistency with the ring topology, reflected in the Finger
Tables and predecessor nodes, inevitably results in inconsistency of Compass. Since
the Finger Tables are the foundation for Compass changes to them, in face of join-
ing/leaving finger nodes, have to be propagated to Compass Table level immediately. A
straightforward, yet effective solution to Finger Table dynamics, lies in case of Compass
with the reinitialization of Compass Tables. Simply put, whenever an underlying Finger
Table changes, the Compass Table has to be reset so as to restart the relaxation process
and thus reevaluate the updated finger nodes. The reinitialization of the Compass Table
has to take place whenever the predecessor node changes as well.
Compass Efficiency
The iterative relaxation process of Compass, once converged, results in Compass Tables
that are of linear size w.r.t. the number of nodes in the Chord ring:
|CT(n)| = |N|
The computational complexity of the Compass algorithm can be broken down into
the asymptotic complexity of the Bellman-Ford algorithm on which it is based. By def-
inition, the complexity of the Bellman-Ford is bound to the number of nodes (i.e., |N|)
in the environment and the number of edges (i.e., |E|) among them:
Bellman− Ford computation = O(|N| · |E|)
When applied to Compass, each node possess only one edge for each of its finger nodes,
i.e., only (|FT(n)| = log(|KI|)) edges. However, to obtain all |N| entries of the Compass
Table log(|KI|) iterations of the Compass maintenance algorithm are necessary at each
node during which all the finger nodes are evaluated all over for optimal paths. Hence,
we conclude the asymptotic complexity of computing the optimal paths of the Compass
maintenance algorithm to be:
Compass computation = O(|N| · log(|KI|)2) = O(|N| ·m2) where |KI| = 2m
For most computational nodes of a heterogeneous environment such a complexity
should prove to be affordable. First, given the our motivation application scenario of
Section 2 it is unlikely to expect the to execution environment to be of unlimited node
numbers. Rather a predefined and limited setting of computational nodes, as in the
case of the mobile computers at the firefighters, stationary computers at the trucks etc.
will be used instead. Second, given the advancements in computational performance
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(i.e., CPU power and main memory capacity) of modern mobile devices [Gao] the local
maintenance of a data structure that is of a quadratic size over a logarithmic base should
not be too much of a computational overhead.
In case Compass is applied to a scalable execution environment that is composed of
a vast number of computational nodes (i.e., |KI| ≈ |N|), a linear Compass Table might
prove to be inefficient from a bandwidth resource consumption point of view. In partic-
ular mobile (i.e., resource-limited) nodes might be significantly burdened with the over-
head of Compass maintenance algorithm (i.e., the gossiping part of it) in periodically
transmitting the linear Compass Tables to the finger nodes. To reduce the bandwidth
consumption at mobile nodes, Compass applies a compression algorithm on top its ta-
bles just before they are sent out into the network and thus significantly contributes to
network transmission reduction per node.
The compression algorithm is based on the idea of exploiting the destination metric
of Compass Tables, which is KI, to create new entries which encompass a bigger parti-
tion of KI and thus subsumes multiple affected entries so as to reduce reciprocally the
size of Compass Tables. In order to be able to subsume multiple entries into a bigger one
they have to be similar. Similarity of entries is derived on their relative latency distances
towards adjacent key identifier sets for the same optimal forwarding node. Simply put,
if two Compass Table entries feature adjacent key identifier sets, the same forwarding
node and almost the same (similar) latency distances then they can be merged into one
entry. In turn, the newly joined entry will feature a merged key identifier set, the carried
over optimal forwarding node and one latency distance value of the two similar values.
In order not to overestimate similarity with other entries in the future we choose the
higher latency value of the joining entries for the new entry.
Latency similarity, is defined by means of a threshold value σ. This values speci-
fies the relative latency distance among any two Compass Table entries that has to be
matched. To compute the relative distance among any two Compass Table entries of a
node the distance function fsj is introduced as follows:
fsj : CT(n)× CT(n) ↦→ IR+ where fsj(ct1(n), ct2(n)) = |ct1(n).lt− ct2(n).lt|max{ct1(n).lt, ct2(n).lt}
Hence, in case two Compass Table entries feature latencies whose relative difference is
lower than the latency threshold value σ they have the potential to be merged into one
entry. Adjacency of key identifier spaces is determined by means of the function fadj as
follows:
fadj : 2KI × 2KI ↦→ {true, f alse}
Example 5.8
For instance, let us assume that the latency value of node A improves to 20ms for node
C and 5ms for node E in the example presented in Figure 5.8. As a consequence the
entry encompassing the key identifier space partition of node A in node C’s Compass
Table would change to ctC5 = (c, E, [14, 0], 15) eventually. Given the similar entry ctC4 =
(c, E, [10, 13], 10) that features the same forwarding node E, a subsequent key identifier
set ( fadj([10, 13], [14, 0]) = true) and a similar latency (i.e., fsj(15, 10) < 0.4 for σ = 0.4)
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to ctC5 they can be merged into a new entry. Thereby, ctC5 would be added to ctC4 such
that the updated ctC4 entry would extend its key identifier space set and assume the
higher latency as follows: ctC4 = (c, E, [10, 0], 15).
The complete Compass Table compression routine is shown in Algorithm 5.7. Note,
that Algorithm 5.7 is also periodically applied as the last step of the Compass Table
maintenance routine (i.e., Algorithm 5.5, line no.19).
Algorithm 5.7 n.compressTable() In case Compass Table compression is enabled at node
n, first it selects fer each all entry a subset of the Compass Table that is similar CTj, in
terms of adjacent encompassed key identifier sets KIct, the same forwarding nodes n f w
and lower relative latency distance than σ. Finally, it merges all entries of CTj into a
single one by taking over the maximal latency value of all entries.
1: if compression = true then
2: for all ctx ∈ CT(n) do
3: CTj ⊆ CT(n)|∀ctj ∈ CTj =⇒ fsj(ctx, ctj) < σ ∧ ctx.n f w = ctj.n f w ∧
fadj(ctx.KIct, ctj.KIct) = true
4: CT(n) \ CTj
5: for all ctj ∈ CTj do
6: ctx.lt ← max{ctx.lt, ctj}
7: end for
8: end for
9: end if
The similarity threshold value σ is subject to specification by an expert end-user that
administers the workflow engine so as to reflect demands of the high-level application
for bandwidth resource conservation. However, σ also introduces a trade-off between
precision and efficiency of the Compass approach. By adjusting for σ the compression
granularity of the Compass Tables can be specified directly. A higher σ value should
result in more joined entries and thus smaller tables, at the price of diluted latency dis-
tance values. Whereas, a lower σ value should result in very few joins and thus more
linear Compass Tables, with more accurate latency entries. Finding an similarity thresh-
old value which guarantees optimal latency and sub-linear Compass Table sizes is not
a trivial task. In general, the optimal σ value strongly depends on the execution en-
vironment characteristics. As we shall see in the evaluation chapter of this thesis the
biggest data lookup performance can be achieved for environments which are evenly
composed of mobile and static nodes. Given such configurations σ has to be addition-
ally experimentally evaluated for various combinations so as to yield the same lookup
performance for reduced Compass Table sizes.
5.1.3 Reliable Data Flows
As Figure 5.1 suggests failures of nodes is a common occurrence in distributed systems.
While the Safety-Ring helps to overcome node failure issues of the control flow the
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failures related to the data flow such as lost data items, lost service instance state etc.
necessitate special handling.
So far the passive-standby recovery has been identified as the ideal approach to
data flow reliability due to its conservative utilization of node resources. Traditional
passive-standby approaches base their recovery strategies on limited redundancy, i.e.,
one backup node only. Simply put, the traditional passive-standby approach assumes
the backup node to be ideal and not endangered by failure in any situation. However,
in heterogeneous environments no node can be assumed as ideal, all nodes have a ten-
dency to fail or at least become unresponsive to the others for a certain period of time.
This is especially the case if they are mobile or resource limited nodes are involved in
the system.
To increase the robustness of passive-standby in heterogeneous environments the
most straightforward approach is to extend the redundancy of the checkpoints beyond
the ideal backup node. By increasing the number of backup nodes for the state check-
points of an active service instance, the robustness to node failures of the data flow will
be increased. With more backup nodes at hand, continuous data flow can be rerouted
to one of the backup nodes. On the other hand, increased backup redundancy entails
the assertion of the state consistency among the backup nodes as well. As in the case of
workflow instances, only if all backup sites feature the exact same state, correct recovery
is possible in face of failures. Recovery of node failures based on inconsistent data can
result in unforeseeable consequences.
Although it features a scalable, reliable and consistent data store at its core the Safety-
Ring cannot be used for streaming instance state checkpoints for reasons of efficiency
and compatibility as elaborated in the follow-up:
• The Safety-Ring applies the symm mapping function of symmetric replication
(Section 3.2.3, Definition 3.10) so as to locate the replication SR-nodes. The symm
function is agnostic to the availability of service instances at the replicated nodes.
This implies that state checkpoints would predominantly end up at SR-nodes that
do not feature the backed up service type in storing at the Safety-Ring. Hence, an
additional data replication step would be necessary so as to replicate the backed-
up state to the replacement service instance in the event of failure. The additional
transfer of state from the Safety-Ring to the optimal backup node would delay the
recovery time.
• The communication overhead, in terms of exchanged messages, of Paxos commit
could turn out to be too much of an overhead for resource limited (e.g., networking
capabilities) active service instances.
• The fault handling of streaming service instance failures would have to be dele-
gated to the SR-nodes, which would correspond a considerable interference with
the semantics of the passive-standby approach.
For all the mentioned reasons the Safety-Ring should be avoided for replication of
streaming instance state. Rather, the state backups should be made available at all
backup nodes directly. To ensure consistency of the check-pointed state at all distributed
backup nodes a more lightweight consistency protocol should be considered such that
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it can even be carried out by resource limited devices. Going back to the discussion of
Section 5.1.2 where we assume memory and CPU resources to be negligible even for
mobile devices we chose to apply a consistency protocol that conserves bandwidth re-
sources instead. Being the most basic distributed transactional protocol, with the small-
est communication overhead we opt for the two phase commit (2PC, Section 3.3.2) so as
to enforce consistency at the distributed backup nodes.
Redundant Passive-Standby
The big idea behind the redundant passive-standby approach is to increase redundancy
of an active service instance state checkpoint by simultaneous replication to multiple
backup nodes. To ensure consistency of the replication process it is supported by means
of a 2PC distributed transaction. In the context of 2PC, the active streaming instance
becomes the transaction coordinator whereas the backup nodes become the transaction
participants. Along the lines of the 2PC protocol, the active service instance interacts
with the backup nodes in two phases:
• In the Voting phase the active streaming instance (i.e., coordinator) sends the its
state checkpoint along with the prepare request to all backup nodes. The backup
nodes take over the checkpoint state asses the prepare request of the coordinator
by means of the local concurrency control mechanism and respond accordingly.
• In the Commit phase the coordinator issues the commit request if all backup nodes
are ready. Once all backups have acknowledged the commit request the coordina-
tor acknowledges the backup to its upstream service instance just as in the case of
the traditional passive-standby approach.
For all the other cases the current transaction is aborted and has to be retried at a
later stage in time by the coordinator. In the meantime, the upstream service instance
has to wait for the acknowledgment from the downstream service instance. Figure 5.9
illustrates the 2PC enabled passive-standby checkpointing.
Since in our model there are no stable nodes backup nodes can fail themselves. That
is why we enable the active streaming instance with capability of selecting the backup
nodes. In case a transaction could not be competed due to backup node failure, a new
backup node is selected inside the environment by the coordinator and the a new trans-
action is initiated. Naturally, the active service instance will select r backup nodes that
have the same service type already deployed at them. Moreover, out of the set redun-
dant and inactive service instances the active one will select the r best ones w.r.t. their
metadata characteristics. Precisely, the r best service instances according to the routine
getSI(anext) (i.e., Algorithm 4.5) will be selected.
For all of its benefits (e.g., simplicity and efficiency) 2PC is commonly known to be
vulnerable to the transaction coordinator failure. Recap, in case the coordinator of a
transaction fails in the course of the voting phase after having issued the prepare re-
quests, the transaction will block. This issue can however be effectively overcome by
exploiting the failure recovery strategy of passive-standby. Since the active streaming
instance is at the same time also the coordinator the upstream node will detect its ab-
sence (e.g., due to failure) and can thus terminate the ongoing transaction (if any) on
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Figure 5.9: Passive-standby checkpointing in the context of 2PC transactions.
its behalf. In recovering the interrupted data flow at a backup node, the replacement
service instance also becomes the new transaction coordination for future reference.
In order to be able to resolve any ongoing transaction of the downstream service
instance, the upstream service instance has to be aware of the downstream transaction
state, i.e., the current downstream coordinator, the current downstream checkpoint and
the current downstream backup nodes. Only when this information is available at the
upstream streaming instance the downstream coordinator can be successfully recov-
ered. The downstream coordinator transaction state is obtained along with an acknowl-
edgment message of the downstream node. Figure 5.10 depicts the recovery of a failed
a transaction coordinator, i.e., active streaming instance.
Example 5.9
As we can observe from Figure 5.10 there are five peers (A, B, C, D, E) in the environ-
ment such that at nodes A and B active streaming instances are residing. Thereby, A is
the upstream streaming instance of node B which is downstream streaming instance in
streaming to it the data stream DST1. The nodes C, D and E feature redundant service
instances of in terms sink service type (depicted with the same icon) of node A. In doing
so, the nodes C and D serve as backup nodes for node B.
As further illustrated in this figure node B fails after having received the commit
readiness from C and D which blocks the current transaction denoted with the identi-
fier CH5. Once the upstream service instance at node A detects the absence of acknowl-
edgment messages from A it triggers the passive-standby recovery in the traditional
sense by rerouting the data stream DST1 to node C which becomes the new down-
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Figure 5.10: Redundant Passive-standby recovery of a failed transaction manger.
stream streaming instance. However, for redundant passive-standby A also needs to
abort any ongoing transaction for which B has been the coordinator. That is why it
sends an ABORT request to all backup nodes. Moreover, node A also needs to acti-
vate the new coordinator, hence it sends to C the last checkpointed transaction state it is
aware of, i.e., the remaining backup nodes, the new coordinator identifier and the last
transaction identifier – ⟨{TP2}, TM2, CH4⟩. This information the upstream streaming
instance obtained with the last acknowledgment message.
Once activated the new active streaming instance at node C will eventually start a
checkpoint of its own with a new state SSc and a new 2PC transaction identifier CH5.
But before it can do so, it has to pick a new backup node, which is node E, so as to
reinstate the replication factor of r = 2. Upon successful completion of the transaction
CH5 node D will send an acknowledged message to the upstream service instance as-
serting the latest transaction checkpoint state along with the latest backup nodes, the
latest coordinator and the latest transaction identifier, and the most recent state of the
service instance checkpoint – ⟨{TP2, TP3}, TM2, CH5, SSc⟩.
As the previous example already suggests to fault-handle downstream service in-
stance failure, the upstream streaming instance needs to be always alive for the re-
dundant passive-standby to work. This requirement is however inherently granted
by the passive-standby idea itself. Precisely, the upstream service instance will also
be backed by another upstream service instance and a set of redundant backup nodes.
These will jointly fault-handle the upstream service instance if it should fail. To cope for
upstream service instance failures, the last acknowledged downstream service instance
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state has to be stored redundantly, i.e., shared with the backups, as well. Should the
upstream service instance fail, its backup will contain the backed up acknowledgment
of downstream service instance and can fault-handle from that state on downstream
node failures. Any checkpoint of an active streaming instance should thus feature its
current stream processing state and the latest acknowledgment of downstream service
instance. Hence, we define a checkpoint of an active streaming instance for the redun-
dant passive-standby approach to be as follows:
Definition 5.3 (Redundant passive-standby checkpoint – ch). A checkpoint ch of the
redundant passive-standby approach for a streaming instance si ∈ SIc is defined as tuple
ch(si) = (ss, cntch, cntco, acksi, ackco, ackch, SIack) where:
• ss ∈ SS is the current state of si with:
ss = si.s.ss
• cntch ∈ IN+ is the current checkpoint state counter of si,
• cntco ∈ IN+ is the current coordinator counter of si,
• acksi ∈ SI is last acknowledged downstream coordinator of 2PC,
• ackco ∈ IN+ is the last acknowledged counter of the downstream coordinator,
• ackch ∈ IN+ is the last acknowledged counter of the downstream checkpoint,
• SIack ⊂ SI is the last acknowledged current downstream set of backup streaming in-
stances.
Whereas the set of all redundant passive-standby checkpoints for all active streaming instances
is denoted as CH. □
Observe that acksi and ackco together denote the downstream transaction coordinator
in the context of Example 5.9, whereas ackch denotes the transaction identifier.
The checkpoint ch is replicated to the backup nodes is supported with a 2PC dis-
tributed transaction. For this to work the checkpoint ch has to be embedded into a
distributed transaction item and back. To this end the mapping functions fcd and fdc are
introduced as follows:
fcd : CH ↦→ DI ∧ fcd : DI ↦→ CH
Algorithm 5.8 shows the 2PC embedded checkpointing approach into passive-standby
for multiple backup nodes.
Note, that in case of a successful commit the routine backup() will return the ac-
knowledgment as a complex data structure and not send the acknowledgment itself.
The actual sending of the acknowledgment data structure to the upstream streaming
instance takes place in Algorithm 4.1, line no.13 where the returned data structure
of backup() is just appended to the actual acknowledgment message. Moreover,
the timestamp of the transaction is determined by the current counter of the check-
point. This can be attributed to the fact that the our 2PC distributed transactions ap-
ply an optimistic serializability approach to concurrency control. Even though 2PC is
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Algorithm 5.8 si.backup(ssnew, SIch). Updates the checkpoint state of si to the given
latest state ssnew and an increased checkpoint counter cntch. Afterwards it creates a
2PC distributed transaction dtx with the checkpoint of si, i.e., ch(si), to be the transac-
tion item. Then, the transaction dtx is started such that all service instances of SIds are
the transactional participants. In case dtx could be committed it updates the internal
service instance state to ssnew and the new counter, upon which all upstream service
instances are acknowledged with the current coordinator si, its counter cntds and the
backup nodes set SIds. For all other cases the backup is not performed no acknowledg-
ments are issued.
1: ch(si)← CH(si)
2: ch(si).cntch ← ch(si).cntch + 1
3: ch(si).ss ← ssnew
4: item ← ( fcd(ch(si)), W)
5: dtx ← (”RANDOMKEY”, ch(si).cntch, {item, C}, {(item, C)}, 2PC)
6: Participants ← SIch
7: if n.commit(dtx) = COMMIT then
8: CH ∪ ch(si)
9: retVal ← (si, ch(si).cntch, ch(si).cntco, SIch)
10: return retVal
11: end if
12: return null
commonly used in conjunction to pessimistic locking (e.g., strict two phase locking –
SS2PL [WV01]), redundant passive-standby follows another approach.
Since only the active service instance issues transactional writes, concurrent transac-
tions at the backup nodes should not exist, thus the probability of transactional conflicts
is very low. Preemptive locking of the backup nodes thus would unnecessarily consume
additional network resources in acquiring the locks. To save network resources, the 2PC
transaction protocol of redundant passive-standby assumes asynchronous replication of
checkpoints to the backup nodes in conjunction optimistic serializability.
However, our reliability model does not completely rule out concurrency of trans-
actions by default. Concurrent transaction can occur when the upstream streaming in-
stance introduces the a new coordinator which consequently starts to checkpoint its
state. In case the downstream streaming instance is still alive but has been recovered by
the upstream service instance due to a false failure suspicion then concurrency will be
introduced. That is, there will be two coordinators at the same time issuing transactional
writes to the backup nodes. In face of concurrent writes our conflict resolution model
always decides for the transaction with the latest transaction coordinator first and for
the transaction with the latest transactional timestamp second. Algorithm 5.9 provides
the conflict resolution of optimistic serializability for the 2PC transaction protocol of the
redundant passive-standby approach.
Note, that Algorithm 5.9 overrides the routine readyToCommit already introduced
in Algorithm 3.16, in the context of 2PC prepare acknowledgment, so as to enhance the
concurrency control mechanism for optimistic serializability.
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Algorithm 5.9 tp.isCommitReady((dtx) Given the transaction dtx extracts from it the
checkpoint ch(si) for the coordinator si. Then it checks if the coordinator counter of
ch(si) is greater than the current coordinator counter cntch of the participant tp. If this is
the case, then there is a new coordinator and the transaction is accepted. Otherwise, it
checks if the checkpoint counter of ch(si) is greater or equal than the checkpoint counter
cntch of tp. If this is the case, then there is a new checkpoint and the transaction is ac-
cepted. If both case do not apply an outdated transaction is trying to commit, thus it
has to be aborted.
1: ∃item ∈ dtx.Item : item ̸= C
2: ch(si)← fdc(item.di)
3: if ch(si).cntco > cntco then
4: cntco ← ch(si).cntco
5: cntch ← ch(si).cntch
6: return true
7: end if
8: if ch(si).cntco = cntco ∧ ch(si).cntch ≥ cntch then
9: cntch ← ch(si).cntch
10: return true
11: end if
12: return false
Whenever a failure is detected at the upstream node the data stream is redirected to
the optimal backup node (getSI()) as in the case traditional passive-standby. Since
the failed service instance could have been in the process of coordinating an ongoing
transaction the replacement coordinator will introduce concurrency with its transac-
tional writes. To put the new coordinator into a better position, from a conflict reso-
lution point of view, the upstream streaming instance assigns the recovery coordinator
with a greater coordinator counter cntco. Thereby, the upstream service instance will set
the new coordinator value such that it correspond to an increased value of the last ac-
knowledged coordinator counter (i.e., ackco). Algorithm 5.10 shows the passive-standby
embedded coordinator recovery.
We assume also that canceled transaction can also occur due to the failure of partic-
ipants. In such situations the failed participant is replaced with a new one and a new
transaction is issued in a later point in time. Since service instances that feature sources
of the data stream do not have an upstream node they cannot be recovered by means
of redundant passive-standby. Therefore, we have to assume the streaming instances
featuring the data source to be ideal (i.e., fail-safe) as well. For any other service in-
stance failure in the data flow, redundant passive-standby will perform a recovery –
provided the number of simultaneous failures does not exceed the replication factor,
i.e., the number of backups. We additionally assume that the streaming instance state of
each checkpoint is not too big, in terms of data size, and fine grained such that replica-
tion of it across a set of redundant backup nodes would not be too resource consuming.
Given that no failures occur in the course of the coordination process, the approach
of redundant passive-standby thus additionally burdens its traditional counterpart by
just one phase of exchanged messages. That is, redundant passive-standby features the
152 Self-organizing Workflow Execution Engines
Algorithm 5.10 si.ackTimeout(si f ) In the event of service instance si f failure redirects its
output stream DSTs to the backup service instance sibk. Selects sibk to feature the high-
est checkpoint number cnt. Afterwards it activates enables sibk for checkpointing with
the backup node set SIds and the increased coordinator counter cntds. Afterwards, it
stops the failed service instance preemptively in case the suspicion was wrong. Finally,
updates the corresponding workflow instance wi with sibk.
1: DSTs ← si.getStream(si.s.ss, si f )
2: ch(si)← CH(si)
3: sibk ← si.getSI(ch(si).SIack)
4: si.setStream(si.s.ss, sibk, DSTs)
5: sibk.activate2PC(ch(si).ackco + 1, ch(si).ackch, ch(si).SIack \ sibk)
6: si f .abort2PC(ch(si).ackco)
7: for all sibk ∈ ch(si).SIack \ sibk do
8: sibk.abort2PC(ch(si).ackco)
9: end for
10: ∃wi ∈ WI : si ∈ wi.SIa
11: wi.SIa \ si f
12: wi.SIa ∪ sibk
prepare and commit message exchange phase, in a failure-free scenario. In each phase r
messages are sent back and forth between the participating nodes. Hence, only addi-
tional 4r messages are burdened on the system by our approach.
The checkpointing process itself is independent (i.e., asynchronous) of the data flow
and does not affect of the throughput directly. It does however delay the subsequent
checkpoint until the running one has been acknowledged by the distributed transac-
tion. This implies that the delay in state checkpointing should result in more data items
at the output streams of the upstream streaming instance that have not been acknowl-
edged. Hence, our approach should affect the recovery performance of passive-standby.
In the event of downstream coordinator failure, all unacknowledged data items at the
upstream steaming instance will have to be resent to a backup so as to restore the lost
state. Given more unacknowledged upstream data items the state recovery process at a
backup node should thus last longer. However, for all of its benefits redundant passive-
standby can be considered as efficient from a resource consumption (e.g., network band-
width) point of view, such that it can be applied to heterogeneous environments.
5.2 Self-optimizing Workflow Definition Execution
A typical Peer-to-Peer execution environment is highly dynamic given the heteroge-
neous nature of the participating nodes. In view of available hardware resources, no
two nodes tend to exhibit the same service instance execution behavior. While well-
equipped nodes will feature stable and powerful performance, resource limited nodes
will feature low performance and will be more likely to fail (e.g., due to resource deple-
tion) than other nodes. Mobile nodes (if present), on the other hand, will likely change
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their positions over time, and thus feature constantly changing data transmission char-
acteristics. In view of service type deployment, some peers will host multiple service
types while other peers will be dedicated to certain service types only.
Whatever the setting, all peers of a heterogeneous environment will feature at all
times constantly changing execution performance characteristics. When distributed ex-
ecution of workflow instances is subjected to such a heterogeneous node environment,
the individual dynamic behavior of peers will have a significant effect on the overall
system performance. In particular the throughput of workflow instances in the system
will be affected by dynamics of peers. If in the course of workflow instance migration
low performing nodes are selected over others then the throughput of the system is
likely to be reduced and exposed to risk of node failure. For example, nodes that are
frequently failing should be less preferred for late-binding decisions. Availability of ser-
vice types additionally affects the throughput of workflow instances in the system. If
highly demanded service types are instantiated too scarcely in the environment, work-
flow instances will have to queue for them and thus get delayed. This applies both for
application as well as system services.
Therefore, the goal of our work is to increase the system performance, in terms of
workflow instance throughput, by optimizing the control flow execution at runtime.
Our approach is based on an improved late-binding of service instances that takes into
account the dynamics of the environment to a greater extent. Precisely, we seek to
achieve an effective load balancing among service instances by focusing on two main
aspects of heterogeneous execution environments:
1. Well-performing nodes. Nodes that support a high throughput of workflow in-
stances have to be preferred by the control flow at late-binding time. Such nodes
typically feature a high execution performance due to abundant local (hardware)
resources. Hence, they should be able to perform many concurrent invocations of
the same service type and thus reduce the workload of the other nodes. To clas-
sify well-performing nodes various aspects of dynamic runtime behavior should
be considered such as responsiveness, workload, available memory etc.
2. Service type availability. To support the throughput of workflow instances, an ad-
equate amount of frequently used service instances has to be provided as well. In
case the system does not offer enough instances of a service type, that is demanded
by many workflow instances, it will likely from a bottleneck from a workflow in-
stance migration point of view. To this end, new instances, of frequently used
service types, should be dynamically created by the system. For the deployment
of new instances well-performing nodes should be preferred so as not to over-
load the already resource limited ones. On the other hand, if the system features
an abundance of instances of a service type that is not frequently used for late-
binding, some of the instances should be decommissioned by the system. This
way local resources will be conserved and if necessary more demanded service
types can be deployed instead.
Traditional workflow engines rely on centralized metadata aggregation on the ex-
ecution environment in conjunction to centralized decision making. The price of such
an approach is limited scalability (as elaborated in Section 1.3, Example 1.4). Literature
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(e.g., [STS+06]) provides confirmed reports of scalability bottlenecks when centralized
late-binding is applied to scalable execution environments.
Contrarily to the traditional engines, our distributed execution model is completely
decentralized and autonomously orchestrated by each orchestrator node itself. In our
system each orchestrator is capable of autonomous late-binding of service instances,
based only on locally available metadata. To support the orchestrator nodes in their
decentralized late-binding functionality we choose to enrich them with additional in-
formation on the dynamic aspects of the execution environment. This in turn allows us
to better classify the well-performing nodes.
Although additional metadata facilitates an improved detection of well-performing
nodes, they might turn out not be that supporting for throughput as they lack the
frequently used service types. Therefore, we enable the orchestrator nodes with hot-
deployment functionalities for any kind of application service type. This in turn allows
us to boost the throughput for sluggish workflow instances provided that service type
scarcity is the main problem.
5.2.1 Extended Metadata on the Execution Environment
In order to identify the well-performing nodes at a certain point in time all aspects of
their execution behavior have to be considered, especially the dynamic ones. The more
information we have on nodes the better decisions we can make at runtime while en-
trusting them with important system functionalities, such as Safety-Ring participation,
activity invocations etc.
Every node of the execution environment usually exhibits static and dynamic exe-
cution behavior at runtime. These characteristic can be summarized as follows:
• Static – Static behavior of nodes can be described with characteristics that either do
not change at all or rarely change, over a longer period of time. For instance, hard-
ware equipment can be considered as a static characteristic that can help classify
nodes w.r.t. performance. However, such characteristics are generally concealed
behind the service type interface and cannot easily accessed by the system.
• Dynamic – Dynamic behavior of nodes can be described with characteristics that
do frequently change over a longer period of time. Unlike static characteristics,
dynamic characteristics can be disclosed by means of external measuring (e.g.,
by other nodes) and thus statistically maintained by the system. For example,
node positioning, workload, available resources, latency, stability etc. can to some
extent at runtime be measured by other nodes and shared with the system so as
to obtain a better insight on the execution environment. To grasp the dynamic
behavior of nodes, all it takes is to perform periodic probing among themselves
and to report the values to the system. Dynamic node characteristics that can
not be externally measured, can nevertheless be retrieved by enforcing the system
nodes to periodically update the workflow engine with their internal dynamic
characteristics. For example, currently available resources and physical location
can be submitted to the workflow engine.
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Existing metadata, such as hosts workload, i.e., MD, cannot reliably tell us whether
nodes are suitable for late-binding. For instance, the least loaded node could be a mobile
one that is located far away and thus is susceptible to failure and low data transmission.
To capture some extent of dynamic node behavior at runtime, we introduce a set of addi-
tional node metadata so as to power the system services. Precisely, we introduce next to
the already existing workload metadata the stability, mobility and latency metadata that
are extended to the global metadata repository ρ. The additional metadata sets provide
us with further insight on nodes execution aspects such as their failure frequency, and
responsiveness, which certainly tend to frequently change over time.
Stability Metadata
To capture the dynamic behavior of nodes w.r.t. failure frequency the stability metadata
is introduced. By statistically maintaining the number of reported failures per node
over a certain period in time, the workflow engine can classify each node, in terms of its
stability. Hence, instable nodes are concluded to be more likely to fail again and can thus
be avoided (if possible) over other more stable nodes at runtime. The stability of nodes
is classified into six categories, i.e., failure-free, very-stable, stable, instable, critical and failed
which have been experimentally classified as good descriptors of node runtime stability
state. The node stability categories are represented by the category set CTst as follows:
CTst = {FAILUREFREE, VERYSTABLE, STABLE, INSTABLE, CRITICAL, FAILED}
Each stability category is represented by a failure frequency threshold value, i.e.,
tsh f f , tshvs, tshs, tshis, tshcr and tsh f l, which needs to be matched by a node so as to fall
into the respective category. The exact threshold values of the stability categories are
subject to end-user application specification. The threshold values are represented by
the category threshold set TSHst as follows:
TSHst = {tsh f f , tshvs, tshs, tshis, tshcr, tsh f l}
The formal definition of the stability repository is provided as follows:
Definition 5.4 (Stability metadata– st). The stability metadata for node a n ∈ N at timestamp
t ∈ T is defined as tuple st(n, t) = ( fst, τst,ωst, ctn) where:
• fst ∈ IN+ is current failure counter,
• τst ∈ T is the timestamp of the first failure report,
• ωst ∈ T is the failure frequency evaluation window size,
• ctn ∈ CTst is current stability category value,
The set of all stability metadata for node n is defined as ST(n), whereas the set of all mobility
metadata for all nodes is defined as ST. □
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The stability metadata set is an extension to the global metadata repository ρ. Hence,
all peers should also be subscribed to the stability metadata at all times, as well.
ρ ∪ ST
However, only the SR-nodes get to update the stability repository as they are the ones to
detect the failures of nodes. Whenever a SR-node suspects a node to have failed it sends
an update to repository featuring the suspected node and the failure timestamp (i.e.,
Algorithm 5.3, line no.3). In turn, the repository acknowledges the failure report and
updates the frequency metadata. Based on end user specified failure frequency thresh-
olds (i.e., TSHst) and evaluation windows (i.e., ωst) the reported nodes are categorized
into the corresponding stability category. Algorithm 3.26 shows the node failure report
handling.
Algorithm 5.11 n.updateStatistics(n′, τ) Creates a new stability report st(n′, τ) for given
node n′ based on the latest report st(n′, τmax). It further increases the frequency counter.
If the given failure timestamp τ exceeds the evaluation window ωst as compared to the
timestamp of the first occurrence τst it categorizes n′ w.r.t. thresholds values of TSHst.
1: ∃st(n′, τmax) ∈ ST(n′) : ∄st(n′, tx) ∈ ST(n′) where tx > τmax
2: st(n′, τ)← st(n′, τmax)
3: st(n′, τ). fst ← st(n′, τ). fst + 1
4: if τ − st(n′, τ).τst ≥ st(n′, τ).ωst then
5: st(n′, τ).τst ← τ
6: for tsh ∈ TSHst do
7: if st(n′, τ). fst < tsh then
8: st(n′, τ).ctn ← n.category(tsh)
9: return
10: end if
11: end for
12: end if
13: ST(n′) ∪ st(n′, τ)
Note, that the node failure reports bear a certain uncertainty w.r.t. the provided fail-
ure timestamp τ that is reflected in the unsynchronized time clocks of the individual
nodes. That is, each node reports a failure timestamp τ based on its own internal clock.
In practice, the internal clocks of any two nodes can be considered as perfectly synchro-
nized – the same. This is however, negligible in the case of the stability repository as we
are not interested in the exact time of failure for each node. Rather, we are interested
in the stability category value for each node which is based on an approximation of the
node failure frequency. The node category value provides the orchestrator nodes with
sufficient information so as to identify stable nodes.
Mobility Metadata
To capture the dynamic behavior of nodes w.r.t. movement the mobility metadata is in-
troduced. By keeping track of the actual physical location per node (e.g., by means
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of GPS device at each node), relative physical distances among nodes can be com-
puted and thus movement deduced. Based on the computed relative physical distances
among nodes, service instances can be identified that feature nodes which are closer by
than others. Physically closer nodes, in case of inherent mobility, should be less likely
to move out of the reception range from each other. As a consequence they will be less
likely mistaken to have failed. Frequently moving nodes, on the other hand, are more
likely to get damaged and thus fail. This implies that physically closer nodes should be
favored over distant ones at late-binding time. By classifying the nodes into mobility
categories, such as in the example of the stability repository, relative physical distances
cannot be captured. To specify the physical location of nodes, we leverage the three di-
mensional Cartesian coordinates system. The formal definition of the mobility metadata
is provided as follows:
Definition 5.5 (Mobility metadata – m). The mobility metadata of a node n ∈ N at timestamp
t ∈ T is defined as tuple m(n, t) = (x, y, z) where x, y, z ∈ IR are the Cartesian coordinates.
The set of all mobility metadata for node n is defined as M(n), whereas the set of all mobility
metadata for all nodes is defined as M. □
Given that the physical coordinates of a node are lying in the Euclidean space, the
distances among nodes can be computed by means of the Euclidean distance function
fm as follows:
fm : M× M ↦→ IR+ where
fm(ma, mb) =
√
(ma.x−mb.x)2 + (ma.y−mb.y)2 + (ma.z−mb.z)2
The mobility metadata set is an extension to the global metadata repository ρ. Hence,
all peers should also be subscribed to the metadata metadata at all times, as well.
ρ ∪ M
However, since node physical location cannot be easily externally assessed by other
nodes, each node itself has to publish its physical coordinates to the system. This is
done by each node on a periodic basis to the global metadata repository ρ.
Latency Metadata
Latency metadata is introduced so as to capture the dynamic behavior of nodes w.r.t.
to their capability to transmit data and to some extent performance. By keeping track
of the relative round trip delay times among nodes, data lookup times can be derived.
In the context of service instance late-binding, lower latency nodes should be preferred
when the workflow instances are to be migrated. By late-binding low latency nodes only
at each migration step the workflow instances should complete faster and thus the over-
all throughput performance of the workflow engine improved. Performance of nodes
to can be some extent deduced from latency information as well. That is, more pow-
erful and underutilized nodes should immediately forward workflow instances (also
data) that is traversing them, whereas congested (i.e., overloaded) and resource limited
nodes should take more time.
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To have a clear notion about latency, each node has to measure other nodes of interest
by means of periodical probing. Given a huge and scalable node environment latency
probing of all nodes is uneconomical from a resource consumption point of view. If
the majority of a scalable execution environment is to be probed each node has to raise
significant storage and network bandwidth resources to perform probing. Mobile nodes
are usually not up to such a challenge as they can offer only limited resources. Hence,
extensive measuring of huge sets of nodes is not an option for heterogeneous execution
environments. The set of nodes to be probed by each node has to be scaled down,
without completely loosing the knowledge on latency values to the nodes that are not
directly probed.
Since orchestrator nodes are only interested in latency so as to identify nodes which
feature better responsiveness over others we can apply node distance descriptions in-
stead. A notable approach to distance based nodes description is the one of Lips-
chitz [JL84]. In this approach a significantly smaller subset of all nodes, referred to
as the landmarks set, is used to compute latency distances against. The set of landmark
nodes is defined as LMK as:
LMK ⊆ N
Each node probes its latency towards the landmark nodes and declares the returned
values as a n-dimensional coordinate of the Euclidean space. Thereby, each dimension
corresponds the latency distance value towards one of the landmark nodes. To measure
the latency value towards a landmark the function fmsr is introduced as follows:
fmsr : N × LMK ↦→ IR+ ∪ {0}
The landmark distance coordinates of a node n ∈ N are defined with the vector lv[n] as
follows:
lv[n] = [ fmsr(n, lmk1), ..., fmsr(n, lmki), ...)] with lmki ∈ LMK
The set of all landmark distance coordinates for all nodes is defined as LV:
LV =
⋃
∀n∈N
l[n]
By expressing the nodes by means of landmark distance coordinates the global reposi-
tory can be exploited to efficiently disseminate the coordinates as metadata to all nodes
of interest. The metadata describing the latency coordinates in the context of landmarks
distances is formally defined as follows:
Definition 5.6 (Latency metadata – lt). The latency metadata of a node n ∈ N at timestamp
t ∈ T is defined as lt(n, t) = lv[n] where lv[n] ∈ LV is its landmark distance vector. The set
of all latency metadata for node n is defined as LT(n), whereas the set of latency metadata for all
nodes is defined as LT. □
Naturally, all peers are subscribed to the global metadata repository at all times for
node latency coordinates. All peers also periodically publish their landmark coordi-
nates to ρ as well.
ρ ∪ LT
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By exploiting the triangular inequality condition of the Euclidean space among any two
nodes featuring distance coordinates towards the same landmarks pivots, their corre-
sponding distance can be computed by means of the Euclidean distance function flt as
follows:
flt : LV × LV ↦→ IR+ where
flt(lv[na], lv[nb]) = ∥lv[na]− lv[nb]∥2
Hence, given a set of node latency coordinates each node can compute by means of flt
another node with the least distance towards it and thus exploit it for some workflow
engine functionality, e.g., to invoke service instances.
Distance approximations of the Lipschitz approach improve with the size of the
landmarks set. Hence, this approach is subject to a scalability-precision trade-off. In
practice, devising landmark sets which are small and precise for distance approxima-
tions, at the same time is not trivial, which is the main drawback of the Lipschitz ap-
proach. Finding the right balance between scalability and precision is the topic of many
works in literature, e.g., [TC03]. As for our work, we use landmark node sets of dif-
ferent sizes that are experimentally determined and are dependent on the size of the
execution environment. The landmark node sets however in our case always contain
the super peer as well as other stable nodes that do not feature any mobility, i.e., static
nodes.
Combined Node Metadata
Given the additional metadata sets ST, M, LT the global repository ρ features an abun-
dance of node information that needs to be meaningfully put into use in supporting the
system services. In general, the orchestration service is always interested in the optimal
successor service instance at workflow instance migration time. To find an optimal (i.e.,
well-performing) node out of the set of locally available nodes we need to consider all
of its dynamic characteristics at run time. For instance, a node might be underloaded
but instable at the same time, hence it should be avoided for workflow instance mi-
gration. Limited perspective on the execution environment affects the throughput of
workflow instances. In order to be able to assess a node based on all of its dynamically
changing characteristics (i.e., workload, stability, mobility and latency) subsets of the
global repository ρ need to be meaningfully combined at the orchestrator nodes. Natu-
rally, the subsets of ρ to be locally replicated are determined by the local subscriptions
to succeeding activities.
To this end the local orchestrator node metadata set MD needs to be extended for the
newly introduced dynamic node characteristics. The formal definition of the extended
local metadata of an orchestrator node is defined as follows:
Definition 5.7 (Extended orchestrator service metadata – mde). The extended execution
environment metadata mde locally maintained by the orchestrator sio is defined by the tuple
mde(sio) = (md(sio), ρst, ρm, ρlt) such that:
• md(sio) ∈ MD(sio) is local metadata according to Definition 4.13,
160 Self-organizing Workflow Execution Engines
• ρst is the locally maintained subset of the stability metadata for the local subscription
md(sio).subl(sio), with:
ρst = {st(n, t) ∈ ST|∀as ∈ md(sio).subl(sio).Asucc ∃(as, n) ∈ SI}
• ρm is the locally maintained subset of the mobility metadata for the local subscription
md(sio).subl(sio), with:
ρm = {m(n, t) ∈ M|∀as ∈ md(sio).subl(sio).Asucc ∃(as, n) ∈ SI}
• ρlt is the locally maintained subset of the latency metadata for the local subscription
md(sio).subl(sio), with:
ρlt = {lt(n, t) ∈ LT|∀as ∈ md(sio).subl(sio).Asucc ∃(as, n) ∈ SI}
The set of all extended environment metadata for one orchestrator service instance is defined
as MDe(sio), whereas the set of all metadata for all orchestrator service instances is defined as
MDe. □
Based on the locally available extended metadata set MD(sio), an optimal node has
to be found out of the set of all available nodes. For instance, at runtime the orchestrator
has to find the optimal service instance when queried with subsequent activities as in
the case of a workflow instance migration (e.g., Algorithm 5.1, line no.10). Thereby, each
node is represented with its current value in terms of workload, stability, mobility and
latency. All of these features of node dynamics have to be considered while selecting
the optimal node. The solution behind our approach lies in node ranking. That is, for
each node a rank is assigned based on its current metadata dimension values. Once all
nodes have been ranked the one with the highest rank is picked so as to be the optimal
node at the given point in time. Likewise, the node with the lowest rank can be chosen
as well in case bad performing nodes are preferred.
The node ranking procedure is conducted in three steps as follows:
1. Candidate nodes extraction – For a given a subsequent activity an at the orchestra-
tor sio all candidate nodes that feature an instance of an have to be filtered out of
the local metadata set MD(sio). The node candidate set is denoted as Cnd(an).
2. Metadata extraction. Local metadata has to be extracted out of the local metadata
set MD(sio) that describes the candidates of Cnd w.r.t. load, stability, mobility and
latency. The candidate metadata is denoted as La for the load, STa for stability, Ma
for mobility and LTa for latency.
3. Feature vector assignment – Given the candidate set Cnd and the sets La, STa, Ma
and LTa, feature vectors have to be assigned to each node. Each dimension of the
feature vector will reflect a node value of the metadata sets La, STa, Ma, LTa for the
given timestamp t.
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In order to be able to extract the candidate nodes in first we have to find a local meta-
data element that features a subscription to given activity an. Thereby, multiple meta-
data elements might likely exist that feature subscriptions to an. This can be attributed
to the fact that for each workflow definition a subscription is created, thus if different
workflow definitions feature the same activity one metadata elements will be created
per workflow definition at a control flow preceding node. Due to pub/sub replication
by the repository ρ we assume that the redundant metadata elements will consistently
feature the same candidate service instances of type an and the same metadata for them.
Therefore, to the retrieve all node candidate is sufficient to first retrieve just one meta-
data element mde(sio) of subscription to an. Expression 5.3 shows the extraction of the
metadata element mde(sio):
∃mde(sio) ∈ MDe(sio) : an ∈ mde(sio).md(sio).subl.Anext. (5.3)
Now, that we have the metadata element we can extract the candidate nodes set from
all service instances as shown by the Expression 5.4.
Cnd(an) = {n ∈ N|∀n ∈ N∃(an, n) ∈ SI} (5.4)
In case mde(sio) features only a subscription to activity an then mde(sio) contains already
all metadata and all candidate nodes we need to evaluate by default:
|mde(sio).md(sio).subl.Anext| = 1
However, if the preceding activity of the control flow was a forking activity then the
contained metadata of mde(sio) might feature metadata on service instances that are not
of type an. To this end we have to extract all metadata out of mde(sio) such that it reflects
the candidate nodes of Cnd(an) only. Since local metadata is partitioned into the subsets
ρl, ρst, ρm and ρlt of mde(sio) we have to filter them out individually in the second step
of the node ranking process. Metadata node extraction based on the candidate set is
shown in Expressions 5.5-5.8.
La = {h(n, t) ∈ mde(sio).md(sio).ρh|∀n ∈ Cnd(an)} (5.5)
STa = {st(n, t) ∈ mde(sio).ρst|∀n ∈ Cnd(an)} (5.6)
Ma = {m(n, t) ∈ mde(sio).ρm|∀n ∈ Cnd(an)} (5.7)
LTa = {lt(n, t) ∈ mde(sio).ρlt|∀n ∈ Cnd(an)} (5.8)
Observe that we filter all metadata in the in Expressions 5.5-5.8 based on the same
given timestamp t. Timestamp t denotes the point in time at which the late-binding
decision is to be made by sio, thus metadata of this timestamp can be considered only.
Now that we have the extracted metadata in the third step we need to assign it to
each node. To this end we use vector notation such that each node is represented with
a feature vector. Thereby, the feature vector will be characterized by four dimensions
such that each dimension reflects a node’s metadata value for each of the sets La, STa, Ma
and LTa. Each dimension is normalized so as to bound the values within the limits
of 0 − 1. Normalization is achieved by dividing metadata value of the node by the
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maximum value of the corresponding set. If metadata values are members of sets that
are unbounded (i.e., physical distance, latency distance) the maximal values have to be
provided artificially. To do so an expert end-user that administers the workflow engine
has to manually set the maximal normalization values so as to meet the classification
needs of the high-level application.
The load dimension of a node’s feature vector is obtained by representing its load
value of La divided by the maximal value 100. The stability dimension of a node’s fea-
ture vector is obtained by representing its stability category value of STa divided by
the maximum value FL. The maximum value FL corresponds to the FAILED stability
category value of CTst. The mobility metadata featured by the set Ma is multidimen-
sional, thus it has to be reduced to just one dimension if it is to be used for the mobility
dimension of the feature vector. To this end we apply the distance function fm so as
to characterize each candidate node relative physical distance to the orchestrator node.
This is more applicable from an orchestrator point of view, as gives insight on the dis-
tance towards the candidate nodes, so that closer nodes can be preferred at late-binding
time. The obtained mobility distance value has to be normalized by the artificial maxi-
mum value Dm ∈ IR+ which represents the maximal distance value we are considering.
The same approach is used for the latency dimension of the feature vector as well. Since
it is also multidimensional it is reduced to just one dimension by means of the distance
function flt in relation to the orchestrator node. Simply put, each candidate node is
characterized by its latency distance towards the orchestrator node for the latency di-
mension of its feature vector. The obtained latency distance value has to normalized by
the artificial maximum value Dl ∈ IR+ which represents the maximal latency distance
value we are considering.
Now that we dimension values are normalized within the bounds of 0− 1 they are
subtracted from the maximal value 1 due to the preference of nodes that are character-
ized with lower (i.e., lower workload, lower stability category, lower distance) values.
By subtracting each dimension from 1 the corresponding nodes will be awarded with
higher feature vector values and thus higher ranks. Expression 5.9 shows the assign-
ment of the feature vector for a node n:
no = sio.n
v[n] = [1− h(n, t)
100  
Load
, 1− st(n, t).ctn
FL  
Stability
, 1− fm(m(no, t), m(n, t))
Dm  
Mobility
, 1− flt(lt(no, t), lt(n, t))
Dl  
Latency
]
(5.9)
By applying the feature vector assignment for each candidate node we obtain the feature
matrix v as summarized in Expression 5.10:
v = [ v[n1]T v[n2]T ... v[ni]T ... ] with ni ∈ Cnd(an). (5.10)
In order to adjust each feature vector dimension for importance in relation to the others
we devise a normalized weighting vector w. The individual feature vector weights are
end-user specific and thus subject to change, however they have to sum up to the value
1. Expression 5.11 summarizes the weighting vector representation.
w = [ωl ωst ωm ωlt] where ωl +ωst +ωm +ωlt = 1 (5.11)
5.2 Self-optimizing Workflow Definition Execution 163
Finally, we obtain the node ranks as a vector rv out of the feature matrix and the weight
vector by applying the dot product on them. Expression 5.12 summarizes the rank
vector computation.
rv = vT ·wT (5.12)
The computed rank vector rv can be queried by the orchestrator, in the context of
the getSI(a) routine, for the maximal value and thus the corresponding node so as
to obtain an optimal service instance. Depending on the use case of the rank vector,
minimal values can be also queried so as to obtain low performing nodes.
5.2.2 Dynamic Service Deployments
The distributed execution model can only work in the face of node failures as long as
there are enough service instances in the environment to substitute the failed ones. This
applies for both system service instances as well as for application service instances.
Thus the intuitive decision would be to provide always the biggest possible amount
of service instances for all existing service types. The alternative of too few service
instances should otherwise result in lower throughput performance. For example, in
the case of the Safety-Ring, the more SR-nodes there are, the better the robustness of
the system and the better the workflow instance throughput should be in distributing
the transaction processing overhead among them. Better throughput should also be
achieved by providing more application service instances as well. The more application
service instances we have in the system, the better load balancing decisions we can
make at late-binding time.
Although a high number of service instances (of any type) should improve the
throughput of the system it should also incur more overhead on the nodes. Each service
type entails a certain CPU and memory footprint that has to be matched by any node
that is to host it. For example, the Safety-Ring service implies additional overhead on
the nodes with its ring maintenance and distributed transaction algorithms. However,
the hardware requirements of service types can turn out to be too much of a strain for
some type nodes. Especially nodes that feature limited resources and inherent mobility
are susceptible for overload due to unmatched service type (e.g., hardware) resource
requirements. This implies that all peers should be carefully assessed for the deploy-
ment of service types and not all of them are necessarily suitable for a wide spectrum of
service type deployments.
Even if optimal nodes are selected (e.g., hand picked by an expert) for deployment
initially, given the high dynamics of underlying execution environment (e.g., Peer-To-
Peer, Cloud) the workflow engine cannot rely on static configurations of service type so
as to guarantee performance at all times. Static configurations of service types at nodes
have the potential to substantially affect the throughput performance as described by
the following four cases follows:
• Over-provisioning of all service types – In case all existing service types are ex-
cessively configured at all nodes, the system should benefit from a high through-
put performance for all kind of workflow definitions. The price of such an ap-
proach is significant resource consumption at all nodes independently of the sys-
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tem load. For low numbers of concurrent workflow instances, excessive deploy-
ments should turn out to be highly uneconomical. Such configurations are only
beneficial for systems that are loaded at all times with plenty of workflow in-
stances and that feature powerful computational nodes.
• Over-provisioning of selected service types – In case specific service types are ex-
cessive deployed, the system should benefit from a high throughput performance
for and a reduced resource consumption such that less equipped (hardware) nodes
can be used. However, if new workflow definitions frequently enter the system
the previous configurations of certain service types might quickly become obso-
lete and resource wasting. Such configurations are only beneficial if the system is
dedicated to a limited number of workflow definitions only which are instantiated
in high numbers.
• Under-provisioning of selected service types – In case specific service types are
scarcely deployed, the system should benefit from a reduced resource consump-
tion and high throughput performance if various kinds of workflow definitions
exist. However, this is only possible if the scarcely deployed service types are used
for late-binding by a small number of workflow instances. Such configurations are
only beneficial if the system features a high number of workflow definitions that
are only occasionally instantiated.
• Under-provisioning of all service types – In case all existing service types are
scarcely configured at all nodes, the system should benefit overall low resource
consumption at all nodes at the price of overall low system throughput perfor-
mance. Such configurations are only beneficial if the system is composed of re-
source limited nodes only that do not run a big number of workflow instances
independent of the their type.
Therefore, we conclude the throughput performance of the distributed execution
model to be strongly dependent on the number of service instances in the system
and the number of concurrent workflow instances that invoke them. To improve the
throughput performance of our workflow engine we will enable it with the function-
ality of dynamic reconfiguration of the execution environment. This means that our
workflow engine is capable of instantiating new and to deactivating existing service in-
stances in the environment. In dynamically reconfiguring the execution environment
the engine is guided by the goal of supporting the workflow instance throughput and
saving node resources at runtime.
To perform dynamic reconfiguration of the environment the engine first has to find
the optimal reconfiguration node, and then based on the current state of the environ-
ment either instate a new or deactivate an existing service instance. We separate the
dynamic reconfiguration functionality however into two independent aspects. The one
addresses dynamic reconfiguration of system service types while the other addresses
dynamic reconfiguration of application service types.
In the context of system service types, we limit ourselves to the Safety-Ring service
only. Being one of the most resource intensive (e.g., memory and bandwidth) services
in the system the workflow engine will dynamically change number of SR-nodes in
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the environment. This way the workload of processing the workflow instances in a
transactional fashion will be evenly distributed among a dynamically changing set of
SR-nodes. In the context of application service types, we enable the workflow engine
to dynamically add/remove service instances of any type. This way the throughput
of workflow instances will be evenly distributed among a dynamically changing set of
application service instances (for any type) at late-binding time.
Since we are bound to the requirements of an ideal workflow engine (i.e., Sec-
tion 2.4), dynamic reconfiguration of the environment has to be performed in a decen-
tralized fashion so as not to affect scalability of the engine. The remainder of this section
discusses how dynamic reconfiguration of the execution environment is achieved in a
distributed fashion.
Elastic Safety-Ring
In order not to affect the distributed execution of workflow instances by static config-
uring of the Safety-Ring, it should be able to dynamically reconfigure its ring topology.
Depending on the overall workload in the system, induced by the amount of concur-
rently running workflow instances, the Safety-Ring configuration should feature an ad-
equate amount of SR-nodes so as to accommodate the workload evenly. Although the
workflow instances will be evenly distributed among the SR-nodes inherently, the load
per SR-node should anyway increase if the amount of workflow instances is increased
as well. To cope with high lode new SR-nodes should dynamically join the Safety-Ring
configuration in case a high number of workflow instances is run against the system.
At times of moderate workflow instances load in the system, some SR-nodes should be-
come unnecessary and thus leave the Safety-Ring. Simply put, the Safety-Ring should
elastically adapt itself, by adjusting the participation of SR-nodes, to the current number
of workflow instances.
To address the goal of Safety-Ring elasticity in a distributed fashion we rely on the
self-organization concepts of the underlying ring topology. Precisely, we exploit the
ring topology node joining and leaving routines that are powered by a basic autonomic
controller. We employ a control loop that monitors the load of a Safety-Ring enabled
node and in case of overload/underload applies a reconfiguration operation. Such re-
configuration operations include the addition of new SR-nodes – in case of permanent
overload – and the removal of existing SR-nodes – in case of permanent underload.
The Safety-Ring is thus at runtime elastically increased and decreased by the controller
depending on the SR-node load.
The Safety-Ring controller is however decentralized. Each SR-node is enabled with a
controller of its own that allows it to autonomously perform reconfiguration decisions.
Much like the orchestrator nodes are in their orchestration functionality. All controllers
at the SR-nodes are however consistent in the business logic they conduct. Enabling the
SR-nodes with reconfiguration capabilities entails a number of difficulties:
1. Autonomous reconfiguration operations should not result in an over-provisioned
system of SR-nodes so as to conserve resources.
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2. On the other hand, autonomous reconfiguration operations should not result in
an under-provisioned system of SR-nodes so as to obstruct workflow instance
throughput.
3. Given the underlying ring topology, frequent joins/leaves of SR-nodes should be
avoided so as to prevent churning of the topology.
While the first two issues can be effectively resolved by configuring the controllers
at each SR-node consistently, the third issue necessitates special handling. In general
a controller relies on a set of predefined threshold values that will help it to keep
its configuration functionality within controlled bounds. Each Safety-Ring controller
keeps track of the overload/underload frequency at each SR-node by means of count-
ing and triggers its configuration operations given specific threshold values for mini-
mum/maximum frequency and specific time windows for underload/overload occur-
rences. The controller configuration thresholds are summarized as follows:
1. tshLmax ∈ IN+ is the overload threshold value,
2. ωer ∈ T is the threshold value for the overload evaluation window.
3. tsher ∈ IN+ is threshold value of the overload frequency for which a ring expan-
sion operation should be taken.
4. tshLmin ∈ IN+ is the underload threshold value,
5. ωcr ∈ T is the threshold value for the overload evaluation window.
6. tshcr ∈ IN+ is threshold value of the underload frequency for which a ring con-
traction operation should be taken.
By assessing the overload/underload situations for frequency and time periods (i.e.,
ωcr and ωer) oscillations can be dampened out and thus the first two issues of distributed
self-configurations handled. Thereby, the dampening of the controllers strongly depend
on the setting of the controller threshold values. As with all controllers, the thresholds
need to be manually specified by a expert end-user administering (i.e., administrator)
the workflow engine depending the self-configuration needs of the high-level applica-
tion. Setting the controller threshold values by means of tools that are based on machine
learning techniques is also an option.
To compare the threshold values of the controller each SR-node locally maintains
statistics that reflect its overload/underload occurrences. The SR-node load statistics
are formally defined as follows:
Definition 5.8 (SR-node load statistic – statsr). Safety-Ring load statistics that are locally
maintained by the SR-node sisr are defined as tuple statsr(sisr) = ( fer, τer, fcr, τcr) such that:
• fer ∈ IN+ is current overload counter,
• τer ∈ T is the timestamp of the first overload occurrence,
• fcr ∈ IN+ is current underload counter,
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• τcr ∈ T is the timestamp of the first underload occurrence,
The set of all load statistics for all SR-nodes is defined as STATsr. □
The business logic of the controllers is simple and consistently applied across all
SR-nodes. Precisely, the controller counts the number of times the specified threshold
value (i.e., tshLmax or tshLmin) has been exceeded. If the frequency of excesses is higher
than the specified configuration threshold value (i.e., tsher or tshcr) for the specified
time window (i.e., ωer or ωcr) a reconfiguration situation is ascertained. Algorithm 5.12
shows the business logic of the controller.
Algorithm 5.12 n.checkFrequency( f , τ,ω, tsh) Increases the given frequency counter f by
one. Updates the given timestamp τ to current time if it’s the first count. If the difference
between the current timestamp and the first occurrence timestamp exceeds the given
window ω, the frequency counter f is evaluated. A higher value of f as compared to
the given threshold tsh results in a reconfiguration situation and thus a true outcome.
Otherwise f alse is returned.
1: f ← f + 1
2: if f = 1 then
3: τ ← n.currentTime()
4: end if
5: ∆τ ← n.currentTime()− τ
6: if ∆τ ≥ ω then
7: if ∆τω f ≥ tsh then
8: return true
9: else
10: f ← 0
11: end if
12: end if
13: return f alse
The controller aids the SR-nodes in informing them when to reconfigure the topol-
ogy, but it does not tell them how reconfigure the system. Reconfiguration of the Safety-
ring is dependent on the underlying Chord ring topology and needs special handling.
For example, frequent and concurrent SR-node join/leave operations have the potential
to partition the ring into multiple disjunct ones [KEAAH05, RGRK04] which cannot be
reconciled without manual intervention.
The approach of Safety-Ring to decentralized reconfiguration based on autonomous
reconfiguration operations at each of the SR-nodes that are specific to the underlying
ring topology. Having only a limited overview of the whole topology – the predecessor,
the successor and the finger nodes – each SR-node should only change part of the ring
that it is aware of. Its reconfiguration operations should not affect distant parts of the
ring topology and SR-nodes that are associated it. To prevent the reconfiguration op-
erations that interfere with nonadjacent SR-nodes we restrict each SR-node to changing
parts of the ring that address its area of responsibility only, i.e., its key identifier space.
In the context of ring expansion, this implies that a SR-node can add a new SR-node
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only if the new SR-node would be located inside its key identifier space, i.e., if it would
its predecessor. In the context of ring contraction, this implies that a SR-node can not
remove any SR-nodes but only voluntarily leave the ring.
In face of concurrent reconfiguration operations by all the SR-nodes, churning of the
topology is averted by means of synchronization. For a SR-node to introduce a new
predecessor or leave the ring it has to synchronize with its immediate neighbors, i.e.,
the predecessor and the successor. Only if they are not in a reconfiguration process
themselves a SR-node can either leave or introduce a new predecessor. A SR-node can-
not perform reconfiguration operations if any of the adjacent nodes is a reconfiguration
process. Hence, restriction of the SR-nodes to their key identifier space partitions in
conjunction to synchronization should effectively prevent ring churning. Adjusting the
controller to be restrained in performing reconfiguration operations is helpful as well.
Safety-Ring Dynamic Reconfiguration
When it comes to Safety-Ring expansion, each controller triggered SR-node can instruct
a regular service instance to join the Safety-Ring. We say that a SR-node promotes an
application service instance into the Safety-Ring. In doing so the reconfiguring SR-node
can only choose from a set of known service instances that would at the same time be-
come its predecessors if promoted. Since a SR-node is only aware of application service
instances that it is monitoring it chooses from them. The set of service instances that are
candidates for promotion is denoted SICND(sisr) as:
SICND = {si ∈ SI|∃wi ∈ WI : si ∈ wi.SIa ∧ fh(wi.id), fn(si.n) ∈ KIP(sisr.n}
By ceding a partition of the key identifier space to the new predecessor, the running
workflow instances that are mapped into the ceded partition will be reassigned to the
new predecessor according to the ring topology self-organization feature. As a result
the new predecessor will assume its monitoring and workflow instance storage respon-
sibilities and thus reduce the workload at the successor. Out of the set of candidate
nodes the optimal one is chosen by consulting the locally stored extended metadata
set on them. The routine selectOptimal() implements the multidimensional node
ranking of the extended metadata set mde and returns the node that features the highest
rank. Upon promotion, the new SR-node joins the existing Safety-Ring by executing
the ring topology joining routine (i.e., Algorithm 3.7) which commences reassignment
of Safety-Ring functionalities to it. Algorithm 5.13 shows the Safety-Ring expansion
routine.
Note, that Algorithm 5.13 is periodically executed by the controller, i.e., is embedded
into it.
When it comes to ring contraction, a SR-node can (instructed by its controller) leave
the Safety-Ring so as to conserve local resources at the node. While expanding the
ring is as simple as asking a service instance to join, contracting the ring is far more
complex. Even though we do not want the controller to be hasty in expanding the ring
we assume the addition of SR-nodes to be a welcome occurrence. The reason is that
additional SR-nodes should generally result in decreased workload at the others. That
is why we choose not to additionally constrain ring expansion routine except for the
synchronization with the neighboring SR-nodes.
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Algorithm 5.13 sisr.expandRing() Checks the load of the SR-node sisr. In case the global
load threshold value tshLmax is exceeded the controller is consulted with the local statis-
tic on it stat(sisr). It handles the reconfiguration instruction by the controller it selects
out of the candidate set SICND(sisr) the optimal and instructs it to join the Safety-Ring.
1: ∃h(sisr.n, τmax) ∈ H(sisr.n) : ∄h(sisr.n, tx) ∈ H(sisr.n) where tx > τmax
2: if h(sisr.n, τmax) ≥ tshLmax then
3: ∃stat(sisr) ∈ STATsr
4: isOverloaded ← n.checkFrequency(stat(sisr). fer, stat(sisr).τer,ωer, tsher)
5: if isOverloaded = true ∧ con f = false then
6: con f ← true
7: n′ ← n.selectOptimal(SICND(sisr))
8: if n′ ̸= null then
9: n′.join(n)
10: end if
11: con f ← false
12: end if
13: end if
The departure of SR-nodes is far more serious as the some consequences of it would
not be welcome most of the times. A leaving SR-node has to leave behind the Safety-
Ring in a stable situation. Otherwise, its departure could put the remaining into critical
situations. For example, if a adjacent node of a leaving SR-nodes is overloaded, the
departure of it could put them under additional workload. As sa consequence, one of
them could fail due to overload and cause failures of others etc. In face of overladed
neighbors a SR-node should better not leave the ring.
Moreover, if the departure of a SR-node cedes a key identifier space partition of sig-
nificant size to the successor it might also become overloaded. Given a high number
of workflow instances that are mapped into the ceded key identifier space partition the
additional overhead of their storage might put significant a workload on the successor.
The departure of a SR-node can also leave the successor behind with a too big key iden-
tifier space partition. This is especially the case for low SR-node configurations. If the
key identifier space partition of the successor becomes too big, i.e., grater than |KI|/r,
then it might become a backup node of itself:
|KIP(successor)| ≥ |KI|
r
. (5.13)
Due to the symmetric replication in the system, data items might end up at the same
node by applying the symm operator if Expression 5.13 applies. Hence, a SR-node
should not leave if its successor will end up with a big key identifier space partition.
Finally, if a SR-node is currently monitoring active service instances, the departure
of it will leave the service instances unmonitored. Fault handling of such nodes will be
unnecessarily delayed until the successor copies the corresponding workflow instances
and thus takes over. Hence, a SR-node should not leave in case it is monitoring applica-
tion service instances.
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To cope with the undesired effects of SR-node departure the Safety-Ring is con-
strained by a set of preconditions that have to be fully met by the SR-node before it
can leave. If even a single one is not met, the instructed SR-node cannot leave. The
preconditions are summarized as follows:
1. Neither the predecessor nor the successor may be in an overload state or in a
configuring state.
2. The yielded key identifier space partition to the successor may not increase its key
identifier space by 1/r of the whole KI.
3. The leaving SR-node should not monitor any SR-nodes
Only once all three requirements have been met by a SR-node it is allowed to leave the
Safety-Ring by means of the ring topology routine leave(). Algorithm 5.14 shows the
Safety-Ring contraction routine.
Algorithm 5.14 sisr.contractRing() Checks the load of the SR-node sisr. In case the global
load threshold value tshLmax is not matched the controller is consulted with the local
statistic on it stat(sisr). If the controller detects underutilization, the adjacent nodes are
not overloaded and locked, the resulting partition of the successor is not too big, and
sisr is not monitoring any service instances then it makes n leave the ring.
1: ∃h(sisr.n, τmax) ∈ H(sisr.n) : ∄h(sisr.n, tx) ∈ H(sisr.n) where tx > τmax
2: ∃h(predecessor, τmax) ∈ H(predecessor) : ∄h(predecessor, tx) ∈
H(predecessor) where tx > τmax
3: ∃h(successor, τmax) ∈ H(successor) : ∄h(successor, tx) ∈ H(successor) where tx >
τmax
4: if h(sisr.n, τmax) ≤ tshLmin then
5: ∃statsr(sisr) ∈ STATsr
6: isIdle ← n.checkFrequency(statsr(sisr). fcr, statsr(sisr).τcr,ωcr, tshcr)
7: if isIdle = true ∧ con f = false thens
8: con f ← true
9: if h(predecessor, τmax) < tshLmax ∧ predecessor.con f = false then
10: if h(successor, τmax) < tshLmax ∧ successor.con f = false then
11: if |KIP(n)|+ |KIP(successor)| < |KI|r ∧ Monitoring = ∅ then
12: sisr.n.leave()
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: con f ← f alse
17: end if
18: end if
Note, that Algorithm 5.14 is also periodically executed by the controller, i.e., is em-
bedded into it. Finally, although the SR-node reconfiguration operations should yield a
better utilization of the computational resources their excessive application should also
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cause inconsistencies in the underlying Finger Tables of the ring topology. The Finger
Tables might be inconsistent but the managed data items (i.e., workflow instances) can-
not be. Paxos commit transactions prevent writes at inconsistently routed nodes (i.e.,
learners) till the Finger Tables have converged. Another simple solution to excessive
reconfiguration prevention of the ring topology is the proper adjustment of invocation
intervals for the contraction and expansion routines. This however is dependent on
end-user application of the Safety-Ring.
Dynamic Deployments of Application Service Types
The dynamic reconfiguration of the execution environment, in terms of application ser-
vice type deployments, should not be limited to the Safety-Ring only. Static configu-
rations of application service types have the same negative effects on the distributed
execution of workflow instances as discussed already in Section 1.3. In face of the
distributed execution model that is based on late-binding, the execution environment
should not feature service types of bottleneck characteristics. That is, there should not
be service types that feature too few service instances. In case a high throughput of
workflow instances is expected from the system, new service instances that are invoked
by them should be added. In case a moderate number of workflow instances is run
against the system, underutilized service instances should be removed so as to conserve
resources. Simply put, the configuration of the execution environment should linearly
scale with the overall workload in the system.
We address the dynamic reconfiguring of the execution environment in a decentral-
ized fashion by enabling each orchestrator node with functionality to instantiate and
deactivate application service types at arbitrary nodes. For this purpose we assume
that the service types can be instantiated and deactivated dynamically without any un-
foreseeable consequences or side effects. That is, we limit ourselves to dynamic config-
uration of discrete service types only. The dynamic instantiation of continuous service
types is already handled by the passive-standby technique.
The dynamic reconfiguration of the execution environment builds on the same ideas
as dynamic Safety-Ring configuration. In a nutshell, we employ a control loop that
monitors the throughput of a workflow instances and in case decrease/increase applies
corrective measures – service instance instantiation or deactivation. Along the lines of
decentralized reconfiguration at each orchestrator we deploy a throughput controller
that with a consistent business logic.
Each controller at an orchestrator keeps track of the throughput by counting the
number of late-binding actions for the subsequent service type and triggers its recon-
figuration operations by taking into account specified threshold minimum/maximum
throughput values and specified time windows. However, we do not just tune the con-
troller to operate on plain late-binding occurrences.
Given the distributed execution model we have to take into account that the moni-
tored throughput at the orchestrator is not the same at all times. Although the control
flow is steered with load balancing in mind it might not always produce an optimal out-
come. For example, induced by out-of-date metadata at the previous orchestrator nodes
the control flow of many workflow instances might end up at the same orchestrator. In
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face of suboptimal routing of the control flow, and thus its late-binding overload, the
controller should not unnecessarily instantiate/deactivate subsequent service types. To
this end, the controller has to take into account the existing environment configuration
for each subsequent service type before taking reconfiguration operations.
That is why our controllers keep track of the node ranks, in computing the optimal
succeeding service instance, in conjunction to the throughput when performing late-
binding of the subsequent service type. By maintaining the rank of the optimal service
issuance per activity we gain valuable insight on the execution environment. If the late-
binding frequently features low ranked service instances for a longer period of time we
broadly conclude the service instances of that type to be overloaded and the distributed
execution model to be affected by congestion. On the other hand, the late-binding fre-
quently features high ranked for a longer period of time we broadly conclude the service
instances of that type to be underutilized and the execution of workflow instances to
be uneconomical, i.e., resource wasting. This implies that the controller maintains the
throughput for permanently low ranked and permanently high ranked service types
when selecting optimal forwarding nodes (i.e., Algorithm 5.1, line no.11) as well.
The controller configuration thresholds, which are used to steering it, are summa-
rized as follows:
1. tshRmin ∈ IN+ is the low rank threshold value,
2. ωlr ∈ T is the threshold value for the low rank evaluation window,
3. tshlr ∈ IN+ is threshold value for the low rank frequency at which a service in-
stantiation operation should be taken.
4. tshstart ∈ IN+ is threshold value for the throughput at which a service instantiation
operation should be taken.
5. tshRmax ∈ IN+ is the low high threshold value,
6. ωhr ∈ T is the threshold value for the high rank evaluation window,
7. tshhr ∈ IN+ is threshold value for the high rank frequency at which a service
deactivation operation should be taken.
8. tshstop ∈ IN+ is threshold value for the throughput at which a service deactivation
operation should be taken.
Similarly to the Safety-Ring controller, the throughput controller needs to be manually
tuned by a expert end-user administering (i.e., system administrator) the workflow en-
gine depending the self-configuration needs of the high-level application
To compare the controller threshold values against each orchestrator node locally
maintains statistics that reflect its congestion/underload occurrences. The orchestrator
rank statistics are formally defined as follows:
Definition 5.9 (Rank statistic – statrk). Rank statistics locally maintained by the orchestrator
sio for a service type s ∈ S is defined as tuple statrk(sio, s) = ( fhr, τhr, flr, τlr) such that:
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• fhr ∈ IN+ is current high rank counter,
• τhr ∈ T is the timestamp of the first high rank occurrence,
• flr ∈ IN+ is current high rank counter,
• τlr ∈ T is the timestamp of the first high rank occurrence,
The set of all rank statistics for all orchestrator nodes is defined as STATrk. □
Given the rank statistics, the controller can deduce (by means of routine
checkFrequency()) congestion and underutilization situations the system and trig-
ger reconfiguration operations. In the scenario of frequently low node ranks for a
service type, the controller detecting the congestion can try to improve the situation
by instantiating a service type at an underutilized node. In the scenario of frequently
high node ranks for a service type, the controller detecting the underutilization can
try to improve the situation by deactivating a service type at an underutilized service
instance.
In order not to over-provision or under-provision the system with service instances
we further constrain the controllers with an average throughput limit per service in-
stance. That is, only if at the same time the controller detects congestion and the aver-
age throughput per service instance is greater than the instantiation threshold tshstart a
new service type may be instantiated. Similarly, only if at the same time the controller
detects underutilization and the average throughput per service instance is lower than
the instantiation threshold tshstop an existing service instance may be deactivated.
Selection of the instantiation node is based on a set of candidate nodes, that is ex-
tracted from the local metadata set MD(sio), such none of them already host the in-
stantiation service type. The instantiation candidate nodes are denoted with the set
InstCand as follows:
InstCand(sio, s) ⊂ N where
∀n ∈ InstCand(sio, s)∃mde(sio) ∈ MDe(sio) :
s /∈ mde(sio).md(sio).subl.Anext ∧ h(n) ∈ mde(sio).md(sio).ρh ∧ (s, n) /∈ SI
Selection of the deactivation service instance is based on a set of candidate nodes, that
is extracted from the local metadata set MD(sio), such all of them host the deactivation
service type. The deactivation candidate nodes are denoted with the set DeInstCand as
follows:
DeInstCand(sio, s) ⊂ N where
∀n ∈ DeInstCand(sio, s)∃mde(sio) ∈ MDe(sio) :
s ∈ mde(sio).md(sio).subl.Anext ∧ h(n) ∈ mde(sio).md(sio).ρh ∧ (s, n) ∈ SI
To choose the best candidate node out of the sets InstCand and DeInstCand we rely
on the routine selectOptimal() that returns the best ranked node based on locally
available metadata on them, i.e., MDe. The routine selectOptimal() implements the
multidimensional node ranking (i.e., Expression 5.12) and returns the node that features
the highest rank. Algorithm 5.15 shows the dynamic service configuration routine.
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Algorithm 5.15 sio.updateStatistic(sn, rk). In case the given rank rk is lower than the
global threshold value tshRmin, it updates the statistics STATrk for the given service type
sn by means of checkFrequency(). If sa is congested and the average throughput per
service instance is being higher than tshstart it adds a new service instance to SI. Thereby,
out of the set InstCand(sio, s) the best ranked one is chosen. If rk is bigger than the global
threshold value tshRmax the statistics STATrk are updated as well. If s is underutilized
and average throughput per service instance is being lower then tshstop it removes a
service instance from SI. Thereby, out of the set DeInstCand(sio, s) the best ranked one
is chosen.
1: SIs = {si ∈ SI|sis.s = sn}
2: if rk < tshRmin then
3: ∃statrk(sio, sn) ∈ STATrk
4: isCongested ← n.checkFrequency(statrk(sio, sn). flr, statrk(sio, sn).τlr,ωlr, tshlr)
5: if isCongested = true ∧ statrk(sio,sn). flr|SIs| > tshstart then
6: n′ ← n.selectOptimal(InstCand(sio, sn))
7: SI ∪ (sn, n′)
8: end if
9: end if
10: if rk > tshRmax then
11: ∃statrk(sio, sn) ∈ STATrk
12: isUnderloaded ← n.checkFrequency(statrk(sio, sn). fhr, statrk(sio, sn).τhr,ωhr, tshhr)
13: if isUnderloaded = true ∧ statuis(sio,sn). fhr|SIs| < tshstop then
14: n′ ← n.selectOptimal(DeInstCand(sio, sn))
15: SI \ (sn, n′)
16: end if
17: end if
Deactivating service instances is not always as straightforward as instantiating them.
Although a service instance has been chosen for deactivation due to a very high rank
and negligible average workflow instance throughput it might be in the process of serv-
ing an invocation request. When deactivated, a regular workflow instance execution
is artificially terminated for the purpose of economical resource consumption. In case
the execution time of such a service type is long, or costly, due to some other execu-
tion aspect, the forced deactivation of it might turn out to be not so beneficial after all.
To overcome this the deactivation routine could be additionally constrained with an
allowed number of currently invoked service instances or even with the semantical im-
portance of the service type. In any case, the expert end-user should always choose to
set all threshold values to be moderate in terms of deactivation, and lavish in terms of
instantiation. In general, a forcefully deactivated running service instance will not af-
fect correctness of it as it will be detected by the Safety-Ring as a failure and recovered
immediately at a backup node.
When it comes to decentralized reconfiguration of the environment, our approach
is conditioned on the freshness of the locally available extended metadata set MDe. If
metadata changes are immediately visible at the subscribed orchestrator nodes more
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accurate decisions can be made when selecting the optimal reconfiguration node. This
even true when redundancy of the metadata at different orchestrator nodes is consid-
ered. If all redundant orchestrator nodes feature locally the same metadata they will
concurrently come to the same optimal node decisions in applying the same business
logic, i.e., the same routine selectOptimal(). Formally, the same optimal reconfigu-
ration node will be selected in a distributed fashion if:
sio1.selectOptimal(DeInstCand(sio1, s)) = sio2.selectOptimal(DeInstCand(sio2, s)) =⇒
DeInstCand(sio1, s) = DeInstCand(sio2, s)∧
∀n ∈ DeInstCand(sio1, s)∃mde(sio1) ∈ MDe ∧ ∃mde(sio2) ∈ MDe :
ho1(n, t) ∈ mde(sio1).md(sio1).ρh ∧ ho2(n, t) ∈ mde(sio2).md(sio2).ρh∧
mo1(n, t) ∈ mde(sio1).ρm ∧mo2(n, t) ∈ mde(sio2).ρm ∧
sto1(n, t) ∈ mde(sio1).ρst ∧ sto2(n, t) ∈ mde(sio2).ρst ∧
lto1(n, t) ∈ mde(sio1).ρlt ∧ lto2(n, t) ∈ mde(sio2).ρlt
The same constraint applies for the activation candidates set InstCand as well. How-
ever, any two orchestrator nodes are more likely to differ in the sets InstCand than in
the sets DeInstCand which are always the same for all. This can be attributed to the
existence of subscriptions at them. For instance, if a orchestrator hosts more than one
application service type, it will feature for each one of them subscriptions to the subse-
quent service types. As a consequence, the activation candidates set InstCand should
feature more nodes the more service types are hosted at a node. Thus orchestrator nodes
are not as likely to derive the same optimal instantiation nodes as they are in case of de-
activation nodes.
Our approach to dynamic reconfiguration of the environment is influenced by the
state of the centralized metadata repository which supplies the decentralized controllers
with metadata. In case metadata repository features overload situations the freshness
of metadata should differ at the controllers and thus the candidate node sets. However,
given the freshest metadata at the controllers, the instantiation/deactivation decisions
will be concentrated to a limited set of optimal nodes and thus should yield at runtime
addition/removal of service instances which is gradual at and not widespread. Hence,
by keeping the metadata repository working at moderate capacity the decentralized
reconfiguration approach should deliver the expected results.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter we have described how the distributed execution model is enhanced in
a novel way for reliability and performance without affecting any of its main character-
istics such as scalability.
First, we have concluded that the distributed execution model is vulnerable to fail-
ures of active service instances. To overcome these we have introduced the Safety-Ring
system service. SR-nodes perform monitoring of active service instances and handle
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their failure with a late-binding of a replacement service instance. To posses the data
for late-binding purposes the SR-nodes organize themselves into a reliable, scalable
and consistent data store for storage of workflow instances. That is, the SR-node from
a Chord ring that supports symmetric replication and Paxos distributed transactions.
The benefit of such an approach is that the SR-nodes are reliable and scalable them-
selves and so is the Safety-Ring service. Hence, scalability of the distributed execution
model is preserved by redirecting the late-binding step through the scalable Safety-Ring
with a successful write of the workflow instance. However, the price of reliability of the
distributed execution model is reduced throughput performance.
To extend the Safety-Ring service to heterogeneous execution environments in this
chapter we introduce the Compass data access protocol. Compass complements the
Chord ring of Safety-Ring with node latency information. This way Compass can com-
pute the latency optimal paths to each node in the Chord ring and use when needed
instead of the Finger Tables. By taking the latency optimal paths more forwarding steps
can be taken as compared to Chord. The latency optimal paths are maintained inside
Compass table that are of linear size relative to the number of nodes in the Chord ring.
The Compass Table can however be downsized at the price of optimal path precision.
This chapter additionally introduces novel approaches to continuous data flow reli-
ability. While the reliability of the control flow is guaranteed by the Safety-Ring, contin-
uous data flows (i.e., data streams) necessitate more resource friendly recovery mecha-
nisms. In this chapter we have extended the traditional passive-standby approach for
redundancy. Namely, traditional passive-standby, features periodic checkpointing of
streaming instance state to one backup node only. By increasing the number of backup
nodes we have improved the robustness of continuous data flows to node failures. To
enforce the consistency of the redundant backups we have applied the 2PC protocol for
the coordination of the asynchronous data replication processes. The 2PC protocol has
even be modified such that it is not blocking in the event of a coordinator failure. The
price for the improved reliability of continuous data flows is slightly increased network
overhead (i.e., additional backups) per active steaming instance, and potentially longer
recovery times in case of node failures.
With the Safety-Ring and redundant passive-standby extensions we have shown in
this chapter how the distributed execution model has been adapted for reliability. This
chapter addressed also the problem of suboptimal (static) service instance configura-
tions in the environment in terms of workflow instance throughput. The approach of
this chapter is based on dynamic deployment of service instances at arbitrary nodes.
In this chapter, dynamic reconfiguration of the environment is achieved in a decentral-
ized fashion by means of distributed controllers that perform autonomous instantia-
tion/deactivation of service instances. To this end they rely on accurate metadata on
the environment and local statistics. To capture additional aspects of dynamic behavior
inside the heterogeneous execution environment we have introduced the stability, mo-
bility and latency metadata next to workload. The additional metadata is maintained by
the global repository and published to all subscribed controllers, which in turn use the
metadata for optimal deployment node detection. In instantiating/deactivation service
instances, the controllers are however limited to application service types (of discrete
nature) and SR-nodes only.
6
Implementation
In this chapter we describe the software implementation of the distributed workflow
execution model introduced in the previous chapters. We start this chapter with the
description of the OSIRIS framework that will serve as the basis for our work as intro-
duced in Chapter 5. OSIRIS [SWSjS04, SST+05, STS+06] is a JAVA based framework
for the Peer-to-Peer execution of distributed processes, that address the workflow man-
agement concepts of Chapter 4 to the biggest possible extent. In terms of OSIRIS, we
provide an architectural overview of its software stack that is inter-operable with any
JAVA execution environment. Further, we introduce all of its extensions – OSIRIS-
SE [BS07, BS11a, BSS05, Bre08], OSIRIS-ON [MS10b, Moe12] and OSIRIS-PRO [Zel11]
designed for the improvement of various aspects of distributed workflow management.
Finally, we conclude this chapter with the elaboration of the integration process of our
work into the OSIRIS framework.
6.1 The Workflow Engine Implementation
The OSIRIS framework implements the distributed process execution along the lines
of the concepts found in Chapter 4. The only difference is that OSIRIS operates on
distributed processes or even composite services, which can be from a semantic point of
equivalent to our workflows. That is, both distributed processes and composite services
structure a set of atomic activities into a partial execution order.
In correspondence to the distributed workflow execution model, OSIRIS features
the necessary system services,i.e., the orchestration service and the repository service.
That is, each OSIRIS peer is equipped with an orchestration service and is all times sub-
scribed to the repository service. In turn, the repository service is usually maintained
at one peer only, i.e., the super peer. The control flow along with its corresponding
workflow instance is embodied with of a token data structure that is referred to as the
Whiteboard. The Whiteboard token is the subject of exchange among the peers, and
the possession over it puts the orchestrator node in control of the workflow instance.
Only once in possession of the token the orchestrator can perform invocations of appli-
cation service instances. The other ones have to wait for their turn. The data flow is
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also maintained within the Whiteboard control token, but only if the service types are
of discrete nature. Orchestrator nodes in control of the token map the conveyed data
into invocation request parameters and store the resulting values in the token for subse-
quent service instance invocation purposes. Continuous data flows are implemented by
streaming the data directly among the activated streaming instances. Therefore, the dis-
tributed execution model is implemented for the control flow and the discrete data flow
by means of the Whiteboard control token which is subject to collaborative migration
among the orchestrator peers.
6.2 The OSIRIS Framework
OSIRIS stands for Open Service Infrastructure for Reliable and Integrated process Support
and is in its essence a message-oriented middleware (MOM) that supports a modular
functionality architecture. The foundation of the OSIRIS framework are the components
that feature any system or application service specific functionality. The components
are loosely coupled by means of the messaging middleware so as to form a coherent
functional whole. This allows for dynamic functionality adaptation, as components can
be activated/deactivated on the fly. Thereby, the message exchange among components
can even span remote computational devices
Per default OSIRIS provides a rich set of components, that provide basic workflow
management functionality, and that are available to any application service. For in-
stance, the orchestration system service is an OSIRIS component as well as the reposi-
tory system service is. In turn, application services can either be implemented by OSIRIS
components (manually) or can feature external Web Services which are again accessed
through endpoint components (e.g., SOAP endpoints) of OSIRIS.
An OSIRIS component is designed to be lightweight, in terms of memory and CPU
requirements, so that general purpose deployments to any kind of computational envi-
ronment are feasible. To exploit the locally available hardware resources in a scalable
fashion (in particularly the CPU core numbers) for providing a high performance func-
tionality execution of a component, OSIRIS exploits the Actor computation model. Pre-
cisely, the business logic of a component is embedded into the messaging middleware
with of a set of stand-alone tasks that are concurrently executed by a set of Actors. Each
tasks directly implements a part of the businesses logic in the from of a message han-
dler that maps to a specific message type. Upon reception of an instance of a concrete
message type the corresponding handler is found and then executed by the an actor.
Thereby, the incoming messages, stemming from other components, are first placed in
a message queue and then handled by the first available Actor in line with the corre-
sponding handler. OSIRIS implements the message queue with a Java first-in-first-out
(FIFO) dequeue and each Actor with of a Java thread. Per default, OSIRIS assigns to
each message queue a number of Actors which corresponds to the number of available
CPU cores at the peer. The number of Actors can be dynamically increased/decreased
at runtime. The Actors of the system components are assigned with the highest thread
priority whereas the Actors of the application components are assigned with the de-
fault thread priority. To power the message handler embedded business logic a compo-
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Figure 6.1: OSIRIS component architecture.
nent can feature a set of data store containers. Each container is founded on the pub-
lish/subscribe message exchange pattern so as to replicate metadata among the compo-
nents. The component architecture of OSIRIS is depicted in Figure 6.1.
The Actor based message processing of an OSIRIS component is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.1. As the figure shows, the incoming message is firstly (i.e., step no.1) enqueued at
the message queue (i.e., depicted with the blue rectangles). Afterwards, the first avail-
able Actor (e.g., Actor no.2, depicted with the gear-wheel) dequeues the message (step
no.2) and maps the message to corresponding message handler (e.g., Message Handler
no.2, depicted with the green rectangle). At the next stage of the processing (step no.3),
the encoded business logic of the message handler is executed by the Actor. In case
the message was sent to the component in a pub/sub container (i.e., depicted with the
silver cylinders) related context, the message hander execution involves the update or
querying of some container. That is, the data conveyed by the message is to be stored
at some container (e.g., step no.4), or data is to be read from some container (e.g., step
no.5) so as to complete the execution of the message handler. Where necessary an out-
put message is produced and sent out to some other component (i.e., step no.6) as the
result of the message handler execution.
The message middleware functionality, that is responsible of connecting all com-
ponents, is implemented with a special purpose component that is referred to as the
Horus component. The Horus component serves as a peer local message routing hub
that accepts all incoming messages and redirects them to the appropriate component.
All message communication among the components has to necessarily go through the
Horus. In order to be able to know the accurate component destination the Horus relies
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on a container that stores node addresses and a container that stores node component
occurrences. The repository that features the occurrence of components at nodes essen-
tially corresponds to the local metadata of the service instance repository. Moreover, the
Horus is capable of dynamic component activation/deactivation at runtime. A message
is essentially implemented also as a serializable key-value associative array.
The Whiteboard itself is a specific implementation of an OSIRIS message, i.e., a hash-
table. At runtime there might exists multiple copies of a Whiteboard for the same work-
flow instance. Multiple copies are created whenever a forking activity is migrated (e.g.,
for each parallel activity one Whiteboard is created) which are all merged into one copy
at some join activity.
In general, the global metadata repository as elaborated in Section 4.2.2 (i.e., Algo-
rithms 4.3, 4.4) is implemented with the Repository component that all other containers
of all the other components are subscribed to for pub/sub metadata replication. The
repository component is however usually hosted at one node only, i.e., at the super-peer.
This does not have to be always the case as the global repository can be horizontally
distributed to an arbitrary number of nodes. The Repository component can be parti-
tioned along the separate metadata sets. The only prerequisite is that all nodes know
about the specific locations of the distributed repository components. The Repository
connects all peers by locally accepting and managing all subscriptions. Updates to state
at peers are first issued to the repository where they are locally collected (i.e., updated)
upon which they are subsequently propagated to all other peers that are determined
based on subscriptions and affected by the updates. Hence, the repository accumu-
lates an aspect (e.g., workload) of the execution environment metadata and efficiently
publishes updates parts of it to subscribed peers. Each subscription to the repository is
further associated with a set of predicates that facilitate the reduction of replication data
volumes. For instance, the subscribers can specify the relative change (e.g., 10% in the
change of workload), in data before it becomes a subject of propagation to them. In case
of continuous and frequently changing (e.g., workload) discretization predicates can be
applied so as to map the data to a finite set of discrete values. Freshness predicates (i.e.,
eager and lazy) are also applicable. Subscriptions that feature a lazy freshness predicate
are subject to batching, compression of multiple data items and data propagation in
quiesced state of the system.
The control flow based migration of workflow instances (i.e., the Whiteboards) is
implemented with the Orchestrator component. Next to node component container the
Orchestrator component additionally relies on a container which features local meta-
data, in terms of node workload. The amount of node metadata to be maintained is
naturally determined by the locally available application components and their control
flow dependencies to other ones.
OSIRIS does not only provide pub/sub metadata replication and Whiteboard mi-
gration, which jointly yield a peer-to-peer workflow instance execution. Per default,
OSIRIS also offers of a rich set of distributed workflow management features that have
been added to it over the years. The most important features among many others
include continuous data flow management, semantic execution models and intuitive
workflow definition description etc. The OSIRIS extensions can be best summarized as
follows:
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• OSIRIS-SE. OSIRIS Streaming Enabled enforces the reliability of continuous data
flows by means of the passive-standby approach as introduced in Section 4.1.2. To
this end it introduces a Stream component that in enhanced with (input/output)
data item buffers so as to handle the data streams (i.e., reliable data item send-
ing, ordering of data items etc.) and that implements the algorithms 4.1 and 4.2.
Moreover, OSIRIS-SE additionally features algorithms that improve checkpoint
efficiency for resource limited nodes, i.e., the Coordinated Checkpointing (COC) and
the Efficient Coordinated Checkpointing (ECOC) algorithm. ECOC features coordina-
tion of checkpoints among all downstream service instances which allows for the
omission of the input/output buffers from the checkpoint state. Being the biggest
portion of a checkpoint data payload the omission of buffers yields a significantly
reduced resource consumption of bandwidth and data storage per node.
• OSIRIS-ON. OSIRIS Next enforces the reliability the of control flow by means of
semantic services as introduced in the advanced execution models of Section 4.1.2.
OSIRIS-ON recovers failures of service instances at runtime by means of alterna-
tive yet semantically equivalent activity execution paths. To represent service se-
mantics the symbolic approach based on Description Logics is leveraged. Thereby,
the alternative activity paths are not predefined but are resolved at recovery time
in a forward-oriented and optimistic fashion while preserving the correctness of
execution. To this end OSIRIS-PRO introduces the ON component, that features a
knowledge base for the semantic description of service type functionality. For in-
stance their preconditions and effects etc. Moreover, the ON component features
a set of novel algorithms that allow for the semantic detection of failures and the
dynamic adaptation of the control flow at runtime.
• OSIRIS-PRO. OSIRIS Process applies the programming in the large [DK76] soft-
ware development approach to the description of workflow definitions1. OSIRIS-
PRO introduces a novel programming language that closely resembles, in terms
of intuitiveness and mightiness, to the well known programming language
JavaScript [GM04]. The novel programming language is powered by the Com-
piler component that embeds the Scala [Oa04] programming language interpreter
into it. The embedded interpreter allows for just-in-time interpretation of work-
flow definition code at runtime and thus dynamic insertion of functionality (i.e.,
code) into the components. Hence, OSIRIS-PRO enables the system for dynamic
functionality change of components. Moreover, it adds to workflow dentitions
other programming language constructs such as pointers and exceptions etc. Es-
sentially, these map under the hood to underlying data store and failure recovery
facilities such as the Safety-Ring storage and recovery.
All available components of OSIRIS are wrapped into a thin software stack that is
referred to as the OSIRIS layer and that can be deployed at any peer running the Java
runtime environment (JRE). Thereby, the system components are always lying on top
of the system components and are combined with them (via the Horus messaging) so
1In OSIRIS-PRO terminology, a workflow definition is commonly referred to as a process
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as to support the desired functionality of the application service. Figure 6.2 depicts the
OSIRIS layer architecture.
For instance, if OSIRIS is to be run on resource limited (e.g., mobile) devices or com-
modity hardware, minimalistic variants that contain only the most necessary compo-
nents of the OSIRIS layer can be used. If OSIRIS is to be hosted at powerful compu-
tational cluster nodes or Cloud environment instances, the full fledged OSIRIS layer
containing all the existing components can be deployed. Due to the high modularity
of the its component stack, OSIRIS is open for virtually unlimited application possibil-
ities. That is, depending on the concrete application scenario the right combination of
components merely has to be selected.
6.3 OSIRIS Safety-Ring
In order to implement the advanced concepts of distributed workflow management, as
introduced in Chapter 5, the default OSIRIS framework is extended with a new set of
features. Precisely, the OSIRIS layer is extended with a new set of system components
that put into effect the self-healing and self-optimizing distributed workflow execution
model. These features of the system are embodied with the OSIRIS-SR [PSH13, SS13,
SPS13, SS12, SH12, MS10a], OSIRIS-rSE and OSIRIS-PROs extensions of OSIRIS. While
OSIRIS-SR and OSIRIS-rSE deal with reliability of execution of the control flow and the
data flow, OSIRIS-PROs focuses on service type dynamic hot-deployment. The exact
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contribution of each OSIRIS extension as well as its functional dependency to others is
summarized as follows:
• OSIRIS-SR – The reliable control flow execution feature is implemented with the
OSIRIS-SR extension. OSIRIS Safety-Ring implements as the name already sug-
gests the Safety-Ring concept of Section 5.1.1. Since Safety-Ring is dependent on a
number of fundamental distributed data management concepts OSIRIS-SR imple-
ments a number of general purpose system components so that they can be uti-
lized by any other component as well. As a basis for further extension OSIRIS-SR
introduces the Paxos and the Chord component. The Paxos component implements
the reliable distributed transaction concept of Section 3.3.2 along with all of its al-
gorithms, i.e., Algorithm 3.18 – Algorithm 3.32. In line with the concepts of a sym-
metric replication based Chord distributed hash table of Section 3.1 and Section 3.2
the fundamental Chord component is introduced by OSIRIS-SR as well. Thereby,
the Chord component implements the algorithms 3.1 – 3.7 and algorithms 3.10 –
3.14. To improve the performance of Chord, in terms of data lookup efficiency, for
heterogeneous node environments OSIRIS-SR introduces the Compass component.
The concepts of latency optimal data access, as introduced in Section 5.1.2, are car-
ried out by of the Compass component and its implemented algorithms 5.4 – 5.7.
The Compass component builds upon the Chord component and cannot function
without an underlying Chord ring. Finally, the Safety-Ring component implements
the reliable distributed execution model by applying the Paxos commit on top of
Chord (i.e., Algorithms 3.33 – 3.40) so as to create a scalable, reliable and consis-
tent data store. The Safety-Ring data store is then merged with the control flow by
implementing the algorithms 5.1 – 5.3 so as to ensure it for failures.
• OSIRIS-rSE – The reliable data flow execution feature of OSIRIS-SE is enhanced for
redundancy by means of the OSIRIS-rSE extension. OSIRIS redundantly Streaming
Enabled implements the redundant passive-standby recovery strategy for contin-
uous data flows as introduced in section Section 5.1.3. For this purpose the 2PC
distributed transaction protocol of Section 3.3.2 is needed so as to guarantee con-
sistency of checkpointed data. OSIRIS-rSE implements the 2PC protocol (i.e., al-
gorithms 3.15 – 3.17) with the general purpose system component that goes by
the same name. The 2PC component is open for usage to any other component of
the OSIRIS layer. The redundant passive-standby mechanism is embodied with
the joining the 2PC component and the Streaming component inside the corre-
spondingly named system component. To this end, the Redundant Passive-standby
component implements Algorithm 5.8 along with Algorithm 5.10.
• OSIRIS-PROs – The service instance hot-deployment concept, aiming to improve
throughput of workflow instances, is implemented with the OSIRIS-PROs exten-
sion. Thereby, OSIRIS Process Services bases its implementation on the distinc-
tion between application service types and system service types just as elaborated
in Section 5.2.2. Thereby, application service types are dynamically deployed
by means og the Service Balancer component such that it implements the Algo-
rithm 5.15. Although the Service Balancer component can be used by any other
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one of the OSIRIS stack, it is also an important building block for the reliable con-
trol flow of the Safety-Ring component. That is, only the Safety-Ring improves the
workflow instance throughput with the help of the Service Balancer component.
In terms of system services, only the Safety-Ring has been enabled for dynamic
deployment. To this end, the component Safety-Ring Balancer implements the ring
expansion and contraction algorithms 5.13 – 5.14 with the Safety-Ring component
as its building block. However, the OSIRIS-PROs extension does not only add new
components to the stack. It also modifies the existing ones. Precisely, the Reposi-
tory component is extended for the additional metadata on nodes such as stability,
mobility and latency, as elaborated in Section 5.2.1.
An overview of the extended OSIRIS layer with the new components and their func-
tional hierarchies is shown in Figure 3.15. Note, that although the extended OSIRIS
layer features a significant number of new components, and thus an increased memory
and CPU footprint, it is very unlikely that all of them will be deployed at the same time.
Precisely, we assume that Safety-Ring nodes cannot be active streaming instances at the
same time in practice, i.e., OSIRIS-SR components and OSIRIS-rSE cannot be deployed
simultaneously. Whereas combinations of components of OSIRIS-SR and OSIRIS-rSE
with OSIRIS-PROs are always possible.
Finally, Figure 6.4 illustrates the big picture of the OSIRIS based workflow execu-
tion. As the picture shows OSIRIS fully incorporates the distributed workflow execution
model as discussed in Section 4.2 and in the example pictures Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
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Example 6.1
As illustrated in Figure 6.4 all peers now commonly feature the OSRIS stack, that encom-
passes the application and system services. This means that even the super peer (i.e.,
peer B), which usually only hosts the metadata repository, can also participate to the
construction of the Safety-Ring itself. All the steps of the distributed execution model
are followed through, except that instead of the workflow instance the Whiteboard is
migrated among the peers. Whenever a workflow instance enters the system it is first
sent to the super peer upon which metadata on it is propagated to all peers of interest –
steps 2 - 3. Afterwards, based on control flow precedence order the late-binding of peers
with the Whiteboard is performed in a reliable fashion – steps 4 – 8. That is, each step
between 4 and 8 is considered to be reliable as it goes through the Safety-Ring. In con-
trast to the traditional distributed execution model, the join repository is circumvented,
in letting a corresponding SR-node perform the joining. This is however, inherent to the
reliable distributed execution model of Section 5.1.1.

7
Evaluation
In this chapter, we provide experimental results that validate the concepts of our work.
That is, we evaluate the self-healing and self-optimizing features of our work aimed at
improving the distributed workflow execution model. To conduct the experiments we
first need to define a common execution environment and notation that will be used
throughout all experiments. Then we introduce the baseline system that represents the
current state of distributed workflow management. Once this is established our contri-
butions can be added and evaluated against the base line.
To evaluate the improved reliability of Safety-Ring we will run inside the execu-
tion environment a number of workflow instances that are subjected to random node
failures. Thereby, we will evaluate the Safety-Ring in different SR-node configurations
so as to examine the effects of Safety-Ring on the scalability. Precisely, we will inves-
tigate whether the reliability of Safety-Ring has an affect on the scalability of the dis-
tributed execution model. We will measure the effects of reliability with the throughput
of workflow instances. In theory, with the increase of SR-node numbers the throughput
of workflow instances should be higher and node failures should be recovered faster
yielding again more processed workflow instances. On the contrary, with no Safety-
Ring around, workflow instances should start disappearing. We will increase the size
of the execution environment as well so as to follow up on the scalability investigation.
With more nodes in the environment the Safety-Ring should in theory perform even
better and facilitate throughput due to its scalable architecture.
To evaluate Safety-Ring for node heterogeneity we will introduce nodes of different
hardware characteristics (i.e., CPU and network bandwidth) and of different numbers
inside the environment. We will also upscale the heterogeneous execution environment
so as to investigate scalability of Safety-Ring w.r.t. heterogeneity of nodes. The Compass
extension of Safety-Ring should help to improve throughput of workflow instances in
heterogeneous settings even for the upscaled configurations.
Once, Safety-Ring has been evaluated for reliability and scalability we will evaluate
the workflow engine w.r.t. continuous data flows, i.e., data streams. We use a different
execution environment that is comprised of resource limited nodes only. In this envi-
ronment we will create a continuous data flow that is subjected to node failures. The
majority of nodes will be faulty. Not all of them will actively participate to the stream-
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ing of data as some will serve as backup nodes. By increasing the number of backup
nodes in separate experiments we will investigate whether redundant passive-standby
improves the robustness of the continuous data flow to node failures. Recap, the more
backup nodes are featured by redundant passive-standby, the more robust the continu-
ous data flow should be. We will measure the effects of reliability with the throughput
of data. More reliable settings should yield more transmitted data, as less data items
should get lost due to failure.
Finally, we will evaluate the self-optimization feature of the distributed execution
model. Thereby, we will limit ourselves to the dynamic deployment of application ser-
vice instances only. For these evaluations the same heterogeneous environment will be
used as for the Safety-Ring evaluations. Thereby, we will also upscale the heterogeneous
environment so as to investigate the effects of scalability on our decentralized approach
to dynamic service deployment. Recap, with more nodes at disposal the controllers
should have more variety in selecting optimal deployment nodes. We will measure the
effects of self-optimization with the throughput of workflow instances.
7.1 Basic Experimental Setting
The purpose of this section is define common execution environments that will be used
for the evaluation of the self-healing and self-optimization features. To do so we charac-
terize the execution environment by the number of all participating nodes, the number
of mobile nodes, and the number of faulty nodes. Against this configurable execution
environment a common workflow definition is used for all experiments.
Since our work aims at improving the reliability of the distributed workflow exe-
cution disjointly in the context of the control flow and the continuous data flow (data
streams) we separate our experiments with that regard. For the purpose of evaluat-
ing the contributions of the reliable control flow execution we devise a specific system
setting that is composed of a specific execution environment and a specific workflow
definition. Likewise for evaluating the contributions of reliable data flow of continuous
type we devise a specific experimental setting as well.
7.1.1 Environment for the Control Flow Evaluations
To evaluate the control flow for its dynamic runtime execution behavior we confine all
our experiments to a common workflow definition, a common execution environment
and a common experimental procedure.
Workflow Definition for the Control Flow Evaluations
The sample workflow definition we use stems from the dynamic emergency manage-
ment application scenario of Section 2.3 by mimicking the Disaster Management work-
flow. Figure 7.1 depicts the used workflow definition for the control flow in BPMN nota-
tion, that is composed of eight discrete application services (i.e., A, B, C, D, E, F, G and
H) of different type. Each one of them simulates computations at which some of them
7.1 Basic Experimental Setting 189
are more intensive than others. Two classes of activities with respect to their utilization
of CPU device resources are defined as follows:
• Intensive: Services of this class are significantly more CPU intensive than the ac-
tivities of the other class since they are performing heavier, longer computations.
That is, each invocation of these activities results series of numerical calculations
that simulate real workload and thus create a high CPU load on the hosting node.
The services B, F and G belong to this class.
• Non-Intensive: Services of this class are not as computationally intensive since they
bring less work on the node. That is, each invocation of these services result in
simpler numerical computations that are approximately three times smaller than
the intensive service ones, in terms of their relative execution time with respect to
the underlying computational hardware. The remaining services A, C, D, E and H
belong to this class.
Each application service type is depicted by means of Figure 7.1. Thereby, the com-
putationally intensive services are depicted with bold letters and violet colors, whereas
the less intensive ones are depicted with blue colors. The orchestration system service,
in charge of enacting the workflow definition, is depicted with the green BPMN swim-
ming lane.
Note, that our application services do not involve any meaningful data creation.
Precisely, none of the specified application service produces any meaningful and vo-
luminous data that is shipped along with the workflow instance. Neither is the data
that is produced, i.e., intermediate computational results of the numerical calculations,
written to disk. It is on only kept in main memory during execution. The reason behind
that lies in the fact that data transmission among services is not an optimization metric
for the control flow. As consequence, this workflow definition neglects the flow of vo-
luminous data among application services and is solely focused on the flow of control
and metadata among system services, needed to power them. It is important to men-
tion that voluminous data items that are shipped among discrete application services
would not make any significant difference. In OSIRIS-PRO voluminous data items can
be offloaded to internal storage and references to them used instead inside the shipped
Whiteboards.
Application services that can be invoked in parallel exist within the used workflow
definition, as well. These services are structured into parallel branches that are spawned
by service B and have to be joined at service G. The first parallel branch is composed of
the service C, D and the second of services E, F. The service type D is a primary activity,
whereas F is the secondary activity.
To achieve a true control flow based execution, we spread the services across all
nodes such that no node can perform multiple subsequent activities locally in deploy-
ing only one service per node. Later, with the activation of self-optimizing execution
features this state is subject to change and arbitrary number of services might be dy-
namically deployed at a node. The initial distribution of the first 8 services has been has
been randomly determined and then consequently applied on the other existing nodes
by means of the modulo operator:
Peerid mod |Services|
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Figure 7.1: The workflow definition in BPMN notation for the evaluation of the control
flow.
Moreover, all nodes also feature the orchestration service and all the corresponding
OSIRIS components. However, only one of the evaluation nodes is the super-peer
and hosts all necessary global metadata repositories (i.e., the Repository component)
whereas the other ones are merely subscribers to it.The resulting deployment of ser-
vices for all nodes is summarized by Table 7.1 as follows:
Table 7.1: Services distribution at nodes
Services Peers
Super− peer Peer 0
A Peer 8, Peer 16
B Peer 7, Peer 15
C Peer 2, Peer 10, Peer 18
D Peer 1, Peer 9, Peer 17
E Peer 3, Peer 11, Peer 19
F Peer 5, Peer 13
G Peer 6, Peer 14
H Peer 4, Peer 12
The distribution of other system critical services such as the Safety-Ring functional-
ity is evaluation dependent and shall be discussed in detail in the corresponding evalu-
ation subsections.
Execution Environment
The execution environment we have chosen to run our experiments against is com-
prised of two configurations with 11 or 20 nodes, respectively. In terms of hardware
characteristics, each of the evaluation nodes corresponds to an Amazon EC2 (Elastic
Compute Cloud) virtual device instance. The instance type used in our experiments
is c1.medium1. Note, that the application of the same AWS instance type for all ex-
perimental nodes guarantees equality of hardware characteristics. This way the self-
optimizing and self-healing features of our work can be elicited since there are no over-
powerful nodes to drastically affect the behavior of the system and suppress the effects
of concepts. However, to simulate heterogeneity and volatility inside the computational
1http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/previous-generation/
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environment, such as in the case of our sample high-level application scenario, we in-
troduce different classes of evaluation nodes:
• Static. Static nodes are the plain EC2 virtual instances, which feature moderate
compute (2 virtual CPU cores), memory (1,7 GiB) and moderate network perfor-
mance characteristics (around 100kB/sec).
• Mobile. Mobile nodes are simulated by artificially decreasing the network trans-
mission performance of static nodes. That is, just before a message is sent to the
network socket dummy data of notable size is attached to it such that is signifi-
cantly throttles down the actual transmission capabilities of the node. The dummy
data corresponds to string data structures that are containing randomly generated
number sequences of variable byte size. The precise dummy data size values are
determined by the physical distance towards the destination nodes. Since node
physical proximity is always subject to random change, the dummy data size val-
ues will constantly fluctuate within the limits of 0 - 100kB/sec ms as compared to
the static nodes.
• Faulty. Faulty nodes are simulated by stopping the OSIRIS processes at the static
nodes at a random point in time. The precise stopping moment is determined
by a uniformly distributed random function with that remains within the limits
of 0 - 320 seconds. Each of the stopped nodes eventually rejoins the execution
environment after 60 seconds of waiting time and is again subject to a new random
stop.
Heterogeneity and volatility of the execution environment is thus achieved by config-
uring in separate evaluation runs a certain amount of static nodes to be faulty and/or
mobile. Precisely, a relative proportion of 0%, 25%, 50% and 80% out of all static nodes
can be configured to be mobile and/or faulty. Thereby, only the nodes 6− 11 (i.e., for the
11 node configuration case), and 10− 20 respectively (i.e., for the 20 node configuration
case), will be assigned to be faulty, whereas nodes 3 − 8 (i.e., for the 11 node config-
uration case), and 5− 15 respectively (i.e., for the 20 node configuration case) will be
assigned to be mobile. The detailed node class configurations of the are evaluation de-
pendent and shall be discussed in detail in the corresponding evaluation sub-chapters.
Experimental Procedure
The simple composition of the evaluation workflows is designed to correspond to a
short running execution request issued by a system user for each experiment. Hence,
user requests are mimicked with a queuing model by triggering an instance launch
every t milliseconds. Thereby, the super-peer will solely serve as a measurement and
workflow instance launching node. To elicit the self-optimization features of the system
we will create a significant load on the system, in terms of running workflow instances,
by decreasing t by 15% every minute. For each experiment, we will set the initial t
value to 1,2 seconds which corresponds to 50 instances in the first minute. The load on
the system will be steadily increased for the subsequent four minutes upon which in the
final sixth minute will leave the same load as in the fifth minute and thus create a load
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plateau. In total around 430 workflow instances will be launched against the system
unevenly spread across six minutes. Finally, we will wait further four minutes of catch-
up time to collect the results of lagging instances which might have been slowed down
due to overload and/or failure at nodes.
The exactly chosen load on the system is based on previous experimental experi-
ences. On the one hand, this load setting enables us to create critical situations in the
environment, such as overload at nodes, for respective configurations. On the other
hand, the same load setting is also sufficient to show the effects of the various concepts
our work, such as such as scalability, robustness, self-optimization etc., aimed at over-
coming those critical situations. The metric that we use to measure and analyze the
system execution output for all experiments is throughput.
Workflow instance throughput – denoted as P – measures the number of instances
that have been completed each 30 seconds. Moreover, out of the number of completed
instances we further count the number of unsuccessfully finished ones, i.e., the ones
that have been aborted due to execution problems in the environment. The throughput
metric allows us to quantitatively analyze the effects of the self-healing (i.e., Safety-
Ring) and self-optimization (dynamic service deployment) contributions our work for
the control flow.
Finally, we designate the y axis to the workflow instance throughput value P and
the x axis to the time dimension for illustration purposes of the upcoming experiments.
Whereas each experiment is depicted with a separate line of different color that is la-
beled according to the node configuration inside the environment.
7.1.2 Baseline Evaluation of the Control Flow
In this subsection we show the default system behavior of the control flow execution.
The contributions of our work mainly address drawbacks of distributed workflow man-
agement, in terms of control flow execution robustness and performance. This implies
that more experiments addressing the issues of the control flow have been conducted
than the data flow. The extent of control flow experiments spans two sections of this
chapter. In order to make their results comparable we have to extract the default sys-
tem behavior first. That is why we dedicate the experimental results of baseline system
behavior a separate section, that will be used as reference in the subsequent sections so
as to quantify the gain of our work.
The goal of this experiment is to show the baseline system behavior of the control
flow execution with regard to the output metric P (i.e., workflow instance throughput)
when the system is subjected to volatility and heterogeneity. Precisely, in this experi-
ment we will use 11 and 20 evaluation nodes. In separate runs we will configure the
environment to contain 25%, 50% and 75% of mobile nodes. For a zero mobile node
configuration we will further adjust the environment to contain 0%, 25% and 50% of
faulty nodes in separate runs. Hence, our baseline system configuration space will be
defined by the by the number of nodes N, its possible proportions of mobile nodes M, its
possible proportions of faulty nodes F and this configuration space will be completely
covered in our experiments. The complete list of all evaluated experimental system
configurations is shown in the following table:
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Table 7.2: Baseline evaluation system configurations
Experiment Id Number of nodes
(N)
Number of mobile
nodes (M)
Number of faulty
nodes (F)
Bn11m0f0 11 0 0
Bn11m0f3 11 0 3
Bn11m0f5 11 0 5
Bn11m3f0 11 3 0
Bn11m5f0 11 5 0
Bn11m8f0 11 8 0
Bn20m0f0 20 0 0
Bn20m0f5 20 0 5
Bn20m0f10 20 0 10
Bn20m5f0 20 5 0
Bn20m10f0 20 10 0
Bn20m15f0 20 15 0
Expected Results
The baseline system should yield results that feature a high system performance, in
terms of P. All workflow instances should finish within the extended catch-up time.
The throughput performance of the 20 node setting should be slightly better than the
11 node setting due to the scalable nature of the distributed workflow execution model
and all workflow instances should finish with even less delay. In case mobile nodes are
introduced into the environment, the throughput should slightly suffer as instances that
traverse the mobile nodes will lag behind due to the increased latency and should re-
quire more time for completion. Of course the throughput degradation should coincide
with the increase of mobile nodes in the environment. If faulty nodes are introduced
into the environment, the throughput should severely suffer and should not coincide
with the number of launched instances. This is due to the fact that workflow instances
should disappear together with the faulty node at moment of failure in case they are
late-bound for an invocation. Analogously, throughput degradation should coincide
with the increase of faulty nodes in the environment.
Experimental Results
Figure 7.2 depicts the evaluation results of baseline the system performance w.r.t. P
when faulty nodes are introduced into the system. Precisely, Figure 7.2(a), shows the
number of aggregated workflow instances that have finished per 30 sec for all node
configurations. Figure 7.2(b), shows the number of finished workflow instances per
30 sec for all 11 node configurations. Figure 7.2(c), shows the number of finished work-
flow instances per 30 sec for all 20 node configurations. The results are summarized as
follows:
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Figure 7.2: Workflow instance throughput for with faulty nodes for the baseline
• 11 node setting with failures – As we can observe from the eleven node setting (i.e.,
Bn11m0 f 0) that the maximum throughput performance of the system lies steadily
at around 15 workflow instances per 30 sec (Figure 7.2(b)). Due to the fact that the
computationally more intensive services F and G are deployed only once and they
act as throughput bottlenecks. This means that system manages to linearly process
around 280 workflow instances after 10 minutes of execution time in a failure-free
scenario (i.e., Bn11m0 f 0) which does not meet our expectation. Observe from Fig-
ure 7.2(b) that after the eight minute the P drops to 8 instances per 30 sec due to the
stopped influx of new workflow instances into the system. After one minute the
throughput rises again to the maximum capacity as delayed workflow instances
which are queued at the bottleneck service instances in the system become subject
to subsequent processing.
When failures are introduced into the system (i.e., Bn11m0 f 3 and Bn11m0 f 3) the
throughput significantly decreases as expected. Already with the introduction of
25% of faulty nodes (i.e., Bn11m0 f 3) the throughput declines almost by 50% to
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around 15 workflow instances per 30 sec (i.e., ∼ 170 instances after 10 minutes).
The difference in workflow instances among the two experiments reflects in loss
of them due to a lack of an effective fault-tolerance mechanism by the baseline
system. When even more faulty nodes are added to the system (i.e., Bn11m0 f 5) the
throughput in workflow instances even further increases to ∼ 120 instances after
10 minutes. The difference in 200 workflow instances as compared to Bn11m0 f 0
is also lost due to failure of nodes.
• 20 node setting – When the system is scaled up to 20 nodes the system performs as
expected with regard to throughput. For the failure-free case (i.e., Bn20m0 f 0) we
can observe the benefits of the scalable architecture of OSIRIS. Namely, P doubles
to a steady 30 workflow instances per 30 sec (Figure 7.2(c)) as compared to the
11 node case. Given the increase in service instance number of type F and G the
orchestrator nodes can at late-bing time direct workflow instances towards the
newly added service instances and thus provide load balancing among them. As
a result all workflow instances can be processed by the system after 2, 5 minutes of
catch-up time. The same drop in throughput can be also observed for the 20 node
case once the influx of workflow instances stops. The scaled up configuration the
system manages to resume maximum capacity faster as workflow instance queues
at nodes should be shorter due to higher redundancy of service instance numbers.
Naturally, workflow instances are lost when failures are introduced into the sys-
tem (i.e., Bn20m0 f 5 and Bn11m0 f 10) as well. Moreover, the same proportions of
lost workflow instances are observed as well for this configuration. That is, with
the introduction of 25% of faulty nodes P drops by 50% to 210 workflow instances
(i.e., Bn20m0 f 5), whereas with of 50% of faulty nodes P drops by 50% to 90 work-
flow instances (i.e., Bn20m0 f 10) as compared to Bn20m0 f 5. The only difference to
the 11 node configuration scenarios is that the losses ca be observed more clearly
since after some time a throughput plateau forms, i.e., for Bn20m0 f 5 after 10 min-
utes and for Bn20m0 f 10 after 8 minutes. This implies that no workflow instances
are finished any more after these points in time due to failure. The same observa-
tions can also been observed in Figure 7.2(c) after the minutes 10 (for Bn20m0 f 5)
and 8 (for Bn20m0 f 10).
Figure 7.3 depicts the evaluation results of the baseline system performance with re-
gard to P when mobile nodes are introduced into the system. Precisely, Figure 7.3(a),
shows the number of aggregated workflow instances that have finished per 30 sec for all
node configurations. Figure 7.3(b), shows the number of finished workflow instances
per 30 sec for all 11 node configurations. Figure 7.3(c), shows the number of finished
workflow instances per 30 sec for all 20 node configurations. The results are summa-
rized as follows:
• 11 node setting with mobility – As we can observe from the eleven node setting (i.e.,
Bn11m3 f 0) with the smallest percentage of mobile nodes, mobility has an impact
on P, albeit unexpectedly a very small one. Precisely the average throughput per
30 sec lies also around 15 workflow instances (Figure 7.3(b)) which yields a to-
tal P of 250 workflow instances after 10 minutes of execution time. This means
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Figure 7.3: Workflow instance throughput for with mobile nodes for the baseline
the increase of M by 25% results in a decrease of P by only 10%. This could be
attributed to the fact that the workflow instances we chose do not convey any
meaningful data. Hence, the migration of workflow instances of small data sizes
does not pose a problem for the distributed execution model of OSIRIS.
Unexpectedly, this is even more obvious when the percentage of mobile nodes
is increased to 50%. As we can see the corresponding configuration Bn11m5 f 0
features even a better performance as compared to the Bn11m3 f 0. We believe that
the increase in mobile nodes has slowed down the inflow rate of which workflow
instances at the bottleneck service instances F and G. As a result, the load on
them decreased making it possible to catch-up with the already queued workflow
instances.
As expected with the additional increase of mobile nodes to 80% (i.e., Bn11m8 f 0)
P decreases again but very slightly as well. That is, Bn11m8 f 0 features almost the
same performance as the configuration Bn11m8 f 0. The increase of mobile nodes
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should have decreased the transmission of workflow instances sufficient so that P
decreases again as compared to Bn11m5 f 0.
In general, the same performance drops can be observed around the seventh
minute for the configurations Bn11m3 f 0 and Bn11m8 f 0 as well. Whereas,
Bn11m5 f 0 features a rather constant throughput over the whole evaluation in-
terval. This underpins us in our opinion that the service instances F and B have
been slightly relieved by the reduced transmission rate of workflow instances –
just enough to faster complete the queued ones.
• 20 node setting with mobility – When the environment is scaled up to 20 nodes the
system behaves as expected. P increases to around 30 workflow instances per
30 sec (Figure 7.3(c)) so as to complete the execution of all workflow instances after
2.5 minutes of catch-up time. This is true for all mobile node configurations, i.e.,
Bn20m8 f 5, Bn20m8 f 10 and Bn20m8 f 15. Even the same performance drops can be
observed for the configurations, albeit one minute later as compared to the eleven
node configurations. Although the increase in mobile nodes for Bn20m8 f 10 to 25%
and Bn20m8 f 15 to 80% slightly decreases P this is barely visible on the figure. Just
like in the case of the 11 node configuration we attribute this fact to the omission
of meaningful data within the workflow instances.
We conclude the system to be generally performing as expected with regard to con-
trol flow migration. Simply put, it scales and significantly losses workflow instance in
face of node failure. However, mobility of nodes does not pose a challenge to system
if no voluminous data is shipped around and performance seems to suffer from bottle-
necks for low node configurations if service types are not distributed optimally.
7.1.3 Environment for Streaming Evaluations
To evaluate the continuous data flow w.r.t. its dynamic runtime execution behavior we
confine all our experiments to a common workflow definition, a common execution
environment and a common experimental procedure. The common experimental char-
acteristics are subject to a detailed discussion in the remainder of this subsection.
Workflow Definition for Streaming Evaluations
The workflow definition we use for the evaluation stems from the dynamic emergency
management application scenario of Section 2 and mimics a simple and data processing
chain. Figure 7.4 depicts the used workflow definition. As the figure shows the eval-
uation workflow definition is composed a variable number of activities out of which
there are only three distinct service types, i.e., TestSensor, Intermediate and Sink. Each
one of them simulates continuous processing of data streams such that they differ in
their semantics for the overall data flow. The semantics of each individual service type
are summarized as follows:
• TestSensor – This service type corresponds to the source of the continuous data
flow. That is, only the start activity can precede it. It continuously produces (i.e.,
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Figure 7.4: The workflow definition in BPMN notation for the evaluation of the data
flow.
streams) data items such that the payload of each data item corresponds to its
creation timestamp. The TestSensor service creates data items at a rate of 100 data
items per second that are forwarded to the output stream.
• Intermediate – The TestSensor is followed by an arbitrary number of Intermediate
service types. In terms of business logic, this service type performs simple data
item forwarding and data stream consistency validation. That is, each data item
from the input data stream is simply forwarded to the output data stream. How-
ever, the Intermediate service type also features an internal state that corresponds
to a counter of the currently processed data item. This counter is exploited for the
detection of inconsistencies in the data stream which can occur due to lost data
items. To this end the business logic of the service type indicates the next valid
data item which has to be processed so as to be consistent.
• Sink – The Sink service type concludes the continuous data flow structuring. That
is, only an end activity can succeed it. Moreover, this service types consumes
all data items and detects inconsistencies in a similar fashion as the Intermediate
service type does. The Sink service type additionally validates whether all data
items of the data flow have arrived to it as well.
As Figure 7.4 already suggests multiple Intermediate service types can be added
to the structure of the data flow. Thereby, each Intermediation service type can only
feature one predecessor and one successor as determined by the data flow precedence
order. We limit ourselves in our experiments to two and three Intermediate service type
instantiations which are evaluated separately.
To achieve a true flow of data among the streaming service instances, we spread the
services across all nodes such that no node can stream data items to itself in deploying
only one service type per node. To this end we apply the modulo operator on all peers
as follows:
Peerid mod |Services|
Each distinct outcome of the modulo operator is designated to one service type. We ap-
ply the modulo operator starting from peer one. As usual the zeroth peer is super-peer
which hosts all necessary global metadata repositories (i.e., the Repository component).
In the context of data flow evaluations the supper-peer contains the TestSensor as well.
This implies that all service types except for the TestSensor are redundantly deployed
in the environment. This is along the lines of the passive-standby recovery mechanism
which exploits service instance redundancy for safe of data flow reliability. Depending
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on the number of different Intermediate service types the level of redundancy is going
to vary. Since we apply either two or three distinct Intermediate service types in sepa-
rate configurations our experiments will feature two different deployments of services.
These are summarized by the Table 7.4 and Table 7.3
Table 7.3: Services distribution at nodes for two distinct Intermediate service types
Service Peers
Super− peer Peer 0
TestSensor Peer 0
Intermediate1 Peer 1, Peer 4, Peer 7, Peer 10, Peer 13, Peer 16, Peer 19
Intermediate2 Peer 2, Peer 5, Peer 8, Peer 11, Peer 14, Peer 17
Sink Peer 3, Peer 6, Peer 9, Peer 12, Peer 15, Peer 18
Table 7.4: Services distribution at nodes for three distinct Intermediate service types
Service Peers
Super− peer Peer 0
TestSensor Peer 0
Intermediate1 Peer 1, Peer 5, Peer 9, Peer 13, Peer 17
Intermediate2 Peer 2, Peer 6, Peer 10, Peer 14, Peer 18
Intermediate3 Peer 3, Peer 7, Peer 11, Peer 15, Peer 19
Sink Peer 4, Peer 8, Peer 12, Peer 16
Note, that all nodes also feature the orchestration service and all the corresponding
OSIRIS-rSE components.
Execution Environment
The execution environment we have chosen to run our data flow experiments against
is fairly simple. It is comprised of 20 equally equipped nodes. Each node is an Amazon
EC2 virtual device instance. The instance type used for the data flow experiments is
t1.micro2. Note, that this instance type significantly differs from the c1.medium which
has been used for the control flow experiments. A t1.micro node features only very
limited CPU, memory and bandwidth resources such that they are well suited as mobile
sensor devices. Simply put, a t1.micro node features:
• One virtual CPU of 1.0-1.2 GHz performance,
• Main memory of 615 MB,
2http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/previous-generation/
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• Low permanent storage of 9.0 GB
• Very low network bandwidth performance of ∼ 20Mbs.
Since we are evaluating only the self-healing features of our work only uniformity of
redundant nodes, in term of hardware resource, guarantees elicitation of the conceptual
effects.
Volatility inside the computational environment, such as in the case of the control
flow evaluations, is introduced again by means of faulty nodes. Recap, faulty nodes are
simulated by stopping the OSIRIS processes at the normal nodes at a random point in
time. The precise stopping moment is determined by the same uniformly distributed
random function that remains within the limits of 0− 320 seconds. The faulty nodes
eventually rejoin the execution environment after 60 seconds of breakdown time and
are again subject to a new random stop. Volatility of the execution environment is
achieved by configuring in separate evaluation runs a certain amount of normal nodes
to be faulty. Precisely, all service instances of Intermediate type are configured to be
faulty.
Experimental Procedure
The simple composition of the evaluation workflows is designed to correspond to a
simple data transfer request by some system end-user that lasts over a small period
of time. In the context of the emergency management scenario the simple workflow
corresponds to the scenario in which sensor data produced at firemen is streamed to
the trucks for aggregation purposes. The data stream is thus mimicked by creating a
workflow instance which activates all streaming service instances in conjunction with
their backup nodes in the course of the control flow. Upon activation of the streaming
instances the continuous data flow is initiated and it lasts for six minutes. To this end
the super-peer initiates the workflow instance and serves as the streaming data source
by solely hosting the TestService service type.
To elicit the self-healing features of the system we will enable the faulty nodes once
the continuous data flow has been initiated. From this point forward failures of random
nodes and at unforeseeable points in time can happen. That is, only the service instances
of type TestSensor and Sink are exempt from the failures. As elaborated before the
data source is assumed to be fails-safe and thus it cannot failed. On the other hand, a
service instance of Sink type serves as a measurement and consistency validation node
by counting the incoming data items and assessing them for their order. Hence, it cannot
be failed as well.
Data item throughput – denoted as D – measures the number of instances that have
been completed each 30 seconds at the Sink service instance. The data throughput met-
ric allows us to quantitatively analyze the effects of the self-healing (i.e., redundant
passive standby) contributions our work w.r.t. the data flow.
In separate runs we evaluate D for different workflow settings of encompassed In-
termediate service types. In case we use two Intermediate service instances the work-
flow instance features four active service instances in total at the same time. In case we
use three intermediate service instances the total number of streaming service instances
sums up to five.
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By increasing the number of Intermediate service types we directly expose the data
flow to more volatility. From the tables 7.3 and 7.4 we can conclude that in the case of
5 active service instances more nodes are exposed to random failure. Recap, all service
instances of type Intermediate are set to be faulty, independent of their activity status,
at all times. This implies that for Table 7.4 16 Intermediate service instances are affected
by volatility whereas for Table 7.3 13 service instances are affected.
For each of the workflow structure cases we further vary the number of backup
nodes for each active services from one to three so as to address the volatility with the
redundancy. The node configuration featuring just one node corresponds to the baseline
system output and is used as a reference for our work. Each backup node configuration
is validated by means of a separate experiment.
This implies that out of the 16 failure affected service instances (in Table 7.4) 9 nodes
are directly participating to the data flow (either as active service instances or backups)
for the 2 backup node case and 12 are directly participating to the data flow for the 3
backup node case. On the other hand, out of the 14 failure affected service instances (in
Table 7.3) 6 nodes are directly participating to the data flow for the 2 backup node case
and 8 are directly participating to the data flow for the 3 backup node case. Based on
this numbers we conclude that by increasing the number of active service instances the
data flow is more likely to be affected by node failure.
Finally, we designate the y axis to the data throughput value D and the x axis to the
time dimension for illustration purposes of the upcoming experiments. Whereas each
experiment is depicted with a separate line of different color that is labeled according
to the node configuration inside the environment.
7.2 Evaluation of the Self-healing Execution
In this section we evaluate the qualitative gain of our work with regard to reliability
of the control flow and the continuous data flow via a series of experiments. Thereby,
we exploit the execution environment, in terms common configuration characteristics,
of the baseline system so as to apply our concepts on top of it. Since we provide two
separate solutions for the reliability of the control flow (i.e., the Safety-Ring) and the
reliability of the steaming data (i.e., redundant passive-standby) we separate our exper-
iments with that regard.
7.2.1 Safety-Ring Evaluations
The control flow is supported by means of the Safety-Ring so as to offer reliability.
Hence, we provide in this section quantitative results of the reliability that Safety-Ring
offers in a set of experiments. In case mobile nodes are added to the environment we en-
able the Compass feature of Safety-Ring. The resulting effects of Compass are provided
by means of a separate experiments set.
In this experiment set we will evaluate the system behavior with regard to the execu-
tion output metric P, with the enabled Safety-Ring as compared to the baseline. There-
fore, we will use the same experimental system configurations, however extended with
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another configuration parameter, i.e., the number of SR-nodes. In separate evaluation
runs we will configure the system to additionally contain 50% and 100% of SR-nodes out
of all nodes N. Mobile nodes are omitted from this experiments set. Hence, the com-
plete list of all evaluated experimental system configurations is shown in the following
table:
Table 7.5: Safety-Ring enabled evaluation system configurations
Experiment
Id
Number of
nodes (N)
Number of
Safety-Ring
nodes (S)
Number of
faulty nodes
(F)
Safety-
Ring self-
configuring
(A)
SRn11s5f0a0 11 5 0 no
SRn11s5f3a0 11 5 3 no
SRn11s5f5a0 11 5 5 no
SRn11s11f0a0 11 11 0 no
SRn11s11f3a0 11 11 3 no
SRn11s11f5a0 11 11 5 no
SRn20s10f0a0 20 10 0 no
SRn20s10f5a0 20 10 5 no
SRn20s10f10a0 20 10 10 no
SRn20s20f0a0 20 20 0 no
SRn20s20f5a0 20 20 5 no
SRn20s20f10a0 20 20 10 no
Since Safety-Ring necessitates a certain degree of workflow instance metadata re-
dundancy so as to guarantee availability in the presence of failure, we select a replica-
tion factor of r = 3. This mean that metadata of all workflow instances is replicated on
three different SR-nodes. A higher replication factor guarantees improved robustness
to failures, however it is only applicable environments of higher node numbers. For in-
stance, a higher replication factor of e.g., 5 would necessitate replications to the majority
of nodes inside the environment for the low Safety-Ring node configurations.
Expected Results
The expectation of our experiments towards the Safety-Ring enabled baseline system
is that more workflow instances will be saved from node failure. The throughput per-
formance of the system should be lower due to the overhead of the Safety-Ring. That,
is P should be visibly lower (delayed) as compared to the baseline. This decline in P
should however improve with the upscaling of SR-nodes. Even at 11 nodes the increase
in SR-nodes should yield a better P as load can be shared among them. With the upscal-
ing of the Safety-Ring node to 20 nodes P is expected to be very similar to the baseline
performance.
7.2 Evaluation of the Self-healing Execution 203
 0
 40
 80
 120
 160
 200
 240
 280
 320
 360
 400
 440
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12
W
o r
k f
l o
w  
i n
s t
a n
c e
s
Time (Mins)
SRn11s5f0a0
SRn11s5f3a0
SRn11s5f5a0
SRn11s11f0a0
SRn11s11f3a0
SRn11s11f5a0
Bn11m0f0
Bn11m0f3
Bn11m0f5
(a) Aggregated workflow instances that have fin-
ished
 0
 40
 80
 120
 160
 200
 240
 280
 320
 360
 400
 440
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12
W
o r
k f
l o
w  
i n
s t
a n
c e
s
Time (Mins)
SRn11s5f0a0
SRn11s5f3a0
SRn11s5f5a0
SRn11s11f0a0
SRn11s11f3a0
SRn11s11f5a0
(b) Aggregated workflow instances that have been
aborted
Figure 7.5: Workflow instance throughput for 11 node configurations with faulty nodes
for the baseline and Safety-Ring
In case faulty nodes are introduced into the system, throughput should be visibly
improved due to the Safety-Ring fault recovery. Out of all finished instances a signif-
icant proportion should end with an unsuccessful result (i.e., with an abort) for the 11
node configuration as the environment does not provide substitutions for recovery. Of
course with the upscaling of the system recovery efficiency of Safety-Ring should be
much better.
As compared to the baseline, the system should only exhibit a minimal number of
lost workflow instances due to failure. Only when the system suffers from a simul-
taneous failure of the majority of SR-nodes, belonging to the same equivalence class,
workflow instances can be lost. This is due to the fact that Safety-Ring exploits Paxos
commit for the replication of data items, which in turn guarantees reliability of F given
2F + 1 SR-nodes. In our case this implies that only one SR-node of a equivalence class
is allowed to fail so as to guarantee reliability. Of course the throughput degradation,
workflow instance abortion rates and disappearance numbers should coincide with the
increase of faulty nodes in the environment.
Experimental Results
Figure 7.5 depicts the evaluation results of Safety-Ring enabled system performance
with regard to P of 11 nodes as compared to the baseline. Precisely, Figure 7.5(a), shows
the number of totally finished workflow instances per 30 sec. Figure 7.5(b), shows the
number of totally aborted workflow instances per 30 sec.
• 5 SR-node setting with failures – As we can observe from the Figure 7.5 some un-
expected results are returned when the Safety-Ring is put into play. Firstly, when
only five SR-nodes are activated (i.e., SRn11s5 f 0a0) P increases to about steady
20 workflow instances per 30 sec, which results in a completion of all workflow
instances in eleven minutes. This is somehow surprising as the expectation was
204 Evaluation
for the Safety-Ring to lower the throughput as compared to Bn11m0 f 0. The expla-
nation lies in the fact that Safety-Ring completely forces through the Peer-to-Peer
execution style and does query centralized metadata repositories at runtime. Re-
cap, the baseline has to query the join metadata from the repository at runtime so
as to obtain the join service instance information. In Safety-Ring late-binding of
the join service instances is carried out in a distributed fashion by the SR-nodes
which clearly boosts throughput.
When failures are introduced into the system (i.e., SRn11s5 f 3a0) the system fi-
nally behaves as expected. As compared to the baseline (i.e., Bn11m0 f 3) almost
all workflow instances can be recovered. Thereby, the system manages to complete
all workflow instances after 11.5 minutes, We can also observe from Figure 7.5(b)
that out of the completed workflow instances a certain amount of them had to be
aborted. For SRn11s5 f 3a0 around 80. This is due to the fact that at recovery time
no substitution service instances were present so the workflow instances could not
be late-bound and thus had to be aborted.
When even more failures are introduced into the system (i.e., SRn11s5 f 5a0) be-
haves expectedly, as well. The throughput is the about the same 410 workflow
instances after ten minutes. This high throughput can be explained by study-
ing Figure 7.5(b) which feature far more aborted workflow instances than in the
configurations SRn11s5 f 3a0. Given more faulty service instances more workflow
instances have to be aborted at runtime as well as there are less substitution late-
binding possibilities.
• 11 SR-node setting with failures The same system trends can be observed when the
Safety-Ring is extended to all nodes (i.e., SRn11s11 f 0a0), even there the through-
put is significantly better than the baseline for the same reason of omitted join
repository. However, as compared to SRn11s5 f 0a0, P of SRn11s11 f 0a0 slightly
decreases to about steady 18 workflow instances per 30 sec, i.e., 380 workflow
instances after eleven minutes. We explain this trend with the extension of the
Safety-Ring over to the service instances F and G. These are as already mentioned
more computationally intensive and thus also consume significant local resources.
Although system services such as Safety-Ring are more privileged over the appli-
cation services, in terms of thread priority, the excessive computational require-
ments of F and G make themselves felt when in concurrence to other services.
When failures are introduced into the system the full SR-node configuration (i.e.,
SRn11s5 f 3a0) manages to complete ∼ 390 instances after 12 minutes. The dif-
ference in P among the two configurations can be explained by the fact that in
SRn11s11 f 3a0 also three SR-nodes failed which had to be recovered themselves
before workflow instances could be, thus the delay in throughput. The configura-
tion SRn11s11 f 3a0 features more aborted workflow instances due to recovery of
failed SR-nodes which implies reconfiguration of the Safety-Ring. In the meantime
update of workflow instance state (i.e., Paxos commit writes) at SR-nodes affected
by the reconfiguration is temporarily not possible (e.g., compass table inconsisten-
cies, missing data items at the SR-node) and thus have to be aborted after a finite
number of times.
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Figure 7.6: Workflow instance throughput for 20 node configurations with faulty nodes
for the baseline and Safety-Ring
In case of the full SR-node configuration (i.e., SRn11s11 f 5a0) is subjected to even
more failure the throughput is the about the same (i.e., 410 workflow instances
after ten minutes) as SRn11s5 f 5a0. However, more failed SR-nodes inflict even
more aborted workflow instances (i.e., 80 more) due to the even bigger numbers
of affected SR-nodes with the Safety-Ring reconfiguration overhead at runtime.
As a consequence, even more transactions will not be possible and thus will have
to be aborted.
Figure 7.6 depicts the evaluation results of Safety-Ring enabled system performance
with regard to P of 20 nodes as compared to the baseline. Precisely, Figure 7.6(a), shows
the number of totally finished workflow instances per 30 sec. Figure 7.6(b), shows the
number of totally aborted workflow instances per 30 sec. The results are summarized
as follows:
• 10 SR-node setting with failures – Upscaling the system (i.e., SRn20s10 f 0a0) brings
about the same workflow instance throughput behavior of the Safety-Ring. The
performance of the system slightly improves by one minute (i.e., in total ten min-
utes) to complete the execution of all workflow instances as compared to the 11
node Safety-Ring setting. Thereby, the same drop in throughput (to on average 12
per 30 sec) due to stopped influx of workflow instances can be observed around
the sixth minute as well. However, in this setting the system behaves more as
expected when compared to the baseline. Precisely, P is notably lower (i.e., ∼ 20
workflow instances per 30 sec) than the baseline (i.e., Bn20m0 f 0 – ∼ 30 work-
flow instances per 30 sec) due to the overhead of the Safety-Ring. The fact that
Bn20m0 f 0 significantly outperforms Bn10m0 f 0 leads us to believe that in general
the combination of bottleneck service instances and bottleneck repositories is bad
for throughput whereas just one bottleneck is not given a scalable architecture.
Safety-Ring features no bottleneck entities.
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In face of 25% of faulty nodes (i.e., SRn2010 f 5a0) the system behaves much bet-
ter, in terms of recovery. With the presence of more substitution service instances
the Safety-Ring can recover almost all workflow instances (i.e., 400) after eleven
minutes. Out of the recovered ones only ∼ 10 had to be aborted whereas the
other ones could be successfully late-bound to substitution service instances. We
attribute the aborted instances to metadata propagation either delays or transac-
tional conflicts. The former implies that due to metadata on substitution service
instances was not propagated on time to the SR-nodes such that they concluded
no substitution service to be available. The latter implies, that parallel activities is-
sued transactional updates at the same time thus causing repeated conflicts which
had to be aborted after a finite number of times.
The increase of the percentage of faulty nodes to 50% (SRn2010 f 10a0) brings about
the same performance ,i.e., 410 workflow instances after eleven minutes. Fig-
ure 7.6(b) shows SRn2010 f 10a0 feature a lower P during workflow instance in-
flux time, due higher recovery overhead, but manages to catch-up once the influx
is stopped (i.e., after the seventh minute).
• 20 SR-node setting with failures The same trend can be observed with increase of
SR-node numbers, i.e., SRn20s10 f 0a0. The throughput is about the same as com-
pared with SRn20s10 f 0a0 (i.e., all workflow instances are completed ten minutes
of execution time), although it is slightly lower during the whole course of the
execution. The reason is the same as in the 11 node setting – more SR-nodes are
collocated with the computationally intensive service instances F and G.
Introduction of faulty nodes (i.e., SRn2020 f 5a0 and SRn2020 f 10a0) brings about
the same trends all over again. A majority of workflow instances (i.e., 400 for
SRn2020 f 5a0 and 390 for SRn2020 f 10a0) is recovered after eleven minutes of exe-
cution time due to the availability of substitution service instances. As in the case
of SRn2010 f 10a0 the failure of SR-node entails their recovery first before work-
flow instances can be recovered. As expected for these two settings the abortion
number is visibly higher – 60 for SRn2020 f 5a0 and 85 for SRn2020 f 10a0. Natu-
rally, more failed SR-nodes imply higher Safety-Ring recovery overhead, during
which transactions are more likely to be aborted along with the featuring work-
flow instances.
Based on the shown experiments we conclude the Safety-Ring to be performing as
expected. Simply put, the Safety-Ring provides reliability of the control flow. Even
for small node configurations reliability can be achieved, albeit at the cost of frequent
aborts. Whereas in upscaled configurations the Safety-Ring behaves just as it should. It
recovers the majority of workflow instances at the price of notably reduced throughput.
However, the scalable architecture of it allows for the improvement of throughput with
the increase of SR-node numbers and for small configurations even better performance
than the baseline.
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7.2.2 Compass Evaluations
In this experiment we will experiment with a Safety-Ring enabled system when mobile
nodes are introduced with regard to the execution output metric P. In order to observe
node latency effects on the execution, we will subject all nodes to the Safety-Ring at all
times and omit the faulty ones. In separate evaluation runs for different mobility config-
urations we will enable the Compass extension so as to compare the mobility enhanced
Safety-Ring with the baseline system. Hence, the experimental system configuration set
for this experiment is shown in the following table:
Table 7.6: Baseline evaluation system configurations
Experiment
Id
Number of
nodes (N)
Number of
Safety-Ring
nodes (S)
Number of
mobile nodes
(M)
Compass (C)
SRn11s11m3c0 11 11 3 no
SRn11s11m5c0 11 11 5 no
SRn11s11m8c0 11 11 8 no
SRn11s11m3c1 11 11 3 yes
SRn11s11m5c1 11 11 5 yes
SRn11s11m8c1 11 11 8 yes
SRn20s20m5c0 20 20 5 no
SRn20s20m10c0 20 20 10 no
SRn20s20m15c0 20 20 15 no
SRn20s20m5c1 20 20 5 yes
SRn20s20m10c1 20 20 10 yes
SRn20s20m15c1 20 20 15 yes
Note, that the Compass Table compression algorithm is not applied in the experi-
ments.
Expected Results
The expectation of our experiments towards the Compass is that the workflow instances
throughput will be improved as compared to plain Safety-Ring when subjected to mo-
bility. First of all we expect the system to significantly decrease in performance when
plain Safety-Ring is subjected to mobile nodes. The combination of mobile node traver-
sal in conjunction with the overhead of Safety-Ring should heavily slow down the for-
warding of workflow instances. The Safety-Ring maintenance and enforcement algo-
rithms are rather message and data intensive and should claim significant bandwidth
resources. Thereby, the more mobile nodes we add into the system the higher the de-
crease of P should be. However, the application of Compass should significantly im-
prove the performance of the system, but only compared to the plain Safety-Ring case.
When it comes to upscaling of the system a slightly better performance of the system is
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Figure 7.7: Workflow instance throughput for mobile configurations with Safety-Ring
and Compass
expected as the Safety-Ring overhead should be distributed among the SR-nodes. Com-
pass on top of an upscaled system should also yield an improved performance as more
possibilities for latency optimal path will present themselves.
Experimental Results
Figure 7.7 depicts the evaluation results of Compass enabled system performance with
regard to P for all nodes as compared to the plain Safety-Ring baseline. Precisely, Fig-
ure 7.7(a), shows the number of totally finished workflow instances per 30 sec for 11
SR-nodes. Figure 7.7(b), shows the number of totally aborted workflow instances per
30 sec for 20 SR-nodes. The results are summarized as follows:
• 11 SR-node setting with Compass – As we can observe from the Figure 7.7(a) ex-
pected results are returned when the Safety-Ring is subjected to mobility. Even the
addition of just three mobile nodes (i.e., SRn11s11 f 0m3c0) decreases the through-
put performance of the system significantly. After ten minutes of execution the
system features a performance of P ≃ 320 which is lower by around 50 workflow
instances as compared to a static only system. This fully meets our expectations
due to the message intensive interaction with the Safety-Ring in the course of the
control flow. Precisely, given a replication factor of three (i.e., r = 3) around 30 (as
discussed in Section 3.3.2) messages have to be exchanged among at most 6 nodes
for a workflow instance to be successfully updated, thus the throughput has to
suffer from the reduced bandwidth of nodes. Somehow unexpectedly the activa-
tion of Compass (i.e., SRn11s11 f 0m3c1) does not manage to improve throughput
for the same configuration. We attribute this to the fact that with only three mo-
bile nodes in the environment no meaningful optimal paths could be found just
yet. However, even for this low mobile combinations the activation of the Safety-
Ring pays off, in terms of P, as compared to the baseline (Bn11m3 f 0) due to the
omission of the centralized join repository.
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When mobility in the configuration is increased to five nodes (i.e.,
SRn11s11 f 0m5c0, SRn11s11 f 0m5c1 and Bn11m5 f 0), the system again behaves
as expected. The increased mobility in the system drastically decreases P when
the Safety-Ring is enabled to a sheer 160 workflow instances after ten minutes
of execution. Note, that the baseline throughput performance (i.e., Bn11m5 f 0) is
significantly higher, i.e., P = 280 after the same time span. With the increased
mobility factor to almost 50% almost every Paxos commit transaction must have
been affected by at least one mobile node and thus delayed the execution time.
In this configuration however the benefits of Compass are fully shown. With
the activation of Compass (i.e., Bn11m5 f 0) the performance of the Safety-Ring
is linearly improved to P = 240 after ten minutes of execution time. With more
mobile nodes more optimal path combinations exist which can be discovered by
Compass and consequently exploited at runtime.
The same trends can be observed when the mobility factor is increased to eight
nodes – SRn11s11 f 0m8c0, SRn11s11 f 0m8c1 and Bn11m8 f 0. The baseline per-
formance (i.e., Bn11m8 f 0) remains about the same, albeit slightly decreased to
P = 250 after ten minutes of execution time. The plain Safety-Ring system perfor-
mance (i.e., SRn11s11 f 0m8c0) is similarly low at P = 180. Whereas Compass acti-
vation (i.e., SRn11s11 f 0m8c1) boosts workflow instance throughput to P = 230 for
the same evaluation timespan. Given the even higher mobility in system less static
mobile nodes are available thus less optimal paths can be discovered by Compass
as compared to the five node configuration, i.e., SRn11s11 f 0m5c1.
• 20 SR-node setting with Compass – As shown in Figure 7.7(b) upscaling the system
to 20 nodes brings about the same performance trends. All baseline mobility con-
figurations (i.e., Bn20m5 f 0, Bn20m10 f 0, Bn20m15 f 0) feature similar performances
with the increase of mobility as discussed in Section 7.1.2. Due to its scalable
architecture the Safety-Ring is not affected by mobile nodes in the lower mobil-
ity cases (i.e., SRn20s20m5c0) as it manages to complete all workflow instances
within the designated time of ten minutes. Unexpectedly, the activation of Com-
pass (i.e., SRn20s20m5c1) for even such a small mobility proportion improves the
throughput notably to a ∼ 25 workflow instances per 30 sec. This leads us to
believe that latency optimal data lookup is beneficial for the Safety-Ring even in
predominantly static configuration provided that the system is under heavy load.
Namely, since overloaded SR-nodes are less responsive at runtime they might be
avoided from latency optimal paths by Compass. This why Compass facilitates
load-balancing inside the Safety-Ring even if mobile nodes are not predominantly
included.
Only when the amount of mobile nodes is increased to m = 50% the performance
of the plain Safety-Ring (i.e., SRn20s20m10c0) notably drops for a 20 node setting.
As the figure shows it takes another 30 sec for the plain Safety-Ring to complete
all workflow instances as compared to the designated evaluation time of ten min-
utes. Thereby, the system features a throughput which is about ∼ 15 workflow
instances per 30 sec during the whole workflow instance influx time. Only dur-
ing the catch-up time the system manages to feature a higher throughput which
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is still lower as compared to SRn20s20m10c0. On the other hand, the activation
of Compass (i.e., SRn20s20m10c1) improves again the performance to steady 20
workflow instances per 30 sec which brings it to about the same performance of
the static-only configuration. Almost all instances are completed after ten minutes
of execution time.
Increased mobility results in a even bigger decrease of the plain Safety-Ring (i.e.,
SRn20s20m15c0) as expected. Not even after eleven minutes of execution time all
workflow instances are completed, resulting in a performance of P ≃ 380. The
Compass activation helps to mitigate this decrease by providing a rather stable
throughput performance which yields an almost complete execution after eleven
minutes of execution time.
Based on the shown experiments we conclude the Compass extension of the Safety-
Ring to be performing as expected. Simply put, Compass improves control flow
throughput performance for mobile environments for almost all node configurations.
Thus it helps in mitigating the effects of mobility on the Safety-Ring. It even facilitates
load-balancing in upscaled and predominantly static configurations which are under
heavy load as well. However, Compass does not manage to improve the performance
of the Safety-Ring beyond the mobility induced decrease so to reach baseline perfor-
mance levels.
7.2.3 Streaming Reliability Evaluations
In this experiment set we will evaluate the system behavior with regard to the exe-
cution output metric D, with the enabled redundant passive standby as compared to
traditional one. Precisely, we will deploy 20 t1.micro evaluation nodes. In separate runs
we will configure the workflow definitions to contain either 2 or 3 Intermediate service
types. The latter case implies more volatility on the data flow. For each these Interme-
diate service type case we will configure the active service instances to contain 1, 2 or 3
backup nodes in separate runs. The 1 backup node configuration will correspond to our
baseline. Hence, our evaluation configuration space will be defined by the by the num-
ber of active service instances O, and its possible backup nodes B. This configuration
space will be completely covered in our experiments. The complete list of all evaluated
experimental system configurations is shown in Table 7.7.
Expected Results
The system should yield results that feature a high system performance, in terms of D,
for the 4 simultaneously active service instances. This is in particular true if no fail-
ures are present in the system. When they do occur the baseline setting (i.e., traditional
passive standby) is likely to suffer from lower throughput which will eventually result
in a complete stop of the data flow. With just one backup node, in the baseline sys-
tem, random failure of nodes is more likely to simultaneously include an active service
instance and its backup node. In such situations the data flow should be interrupted
before the system can recover the failures. By increasing the redundancy (i.e., the num-
ber of backup nodes B) the system should be more resilient to random failures. The
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Table 7.7: Data flow evaluation system configurations
Experiment
Id
Number of
active service
instances (O)
Number
of backup
nodes (B)
SEo4b1 4 1
SEo4b2 4 2
SEo4b3 4 3
SEo5b1 5 1
SEo5b2 5 2
SEo5b2 5 3
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5  4  4.5  5  5.5  6A
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (k
B)
 o
n 
Si
nk
 (l
as
t) 
op
er
at
or
Time (min)
#Service instances: 4
SEc4b1
SEc4b2
SEc4b3
(a) Aggregated data flow for 4 active streaming in-
stances
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (k
B)
 c
ha
ng
es
 o
n 
Si
nk
 (l
as
t) 
op
er
at
or
Time (min)
#Service instances: 4
SEc4b1
SEc4b2
SEc4b3
(b) Data flow throughput for 4 active streaming in-
stances
Figure 7.8: Workflow instance throughput for mobile configurations with Safety-Ring
and Compass
throughput improvement should coincide with the increase of backup nodes (i.e., B) in
the environment.
The system performance, in terms failure robustness, should feature the same trends
for the setting with 5 simultaneously activated service instances. Even though the data
flow is more likely to be affected by volatility the same trends should emerge from the
experiments – the more backup nodes the system has the more resistant it should be to
failure. However, the system should in general feature a slightly delayed throughput as
well. The data items originating at the source will be additionally delayed by the added
third service instance of Intermediate type.
Experimental Results
Figure 7.8 depicts the evaluation results of the system performance with regard to D
for 4 simultaneously active service instances. Thereby, Figure 7.8 compares the baseline
with the redundant passive-standby enabled system. Precisely, Figure 7.8(a), shows the
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Figure 7.9: Workflow instance throughput for mobile configurations with Safety-Ring
and Compass
totally aggregated data throughput D per 30 sec. Figure 7.8(b), shows the aggregated
data throughput D per 30 sec.
Figure 7.9 depicts the evaluation results of the system performance w.r.t. D for 5
simultaneously active service instances. Again, the baseline is compared against a re-
dundant passive-standby enabled system. Precisely, Figure 7.9(a), shows the totally
aggregated data throughput D per 30 sec. Figure 7.9(b), shows the aggregated data
throughput D per 30 sec. The results are summarized as follows:
• 4 active service instances – As the Figure 7.8 shows the system behaves in general as
expected when redundant checkpointing of passive-standby is put into play. Even
the baseline system (i.e., SEc4b1) behaves as expected. Caused by node failures,
already after one and a half minutes of execution time the throughput significantly
suffers and reaches almost D ≃ 0 per 30 sec. The baseline system can recover from
these failures and catchup the data transmission of the stream in the course of the
next minute. That is, the throughput is increased to D ≃ 140kb per 30 sec in the
third minute of execution time. However, in the third minute another series of
simultaneous nodes failures occurs instances which effectively breaks down the
data flow for good. After the fourth minute of execution time no more data items
are registered at the sink any more for the baseline system. Thereby, the received
data volume amounts to D ≃ 450kb after six and a half minutes of execution time.
Applying the redundant checkpointing to two backup nodes (i.e., SEc4b2) helps
to improve the reliability of the data flow. The total amount of received data in-
creases as compared to the baseline to almost D ≃ 800kb after six and a half min-
utes of execution time. The system can in this setting (i.e., SEc4b2) even recover
from more node failure situations as observed in the second and fourth minute
of execution time. Namely, at these two intervals the throughput significantly
decreases to D ≃ 25kb per 30 sec which implies failure situations that are recov-
ered eventually. The recovery of the system can be best observed in the third and
fifth minute during which the throughput substantially increases to D ≃ 25kb per
30 sec. This implies that along the lines of the passive-standby recovery the backup
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nodes receive next to the regular data items also the unacknowledged ones which
is results in the increased throughput. However, even for this setting the volatility
in the system, reflected in the faulty node numbers, is too high so as guarantee
uninterrupted flow of continuous data. As this figure shows the SEc4b2 system
configuration also breaks down permanently, albeit only in the fifth minute of ex-
ecution time.
That is why the checkpoint redundancy is increased to three backup nodes (i.e.,
SEc4b3) in the third experiment. This yields again a better throughput perfor-
mance of the system, i.e., D ≃ 950kb after six and a half minutes of execution time.
Thereby, the system features a steady throughput performance of D ≃ 80kb per
30 sec for a long stretch of time that is eventually stopped in the third minute when
failure situations occur. These are however successfully recovered while featuring
a low drop in throughput performance to D ≃ 60kb per 30 sec.
• 5 active service instances – The same trends can be observed in Figure 7.9 when the
chain of streaming service instances is increased by one. As expected the baseline
system (i.e., SEc5b1) eventually fails after having recovered from a series of fail-
ures. In the second (i.e., D ≃ 10kb per 30 sec) and third (i.e., D ≃ 10kb per 30 sec)
minute the baseline system is affected by failures from which it can recover. How-
ever, in the fifth minute the baseline system is damaged beyond recovery ba a
series of simultaneous failures. The longer execution time as compared to SEc4b1
we attribute to the introduced delay by the additional third Intermediate service
type. In total the baseline system managed to transmit the about same amount of
data (i.e., D ≃ 450kb after six and a half minutes of execution time.) as compared
to SEc4b1.
Increase of checkpoint redundancy (i.e., SEc5b2) brings about the same results.
The system can sustain more node failures, transmit more data but eventually
fails. In the experiment of SEc5b2 the system recovers from node failures in the
first (i.e., D ≃ 20kb per 30 sec), second (i.e., D ≃ 5kb per 30 sec), third (i.e.,
D ≃ 60kb per 30 sec) and fourth (i.e., D ≃ 20kb per 30 sec) minutes but fails in
the fifth minute. Thereby, the system managed to transmit about D ≃ 800kb of
data after six and a half minutes of execution time. This is somehow surprising, as
we expected the additional Intermediate service instance to introduce a through-
put delay. We attributed this unexpected throughput improvement to increased
checkpoint frequency by the streaming instances which as consequence reduces
the amount of data items to be resent (in the output buffers) and thus accelerates
the recovery. If more streaming instances exist in the continuous data flow, more
checkpoints will be triggered individually but also due to the coordinated check-
pointing (i.e., ECOC Algorithm of OSIRIS-SE) by the upstream service instances.
Hence, the state at the backup nodes will be freshener, when the failures occur and
thus can faster resume the processing of delayed data items.
Even further increased redundancy (SEc5b2) yields expected results as well. The
system can sustain even more failures and transmit even more data, however
without failing. As Figure 7.9(b) shows the system recovers from notable fail-
ures throughout the whole second (i.e., D ≃ 0kb per 30 sec) minute, in the fourth
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minute (i.e., D ≃ 20kb per 30 sec) and in the fifth minute (i.e., D ≃ 60kb per
30 sec) without failing completely. In doing so the system manages in this setting
to transmit the biggest amount of data (i.e., D ≃ 1mb after six and a half min-
utes of execution time) as compared to all the other experiments. We attribute this
outcome also to increased checkpoint frequency.
Note, that all conducted experiments returned data streams which are fully consis-
tent. That is, in case data items were registered at the Sink service instance they were in
the expected order with no gaps between them.
Based on the shown experiments we conclude the redundancy extension of the
passive-standby technique to be performing as expected and thus beneficial. Simply
put, redundant passive-standby improves the reliability of the system. The more back-
ups nodes the assign the continuous data flow the more robust the system is to simul-
taneous node failures. This is even reflected in an increased overall data throughput by
the system.
7.3 Evaluation of the Self-optimizing Execution
In this section we evaluate the qualitative gain of our work with regard to workflow
instance throughput enhancement via a series of experiments. Thereby, we exploit the
execution environment, in terms common configuration characteristics, of the baseline
system so as to apply our concepts on top of it. Since the throughput of workflow
instances is characteristic for the control flow we provide only experiments on the self-
optimizing solutions for the control flow.
7.3.1 Safety-Ring Elasticity
As described in Section 5.2 the main approach to throughput self-optimization lies in the
dynamic reconfiguration of the environment with service types at underutilized nodes.
To this end we evaluate the dynamic deployment of application service types only.
Given the outcomes of self-healing experiments in the previous section it is obvious
that configuring the system service, i.e., Safety-Ring, to different settings does not signif-
icantly affect the throughput. Rather, in most situations the main cause for throughput
degradation lies in bottleneck application service types. The SR-nodes evenly distribute
their load and to not drag down the throughput. In tun, the bottleneck application ser-
vice instances have queue pending workflow instances at runtime and thus drag down
the throughput. Hence, reconfiguration of the environment with regard to application
service types is the only subject to evaluation in the remainder of this section.
7.3.2 Evaluations of the Dynamic Service Deployment
In this experiment set we will evaluate the system behavior for the execution output
metric P, with the enabled dynamic deployment of application service types. As a base-
line we will use basic system configurations that are enabled with the Safety-Ring. As
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observed in previous experiments SR-nodes enforce reliability and should always be
present in the system. Moreover, when subjected to computationally intensive service
instances they also tend to affect the control flow throughput. In separate evaluation
runs we will configure the system to additionally contain 50% or 100% of SR-nodes
out of all nodes N, which are then individually subjected to dynamic deployment of
application service types. Mobile and faulty nodes are omitted from this experiments
set. The complete list of all evaluated experimental system configurations is shown in
Table 7.8.
Table 7.8: System configurations for dynamic service type evaluations
Experiment
Id
Number of
nodes (N)
Number of
Safety Ring
nodes (S)
Service
type self-
configuring
(d)
DPSRn11s5d0 11 5 no
DPSRn11s11d0 11 5 no
DPSRn11s5d1 11 5 yes
DPSRn11s5d1 11 5 yes
DPSRn20s10d0 11 5 no
DPSRn20s20d0 11 5 no
DPSRn20s10d1 11 5 yes
DPSRn20s20d1 11 5 yes
The threshold evaluation parameters for the optimal forwarding node ranks have
been set as described in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9: Threshold values for dynamic service type evaluations
Threshold
identifier
Threshold
value
Low rank threshold – tshRmin 0.5
Low rank evaluation window size – ωlr 5 sec
Service instance instantiation threshold value – tshlr 3
High rank threshold – tshRmax 0.95
High rank evaluation window size – ωlr 5 sec
Service instance deactivation threshold value – tshlr 0.25
Expected Results
The expectation of our experiments towards the dynamic deployment of application
service types will improve the throughput of the control flow of workflow instances. In
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particular for the 11 node setting we expect that the dynamic addition of service types
should yield better results. The computationally intensive service types F and G have
been identified as bottlenecks, thus the instantiation of service instances should help
the system to offload workload to them. This should in turn notably improve P for both
type of SR-node configurations. In the full SR-node configuration we expect that the
additional redundancy of application service types to potential overload some of the
SR-nodes and as a consequence feature a lower P performance as compared to the 5 SR-
node configuration. With the upscaling of the system to 20 we do not expect a significant
benefit from dynamic deployment of service types. The reason is that the redundancy of
application service types is already grater than one and load will be balanced among the
existing service instances from the beginning. The effects of the dynamic deployment
should manifest themselves at the end of the execution time since the existing service
instances have been overladed first before new ones can be spawned.
Evaluation Results
Figure 7.10 depicts the evaluation results of dynamic deployment enabled system per-
formance with regard to P of 11 nodes as compared to the basic Safety-Ring configura-
tion. Precisely, Figure 7.10(a), shows the number of totally finished workflow instances
per 30 sec. Figure 7.5(b), shows the number of finished workflow instances per per
30 sec.
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Figure 7.10: Workflow instance execution throughput for 11 nodes with dynamic service
deployments
Figure 7.11 depicts the evaluation results of dynamic deployment enabled system
performance with regard to P of 20 nodes as compared to the basic Safety-Ring con-
figuration. Precisely, Figure 7.11(a), shows the number of totally finished workflow
instances per 30 sec. Figure 7.11(b), shows the number of finished workflow instances
per 30 sec.
• 11 node setting – When it comes to dynamic deployment of application service
types we can observe from Figure 7.10 that the system performs as expected.
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Figure 7.11: Workflow instance execution throughput for 20 nodes with dynamic service
deployments
Compared with the plain Safety-Ring configurations (i.e., DPSRn11s5d0 and
DPSRn11s11d0), which serve in this context as baseline, the throughput strikingly
improves for the dynamically deploying configurations (i.e., DPSRn11s5d1 and
DPSRn11s11d1). Already for the five SR-node configuration (i.e., DPSRn11s5d1)
P improves after just one minute of execution time and continuously increases in
the course of the whole execution. Thereby, the average throughput per 30 sec in-
creases to around 27 workflow instances. Consequently, the execution of all work-
flow instances finishes after ten minutes of execution time, which is one minute
faster as compared to the plain Safety-Ring (DPSRn11s5d0) configuration.
When all nodes are equipped with the Safety-Ring service (i.e., DPSRn11s11d1)
dynamic deployment helps to improve throughput as well. Although one minute
later than in the five SR-node configuration DPSRn11s5d1 in DPSRn11s11d1
throughput increases to P ≃ 24 per 30 sec after two minutes of execution time.
In the long run this yields about 420 workflow instances which is about 30 in-
stances better than the plain SR-node configuration (i.e., DPSRn11s11d0) for the
same timespan. Compared with DPSRn11s5d1 we believe that overall throughput
performance of DPSRn11s11d1 is lower for the same reason as DPSRn11s11d0 is
lower than DPSRn11s5d0. Namely, with the instantiation of service instances of
possibly high CPU resource requirements (i.e., service types F and G) at SR-nodes
an overload at the nodes is caused which consequently slows down the control
flow throughput.
• 20 node setting – Upscaling the system yields somehow unexpected results as
shown in Figure 7.11. In this setting, the system does not benefit from dynamic
service deployments (i.e., DPSRn20s10d1 and DPSRn20s20d1) whatsoever, even
worse P slightly suffers as compared to the plain SR-node (i.e., DPSRn20s10d1
and DPSRn20s20d1) settings. Both dynamic service deployments configurations
(i.e., DPSRn20s10d1 and DPSRn20s20d1) feature most of the time a slightly lower
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throughput performance. Only during the catch-up time DPSRn20s10d1 and
DPSRn20s20d1 feature a higher performance, but by then the plain Safety-Ring
configurations (i.e., DPSRn20s10d0 and DPSRn20s20d0) have already processed
most of their workflow instances. However, dynamic deployment does harm
throughput in general as all configurations finish about at the same time,i.e., af-
ter the designated ten minutes of execution time. Only DPSRn20s20d0 takes 30
seconds more as compared to the others. The only visible benefit that can be at-
tributed to dynamic deployment lies with the configuration DPSRn20s20d0 for
which the common performance gap at the sixth minute of execution time is
bridged with a rather steady throughput of P ≃ 20 per 30 sec.
The unexpected lack of benefit we attribute to the already existing redundancy in
the system w.r.t. service instance numbers. Given this redundancy, instantiation
of new service instances is likely applied later in time such that the throughput
cannot be visibly improved any more. In the meantime however the Service Bal-
ancer component constantly consumes local resources in assessing the forwarding
node ranks w.r.t. to activation and deactivation decisions, thus causing the slight
performance degradation.
Based on the shown experiments we conclude the dynamic deployment of service
instances to be performing as expected in general. For small node environments that
feature bottleneck service instances the gain in performance is substantial. Whereas for
upscaled systems that do not feature any bottlenecks the benefits are either not existing
or negligible.
8
Related Work
In this chapter we provide related work in various fields of distributed workflow man-
agement. We structure this chapter in three sections such that each one of them ad-
dresses related work with regard to the concepts elaborated in the Chapters 3, 4 and
5. The first section discusses the related systems, in terms of distributed management
of data, as discussed in Chapter 3. The second section discusses related work for dis-
tributed execution of workflows. The third and final section discusses related mecha-
nisms for fault-tolerance of service types and dynamic configuration.
8.1 Distributed Data Management Systems
This section reviews related work addressing data stores for the management of huge
quantities of data. Recap, the Chord distributed hash table is the main building block of
the Safety-Ring service so as to provide a scalable management of workflow execution
metadata.
When it comes to scalable storage and retrieval of data a plethora of solutions
have been proposed as a part of the NoSql [GHTC13] (Not Only SQL) movement in
the last years: CassandraDB [LM10], SimpleDB [Hab10], DynamoDB [DHJ+07], Megas-
toreDB, [BBC+11], BigTable [CDG+08], MemcacheDB [Fit04], VoldermortDB [SKG+12],
Pnuts [CRS+08], OpenDHT [RGG+05] etc. According to [Edl15] there are over 150
NoSQL data stores as to date.
Although an abundance of NoSQL data stores exists most of them are designed
from the bottom up with the same underlying goal of providing a horizontally scal-
able, highly available, and extremely reliable data stores. Such are the business critical
requirements of their respective creators – e.g., Amazon, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn Yahoo
etc. Just as in the case of the Safety-Ring scalability of the aforementioned data stores is
essentially achieved by means of uniform key range partitioning or consistent hashing
on top of a key-value related data model. However, as the CAP theorem [GL02] man-
dates the aforementioned characteristics of scalable availability and reliability have to
be payed with a price. That price is the sacrificed consistency of the data they manage.
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All of the mentioned NoSQL data stores feature only relaxed consistency semantics (i.e.,
eventual consistency) for the sake of superior availability.
As correct workflow instance recovery cannot be guaranteed from possibly inconsis-
tent back-up data, consistency is a first class citizen in Safety-Ring. In the approaches of
Spinnaker[RST11], Scatter[GBK+11], and Spanner[CDE+12] strong consistency semantics
are not for the trade as well. All of these approaches leverage Paxos for the enforcement
of consistency of the managed data inside groups of preselected peers.
Spinnaker focuses on availability and consistency of data, thus offering competitive
performance, in terms of concurrent read/write operations, as compared to the even-
tually consistent systems. Precisely, Spinnaker leverages an optimized version of Multi-
Paxos [Lam98] for data replication on top of the Zookeeper [HKJR10] distributed peer
coordination service. In line with the CAP theorem, Spinnaker thus trades for partition
tolerance by assuming its application in a single data center only, where the probability
of network partitioning is very low. This in turn limits the scalability of Spinnaker to
one data center only. Spanner offers a similar approach, however it extends the data
store beyond a single data center by providing low-level implementation optimizations
in integrating concurrency control, Paxos replication and 2PC. Moreover, it optimizes
consistency w.r.t. transactional read operations by maintaining multiple versions of the
same data items and offering them to the clients at points in time which are considered
to be consistent. Scatter goes more in the same direction as the Safety-Ring by providing
strong consistency for Peer-to-Peer data management systems. Precisely, Scatter pro-
vides Paxos based replication inside groups. In turn, these peer groups are subjected
to a Peer-to-Peer structural organization (e.g., a Chord ring) that are coordinated in a
consistent fashion among themselves by means of 2PC transactions. This yields a fully
consistent distributed data management system, however at the price of significantly
reduced data operations throughput, i.e., availability.
In contrast to aforementioned strongly consistent and scalable data stores, Safety
Ring trades for availability, as defined by the CAP theorem, by leveraging the fault tol-
erant Paxos commit in conjunction with the Symmetric replication scheme. Those two
building blocks are specifically tailored for reliability of the underlying infrastructure
and are thus neglecting availability of the system as the evaluations of Section 7.2 sug-
gest. We believe however that the underlying scalable infrastructure (i.e., Chord ring)
and the additional data access optimizations (i.e., Compass) help to somehow mitigate
the availability issue. The Safety-Ring data store leveraged for the storage of workflow
instances is a slightly optimized version of the Paxos commit data store as elaborated in
[SRHS10] by slightly reducing the number of exchanged messages.
Other distributed data management systems that imply strong consistency seman-
tics such as the distributed file systems GFS [GGL03], and Apache Hadoop [BGS+11] are
also designed to be operated in more stable execution environments – a single data cen-
ter. Distributed file systems feature master nodes that coordinate read/write operations
for a scalable amount of data resource nodes. Thereby, the write operations are assumed
to be append-only, i.e., once created no data item is changed ever. This goes along lines
of the application scenario of the DFSs, which are big data centers that are constantly
extended with new computational resources. The master nodes are assumed to be sta-
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ble and often have to be manually reconciled in the event of failure which is not possible
for Peer-to-Peer environments.
8.2 Distributed Workflow Management
Although workflow management has been discussed intensively, in terms of the tradi-
tional – centralized – execution model, in Section 1.2 along with the problems associated
to it in Section 1.3, this section is completely devoted to related workflow engines that
apply a distributed execution model. Before we start describing them we briefly de-
scribe how workflows can be formally defined as well.
8.2.1 Related Workflow Formalism
To describe the dynamic behavior of a workflow instance at runtime (i.e., its state
changes) formal state transition systems have to be leveraged There are several for-
malisms such as BPEL4WS [KMW03], BPMN [WG08, VDAHW03, BCPV04], etc. aim-
ing to describe the structural semantics of a workflow definition by means of a
flowcharts [NS73]. However, flowchart based approaches all lack the formal mathe-
matical semantics, in terms of state transition, needed to formally describe workflow
instance behavior at runtime. The Petri-Nets [Mur89, Aal98, Rei13, VDAS11] offers a
well-established mathematical model for the simultaneous representation of workflow
definition characteristics in static (i.e., their structure) and dynamic (i.e., their control
flow) terms.
In using Petri-Nets, the structure of a workflow definition is defined to be a directed
bipartite graph that is composed of nodes and relations among them that reflect control
flow dependencies. Thereby, two types of nodes are distinguished, namely Places (P)
and Transitions (T), that are connected by directed edges, i.e., Arcs. To denote state in a
Petri-Net graph a certain number of tokens is assigned to each place node. The given
distribution of tokens at all places at any point in time thus represents the current state
of the Petri-Net graph from a control flow point of view. The distribution of tokens is
referred to as marking of place nodes.
Workflow definition structures can be represented by means of Petri-Net graphs in
exploiting the transitions for representing the activities and in exploiting the places for
representing the control flow precedence order relations. In doing so, the control flow
semantics have to be upheld by directing the Petri-Net arcs among the nodes so as
to coincide with the precedence order relations. Simply put, a directed place can be
interjected only between two transitions whose mapped activities precede each other
due to a control flow precedence order.
During execution of a workflow instance its state is subject to change. To represent
the change in execution state, Petri-Nets perform redistribution of the tokens among
the place nodes. A transition that features at all of its incoming places tokes is referred
to in Petri-Net terminology as enabled and can invoke its mapping service instance. An
enabled transition consequently fires, i.e., it consumes a token from each of its input
places and produces token at each of its output places, and thus marks its execution
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state advancement. The subsequent firing of enabled transitions represents the Petri-
Net based state transitions.
The Petri-Net model is perfectly suitable for discrete state transitional semantics
such as in the case of the control flow. However, the Petri-Net model does not address in
its basic form neither the subject of data transfer among the transitions nor the continu-
ous liveliness of activities, such as in the case of the data flow. Although the association
of data to the control flow can be accommodated with simple extensions of the basic
model by means of colored Petri-Nets [Jen96], continuous service types are not as simple.
Colored Petri-Nets imply additional color tokens that can be used to encode arbitrary
complex types of data. To represent continuous transitions the time dimension has to be
formally introduced into the basic model by means of Timed Petri-Nets [Zub80, Bow00]
which further entail complex synchronization constructs among the transitions. Timed
Petri-Nets are due to their complexity are over excessive for our simple workflow model
and thus outside the scope of this thesis.
8.2.2 Distributed Workflow Engines
One of the first approaches to distribution of workflow execution is suggested in Ex-
otica/FMQM[AMG+95] where the benefits of scalability are identified early on. Exot-
ica/FMQM goes along the same lines as OSIRIS in migrating workflow instance among
service instances at runtime. In doing so Exotica/FMQM necessitates the provisioning
of workflow definitions at service instances before the execution of its instance even
starts. This implies that the individual activities of the workflow definition are decom-
posed and their hosing nodes supplied with the definitions. Moreover, the invariant
data of the data flow has to be per-distributed as well so as to be able to invoke the
corresponding activities. By distributing invariant data items to specific nodes, run-
time control flow among the instances is implicitly determined at the compilation (i.e.,
build-time) of the workflow definition.
To overcome this rigid approach to late binding AltaVista [BGE99] introduces dy-
namic replication of data among the service instances at runtime. AltaVista features
replication of data flow data items among service instances at runtime through a central-
ized (i.e., master) replication server. Although data propagation via the master server
features simple replication optimizations (i.e., autonomous slave replication servers) it
turns out to be a permanence bottleneck eventually.
Exotica/FMQM and AltaVista are quite different from OSIRIS, even though is has to
analyze the workflow definitions at compile-time so as to obtain the metadata. OSIRIS
features a dynamic data flow by sending the data along with the workflow instance
and selecting the service instances dynamically at runtime based on locally available
metadata.
Agent based approaches of NIÑOS[LMaJ10], DartFlow [CGN97], AMOR[BCF+06],
CEKK [YY07] optimize for the allocation of resources of nodes by avoiding the provi-
sioning of workflow definitions to all nodes. That is they feature smart agents which
posses the entire workflow definitions and resolve their execution paths dynamically at
runtime. The agents also convey the execution data flow along with them. In doing so
agents can also perform semantic path detection (i.e., AMOR and CEKK) for recovery
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purposes. For this to work AMOR relies on metadata repositories on service instance
availability just as OSIRIS at migration time.
Whereas NIÑOS leverages the PADRES [FJLM05] distributed publish/subscribe sys-
tem for the coordination of agents. That is, activity agents located at free service in-
stances subscribe to a workflow instance agent, i.e., process agent – as referred in NIÑOS
terminology. In turn, the workflow instance agent, which is also a pub/sub client, co-
ordinates the execution by publishing the workflow instance to the subscribed activity
agents along the lines of the control flow precedence order. The PADRES framework
carries out load balancing and content-based routing of agent subscriptions through a
network overlay of message brokers in a distributed fashion, i.e., by means of Minimum
Spanning Trees [CLRS09].
JOpera [PA04, HPA05] also features a scalable workflow engine, which can be hori-
zontally and vertically (i.e., by adding new threads to it) distributed at nodes. To power
JOpera a global workflow instance state and environment configuration state is main-
tained at a centralized node. This state is however replicated to across all redundant
engines at runtime in a Peer-To-Peer fashion such that the centrality of the global repos-
itory is alleviated. That is, each workflow engine node locally maintains routing tables
which provide it with information on workflow instance state that is located at other
nodes. This data however needs to be prefetched at runtime from the other nodes be-
fore the invocation of a local activity can take place. In contrast to JOpera, configuration
state is already existent at the orchestrator nodes at runtime, whereas workflow instance
state is not shared through the metadata repository due to the inevitable scalability issue
of it. Similar to OSIRIS, JOpera [BP09, BPA06] also supports continuous service types
within its workflow structures. However, unlike OSIRIS where discrete invocations are
only used to activate streaming service instances, in JOpera arbitrary (interaction) com-
binations of discrete and continuous service types within the structure of a workflow
are possible.
8.3 Self-Healing Workflow Management
This section reviews the aforementioned distributed workflow engines with a particular
focus on the robustness to node failures. Moreover, it discusses related solutions to
node fault-recovery as applied in the Safety-Ring. Finally, it discuses related reliability
solutions in the context of the continuous data flow.
8.3.1 Reliable Control Flow Execution
Already the first distributed workflow engines (i.e., Exotica/FMQM, CEKK) have rec-
ognized the importance of fault tolerance mechanisms for node failures. At that time
the recovery techniques were based on rather simple solutions,i.e., persistent message
queues, that were used to locally store workflow instance state at migration time. This
implies that the recovery solutions addressed failures of temporary type only. CEKK
took the persistent message queues a step forward by enforcing them by means of 2PC
replication to a set of backup nodes.
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Since then reliability of distributed workflow management has come a long way.
The works of [Yu10] extend CEKK with scope managers that oversee distributed work-
flow instance migration by storing backup data. In contrast to Safety-Ring the scope
managers are centralized nodes that do not scale well.
In [Ye06] redundant service instances are equipped with agents that perform moni-
toring and recovery. Although this approach does not rely on centralized nodes, it again
suffers from scalability issues. In the event of active service instance failure, a non-
scalable leader election algorithm has to be conducted among the redundant recovery
agents. On the contrary, in Safety-Ring the service instance is effectively recovered by a
SR-node, and a SR-node is recovered by its successor.
The solutions of [KCS10, JKG09] suggest rollback recovery in conjunction to state
checkpointing for mobile agents. These approaches rather focus of optimizing the
checkpointing frequency for the sake of improved execution performance and do not
consider advanced network failure scenarios, i.e., the backup stores are considered to
be idle.
Musasabi [AUS+09] proposes a similar approach to achieve reliability in Peer-To-
Peer systems. Namely, Musasabi proposes virtual peers, that are composed of multi-
ple redundant ones, that share process state by means of Paxos replication. However,
Musasabi structures the peers by means of the Skip Graphs [AS07] network overlay such
that they are resources they are mapping are close to each other. Given a high load
such an approach would feature an unbalanced load among the peers, as compared to
Safety-Ring where the SR-nodes are evenly loaded.
In NIÑOS the workflow instance agent subscribes to the message flow and can based
on this deduce failure of activity agents. Since control of the workflow instance is cen-
tralized by the manager so is the recovery. JOpera achieves fault-tolerance by periodi-
cally checking the configuration (i.e., routing tables) state among the nodes by pinging
the connected nodes. In case nodes fail the required state for invocation of local activi-
ties is obtained at the global repository. For this to function each workflow engine has
to write its updates to the workflow instance state both to its connected nodes, obtained
through the local configuration state, and the global repository. Consistency of the repli-
cation process is not elaborated in JOpera and the centrality of the global repository still
persists.
8.3.2 Reliable Data Flow Execution
When it comes to reliability of the continuous data flow distributed data stream en-
gines are proposed in literature. According to the works of Aurora [HBR+05] three
general approaches to data streaming reliability are suggested. Namely, the recovery
techniques of active-standby, passive-standby, and as an alternative to passive-standby –
the upstream-backup are suggested. Recap, active-standby features completely redun-
dant data flows at different service instances. Whereas passive standby features pairs
of service instances that share the streaming state by means of checkpointing, such that
one service instances is active and periodically sends state checkpoints to the passive
service instance for backup purposes. In upstream-backup checkpoints are not sent to
a preselected backup node but rather to the upstream service instances. Aurora recom-
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mends the upstream-backup approach as it features the lower backup overhead than
active-standby but better recovery performance than passive-standby.
Aiming for a much higher throughput, in the event of a failure, the Borealis [BBMS05]
streaming engine opts for the active-standby approach. To achieve immediate recovery
Borealis accepts inconsistent data streams that feature gaps, i.e., missing data items. The
inconsistencies are reconciled eventually by temporarily filling the gaps with interme-
diate data items and replacing them with the actual ones as soon as they are available.
Although passive-standby is the most commonly used approach, improved reliabil-
ity in the context of multiple backup nodes, is not very much considered in literature
but before the works of [HXZ07]. In this approach the state of the streaming service in-
stance is split into multiple logical units and then replicated to different backup nodes.
By splitting the state across multiple nodes, it can be retrieved much faster at recov-
ery time by means of parallel queries to the backup nodes. Moreover, checkpoints are
optimally scheduled in time such that the recovery overhead is minimal. On the other
hand, state splitting implies that the consistency of the split sub-states at the remote
nodes can only be guaranteed if the stream processing is deferred (i.e., stopped) until a
checkpoint is successfully finished. That is, in [HXZ07] synchronous checkpointing is
featured. Depending on how fine-grained the redundant state should be, logical units
can be dynamically allocated so as to join/split the streaming instance.
As compared to [HXZ07], OSIRIS-rSE applies asynchronous checkpointing and thus
does not affect stream processing. Assuming that state splitting is possible (or allowed)
due to the nature of the data type that is used to represent it, in OSIRIS-rSE splitting
is not necessary at all. The ECOC algorithm of OSIRIS-rSE substantially minimizes the
checkpointing state volume (i.e., omits the input/output buffers) and is thus efficient
by default.
A similar approach to [HXZ07] is followed in D-Stream [ZDL+12], in terms of redun-
dant checkpoints. The main difference is that in D-Stream metadata on data stream is
check-pointed instead of actual service instance state. This metadata, also referred to
as Resilient distributed datasets – RDD [ZCD+12], is less voluminous and can be used to
efficiently reconstruct the original data stream at runtime. The RDDs can be arbitrarily
fine grained so as to support efficient recovery as well, but they need to be replicated in
a synchronous fashion.
Asynchronous checkpointing of service instance state along with strong consistency
semantics (just as in our case) is achieved in S-guard [KBG08]. S-guard is an extension
of the [HXZ07] project aimed for huge data center application scenarios and features
the same state splitting characteristics. Moreover, it introduces a custom memory man-
agement unit that allows for asynchronous state checkpointing at a stable storage such
as a reliable distributed file system, i.e., Hadoop or GFS. In turn, the DFS provides the
strong consistency semantics of the checkpoints which are executed asynchronously by
the streaming instance. The checkpointing coordinator is made fault-tolerant, just as in
our case, by using rollback recovery on it in the event of its failure.
Even though S-guard checkpointing concept bears a certain similarity to OSIRIS-
rSE it cannot be applied in our case. S-guard offloads the biggest difficulty of the data
flow reliability, i.e., consistency of the backed-up state, to stable storages. These in turn,
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assume unlimited resources so as to achieve their goals, which unrealistic in heteroge-
neous Peer-To-Peer environments.
Finally, in [BP14] alternative approaches to data stream reliability are proposed
which are based on centralized and stable monitoring components in conjunction with
service instance migration. Such approaches are mainly intended for more controlled
execution environments (e.g., Cloud data centers) and thus not applicable to heteroge-
neous P2P environments of OSIRIS.
8.4 Self-Optimizing Workflow Management
This section reviews distributed workflow management with regard to service type hot
deployment. Moreover, it reviews related Chord optimization approaches, that are, just
as Compass, primarily based on distance vector routing techniques.
8.4.1 Chord Optimizations
Since the beginnings of Chord, the need to enhance its core features has been widely
accepted, especially when it comes to applying Chord to dynamic, unreliable and/or
heterogeneous environments such as mobile ad-hoc networks,e.g., MANETs.
The first Chord enhancement techniques, are also based on the idea of assessing
latency among nodes so as to minimize routing times. The approaches based on
Proximity Neighbour Selection(PNS) [CDCR02, DLS+04] and Proximity Route Selection
(PRS) [MWSP08] are the most prominent ones. Thereby, the PNS approach of [DLS+04]
on average outperforms the others with regard to latency and network resource con-
sumption. However, PNS-based approaches are in general based on latency probing of
random candidate peers [MJB05] for the construction of the Finger Tables. This way, the
standard Chord algorithm is significantly altered, and even more, not all possible nodes
are considered for minimal latency paths. Compass instead evaluates all nodes for the
latency optimal paths and complements the Finger Tables only, it does not replace them.
Moreover, PNS approaches are less applicable to MANETs due to the volatile nature of
such environments. For instance, MANETs feature a high and varying data packet loss
rate and significant delays due to collisions and interference among nodes.
Nevertheless, [SGF02] suggested the similarities of Peer-To-Peer environments and
MANETs, expressing the need to combine both, due to the same problems at hand
when it comes to self-organization, scalability and robustness. Advocated solutions
in [SGF02] include, just like in Compass, integrations of Chord with proven networking
protocols such as Distance Vector Routing – DSDV [PB94, Bla00].
The Compass Table convergence process resembles the Distance Vector Routing pro-
tocol which is also founded on Bellman-Ford algorithm for shortest paths computation.
DSDV bases its path destinations computations on nodes and not on key identifiers like
Compass, which are eventually associated to nodes. Moreover, based on the concrete
implementation [Hed88], DVS protocols may posses different distance metrics than la-
tency, for example minimal number of hops again. Finally, in the DVS routing table re-
8.4 Self-Optimizing Workflow Management 227
trieval performance is dependent on the actual node topology which might be in some
cases not scalable as it always is in a ring topology of Chord.
Guided by the aspiration of optimal and scalable content-centric node routing in
MANETs, the various approaches of [FDKC06, MJ07, LWW10, FY09, HGRW06, ZS06,
PDH04] integrate DHT substrates, among others Chord, on top of networking layers.
Commonly, in the works of [MJ07, LWW10, FY09, HGRW06] the routing technique of
the network layer utilized for Chord hops is AODV [PBRD03], which is an implemen-
tation of distance vector routing. For these approaches the Chord Finger Table is con-
sulted first so as to find the next forwarding node. Afterwards the AODV routing tables
are consulted so as to find the optimal physical routes to the next forwarding node.
Compass works the other way around, by consulting the Compass Table first, comple-
mented on top of the default Chord. This way, latency optimal paths are utilized first at
the expense of additional hops as compared to default Chord. In the case of non-existing
optimal paths, our approach always resorts to default Finger Tables.
In [MJ07, FY09] complex random landmarking [WZS04] algorithms are used for the
construction of Finger Tables that comprise physically proximate nodes, which are un-
necessary in our case as physically proximate nodes emerge from latency optimal paths.
Random landmarking differs from the Lipschitz [JL84] approach in assigning the land-
mark nodes dynamically at runtime, whereas with Lipschitz the landmarks are static
and predetermined by expert users.
In terms of network traffic, [MJ07] and [LWW10] mainly focus on minimizing it by
reducing the number of data exchanging nodes to only two, i.e., the predecessor and
the successor. The rest of the ring is learned by overhearing/piggybacking traversing
messages which in the long run yields a much slower optimal path convergence as
compared to the Compass Tables. Mo rover, in [HGRW06] network traffic reduction is
the most important topic and it is achieved by means of multicast messaging of AODV.
An alternative to optimal latency paths that is similar to distance vector routing lies
with Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [JM96] as applied by [FDKC06]. DSR finds the
latency optimal paths reactively, i.e., during route discovery at runtime. In turn, the
optimal paths (containing all optimal traversal nodes) have to be cached at intermedi-
ate nodes in the network. Such an approach is characterized by limited knowledge of
optimal paths (i.e., only the frequently used node paths) and high overhead (i.e.,, the
complete optimal path per destination node has to be stored) at the intermediate nodes.
Moreover, convergence of updated paths is slow given a high ring churn rate.
Self-Optimizing Workflow Engines
When it comes to optimization of the distributed workflow engine, in terms of execu-
tion performance, the main body of work focuses on optimized late-binding. Already
the first distributed workflow engines approaches of [BD00] introduce load balancing
among the service instances at runtime. In doing so, the selection of service instances
is refined by taking into account the dynamic communication costs. Similar to OSIRIS,
in the ADULA [MB11, MB09] framework late-binding of optimal service instances, in
the context of BPEL1 processes, is supported by a performance monitoring mechanism.
1BPEL processes semantically correspond to OSIRIS workflows.
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Thereby, ADULA ensures maintenance of process performance through automated de-
tection of service failures and SLA violations, diagnosis, and repair. The ADULA frame-
work allows for monitoring of process and service performance using lightweight sam-
pling technique and leveraging statistic methods such as Bayesian inference, or statisti-
cal hypothesis testing. Although of similar intention, OSIRIS late-binding is not based
on SLA enforcement and features simpler statistic methods.
Regarding the reconfiguration of the execution environment, with application and
system service types very little work exists in the literature to the best of our knowl-
edge. Not before [LSPF07] the need to dynamically reconfigure workflow engines by
means of autonomic computing model has been recognized in the research commu-
nity. In SOSOA[BBP+11] the general lack of self-optimizing workflow engines bas been
identified and put into a broader context, i.e., self-organization of distributed workflow
engines.
The only notable approaches to dynamic reconfiguration of the workflow engine are
the already mentioned approaches of NIÑOS[GYJ11] and JOpera [HP08]. In a central-
ized approach, NIÑOS proposes the introduction of a feedback loop controller at each
manager agent (i.e., the workflow instance agent) that monitors the load of the opera-
tion agents (i.e., activity agents) such that the instantiations of the operation agents can
be. That is, depending of the monitored load at the operation agents new ones can be
added or underutilized ones removed by the manager agents.
Similarly, JOpera runs its dynamic deployment of workflow engine instances at
nodes on a centralized feedback loop controller. That is global metadata repository
aggregates the configuration state of the whole engine and devises at runtime optimal
configurations with regard to load. These are in turn executed by the local instances
of the workflow engine by adding/removing execution threads from/to it. In con-
trast to NIÑOS, the controller of JOpera is powered by simple policies that allow for
sophisticated and timely configurations of the system and overcome the need for its
manual configuration (e.g., setting threshold values as in our case) by an expert end
user of the system. Moreover, JOpera [PPBB14] redesigns the architecture of tradi-
tional workflow execution engines so as to take full advantage of the modern under-
lying hardware resources, comprising several chip multiprocessors each offering mul-
tiple cores and a large shared memory cache. To this end JOpera additionally intro-
duces self-configuration of the engine upon startup in order to optimize the utiliza-
tion of the available local hardware (i.e., the type and number of available chip multi-
processors) without sacrificing the portability of the engine across different processor
micro-architectures. As a result replication used in conjunction with CPU affinity bind-
ing techniques help increase execution performance of it.
The dynamic deployment of services in OSIRIS is not as fine-grained as it is in the
case of JOpera, i.e., it needs manual configuration at startup. On the other hand, it
encompasses application services and it is completely distributed. Each orchestrator
node can based on local statistics metadata autonomously configure the environment at
runtime. Since the metadata is equally distributed, by the central super peer, and all or-
chestrator nodes are running the same configuration procedure the should come to the
same deployment conclusion. Hence, the dispersion of service types in the environment
should be limited and controlled.
9
Conclusions
In this chapter, we conclude this thesis by summarizing the main contributions of our
work and discuss directions of future work that can improve our contributions even
more.
9.1 Summary
In this thesis we have presented a distributed execution model for workflows that fea-
tures self-healing and self-optimization characteristics. First we have motivated our
work by means of an application scenario (i.e., modern emergency management) that
runs in heterogeneous environment for which we have determined a set of requirements
on an ideal workflow engine. These include conformance for all types and any combi-
nations of service deployments (i.e., continuous and discrete); scalable distribution of
the engine services; reliable execution of the control flow, the data flow and the engine
itself; and finally resource conservation by the services of the engine.
To meet some of the requirements of an ideal workflow engine we have laid foun-
dation for this thesis by defining a formal distributed workflow execution model. The
formal model clearly defines distributed workflows with regard to their structure, run-
time execution behavior and the distributed (i.e., scalable) system that runs them. The
introduced distributed execution model already meets the requirements of service con-
formance, scalability and resource conservation as it is.
However, since the environment in which the engine operates is heterogeneous in its
nature node failure situations have been identified that can critically affect distributed
execution model. To overcome node failures we have presented the self-healing Safety-
Ring system service that provides a novel approach to control flow reliability for active
service instance failures. We have discussed how Safety-Ring constructs a scalable and
self-organizing node overlay (i.e., SR-nodes) with the purpose of active service instance
monitoring and recovery. Since the monitoring node overlay can be used for the recov-
ery of the monitoring nodes themselves, we have asserted the Safety-Ring service to be
self-healing. Moreover, we have described in detail the centerpiece of the Safety-Ring
which is a scalable, reliable, and consistent data store. The Safety-Ring data store is used
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by the monitoring node overlay for the storage of runtime execution state, i.e., workflow
instances and monitoring node assignments. To explain the detailed functionality of the
data store of Safety-Ring, we have provided theoretical background on the applied con-
cepts of the distributed data management such as distributed hash tables (i.e., Chord),
symmetric replication techniques and distributed transactions (i.e., Paxos commit).
Since Safety-Ring assumes rather stable network runtime characteristics, it is not
by default designed for heterogeneous environments. To overcome this issue, we have
extended the Safety-Ring service with Compass data access protocol. With the introduc-
tion of Compass we have highlighted the problems of Chord when applied to mobile
environments in which the network characteristics of nodes dynamically change. We
have shown how latency optimal paths to each node in the environment can be found
and dynamically maintained without affecting the scalability of Chord.
To address the issue of the reliable data flow Safety-Ring is leveraged in the con-
text of discrete service instances. However, data flows of continuous (streaming) ser-
vice instances have to supported by more resource conservative recovery strategies. In
this thesis we have presented how proven techniques for data stream reliability can
be extended for redundancy so as to improve robustness of the continuous data flow.
Thereby, theoretical background on the most common recovery technique, i.e., passive-
standby, has been provided as well. Moreover, we have shown that the increased redun-
dancy does not have to suffer from consistency issues and have provided a consistency
protocol (based on 2PC) that is lightweight enough to be applied in heterogeneous en-
vironments.
With the Safety-Ring and redundant-passive standby extension we have designed
the distributed execution model of workflows for reliability. In this thesis we have
gone a step further in improving the throughput performance characteristics of the
distributed execution model as well. That is, we have presented a novel approach to
dynamic service type deployment inside the execution environment. The presented ap-
proach is based on decentralized controllers which autonomously provision the envi-
ronment service instances with the goals of preventing execution bottlenecks at runtime
and unnecessary deployments – from a resource consumption point of view. Since the
controllers are equipped at any node in the system and can affect any other node of
in system with deployment decisions the distributed execution model is asserted to be
self-optimizing.
Moreover, we have implemented Safety-Ring, passive-standby, Compass and the
dynamic deployment controllers within the context of the OSIRIS distributed workflow
engine. To do so, we have presented the architectural model of OSIRIS and described
how the components of it have been used to implement our concepts.
Finally, the OSIRIS implementations have been subjected to a series of experi-
ments which simulate distributed execution in volatile and heterogeneous environ-
ments. Based on the evaluations we had come to the conclusion that our concepts have
helped to improve the reliability and performance of the distributed execution model.
That is, the reliability requirement of the ideal workflow engine has been successfully
met. Safety-Ring and redundant passive-standby improved the robustness of the con-
trol flow and the data flow to node failures, whereas Compass helped to transfer the
reliability benefits to heterogeneous environments. On the other hand, the centralized
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controllers improved the throughput of workflow instances, albeit for small node envi-
ronments only.
9.2 Future Work
When it comes to future research of our work we propose several interesting directions.
First of all, the costs of Safety-Ring reliability, reflected in reduced throughput, could be
mitigated with the help of batching. Essentially, the number of transactional writes to
the Safety-Ring could be reduced if each SR-nodes would aggregate over time concur-
rent distributed transactions before starting with their processing. Having an overview
over a number of concurrent transactions each SR-node could prevent potential conflicts
by merging parallel workflow instances beforehand and thus save itself the Paxos com-
mit procedure for writes which are destined to be aborted. For instance, if two parallel
activities are trying to migrate to the same join activity the conflict probability of their
corresponding transactions is very high. With batching, one of the concurrent transac-
tions could be stopped (or aborted) while the other one could be admitted for Paxos
commit processing with the already merged workflow instance state. This way the
number of Paxos commit transactions on the system would be reduced and resources
(i.e., bandwidth) at the nodes significantly conserved. In general, workflow definitions
that are characterized by structures of high parallelism (i.e., very many parallel activities
and branches) should benefit from batching as the number of concurrent transactions
would be reduced.
The Safety-Ring recovery mechanism features simple re-invocation of the failed ser-
vice instances. In case the there are substitution service instances to recover the failed
ones the Safety-Ring can only abort the workflow instance execution. Therefore, SR-
nodes could be equipped for semantic recovery of node failures. Having semantical
preference orders at disposal each SR-node could at runtime infer alternative execution
paths recover failures by taking them instead.
Another potential research topic could involve the application of more sophisticate
machine learning tools for our work. Thereby, the decentralized controllers represent
only a first step into research field of artificial intelligence. Currently, all of our self-
optimization features (e.g., Safety-Ring elasticity, application service deployment) rely
on static threshold values that have to be set by expert users of the workflow engine,
i.e., administrators. If the controllers were supported with machine learning tools and
more extensive metadata on the execution environment, configurations of them could
be learned that improve system throughput without the need for human intervention,
i.e., expertise. Distributing such an machine learning approach onto the decentralized
controllers in a scalable fashion would certainly pose another interesting research topic
by itself.
Since the distributed controllers rely on metadata freshness for their decision mak-
ing of service deployments we could facilitate their efforts with more more sophisti-
cated metadata propagation. That is, freshness of the metadata could be improved if
the global metadata repository was distributed to multiple nodes which are physically
closer to subscription nodes. In the context to the modern emergency management sce-
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nario the global metadata repository located at the headquarters could be distributed
to multiple firefighter trucks. Based physical locality the devices at the fireman could
subscribe to nearest firetruck and thus benefit from faster data transmission. In turn,
the trucks would be connected to the headquarters via more powerful data transmis-
sion lines and in conjunction with sophisticated replication algorithms prefetch parts of
metadata that would be of interest to the firemen. At the heart of this approach would be
a distributed and self-organizing tree structure that propagates data in a pub/sub fash-
ion. At the leaf level of such a tree we would repository nodes that maintain and publish
the metadata only on the subscribed nodes of orchestration service type. Whereas at the
inner level we would have higher level repository nodes that aggregate more metadata
(i.e., metadata that reflects all subscribed nodes down the tree) and publish preselected
parts of it to repository nodes at the lower levels. At the root level we would have the
global repository node that aggregates all of the metadata for all nodes in the environ-
ment. Such a repository nodes tree structure would have to dynamically reorganize
itself (i.e., self-organize), in terms of inner repository node numbers (levels), such that
the overall metadata throughput is maximized.
A
List of Acronyms and Symbols
In the following we list a table that summarizes all acronyms and symbols used in chap-
ters 3, 4 and 5. We additionally provide a brief description and the location of each
acronym or symbol.
Acronym/ Explanation Location
Symbol
P2P Peer-to-Peer Chapter 3
KI Key identifier space set Section 3.1
fh Key set parametrized hash function Section 3.1
fn Node set parametrized hash function Section 3.1
K Data items key set Section 3.1,
Definition 3.1
N Nodes set Section 3.1,
Definition 3.1
assign Key set parametrized node assignment
function
Section 3.1,
Definition 3.1
KIP Key identifier space partition set Section 3.1,
Definition 3.2
resp Key identifier node responsibility function Section 3.1,
Definition 3.3
succ Ring topology successor assignment func-
tion
Section 3.1,
Definition 3.4
f n Finger Table node Section 3.1,
Definition 3.6
FT Finger Table Section 3.1,
Definition 3.7
Φ Common data alphabet Section 3.2,
Definition 3.8
DI Data item set Section 3.2,
Definition 3.8
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DHT Distributed hash table Section 3.2,
Definition 3.9
R Replication factor set Section 3.2
R Hash function set Section 3.2.1
SL Successors set Section 3.2.2
EC Symmetric replication equivalence class set Section 3.2.3,
Definition 3.10
symm Key identifier association function of an
equivalence class
Section 3.2.3,
Definition 3.10
DHTs Symmetric replication enabled DHT Section 3.2.3,
Definition 3.11
T Timestamps set Section 3.3
VH DHT version history set Section 3.3
item Transaction item Section 3.3,
Definition 3.13
DTX Distributed transaction set Section 3.3,
Definition 3.14
DHTtx Distributed transaction enabled DHT Section 3.3,
Definition 3.15
2PC Two phase commit Section 3.3.2
Table A.1: Chapter 3 explanations of acronyms and
symbols
Acronym/ Explanation Location
Symbol
sd Discrete service type Section 4.1,
Definition 4.1
fp Business logic function of sd Section 4.1,
Definition 4.1
DST Data stream Section 4.1,
Definition 4.2
SS Internal state set of streaming instances Section 4.1
sc Continuous service type Section 4.1,
Definition 4.3
fc Business logic function of sc Section 4.1,
Definition 4.3
S Service type set Section 4.1,
Definition 4.4
SI Service instances set Section 4.1,
Definition 4.5
WF Workflow definition set Section 4.1,
Definition 4.6
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A Workflow activity set Section 4.1,
Definition 4.6
≺c f Workflow precedence order set for the con-
trol flow
Section 4.1,
Definition 4.6
≺d f Workflow precedence order set for the data
flow
Section 4.1,
Definition 4.6
as Workflow definition start activity Section 4.1,
Definition 4.7
Ae Workflow definition end activity set Section 4.1,
Definition 4.7
WI Workflow instance set Section 4.1,
Definition 4.8
Ac Completed activity set of a workflow in-
stance
Section 4.1,
Definition 4.8
As Subsequent activity set of a workflow in-
stance
Section 4.1,
Definition 4.8
Aa Current activity set of a workflow instance Section 4.1,
Definition 4.8
SIa Set of currently active service stances of a
workflow instance
Section 4.1,
Definition 4.8
SIc Set of traversed service stances of a work-
flow instance
Section 4.1,
Definition 4.8
WIt Workflow instance version history set Section 4.1
fst Streaming service instances state represen-
tation function
Section 4.1.2
so Orchestration service Section 4.2
SIo Orchestration service instance set Section 4.2
H Service host metadata set Section 4.2,
Definition 4.10
SUB Metadata subscriptions set Section 4.2,
Definition 4.11
ρ Global metadata repository Section 4.2,
Definition 4.12
MD Orchestrator metadata set Section 4.2,
Definition 4.13
J Join service instance metadata set Section 4.2.2,
Definition 4.14
Table A.2: Chapter 4 explanations of acronyms and
symbols
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Acronym/ Explanation Location
Symbol
ssr Safety-Ring service type Section 5.1.1
SIsr Safety-Ring service instance set Section 5.1.1
fmt SR-node monitoring assignment function Section 5.1.1
≺sr SR-node successor relations set Section 5.1.1
fwd Workflow instance - data item mapping
function
Section 5.1.1
fdw Data item - workflow instance mapping
function
Section 5.1.1
SRS Safety-Ring Section 5.1.1,
Definition 5.1
CT Compass Table set Section 5.1.2,
Definition 5.2
flat Note latency assignment function Section 5.1.2
CH Checkpoint set of redundant passive-
standby
Section 5.1.3,
Definition 5.3
CTst Stability category set Section 5.2.1
TSHst Stability threshold set Section 5.2.1
ST Stability metadata set Section 5.2.1,
Definition 5.4
M Mobility metadata set Section 5.2.1,
Definition 5.5
fm Mobility distance function Section 5.2.1
LMK Landmark node set Section 5.2.1
fmsr Landmark latency assignment function Section 5.2.1
LV Landmark distance coordinates set Section 5.2.1
LT Latency metadata set Section 5.2.1,
Definition 5.6
flt Latency distance function Section 5.2.1
MDe Extended orchestrator metadata set Section 5.2.1,
Definition 5.7
STATsr SR-node load statistic Section 5.2.2,
Definition 5.8
STATrk Rank statistic Section 5.2.2,
Definition 5.9
Table A.3: Chapter 4 explanations of acronyms and
symbols
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